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History of the 313th Infantry in World War II

United States Army
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HISTORY OF THE 313TH INFANTRY
IN WORLD WAR II
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NORMANDY
6 June to 24 July 1944

★

NORTHERN FRANCE
25 July to 14 September 1944

★

RHINELAND
15 September 1944 to 21 March 1945

★

CENTRAL EUROPE
22 March to 11 May 1945
History of the 313th Infantry
In World War II

By
COLONEL STERLING A. WOOD • COLONEL EDWIN M. VAN BIBBER
CAPTAIN THOMAS L. LYONS • PFC. ROBERT G. DEIHL
FOR THE 313TH INFANTRY ASSOCIATION

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Without a sign, his sword the brave man draws,
And asks no omen but his country's cause.

—HOMER
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(Unless otherwise credited, all photographs in this book by Pfc. Stig Stabe, 313th Infantry)
Foreword

This HISTORY of the 313th Infantry is the result, actually, of a definite policy established early in the career of the Regiment. Col Sterling A. Wood took command in the spring of 1943, and one of the first questions he asked (and he has asked many since) was what was being done about a history of the Regiment. Answers were to the effect that the prospect had not advanced beyond the talking stage. The net result of the discussion was the termination of that stage and the initiation of the next one, i.e., getting something done about it.

Maj (then Capt) Raymond P. Godwin, the Regimental S-2, was given the task of organizing the work. He appointed Pfc Robert G. Deihl as recorder, and Pfc Stig Stabe as photographer. Thereafter a very fine camera was purchased in order that a photographic record of events might be kept, and Pfc Deihl began immediately to write up notes on the history of the Regiment as it had unfolded itself up until that date.

Deihl continued this work until the Regiment went overseas, when it was necessary to leave his accumulated manuscript behind, for security reasons. And, due to the pressure of business (!) in Normandy and elsewhere, there was little time or opportunity to establish the proper cultural surroundings appropriate to literary composition. The mere fact that Deihl was able to transcribe the entries on the Regimental log into a cohesive narrative at all, is a tribute to his industry and ingenuity.

With the end of the war came increased opportunity for work on the history. The breaking up of the Division interfered, of course, but plans were made whereby this obstacle could largely be transcended. Capt Thomas L. Lyons, the last S-2, volunteered to give his free time, after his return to the States, to the furtherance of the work. He and Deihl planned to go into conference with the Infantry Journal Press in Washington, D. C., whose policy on unit histories made the publication of this book possible. It is the spirit of loyalty and self-sacrifice of these two that deserves the gratitude of us all.

The book has been written by various people, which largely accounts for its non-uniformity of style. It is not intended to be a literary masterpiece, however, and I am quite sure that none of its authors have the "best seller" lists in mind. The purpose of this history is merely to entertain the ex-members of the Regiment, and to aid in their reminiscences, both spoken and unspoken.

Signature

Colonel, 313th Infantry
Commanding
HISTORY OF THE 313TH INFANTRY
IN WORLD WAR II
Chapter 1: Preparation

A N ORDER, under the heading of General Orders No. 1, dated June 15, 1942, Camp Pickett, Blackstone, Virginia, filtered down through channels from Regimental headquarters to the various officers concerned. To the battalions and companies it went, bearing its official news. It was signed "Paul C. Paschal, Colonel, 313th Infantry, Commanding," and contained, in three short paragraphs, the following information:

1. ACTIVATION OF 313TH INFANTRY. Pursuant to directive contained in General Orders No. 42, Headquarters Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Maryland, June 2, 1942, the 313th Infantry is activated at 12:01 A.M., June 15, 1942.

2. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. Pursuant to directive contained in Special Orders No. 42, Headquarters Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Maryland, June 2, 1942, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Infantry.

3. APPOINTMENT OF STAFF. The following appointments to the staff, this headquarters, are announced:

   EXECUTIVE OFFICER
   Colonel Charles W. Hanna
   0-10348, 313th Infantry

   ADJUTANT (S-1)
   Captain Phil Lofink
   0-256100, 313th Infantry

   INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (S-2)
   1st Lieutenant Frederick L. Grant
   0-372476, 313th Infantry

   PLANS & TRAINING (S-3)
   Major Clair B. Mitchell
   0-19889, 313th Infantry

   SUPPLY OFFICER (S-4)
   Captain Stewart S. Lawrence
   0-278087, 313th Infantry
   (Signed) PAUL C. PASCHAL, Colonel, 313th Infantry, Commanding

With the signing and subsequent delivery of General Orders No. 1, the 313th Infantry officially came into being. An active and energetic youngster it was, indeed. Born, as we shall soon see, not with the proverbial silver spoon to feed from, nor with a palatial home to live in. No, life for the new arrival was not so easy, as well the Regimental commander and the officers under his command already knew.

True, the machinery for building the Regiment was already in place and ready to go—at least on paper. In Special Orders No. 1, dated June 15, 1942, Camp Pickett, Blackstone, Virginia, and signed by the newly appointed Regimental S-1, Capt Phil Lofink, the names and serial numbers of all officers assigned to the various organizations within the Regiment were announced.

Assigned to Regimental headquarters were the Regimental commander, Col Paul C. Paschal; the Executive officer, Col Charles W. Hanna; the Adjutant, (S-1) Capt Phil Lofink; the Intelligence Officer (S-2) 1st Lt Frederick L. Grant; the Plans and Training Officer (S-3), Maj Clair B. Mitchell; and Chaplains, (Capt) Lemuel T. Fagan, (1st Lt) John J. Dinneen and (1st Lt) Alfred P. Lam.

Lt Maynard C. Miller was assigned as commanding officer of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, with a staff of officers comprising 2dLt Raymond P. Godwin, 2dLt George E. Meyers and 2dLt John B. Mathews.

The commanding officers of the other special units were assigned as follows: Service Company, Capt Stewart S. Lawrence; Cannon Company, 1st Lt John B. Timmons; Antitank Company, Capt Augustus H. Bode; and Medical Detachment, Maj Robert B. Rodman.

Lt Col Frank J. Lawrence was assigned battalion commander of the 1st Battalion. His staff comprised Maj Dewey J. Willis and 2dLt James G. Wilson.

The commanding officer of Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, was Lt Philip E. Coleman. His staff included 2dLts Vincent T. Burns, Lardman E. Altman and Charles H. Whitler.

The commanding officers of Companies A, B, C, and D were, in order: Capts Carl S. Porter, Albert F. Moore, John W. J. Buckley, and Cornelius H. Yates.

Lt Col Louis W. Eggers was placed in command of the 2d Battalion. His staff included Major Robert Outsen and 2dLt Robert E. Egbert.

1st Lt Wilbur G. Earnhardt was appointed Commanding Officer of Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, and his staff included 2dLts Theodore W. Russell, Brian V. DuMonde, and Joseph J. DeSelma.

Companies E, F, G and H were commanded, in order of mention, by Capt Harold L. Ewensizer, 1st Lt Stephen D. Butscher, Capt Roy V. Porter and 1st Lt George E. Monroe.

In the 3d Battalion Lt Col Julian C. MacMillan was assigned as Battalion Commander. His staff comprised Major Edwin M. Van Bibber and 2dLt Louis J. Drakos.

Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, was commanded by 1st Lt John A. McConnell. His staff included 2dLts E. W. L. Manifold, Thomas L. Lyons, and Clay W. Shaw.

The remaining companies within the Regiment, Companies I, K, L and M were commanded in order,
by Capt Joseph P. Windham, Capt Curtis J. Swarens, 1st Lt Louis E. Wheeling and Capt Tillman E. Boyd.

Over seventy officers aside from those appearing here were likewise assigned to their various posts within the Regiment.

So it was that with the issuance of General Orders No. 1 and Special Orders No. 1 the new 313th Infantry Regiment officially got under way. Big things were contemplated, and there was every reason to believe that big things would develop as time passed. Certainly important events were being planned for the regiment by its commander, Col Paul C. Paschal, and no one who knew Colonel Paschal doubted for a moment that he had the necessary qualities to successfully complete those plans. Though small in stature, Colonel Paschal vividly impressed everyone with whom he came in contact as a man of tireless vigor and firm determination. His very presence commanded immediate respect from officers and enlisted men alike. To him, over and above any other consideration, credit for the successful formation and early training of the Regiment is due.

Col Paul C. Paschal knew his job. His background as a student of military affairs was extensive. He attended the United States Military Academy at West Point from 1910 to 1914; The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1923; The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1924; and The Army War College, Washington, D.C., during 1928 and 1929. His subsequent assignments, over a period of years, are indeed noteworthy. He was appointed to the War Department General Staff for a term extending from 1931 to 1935. Transferred from there to The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1935, he served as an instructor until 1939. Following this he was assigned as instructor at The Army War College, Washington, D.C. Shortly thereafter, during 1940 and 1941, he served as Commanding Officer of the 38th Infantry. From there he returned to teaching, having been assigned to the Reserve Officers Training Corps, University of Kentucky, as Professor of Military Science and Tactics.

It was with this extensive background and training that Colonel Paschal assumed command of the 313th Infantry. Being thoroughly informed himself, he believed firmly in adequate preparation and training for both his officers and men.

Preceding the actual activation of the Regiment, this very policy had been followed. Before either the 79th Division or the 313th Infantry was officially activated, intensive training (although condensed for purposes of speed) for officers of the Division had been carried out. On April 3, 1942, Maj Gen Ira T. Wyche, Commanding General of the 79th Division, accompanied by a staff of twenty-two officers, reported at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for a one-month course of training conducted for "Officers of New Divisions." One month later General Wyche, accompanied by his staff, proceeded to Camp Pickett, Virginia, where the job of organizing the Division got under way.

Similarly, a special division school was conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia, designed to prepare regimental commanders and their staffs for the job ahead. Reporting at Fort Benning on April 13, 1942, Colonel Paschal and a staff of thirty officers representing the 313th Regimental staff, and comprising battalion commanders and their executives, company commanders of all units and companies (with the exception of Cannon Company which was not then in existence) attended a thirty-day course of training, preparatory to activation.

The course of instruction at Fort Benning had a double purpose. It not only served to thoroughly acquaint all of the officers with the nature of the work to come, but equally served to acquaint them with one another. The secret of a smoothly working organization lies every bit as much in a friendly and understanding spirit of cooperation as it does upon a knowledge of the work at hand. The month of special training at Fort Benning accomplished both.

Consequently, on May 13, when the course of training was over, a friendly and well informed staff accompanied Colonel Paschal to Camp Pickett, Virginia. Now the task of forming the 313th Infantry was at last to begin.

Many questions presented themselves to the minds of one and all as the train sped northward from Fort Benning to Camp Pickett. What would the new camp be like? No doubt about it, it was a new camp. Of this they had already been informed. But how far along had the construction of barracks, etc., proceeded? Completion of the camp was promised by the contractors no later than June 15, 1942, the official activation day. But suppose the contractors were running behind schedule?

The contractors were behind schedule.

The arrival at Camp Pickett was undoubtedly as gloomy a day for Colonel Paschal and his staff, as it unquestionably was for the thousands of new recruits that were to begin to arrive some thirty days later.
The entire camp was a sea of mud. Completed roads were few. There were no walks, and in many of the buildings, no electricity. Many of the more important buildings were far from completed, some were not even begun. The surrounding grounds were littered throughout the entire area with sardine cans, half-empty lunch boxes and bits of once edible food thrown indiscriminately about. There were no screens on the doors of the buildings, and the flies had multiplied to the extent of constituting a real menace. It was a sad situation indeed.

But where there’s a will there’s a way. No time was lost in getting things organized. Colonel Paschal and the Regimental staff began immediately to set up the machinery necessary to conduct the official business of the regiment. Typewriters and office equipment were procured and work begun.

During the first few days after arrival at Camp Pickett, only those officers who had attended the division school at Fort Benning were on hand to further the initial work of organization. Day by day, however, new officers arrived and reported for duty. The majority of these newer officers reporting were recent graduates of the OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia, and were now about to receive their first practical experience as commissioned officers. Most of this group had entered the service immediately after Pearl Harbor, and had since that time come up from the ranks. In time of war, promotions for men showing aptitude and ability is rapid. The need for officer material is great, and as soon as men could be found who could qualify as officer candidates they were sent before a board of officers who would determine their eligibility. If accepted by the board they were sent to an officer candidate school where they received training, and, if they qualified, were graduated as commissioned officers in the Army of the United States.

As the new officers arrived for duty, they received further instruction from members of the 313th Infantry staff who had attended the special division school at Fort Benning. In this way every officer became thoroughly familiar with his job, knowing what was expected of him and what had to be done.

About the same time the first new officers were reporting for duty, Major Van Bibber, who at that time was assigned to the staff of Headquarters, 3d Battalion, was designated to greet a cadre of noncommissioned officers arriving by train from Camp Gordon, Augusta, Georgia, on May 15. A group of approximately one hundred noncommissioned officers comprised the cadre. Most of the men were Army men with at least two years’ service. They were fully trained specialists, knowing their various jobs well.

Much responsibility was to rest in the hands of these noncommissioned officers. Not only would they be invaluable in assisting their commanding officers in the difficult task of getting things organized, but equally, it would be their task to assist the newer officers in making first-rate soldiers of the recruit material which would arrive some thirty days later.

Major Van Bibber greeted the newly arrived cadre at the Camp Pickett railhead and welcomed them to the 313th Infantry. They were then assigned to their proper stations. Some were assigned to Regimental headquarters, while others were assigned to the various units and companies. Too much cannot be said, not only for their untiring work in helping to prepare the way for the official day of activation, but also for their service at a later date when the recruits arrived.

Before the end of May virtually all of the officer and noncommissioned officer personnel of the 313th Infantry had arrived at Camp Pickett. The work of organization moved forward rapidly despite many obstacles. It was said at the time that neither the contractors nor the workmen, busy attempting to complete the new camp, were particularly happy about matters. And this was not difficult to understand. From the day Colonel Paschal and his staff first arrived at Camp Pickett, until the day completion of the camp was an assured fact, neither workmen or contractors had any real peace. The Army literally lost in getting things organized, but others were assigned to the various units and companies. Too much cannot be said, not only for their untiring work in helping to prepare the way for the official day of activation, but also for their service at a later date when the recruits arrived.
tenant Grant and 2d Lieutenant Egbert, was called. On the night of the meeting Lt Colonel Eggers arrived carrying a well wrapped package.

"I thought, gentlemen," he exclaimed, "that it could do no harm and possibly a great deal of good if plans for the new club were formulated in an assured atmosphere of levity and good cheer."

"Well, open the bottle and stop wasting time with a lousy speech," interjected Major Van Bibber.

After the drinks those present officially appointed themselves the first Board of Governors. The first business (as near as those present could recall) concerned the design and construction of a bar. Major Van Bibber, an old hand at such things, was placed in complete charge of drawing up the plans and designing the masterpiece, which was to include a game section. Lieutenant Grant was placed in charge of construction, and the board unanimously voted him the authority to secure whatever materials would be needed.

At a date following not too far on the heels of the first official meeting of the assembled Board of Governors, the bar was completed according to specifications and plans. Along with it, and having priority over it, the bigger job of preparing for the official day of activation moved ever nearer to a successful conclusion. All in all, it was through a combination of cooperative effort on the part of all concerned—of a firm and unrelenting determination to see the job through—and, yes, of a sense of humor—that finally got the job done.
Chapter 2: Camp Pickett

June 15, 1942 was a hot and sultry day in Camp Pickett. It had been raining for several days and although the sky was finally clear and a hot sun shone above, the ground below was a wallowing mass of Virginia mud.

All too soon activation day had rolled around. Camp Pickett was on this day to open its doors to the first new recruits. In some miraculous way building construction had proceeded to the point wherein accommodations were assured for the thousands of new arrivals. There was still much to be done by way of completing the camp, but things were far enough along that the men could move in on schedule.

79th Division Headquarters had prepared extensively for handling the new arrivals. Not far from Camp Pickett was on this day to open its doors to the first new recruits. In some miraculous way building construction had proceeded to the point wherein accommodations were assured for the thousands of new arrivals. There was still much to be done by way of completing the camp, but things were far enough along that the men could move in on schedule.

79th Division Headquarters had prepared extensively for handling the new arrivals. Not far from the Camp Pickett railroad, a Division Casual Detachment had been set up. There officers from Division Headquarters and the various regiments within the division were assigned to specific jobs incident to handling the men as they filed in. Captain Ousen and Lieutenants Lyons, Mazur, Manning and Bowling were appointed to the 79th Division Casual Detachment from the 313th Infantry. Captain Ousen was given the temporary post of Commanding Officer of Casual Company No. 4, while Lieutenant Lyons was assigned as Personnel Officer.

The plan for handling the new recruits was as effective as it was simple. After arrival at Camp Pickett the new men were to be transferred by truck to the 79th Division Casual Detachment. Here they would remain for approximately twenty-four hours. During this time they were to be given inoculations for typhoid, tetanus and smallpox, shown a sex-morality motion picture and given a sex-morality lecture by an Army medical officer. In the meantime the process of classifying the men to their permanent companies and stations would be going on, and after classification the men would then be marched to their newly assigned "home."

Two trainloads of troops arrived on June 15. To them went the honor of being the first arrivals. Traffic was speeded up thereafter until, in the course of a single day, as many as 2,000 men filed through the Casual Detachment and on to their permanent stations. In approximately two weeks, 15,000 men had been received and classified.

To most of the new recruits the experience of arriving at Camp Pickett was not a happy one. To be sure, the outsider would never have known this for the men took their arrival in good stride, reluctant to show their inner feelings. When banded together among themselves, however, it was more than evident that their morale was pretty low. Instinctively they seemed to dislike the thought of having been assigned to the Infantry. More, on first sight, they disliked the appearance of the camp. In short, they disliked the whole deal. The mud, the camp and the regimentation that was already being imposed.

"God," said one private to a group of buddies on that first evening, "Infantry! Why, that's the toughest life and the toughest branch of service in the whole damn Army. I can tell you now, brother, this is the beginning of the end as far as I'm concerned."

"Wish I could have made the Air Corps," said another.

The attitude of gloom and despair was destined to pass into the nowhere from whence it came once the men became adjusted to their new life. But you could hardly blame them for feeling as they did in those first days. Fresh from civilian life they had suddenly found themselves a part of a strange and vastly different world. All in the course of a few days or weeks they had been run through the gigantic treadmill of Army induction—a treadmill designed to change men by the millions from civilian to Army life.

Selective Service was in full swing now. Everywhere the business of inducing men into Uncle Sam's Army was proceeding smoothly. The whole process, from the first Army physical examination to the eventual assignment at a permanent station, usually required only a matter of from five to ten days. There was no guesswork this time. The mistakes of the first World War constituted ample grounds for constructive and profitable changes in the new induction system. Each man was now classified according to his intelligence and ability. The Army's WD AGO Form No. 20 held a complete and accurate record of each man's age, education and experience. More, the final results of the Army's IQ tests were individually listed thereon.

There was no doubt about it: The soldier of World War II was far better off than the soldier of World War I. His country was giving him the best that money could buy, and the amount being spent to insure his welfare and safety was virtually without stint or limit. Take, for example, the soldier's clothing. The old Army gag about having only two sizes, "too large and too small," no longer could be called even remotely factual. From the smallest to the largest, every effort was being made to secure the indi-
vidual soldier a correct fit. His wardrobe, although lacking the variety of color and individuality of his civilian attire, was nevertheless complete and adequate in every detail.

The new inductees arriving at Camp Pickett were fully aware of this. They knew too that the Army had been pretty darn swell up to now. At the induction stations the food had been the best ever. The barracks were clean and roomy. Shower facilities had been excellent. Army life had been more of a lark than anything else.

But all of that changed as the trains brought the new recruits to the railhead at Camp Pickett. From that moment forward a new and strenuous existence was to begin. Gone were the days of easy living in ideal surroundings. Life was now destined to be tough. Men used to luxuries were now to have few luxuries or none at all. Men used to freedom were now to know the full meaning of regimentation.

The trains arriving at the Camp Pickett railhead came from far and wide. Recruits sent to join the 79th Division had been shipped from the induction centers of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Service Commands. And that covered a wide range of territory. These new arrivals were coming from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Missouri, Mississippi, Ohio, West Virginia, Indiana, Kentucky, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Kansas, Iowa, and Minnesota. Pennsylvania had the largest representation, but it was not difficult to see that the 79th Division as a whole was to be represented by a goodly portion of the whole United States.

The first recruits assigned to the 313th Infantry, having "run the gantlet" at the Division Casual Detachment, began the march toward the regimental area. Barracks bags in hand, or slung over unharden shoulders, they trudged along. The mud was thick and deep. Unsteady feet stumbled and slipped. Men, totally unaccustomed to strenuous living, pant ed and puffed. The two-mile hike seemed endless. Conversation, at first light and humorous, dwindled to a stubborn silence by the time the long line of weary recruits reached its destination.

"Com-pan-ee, Halt!" echoed the stern command.

The men halted.

"Right, Face!"

A feeble attempt was made to execute the command.

"At ease. Rest. You may smoke if you have 'em."

That was all that was needed. Barracks bags dropped like so much hot lead. The men did likewise. Cigarettes were lighted and conversation began.

"Wonder what it'll be like," said one GI.

"Take a look around, bud. This is home," said another.

"Good Lord, the mud!" said a third.

And so it was, day after day. For two weeks the new recruits continued to arrive. At the end of the second week the quota for the regiment was practically filled. Every company within the regiment was approximately up to required strength.

The first few weeks at Camp Pickett were never to be forgotten. They were weeks of getting acquainted and of making new friends. They were weeks of adjustment to infantry life. They were hard weeks, filled with plenty of work and strenuous elementary training. Drill hours were long and tiring. Noncoms barked orders. Company commanders welded the newly arriving personnel into a composite whole. Details worked day and night—cleaning windows, policing the grounds, building roads and sidewalks. In record time order replaced confusion.

Miracles do happen. By the end of two weeks the difference in the appearance of the camp, as well as in the attitude of the men, was almost startling. It didn't take long for the original outlook of pessimism to change. A spirit of competition began to emerge within the ranks. Men took pride in the appearance of their barracks and of their company area. Squads and platoons vied for supremacy in executing the manual of arms. Teamwork replaced a "don't care" attitude during drill hours.

Infantry life wasn't so bad after all.

And the camp itself didn't look so bad by this time, either. As a matter of fact, it looked pretty swell. The barracks, two-story structures designed to house seventy-five men each, were comfortable and roomy. Ample shower and toilet facilities were available in the barracks. The men slept on cots, and were issued a mattress, two blankets, sheets, a pillow case and pillow. Laundry service was poor at first but improved later. In the early days after activation often two weeks or more elapsed before the laundry returned, and when it arrived everybody usually had someone else's clothing. In the meantime, shower rooms and GI brushes worked overtime cleaning fatigues and other equipment.

The post exchanges were open for business from the time the first recruits arrived. But there were
definite disadvantages. The buildings were none too large and were always overcrowded. Proper cooling facilities for soft drinks and beer were not available. The supply of beer was often scarce. Soldiers, after a hard day's work, usually stormed the PXs at the earliest opportunity hoping to get the first few cold ones. Thereafter the beer was habitually warm, but while it lasted sales were nonetheless assured.

The motion picture theaters were large and adequate, although no air conditioning had as yet been installed and on hot nights you had to literally sweat it out. First-run pictures were shown, however, and even on the hottest of hot nights the attendance was always good. Bus service was excellent, and whenever the chance presented itself the men would obtain a pass for a weekend or an evening in nearby Blackstone, Farmville, or Crewe. Richmond, Virginia, was a much-to-be-desired weekend spot, too, and if the bankroll permitted the average GI usually headed in that direction. Fifty per cent of the regiment was allowed on pass at any given time, and no more than fifty per cent at any one time. For this reason weekend passes were always in demand. If you weren't restricted or gigged, you could usually plan a weekend every other week.

But what of the training program?

June 29 was the date set for the beginning of a comprehensive training period. Up to now training had been confined to the more elementary phases of Army instruction. The men had been taught how to drill and how to execute the manual of arms. They had received class instruction on military courtesy and discipline, sex morality, and subjects pertaining generally to the conduct and duty of the soldier.

But it was now time to undertake the fundamentals of infantry fighting. It was time to begin the long and difficult job of basic training. In a modern world at war with weapons combining the knowledge and skill of scientific progress the training of the individual soldier and of a fighting unit became a highly complex affair. No longer could the old methods apply. The old idea of "Johnny get your gun, take it on the run" simply didn't suffice any more. It was now a matter of many months of study as well as hard training, followed by many more months of coordinated and applied training in the field.

The training program outlined for the 79th Division and for the regiments within the division was complete in every detail. Taken in its entirety, it was to require well over a year of concentrated training, which was destined to be followed by many additional months of actual field application. It was to cover a cycle of training for all units divided into four separate parts, or periods. The first period was to stress individual training, known as basic training, or the MTP (Mobilization Training Program). The second period was to cover unit training and was designated as the UTP (Unit Training Program). The purpose of unit training was to teach the individual soldier to cooperate and function smoothly with the rest of his unit. It was to stress the value and necessity of teamwork and was to prepare the way for the third and more difficult phase of training to be known as the CTP (Combined Training Program). The fourth period of training was outlined as "Final Preparation For Combat," and involved exactly what the term implied. Both the third and fourth periods were to be more or less run together, for both had the same ultimate end in view. Taking the training program as a whole, its objective involved the eventual maintenance of a complete state of readiness for combat of both individuals and units.

The first period of training, the basic training, or the MTP, was scheduled to require thirteen weeks. This was the phase of training that was now due to get under way. Beginning as it did on the last of June, both officers and men looked forward to a hot time of it. The month of June had been warm enough at Camp Pickett, even though training had not been too intensive. Now, to contemplate a greatly accelerated training schedule during the month of July was enough to send beads of sweat rolling down sunburned faces.

But climate or weather could not be considered as grounds for taking it easy. There was too much to be done. Training memorandums, drawn up by the Regimental S-3, Major Clair B. Mitchell, and subsequently sent to the various units and companies, made this fact all too apparent. In the thirteen weeks to follow, mobilization training was to cover what appeared to be everything in the book. The program called for individual tactical training for the soldier, marksmanship, range firing, night operations, marches, motor movement and maintenance, nomenclature of the rifle, hand grenade, bayonet, hasty field fortifications, chemical warfare, first aid, field sanitation, map and compass reading, technical and tactical employment of units, orientation in night combat, camouflage, hasty entrenchments, shelter, obstacle course and others.
To be sure, this extensive training was not to be undertaken all at once. One thing at a time would be scheduled so that by the end of the thirteen-week period all subjects listed under the first period of training would have been covered.

It would require a book in itself to attempt to give a detailed account of training, week by week. It is not our purpose to undertake any such involved task here. In this history we can only hope to pass in review, as it were, and hit the high spots.

Dante’s Inferno was mild in comparison to Camp Pickett in July 1942. The sun beat down unmercifully. The mud of May and June was now a thick layer of heavy dust. Except during periods of instruction, when the men were permitted to sit in shaded areas while classes were conducted, training proceeded as usual in the scorching sun. During those days more than one soldier fell by the wayside. There were frequent cases of heat prostration and a few cases of sunstroke during the hottest days. Memorandums were issued advising all personnel of what to do in case heat prostration or sunstroke occurred. Caution was taken to change drill hours on the hottest days so that the long periods of marching would be over before the sun became too hot.

But it was not entirely a matter of sweat and grime and tired aching feet in those early July days of mobilization training. On July 3, 1942, an event of historic significance took place in which the entire 79th Division participated. July 3 had been set aside as dedication day for Camp Pickett. The date was to coincide with the anniversary of the charge of General Pickett’s men at the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863. Camp Pickett Stadium, scene of the dedicatory ceremony, was jammed to capacity. Every unit in the division was on hand. The 313th Infantry marched in dress parade to the stadium grounds where they took their assigned places in the long rows of stadium seats. It was a big affair and a memorable day. Many distinguished personages and speakers were present.

As a part of the ceremony, Lt Col J. D. Brewster, who commanded the 304th Engineers in the old 79th Division of World War I, presented the Division Colors to Maj Gen Ira T. Wyche, Commanding General of the newly activated 79th Division. The Division Colors were originally adopted in November 1918, shortly after cessation of hostilities. Lt Colonel Brewster’s address in donating the Division flag and the address by General Wyche in accepting the emblem will long be remembered. The men of the reactivated 79th Division felt keenly the challenge and inspiration the occasion signified.

Other distinguished speakers at the dedication included Col D. John Markey, Commanding Officer of Camp Pickett; the Honorable Colgate D. Arden, Governor of the State of Virginia; Maj Gen Milton A. Reckord, commanding the Third Service Command; Brig Gen William R. Dear, commanding the Medical Replacement Training Center; and Capt Mark C. Fox, Area Engineer, who supervised the construction of the camp.

At exactly 3:10 P.M. a cannon shot marked the seventy-ninth anniversary, to the day and the hour, of the charge of Pickett’s men at Gettysburg. Eleven members of General Pickett’s family were present at the services, naming the huge camp in his honor.

As a humorous sidelight to the occasion, many soldiers will remember the “green paint” incident. In preparation for the big day, painters had repainted the long rows of stadium seats. They had been painted in ample time, but rain and inclement weather had prevented the paint from drying entirely. Consequently, as the men arose at the conclusion of the ceremony, soldiers (and officers) by the thousands were surprised to find a generous layer of green paint on the posterior region of their khaki trousers. It was a long time before the last remnants of the unwanted green hue disappeared.

Throughout the entire month of July and well into August the weather remained miserably hot. But the stiff training schedule continued nonetheless. Despite the heat, frequent conditioning marches were carried out. The men were not required to hike too great a distance at first. Distances were to be increased as training progressed. In the first marches during July and August the men carried only light combat packs and arms and seldom hiked more than eight miles at any one time. But eight miles under a hot Virginia sun was quite enough for the men, who made the most of their allotted ten-minute breaks during each hour of marching. After the march ended, feet were inspected by an officer and cases of blistered or swollen feet were immediately treated by the medics.

In the early days of training at Camp Pickett, company commanders watched the progress of the new recruits closely. The noncommissioned officers were required to report to the company commander regarding the men in their squads or platoons. If a man was slow to learn, he was given special instruction. If he seemed to lag behind for physical reasons, fre-
quent check-ups were made. If he showed special ability and aptitude, he was promoted.

Promotions were looked forward to and sought after by the men. A spirit of keen competition was always prevalent in the ranks. The men were anxious to get ahead. If a man applied himself he was usually rewarded. One of the favorite slang expressions of the enlisted men was the term "bucking" which simply implied that a particular soldier had his heart set on promotion and was doing all he could to further his cause. If he was doing well he was referred to by his comrades as being "on the ball."

Because of the great need within the Regiment for competent noncommissioned officers, promotions were granted as rapidly as possible. As soon as company commanders were assured that a particular soldier had proven his ability to lead other men and had the necessary qualities essential to handling the work to which he was assigned, he was promoted. In the space of only a few months' time certain enlisted men had advanced all the way from private to the grade of sergeant. Promotions were granted, of course, one grade at a time. As early as July 1, 1942, only fifteen days after activation, the first enlisted men were promoted. According to the records, Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, was the first company to apply for the promotion of certain enlisted men from that company. In a company order signed by the Commanding Officer, 1st Lt John A. McConnell, a group of nine privates were granted promotion to privates first class.

The nine men were Arnold Hanna, Kenneth Mitch­ell, Howard Bezdol, John Culton, Richard Dennis, Jr., Frank Muir, Fred Schivicardi, William Simpson and Nick Vasnick, Jr.

But to return to the training program. Notable among the various types of training during July 1942 was the chemical warfare training. There was no way of being certain that the enemy would refrain from using gas in World War II. Consequently every pre­caution was taken to insure the individual soldier of being properly informed regarding gas and chemical attack. Classes of instruction were held covering in detail the types of gases, care and proper use of the gas mask, and first aid in case of exposure. Following this instruction, every man in the Regiment was re­quired to go through the gas chamber. Before actually entering the chamber, however, light charges of different types of gases were set off so that the men could learn from first-hand experience the nature of the gases. Certain gases have distinctive odors, and when a charge would be exploded the men were questioned regarding the type of gas that had been released. Following this, every man filed into the gas chamber, which was nothing more than a small building filled with tear gas. He was required to enter by holding his breath and once inside to adjust his mask properly on his face. If a man failed to get his mask on properly and on time, it was just too bad for the individual concerned. Eyes watered and violent coughing was the immediate result of error, although no permanent physical damage resulted from exposure to the tear gas. More than one GI was too slow in adjusting his gas mask and the lesson he learned was not soon to be forgotten.

The obstacle course was a unique feature of training. Its purpose was to train the soldier to move forward quickly and without mishap, despite obstruc­tions in his path. The Camp Pickett obstacle course was situated in a wooded area to the left of Range Road. Day after day, units and companies marched to the area for a workout on the course. And what a workout it was! No Coney Island roller coaster, complete with breath-taking dips and zig-zags, could hope to duplicate the feats involved or the difficulties encountered during a run-through of the course. To begin with, the soldier was confronted by three hurdles, or fences, the first of which was two feet high, the second four feet high, and the third seven feet high. After jumping and scaling these the soldier was confronted with a latticework of logs over which he was forced to run. Next an eight-foot board fence appeared in view. After climbing the fence and jumping down on the other side, he ran for a brief distance and jumped across an improvised pond. Beyond this lay a dugout into which he jumped, only to jump out again as he ran along. A sewer pipe, large enough for a man to crawl through, was next. Ahead of this was a pond, approximately seven feet across, over which he jumped (he hoped) by means of a heavy rope sus­pended from a tree limb overhead. Next appeared two parallel logs which had to be foot straddled. An­other wall appeared, which the soldier scaled by means of foot ladders. As a final obstacle the soldier scaled a fifteen-foot wall, jumping to the ground on the opposite side after attaining his high perch. With the exception of a few men who were either too heavy or who lacked sufficient stamina, the course provided a real kick. Teams and individuals would compete with one another to ascertain which team or man could run the course in the shortest time. At all times,
the running of the course was supervised by an officer. 

Undoubtedly a most important phase of training during July and August was the range firing. The actual firing, of course, was preceded by weeks of study of the weapons to be fired, plus long periods of dry-running, which was nothing more or less than going through the motions of firing without actually using live ammunition. The familiar phrase "simulate, lock and load" was heard so frequently that it threatened to become a nightmare to the men. Certainly by the time the actual range firing began every move involved in the correct firing procedure was automatic and second nature. The soldier was required to know his weapon thoroughly. He was taught its various parts and then instructed how to disassemble and assemble it. To insure his knowledge of this procedure he was even required to accomplish the task blindfolded.

The weapons used in modern infantry warfare are many. Training, of necessity, has to be thorough. The broomstick days which had preceded and followed the attack on Pearl Harbor in training camps throughout the country were long since over. No longer did Uncle Sam's soldiers need to train with inadequate weapons or with no weapons at all. From the very beginning of the first period of training (which was then only slightly over six months after Pearl Harbor) American industrial genius had made available the best weapons and equipment.

A vast arsenal of newer, better, higher-powered arms replaced much of the older and obsolete equipment. From the smallest arms to the largest and heaviest weapons, important changes had been made. In the lighter arms, for example, the new M1, caliber .30 Garand rifle was widely used. The Garand was a semi-automatic, gas-operated gun firing eight rounds at far greater speed than the bolt-action Springfield. The carbine, a new, light, and effective weapon weighing only slightly over five pounds, fired fifteen rounds at approximately the same speed as the Garand. It was an accurate weapon used by both officers and enlisted men and was deadly at distances up to three hundred yards.

Before actually firing on the ranges, personnel of the Regiment familiarized themselves with the use of live ammunition by firing the small but accurate caliber .22 rifle. The firing was done on a 1000-inch range, which duplicated in miniature the conditions to be met on the 200-, 300-, and 500-yard ranges at a later date.

Finally, during the latter part of July and early August, range firing began. Every available man in the 313th Infantry was required to fire the caliber .30 Garand rifle for qualification, and was given a few practice rounds of fire with the caliber .30 Enfield, Model 1917 and the caliber .30 1903 Springfield rifles. Certain picked men from the various units and companies fired the BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), the Thompson sub-machine gun and the heavy machine gun, caliber .30.

The actual firing on the range proved to be a thrilling experience for the men. Instinctively a soldier likes to shoot. He knows from the very beginning that the rifle is his greatest protection in combat. Consequently he learned to know his weapon thoroughly and took pride in his marksmanship.

The men were long since tired of the many weeks of preparatory training and were more than glad to have a first chance to try out their weapons with live ammunition. They felt confident of themselves, and they now knew all of the requirements a good rifleman should know. They knew how to adjust their rifles for windage and elevation, knew the correct sight picture, and had learned to squeeze their shots so that the rifle would hold steadily to the target until after the shot was fired. Now they were going to have a chance to see how good they actually were.

To spend a day on the firing range of a large infantry camp is a real experience. At Camp Pickett, on the 200-, 300-, and 500-yard ranges, a total of fifty-five men could fire simultaneously on each range. The men would fire from various positions—prone, sitting, kneeling, or standing. They would fire rapid or slow fire as required. In slow fire the soldier was given as much time as he desired to fire a specified number of rounds. In rapid fire he was timed. In other words, he was limited to a given number of seconds to fire a required number of rounds of ammunition. During the rapid firing exercises the sound of many rifles firing simultaneously produced a deafening roar, and had the enemy been out in front of the concentrated fire few indeed would have survived the experience.

When not firing, the majority of the men had their turn in the pits. The pit detail men were the ones who took care of the targets and who, by the use of a flag and target-marker system, informed the firer of his score. Pit detail work was an interesting (and tiring) experience. The targets were manipulated by hand and on order the men would push them up or down as
necessary. An inter-communicating telephone system between the firing line and the pits served to coordinate the firing order. The pits were well constructed and were deep enough to insure protection from the bullets whizzing by overhead and the pit details were glad enough for this protection when the sharp zing of a caliber .30 bullet was heard.

The 313th Infantry as a whole did very well on their first firing. The scores were unusually good, and only a small percentage had difficulty in qualifying. The preparatory training served well and proved its worth when the chance to fire presented itself.

There were no casualties reported within the Regiment as a result of the range firing at Camp Pickett. This was attributed largely to the fact that range discipline had been drastically enforced by the officers in charge. Range officers were doubly careful that all rifles were inspected and cleaned before a soldier could leave the firing line, and while he remained on the firing line, his rifle had to be pointed at all times toward the targets. If a soldier forgot himself and pointed his rifle in a wrong direction, it was just too bad for the soldier. He was immediately disqualified.

About the time range firing at Camp Pickett was reaching its final stages, the first hot rumors of an early move from Camp Pickett began to circulate. By this time the camp was beginning to feel like home to both men and officers. The Officers' Club had been in operation for some time and frequent Friday dances were held for officers, their wives and guests. The enlisted men felt more at home too. Dayrooms, at first barren and empty, were now well equipped with comfortable lounge chairs, tables, lamps, and in some cases even a piano. Games and ping pong tables were evident also. Aside from this, the service clubs were in operation and Special Service was busy arranging parties and dances.

It's a strange thing about rumors. You can rarely trace their origin, nor can you explain the rapidity with which they get around, no one can deny; and the fact that in dayrooms, latrines, kitchens and barracks everyone was whispering reports about an early move for the 79th Division could not be denied either. That much was an accepted fact. As to where the division was going, or exactly when the move was to be made, opinions differed widely. Everyone thought he knew and no one actually knew. Within a week after the first rumors began to spread, the 79th Division was definitely moving to at least a hundred different camps located from Maine to California. The dates of departure ranged anywhere from six days to six months hence. Talk was cheap and plentiful.

"No doubt about it, fellows. We're moving out of here," said GI No. 1. "I was talking to a guy yesterday ... a guy who knows what he's talking about ... (I won't mention his name) ... and he said positively we're moving to a camp in Maine."

"Hell no," said GI No. 2. "Listen, I've got a buddy who works up at Division Headquarters. He ought to know the score, and he told me that we're going to the West Coast, see."

And so it was, _ad infinitum_. But as always when the Army rumors begin to fly (or rumors anywhere, for that matter), no one really knows much of anything until some sort of official word is released. This was certainly the case during those long to be remembered days at Camp Pickett, until finally, on August 17, 1942, a special order from Second Army Headquarters cleared the expectant atmosphere. Unmistakably now, the cat was out of the bag. The truth was known. The 79th Division and with it the 313th Infantry, were being moved to Camp Blanding, Florida. The move was to be made by rail and the moving date was to be August 24, 1942.

A memorable milestone in the early life of the 313th Infantry had been covered. There were many more to lie ahead. Everyone was ready for the next move. It was time now to reach out for those more distant and greener fields, with new worlds to conquer.
Chapter 3: Camp Blanding

ARRANGEMENTS, down to the last detail, had been completed for the forthcoming trip. Every man in the Regiment was ready and anxious to go. The sun was traditionally hot, but no one seemed to mind. Morale was at a new high and an attitude of expectancy permeated the entire camp.

On the morning of August 24, at 10:00, the first shipment of men from the 313th Infantry lined up and awaited the command to march. Barracks bags had already been loaded in trucks and were now on their way to the Camp Pickett railhead. Then, at the command “Forward, March!” the long line of troops moved out. They were now on their way to the same destination on foot.

The railhead, some two miles distant, seemed a short walk indeed for these men who only months before had found it so difficult when walking, as new recruits, in the opposite direction. Two months had made a world of difference. These men were beginning to feel like soldiers now. Their walk and manner reflected a change of heart and mind. The months of drill were evident too as the men marched along. Commands were executed with precision and snap.

There was much activity at the railhead. Barracks bags were being loaded on the long line of Pullman cars. Toward the front of the train a detail of men loaded the mess car with supplies for the trip. Now the men themselves, at the command of their officers, filed into their respective cars. Strict orders had been issued beforehand. Pullman windows were not to be opened. No debris of any kind was to be thrown about in the cars. Order and discipline were to be maintained throughout the entire trip. The man guilty of an infraction of the rules was to be punished.

Once inside and seated, the men made themselves comfortable. Leggings, which were required to be worn during the march, were now permitted to be removed. So were the full field packs which were a necessary but unwanted part of the apparel. Had it not been for the full field packs the required uniform would have been cool and comfortable. For the dress included, aside from the packs, only leggings, rifle belt and rifle, and the usual summer cotton khaki trousers and shirt.

The cars were hot and the men were eager to get under way. For many the trip was to be a new experience altogether. Only a small percentage of the men had ever been to Florida, and following as it did the two months of intensive training, the trip was almost akin to a vacation excursion.

There were all sorts of ideas as to what to expect upon arrival at Camp Blanding. Some were of the opinion that the camp was a tent city, devoid of barracks and service clubs. Others shared the opposite view. Everyone had a good idea as to the approximate location of the camp for many had maps to take with them on the trip. As for Florida itself, not a man regretted the move to the land of sunshine and palm trees.

At about noon the train lunged forward and the trip began. Conversation had dwindled during the two-hour period of waiting, but now the men were alert. Noses were pressed against Pullman windows for a last look at the terrain which for several months had been called “home,” but minds and thoughts were contemplating the things to come.

The train had been under way for about an hour when the cry of “chow” echoed through the cars, but there was no pushing and no shoving. A plan had been formulated for serving the meals. One car at a time, the men marched in single file to the mess car where they were served. In the same manner they filed back again, carrying their food on paper plates. This method was duplicated, car by car, until all of the men had been served. The officers, meanwhile, had been served in their own cars located at the rear section of the train.

During the entire trip the men were given as much freedom as could be granted commensurate with safety and good discipline. They were not allowed to walk from car to car without permission, but within their own car were free to do as they pleased as long as conduct remained orderly. Much reading and letter writing was accomplished enroute, but of prime importance, it seemed, were the frequent games of poker, rummy and blackjack. More than one soldier arrived at Blanding with a good deal more ready cash than he originally started with, and similarly a great many arrived with a lot less. The matter of gambling was left in the hands of individual company commanders, and few if any of them refused to allow the men to gamble as long as order prevailed. And this was as it should have been. Diversionary pleasures for the men in the service were few enough. A game of cards, a good healthy crap game and the privilege of drinking beer now and then helped morale and made their regimented lives more livable. It was seldom indeed that difficulties arose through extending these privileges. The fact of the matter is that a great many difficulties were undoubtedly prevented by extending them. There were certain limits, however, beyond which the en-
listed man could not go. At no time, for example, was either the drinking or possession of liquor allowed, and there were very few infractions of this rule considering the large number of men governed by it. Except when on pass, the soldier was not permitted to drink anything stronger than the familiar 3.2 beer.

All afternoon and evening the long troop train rolled southward, passing mile after mile of Virginia landscape. More than once the train stopped for periods of time to await track clearances. If the stops were long the cry of "Let's get going!" or "Tell that engineer to get on the ball!" resounded through the cars. Everyone was in a good humor and making the most of the two-day trip.

About 9:00 o'clock beds were made and the men began turning in. They were not particularly sleepy but it was time for lights out. One by one the men relaxed on clean linen sheets. Lights were extinguished.

For a time conversation continued. The men talked about everything and nothing. Finally, one by one, they turned to the seclusion of their own thoughts. Now only the steady rumbling of the train and the occasional whistle of the engine ahead could be heard echoing through the night air.

Next morning there was little difficulty in getting the men awake. They were up and about promptly at 6:00. This was to be a big day and no one wanted to miss the show. Some time, probably late this same evening, they were due to arrive at Camp Blanding.

"Hey, guys, we're in North Carolina," one early riser exclaimed. "I was just talking with the porter and he said we'd be in Georgia in no time. We made good time last night."

Breakfast was served and the day was on in full swing. Within a few hours the train crossed the Georgia border. Later in the day a stop was made at Atlanta, where the men bought newspapers and candy from vendors passing hurriedly through the train.

That afternoon the men began to notice changes in the terrain. It looked more and more as though Florida could not be far ahead. The countryside was low and flat now, stretching for miles and miles as far as the eye could see. Here and there the first glimpses of tropical vegetation appeared. That evening, shortly before sunset, the Florida state line had been crossed.

It was considerably past midnight when the train arrived at Camp Blanding. The night was clear and comfortably cool. A bright moon was shining. For hours the men had been getting glimpses of the white Florida sand from their car windows on the train, and now that the train had stopped, everyone was anxious to get out and take a look around.

At the command of officers in charge the men detrained and formed a column of twos. Members of the advance party, who had preceded the first shipment of troops, were on hand to lead the way to the regimental area. The advance party was by this time fully familiar with conditions at Blanding, and their experiences were well worth relating.

Maj Edwin M. Van Bibber had been in charge of the advance party which arrived at Camp Blanding on the morning of August 22, 1942, just four days before the first troops arrived. His party included 1st Lt Joseph Hunter and 2d Lts Clifford Couvillion, Clay Shaw and Herbert Shell. As part of the advance party were a group of approximately thirty noncommissioned officers who aided in the job of getting the new 313th area ready for the troops.

It was indeed a job. In the first place, the advance party had been denied Pullman accommodations for the trip. They had been promised accommodations but were unable to obtain them. Coach seats were at a premium too, and as a consequence most of the party were obliged to stand.

But the real difficulties were to begin when the party arrived at Camp Blanding. They had previously been informed that there were not sufficient accommodations in the new 313th area to house the entire Regiment, and it was to be their job to erect a sufficient number of tents to make up for this deficiency. This required the laying of floors to be used as bases for the tents. Major Van Bibber had been appointed Regimental Billeting Officer and was to supervise the job.

When the party arrived at Camp Blanding they reported, as instructed, to Camp Blanding headquarters. For some reason, headquarters was not expecting their arrival and considerable difficulty was encountered before matters were straightened out. Finally the officer in charge handed Major Van Bibber a bulky bag of keys and a map. The keys, he was informed, were keys to the various buildings in the 313th area. The map was a reproduction of Camp Blanding. On the map he would find the location of the 313th Infantry.

Major Van Bibber opened the map. The instructions had been correct. In red pencil a large circle had been drawn with the inscription "You Live Here" scribbled inside of it.

The advance party had much to do in the next few days. An inspection of buildings was made first and conditions in many of them were found to be bad. The
kitchens particularly were unsatisfactory. Utensils had been left behind improperly cleaned. The floors, windows and walls were dirty. Cockroaches were everywhere. It was more than evident that much work would have to be done.

The inspection revealed that much equipment was missing, and the reason for this was detected. Men from an adjoining outfit located nearby had been "raiding" the abandoned area, procuring duckboards, kitchen equipment and dayroom supplies as needed.

Meantime work progressed toward completing the required tentage facilities in the 313th Infantry area. A sufficient number of tents had to be erected to house the personnel of Cannon Company, Antitank Company and a limited number of men in the battalions. The job was completed on time.

But there was naturally much to be done that could only be done when the troops moved in. Now the first troops were here, lined up and waiting to be moved to the new area.

The walk from the Camp Blanding railhead to the new 313th Infantry area was not a long one and because of the late hour the men were allowed to walk informally at rout step. Everyone talked enthusiastically about the Florida climate and of their first impressions of Camp Blanding. They seemed to sense that they were going to like it here, even though they knew very little as yet as to what to expect. Although the hour was late no one seemed particularly sleepy. This was a good thing for little sleep was to be had that night.

On arrival at their various company and unit areas it was soon evident that much remained to be done before the men could rest. The sleeping quarters were devoid of both beds and accessories. The quarters were dirty—so dirty, in fact, that it was impossible to sleep in them before at least a preliminary cleaning had been effected. As a consequence the next hour or more was spent in getting sleeping quarters in some sort of livable condition. This accomplished, the men trudged across the sand to a nearby building where cots, mattresses and blankets had been stored, and trudged back again carrying the needed equipment.

Each unit and company had its own unique experience when first arriving at Blanding. In some areas the beds were available when the men arrived and conditions were not too bad. In others no beds were to be found at all. In any case, the first night's experience was a difficult one and little sleep was to be had.

But loss of sleep does not affect Army routine, and the following day reveille was sounded as usual. The men were up and about early for there was much to do. As a matter of fact, several days were required to get the area in condition, and during this time GI details labored long and hard. KPs and added kitchen help worked night and day; men washed and scrubbed every square inch of floor and wall space in sleeping quarters, dayrooms and administration buildings. There was little time for anything but work.

The sleeping quarters at Camp Blanding were unusual. Contrary to the large barracks usually found, the quarters at Blanding were small. Two types of sleeping quarters were prevalent. The small hutment which housed five to seven men, and the larger buildings (although small when compared to the barracks at Pickett) which housed thirteen men. The latrines and shower rooms were located in a large single building, one of which was to be found in each company.
and unit area. There were ample facilities for everyone.

At the time the 79th Division first arrived at Camp Blanding the 29th Division was undergoing a period of training there. So was the 6th Cavalry Regiment. However, some weeks after the 79th Cavalry Division arrived, the 29th Division was moved out to make way for the incoming 30th Division.

Within a week after arrival at Camp Blanding everything was running smoothly. The men liked the camp and they liked the Florida climate. The weather was often hot, but unlike Camp Pickett, a refreshing breeze was commonplace. Blanding was less than forty miles from the Atlantic Ocean, and this had a natural and stimulating effect upon the weather, both in summer and winter. As for the camp site, nothing could have been more ideal from a scenic standpoint. To be sure, the country was low and flat, but there were many areas where trees and vegetation dotted the landscape. During periods of class instruction the men could sit in these shaded areas and even some of the training could be conducted in places sheltered from the sun. Sand proved to be a natural hazard for drilling and marching purposes, for sand is always difficult to walk upon for long periods of time without great difficulty. Then, too, the low and flat country was not as ideally suited for training or field problems as a hilly terrain might have been. The problem of cover and concealment was almost impossible to overcome, and the lack of hills and valleys made the planning of simulated battle conditions difficult. But apart from these disadvantages, Blanding was an ideal camp.

Not far from the 313th Infantry area beautiful Kingsley Lake was situated, which made possible a training program in swimming and lifesaving and provided diversionary water sports for the men. Even while at Camp Pickett, the Regimental S-3 had hoped to be able to include lifesaving and swimming as a part of the basic training program, but lack of facilities had prevented carrying out the plan. Now it could be put into effect.

Kingsley Lake was indeed beautiful. It was circular in shape and approximately one and one-half miles in diameter. The sandy shore provided a natural beach. At many points surrounding the lake there were wooded areas heavily laden with tropical growth.

The parade ground was centrally located and more than large enough to accommodate a full division review. This ground was to be used frequently at a later date by the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division as a whole.

Aside from this advantage, Blanding had a large sports arena, an open-air theater (which was situated on the parade ground) and the finest of service clubs fully equipped with modern libraries and all facilities for entertainment purposes.

It was in surroundings such as these that the 313th Infantry resumed its training schedule. The task of getting the new home in livable condition was now completed and training was being renewed. The basic training period, or the Mobilization Training Program, as it was officially called, required a great deal of classroom instruction. It was impossible to understand or undertake the actual business of battle practice in the field before an accurate knowledge of what to expect and of what to do had been mastered. So much had to be learned in so short a time. To be sure, physical fitness was not to be sacrificed. The men were required as always to drill and march and engage in physical training exercises, but a large portion of the daily training schedule was turned over to class instruction, and covered everything from the elementary knowledge of compass reading to the difficult job of acquiring an accurate understanding of the mechanical functions of weapons and equipment to be used in combat.

The Mobilization Training Program was to be devoted chiefly to the training of the individual soldier. It was designed, in other words, to teach the individual soldier his job, whatever it be. In modern war this entailed an involved and a complex process. So many of the branches were highly technical and required intensive study before the soldier could be of any real use in his assigned jobs.

Radio communication, for example, entailed a high degree of technical experience and knowledge. Here was a science, virtually unknown in the last war, which was playing a decisive role in the winning of World War II. It was the hub of communications in all branches of both Army and Navy service. In the infantry its uses were limitless. Tank formations were directed in the heat of battle by means of it. Time and space had virtually been eliminated because of it. A million uses had been found for it. And each specific use required the capabilities of a trained technician, knowing his job fully.

So it was that in the special units and battalions, men were being instructed in the science of radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony. They were taught the use and operation of the walkie-talkie—a small portable sending and receiving set which was capable of transmit-
Intelligence training, as was the case in radio telephony and telegraphy, required a high degree of specialization. The job of the Regimental S-2 was a vital one, and this all-important branch was not neglected in the development of the 315th Infantry. From the date of activation on June 15, 1942, the Regimental S-2, 1st Lt Frederick L. Grant, began the organization of an extensive intelligence training program. On August 3, 1942, while still at Camp Pickett, 2d Lt Raymond P. Godwin, who at the time was Executive Officer of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, was transferred to the Regimental S-2 section where he assisted Lieutenant Grant in the initial task of getting early intelligence training organized. Lieutenant Grant was later promoted to the rank of captain, and on November 4, 1942, was transferred with a division cadre to Camp Howze, Texas. On this date Lieutenant Godwin assumed the duties of Regimental S-2.

Intelligence training and the field of Army intelligence generally had assumed greater importance in the Second World War than at any other time in history. It played a vital role, not only in procuring valuable information regarding the activities, plans and condition of the enemy in the field, but equally in the vital job of preventing the enemy from learning the facts of our own operations. Very early in training every soldier (not only those directly concerned with intelligence work) was instructed in regard to the importance of keeping his lip shut on matters of a military nature. He was taught not to discuss the details of training, of weapons, and of troop movements. Even his apparently harmless camera, although not denied him entirely, had to be registered and all films censored. He soon learned that loose talk could easily cost American and Allied lives. He was shown training films on this subject and given class instruction on the dos and don'ts of military security.

The most important phase of intelligence training in the 315th Infantry was undertaken by the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon (traditionally known as the I&R), a part of Headquarters and Headquarters Company. It was within this group that the necessary training for intelligence work in the field was to be developed. The platoon comprised twenty-four picked enlisted men under the command of 2d Lt John B. Mathews. Possibly no other branch of infantry service called for a greater degree of knowledge and skill than was required for this group. To them was to go the eventual responsibility of collecting, under combat conditions, information regarding the plans and activities of the enemy. They would be required to move forward in advance of the front lines and to infiltrate enemy positions with utmost care and secrecy. Their job would be to obtain valuable and needed information and to get back alive with that information. They were not essentially to be a combat unit, although at all times they were to be armed and had to attain a high degree of combat efficiency. Aside from this, they had to know a specialized job, which entailed many months of concentrated study.

The work of the message center was an all-important link in the chain of communications. In this branch accuracy was the watchword. So much depended on the smooth, swift and accurate functioning of the message center in the field. In time of actual combat, an error on the part of the message center might be costly in lives and might, in fact, mean the difference between victory or defeat. This is understandable when it is realized that all messages, whether sent by radio, messenger, wire or other means, had to pass through the hands of message center personnel. For this reason every man in the message center section had to be given expert instruction, for much depended on him.

Within the Regiment each battalion headquarters had its own message center, working in cooperation with a central message center, operating at all times close to Regimental Headquarters. The central message center was the clearing house for all messages. It was composed of one message center chief, two code clerks, two basics and three messengers. Under combat conditions a runner from each special unit and battalion headquarters was on duty at all times at the central message center to deliver verbal or written messages sent via messenger.

The work of the wire section was vital too, and was no easy job. These were the men whose job it was to lay the miles and miles of wire so essential to telephone communication within the Regiment. They were among the first to arrive and the last to leave a combat area when in the field. Their job was a difficult and a
dangerous one and required no small degree of skill. They had to learn how to repair telephone and radio equipment, to shoot for trouble in the lines (in actual combat lines were broken frequently by exploding shells or bombs), to splice broken wire effectively and hurriedly, and to know all of the tricks of the trade in the job of laying lines correctly and with a maximum of speed.

To an army travelling to a great extent on wheels, the motor section was of course important. In this field, particularly under combat conditions, the strain on both men and motors was terrific. The motor section comprised the mechanical specialists who repaired and maintained motors and equipment, and the drivers whose job it was to get through despite hell or high water. A driver in the field had to be more than a mere driver. He had to be an expert driver with an iron nerve. The motor mechanics had to be aces in their field too, for without equipment in running order, little could be accomplished.

Added to the few branches just mentioned were many others, each requiring a knowledge of the job at hand. Hence the necessity for the long months of individual training—for the many hours of classroom instruction, and later, for the seemingly impossible task of coordinating all of the widely different branches into a cooperative and composite team.

With this background of the tremendous job of training necessary, we can get a glimpse of the immensity of the Mobilization Training Program. Thirteen weeks was indeed a short time in which to accomplish all that was needed to be done. It was actually necessary, as a matter of fact, to extend the initial Mobilization Training Program to a seventeen-week schedule. Other events intervened and made it impossible to finish the required training on time. The move from Camp Pickett to Camp Blanding had taken well over a week from the regular training program and there were other interruptions that followed.

September 1942 was a busy month at Camp Blanding. No one, however, seemed to mind the stepped-up schedule. Perhaps this was due to the climate. Perhaps it was due to the fact that the men were taking a keener interest in their work. It was probably a combination of many things, but it was certain that morale was high and that progress was being made.

During September, aside from the regular physical training and classroom instruction, a wide range of other activities were carried out. For example, Saturday afternoons were turned over to recreational activities, and in every company area you could see games of touch football, basketball and baseball going on in full swing. The Saturday morning period was devoted to a weekly inspection during which every soldier had to be really on the ball. Early Saturday morning (and more than likely on Friday evening also) he was busy at the task of cleaning all of his equipment. Everything from his shoes to his rifle had to be spotlessly clean. More, the entire company area had to be cleaned as well. The dayroom, supply room, latrine, kitchen, and all of the huts had to be thoroughly scrubbed. The soldier who was lax in complying with the rigid standard of cleanliness was immediately gigged, and his pass privilege revoked until he showed improvement.
After the inspection at least a full hour period was devoted to a review of the past week’s training. In many of the companies a period of current events was also scheduled. Current events was a topic of major interest among the men. They followed world news as closely as possible from day to day, and many good discussion periods were held by the men.

An event of interest to the entire Division occurred about the middle of September. Unexpectedly on Sunday, September 13, 1942, the Commanding General of the Second Army, Lieutenant General Ben Lear, paid a surprise visit to the Division. During the day he made an inspection tour of the various units, questioning individual soldiers on their training and progress. On Monday, September 14, a parade was held in his honor by units of the Division. A battalion from each regiment, a battery from each Field Artillery battalion and a composite battalion made up of units from special troops and from each company of Engineers was in the parade. General Lear was highly pleased with the progress of the Division generally, and expressed this thought in a personal commendation to the Commanding General of the 79th Division, Major General Wyche.

September was the month during which swimming instruction was begun. Here was a phase of training which proved to be more fun than work for the men. Its object, of course, was to insure every man in the Regiment of being able to swim at least sufficiently to take care of himself in case of emergency. The swimming program included a special class for beginners, and an advanced class for the more experienced swimmers. The beginners were given basic swimming instruction and before they were allowed to progress from the beginner group to the advanced class they had to be able to swim for a distance of at least fifty yards. The advance instruction was designed to improve the swimmer’s technique. This group was given underwater swimming, diving, taught the various swimming strokes (including the Army method) and were schooled in the art of holding the breath for increasing periods of time while under water. Both the beginner groups and the advanced class were given instruction in lifesaving and first aid. They were taught how to administer artificial respiration, and the proper method of bringing a drowning man to shore.

Not only were the swimming periods instructive, but they provided healthy relaxation for the men as well. At times during the instructions, periods of water sports would be scheduled, including water polo, swimming races, and diving exhibitions. As late as possible into the fall months swimming was continued, until finally, late in November, the water became too cold and swimming instruction was cancelled.

The preceding background of information serves to relate the early months of training at Camp Blanding. They were eventful, instructive, and interesting months, and much more of interest was to follow. Space does not permit a lengthy explanation of the never-to-be-forgotten period that constituted the training days at Blanding, but a résumé of the months that followed is imperative.

The Mobilization Training Program reached its completion on November 7, 1942. Immediately thereafter the period of unit training began, and with it on November 10 the first furloughs for members of the 313th Infantry were granted. Every member of the Regiment was slated to enjoy his first Army vacation—fourteen days of freedom from Army routine and discipline. Meantime, passes were being given to fifty per cent of the Regiment during each weekend period, and the men paid weekend visits to Jacksonville, Florida, and nearby cities. Life seemed to move at a faster pace than members of the Regiment had ever experienced. The days, weeks and months literally flew by. Unit training was hard and strenuous, but no one seemed to mind. All were learning the grim business of war, but at the same time were looking forward to their furloughs and weekend adventures. Morale was excellent.

Unit training was designed to enable the soldier to work and function effectively as a team. The days of individual training were over now and it was necessary, step by step, to mould the experience of the past into the first beginnings of a composite whole. The training was begun with squad and platoon problems, and was enlarged with the passing weeks until company and regimental problems were eventually undertaken. Prior to the end of December 1942, unit training was confined predominantly to the respective company areas, but early in January 1943, the Regiment as a whole began to participate in unit problems. During this period, which lasted until the end of January 1943, all personnel of the Regiment were in the field most of the time, returning to their barracks only one or two days a week. Life was harder now but progress was evident everywhere.

Meantime social activities continued. The furlough period went ahead uninterrupted, and during the Christmas season the entire Regiment took time out to
Infantry had reached the halfway mark in its evolutionary growth in so far as training was concerned. Anthony was downright proud. More, he was famous. On Youngstown Vindicator, with a letter of congratulation.

A double wish with a single blow. Anthony Crisafi had telling the whole story. Anthony Crisafi be made the official mascot of the news and an official warrant was sent to him along with a laudatory article. Aside from this, would be very happy if could be a mascot in the 313th. Thereafter Anthony was informed of the good doing our part here buying War Bonds and Stamps. I am ten years old.

December 12, 1942

Dear Sir:

I wish to be a mascot in the 313th Infantry. We are all doing our part here buying War Bonds and Stamps. I would be very happy if I could be a mascot in the 313th Infantry at Camp Blanding, Florida. I am ten years old.

Thank you, gratefully yours

ANTHONY CRISAFI
350 Albert Street
Youngstown, Ohio

That was all there was to it, but that was quite enough. The letter was referred immediately to the Regimental commander who in turn authorized that Anthony Crisafi be made the official mascot of the 313th. Thereafter Anthony was informed of the good news and an official warrant was sent to him along with a letter of congratulation. That was how it happened. Fate had taken care of a double wish with a single blow. Anthony Crisafi had the honor of being mascot to an infantry regiment, and the 313th Infantry had Anthony. Aside from this, Anthony was downright proud. More, he was famous. On February 15, 1943 his picture appeared in the Youngstown Vindicator, along with a laudatory article telling the whole story.

With the arrival of the new year, 1943, the 313th Infantry had reached the halfway mark in its evolutionary growth in so far as training was concerned. Mobilization training was over, and unit training was now well under way. The Regiment was beginning to get the "feel" of working together as a team and by the first of February 1943, training had progressed to such a point that the Regiment as a whole was coordinating beautifully in so far as regimental problems were concerned. Thereafter division problems began and the three infantry regiments constituting the 79th Division began working together as a whole. During the period the initial Division problems were held. Actual battle conditions with the Division working together as a combat team were begun. In the first problem, as conceived by higher headquarters, the following problem was simulated: "Red Forces," the problem stated, "have established a beachhead at the Gulf of Mexico and are moving east. You are to stop the advance."

So it was that Division problems got under way, and from the very beginning the months of previous training began to show results. Coordination was excellent, and each individual soldier began to know and understand his place in the vast picture that comprised divisional operations. More than 15,000 men were now successfully working together as a team.

Prior to the first beginnings of the Division problems, every effort had been made to thoroughly acquaint the individual soldier with every conceivable phase of combat. Special classes were conducted to further educate the soldier concerning the shape of things to come, and early in January a bombing and strafing exhibition was given at Sandy Hill Lake during which thirteen aircraft participated in an on-the-scene demonstration of bombing and strafing tactics. During this demonstration the troops were given explanatory instruction over a loud-speaker system and when the exhibition was over every man felt that he now had a better idea of the nature of Air Corps operations in combat as well as the know-how of what to do when coordination between air and ground forces became necessary.

Toward the end of February the first rumors concerning a possible move for the Regiment and the 79th Division began to circulate, and it was not long thereafter that official word was released. Both the Division and the Regiment, it was learned, were scheduled for an early move to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for spring maneuvers there.

The time had again come to move on. Training had now reached a point wherein the big picture would begin to unfold to one and all. True, it was still a matter of simulation, and the thought of actual combat
in the minds of one and all remained somewhere out there in the remote future. But progress toward that ultimate goal had been made, and the spring maneuvers in Tennessee were destined to be the biggest thing in which the 313th Infantry Regiment had as yet participated.

They were great days at Blanding—yes, indeed. They were days that will never be forgotten. In one sense of the word it might be said that the months in Florida were the happiest and most productive days ever spent by the men of the 313th Infantry. Certainly they were the happiest days, and as long as the human heart remains as it is men shall ever prefer to reflect upon those happier periods that come in a lifetime, and shall therefore remember Camp Blanding as an outstanding highlight in the long and difficult years that comprised Army experience.

But life, and certainly Army life, is ever changing, and a grim road stretched ahead. Life was to become progressively more difficult, and everyone sensed that Tennessee maneuvers would set the pace for the beginnings of those more arduous days.
Chapter 4: Tennessee Maneuvers

On the morning of March 6, 1943, the first troops of the 313th Infantry arrived at the Quartermaster Depot, Camp Forrest, Tennessee. The last of these troops arrived on March 9. They had left the bright sands of Florida, traveling by train through the state of Georgia, across the tip of Alabama, and had entered Tennessee for spring maneuvers there.

The weather was extremely cold when the men arrived, and morale, traditionally high during the stay at Camp Blanding, had sunk to a new low. Yes, it was going to be tough, and plenty tough. The men knew that now.

A cold, bleak rain beat down upon the troops when they arrived. Thereafter, a cold wave set in. The troops, long since accustomed to a warm climate, as well as to the comfort of barracks life, suddenly found themselves in the midst of a cold wave in the nowhere that comprised the hills of Tennessee. After leaving the train, they were taken immediately by truck to a place long to be remembered as Busy Corners, Tennessee. Busy Corners consisted of a country store and a few scattered houses located on a Tennessee highway. That was all there was to Busy Corners, and the area surrounding this initial detrucking point was destined to be called "home."

Such was the first recollection of the transition from the warmth and comfort of Florida life to the cold and exposure of the life now to be. In a mere matter of moments the troops had been introduced to the hard, rugged life that only the infantry can fully know. No longer would the men experience the comfort of barracks life; not, at least, for an extended period. No, the days of the weekend passes and of fourteen-day furloughs were over now and the tough life was beginning. Now it was a matter of living in the open; of creating one's own world in the rugged environment of the Tennessee hills.

No word picture could aptly portray the primitive conditions which prevailed during the early days of Tennessee maneuvers. It was necessary, literally, to start from scratch—to erect tents and build roads under conditions that combat itself could hardly be expected to surpass in so far as sheer inconvenience was concerned. The spring rains were the heaviest in many years, and when it failed to rain, the temperature would drop to all-time lows. The Ides of March were indeed something to beware, and to overcome.

But the troops of the 313th Infantry were well trained and in top physical condition. Almost over-night they began to adapt themselves to the rugged life that was now theirs to master. Order and determination began to emerge from the chaos experienced when the troops first arrived. Roads were built from logs and stones, and transportation, stalled for the first several days, began to move. Tent cities sprang into existence, and life began.

The purpose of Tennessee maneuvers was, of course, clear. In so far as the individual soldier was concerned, the whole experience of the rugged life he was already a part of, had been planned and designed to fully prepare him for the tougher days of combat yet to come. It was designed to give him a simulated taste of the sort of life which would eventually become commonplace.

In the bigger picture, Tennessee Maneuvers had an equally vital objective. It was an objective which included not only the 313th Infantry, or the 79th Division, but the entire Second Army of the United States. A gigantic task was being undertaken. It involved the bringing together of masses of men, working and coordinating together in simulated battle. It was a stupendous effort to give each individual soldier the feel of being a part of the immense machine that constituted an army in action.

That was the over-all objective, and after the initial days of preparation and adjustment were over, a series of field maneuvers were begun. Actual Second Army maneuvers were not attempted at first, nor were they planned to begin immediately. The big picture would come later, at a date and time already set by higher headquarters.

The initial field maneuvers were conceived and conducted by Lt Col James O. Wade, an Assistant Chief of Staff. They were designed to enable the various units to make a first beginning toward the ultimate goal in mind. Problem after problem was outlined and executed, and in each, a new and different phase of simulated combat was emphasized. All problems undertaken were adapted to the hilly terrain, and the bad weather, the mud and the cold, added to their realism.

Then, on March 23, a series of seven-day problems began. These were conducted on a larger scale, under the direction of VII Corps. Basically, their purpose was to enable each regiment to be the enemy, so that experience could be gained in defending itself under hazardous and difficult conditions. These problems were, in reality, big stuff. They were umpired by Corps umpires, and throughout the entire series of problems actual battle conditions were simulated. The situation
was tactical at all times from the beginning of a problem until it ended. On the coldest of nights fires were forbidden. Battle conditions were enforced to the letter of Army law. The going was really tough.

Experience was being gained all the while. The men were getting accustomed to the hard and rugged life. They were beginning to understand the true meaning of the word "infantry." They were beginning to know what it truly meant to be a soldier. They were beginning to appreciate the extent of the sacrifice, the hardship, the discomfort and the teamwork necessary to come through victorious, even in simulated battle.

On Easter Sunday, April 25, 1943, Tennessee Maneuvers officially began. By an order released from higher headquarters, the situation was declared tactical at noon, and the Second Army maneuvers were on.

Space will not permit a lengthy account of the maneuver period. A unit history can only record a given amount of material, and if justice is to be done to chapters dealing with actual combat, the length of other chapters must be narrowed to basic facts.

Second Army maneuvers in Tennessee lasted from April 25 to June 16, 1943. During this period a series of eight specific problems were held. The maneuver area stretched roughly from Manchester, to Shelbyville, to Murfreesboro, to Lebanon, and on this hilly terrain troops of the Second Army battled it out under conditions as near to actual combat as a simulated situation would permit. They were not easy problems. The fact that the real thing had not yet come made no difference in the execution of the maneuver phase of training! As one GI put it, "It might as well have been the real thing, for they sure as hell made us think it was."

In Operation 1, acting under the direction of VII Corps, the 79th Division and the 313th Infantry were assigned the mission of protecting the Corps' left flank and assisting in seizing the rail facilities in the town of Lebanon, Tennessee. The 79th Division was a part of the Blue force in this initial problem, and with blue bands on their left shoulders to designate their affiliation, they fought against the Reds with troops of the 5th Armored Division, the 81st Infantry Division, the 73d Field Artillery Brigade, the 1105th Engineer Group, the 405th AAA Battalion and the 503d Engineer Light Ponton Company. This initial battle raged for a full week, and after a brief rest a second problem (Operation 2) began in which the same troops comprising the Blue force were assigned an offensive mission.

Operation 3 was perhaps the most difficult and hazardous of all the problems confronting the 313th Infantry during the Tennessee Maneuvers period. This problem involved the crossing of the swift and turbulent waters of the Cumberland River. Due to the heavy spring rains the waters of the Cumberland were high and dangerous, and even though utmost caution was taken to insure safety, several men lost their lives. Despite this, however, Operation 3 accomplished its purpose and was highly successful, and the troops emerged from the experience fully prepared to handle the problem of river crossings when the real thing came along. At the conclusion of Operation 3 the 79th had actually succeeded in moving all troops and organization motors across the river. This did not include the artillery, which remained behind to cover the move with protective artillery fire. Bridgeheads were successfully established before the problem ended.

From May 17 to 20, the duration of Operation 4, the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division maneuvered as a part of the Blue force for the last time. Operation 4 comprised an advance move eastward to destroy any enemy encountered. This was one of the shorter problems in so far as duration of time was concerned, but like the others it was highly interesting and conducted in warlike fashion. The problem ended as the various combat teams were approaching the enemy outpost line.

The conclusion of Operation 4 brought the halfway mark for Tennessee Maneuvers. During this period another brief rest was permitted, and thereafter troops of the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division became the Red force and certain changes were made. As Operation 5 began, the 79th Division was reinforced by antiaircraft and tank destroyer groups, plus the 129th Sig-
Reconnaissance on the Cumberland River during the Tennessee maneuvers

nal Radio Intelligence Company. Air units also offered support, including a bombardment squadron. In this operation, the 79th Division had the mission of establishing a bridgehead in an area south of Carthage, Tennessee. This sector was to be defended at all costs, and the mission involved a rearward movement across the Cumberland River by means of bridges, both permanent and temporary, and the subsequent destruction of those bridges to prevent the enemy's advance.

Thereafter followed Operation 7, in which airborne troops were used for the first time. The 101st Airborne Division with the 506th Parachute Infantry attached, reinforced the Blue force. Bad weather delayed the initial air attacks, but eventually, with skies still somewhat overcast, the jumps by airborne infantry were made. The airborne attacks added a real thrill and zest to the final problems, and needless to say, the townspeople of Gallatin, Tennessee (where the jumps were made) were literally spellbound at the sight of a sky invasion. To combat these airborne forces the Reds were reinforced by the 933d Airbase Security Battalion, and the 3d Battalion of the 317th Infantry, 81st Division, a motorized unit. The 79th Division, a part of the Red force, resisted the air onslaught with gallantry and cunning, and to ward off disaster, the 79th Reconnaissance Troop was diverted for a time to antiairborne use.

In Operation 8, at least from a technical standpoint, the 79th Division faced its severest test. The Blue force was stronger than ever, and the Reds had to use every stratagem they could command. In Operation 8 the Blue (enemy) force, with the 81st Division, the 5th Armored Division and the 101st Airborne Division as its principal components, had the task of crossing the Cumberland River in the face of strong Red defensive action. The 79th Division, together with the remainder of the Red force, had a tough battle involving strategic fighting and defensive tactics.

As Operation 8 drew to a close, all elements of the 79th Division literally had their backs to the wall. Enemy infantry and armored forces had effected river crossings at various points and were advancing from all sides. They were advancing against our front-line troops north of the river, with enemy infantry concentrated on our front and armored elements moving against our flank and rear. Added to this concerted action was the very active participation of the paratroopers and glider-borne troops. Planes swooped down from the sky and unloaded men who were to harass our rear installations. We were seriously threatened as the problem ended, for the attack by air came as a climaxing feature, and all of 79th Division Headquarters was in grave danger. The entire Division, including Division Headquarters personnel, were doing battle at the moment the problem ended. Troops of the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division did well to the very last, defending their territory against vastly superior forces from early Sunday morning until Wednesday evening, June 16, 1943, when the Second Army maneuvers in Tennessee were officially declared over.

No one could say that the days spent during Tennessee maneuvers were easy. They were anything but easy, and looking back on those days in retrospect, it is not difficult to see the immense practical value derived from the experience. The man who survived Tennessee Maneuvers in good health was a soldier, a good soldier, and he knew it. He had endured all kinds of weather and all sorts of punishment. He had been through the mill in the fullest sense of the word, and he was inwardly proud of it.

But it wasn't a matter of all work and no play during Tennessee Maneuver days. During breaks in the many tactical problems, which usually came on weekends, passes were granted to visit nearby towns and cities. Nashville was of course the best place to go when the break periods came along, and the men lucky enough to get away from the strenuous maneuver life were sure to make the most of their brief periods of liberty. Then, for those unable to leave camp, bar parties and other forms of entertainment were scheduled.

All in all, much was accomplished during the maneuver period, and for the 313th Infantry in particular,
one important change had come about. It was during Tennessee Maneuvers that Col Paul C. Paschal relinquished his post as Regimental commander of the 313th Infantry, to accept an important assignment elsewhere. Colonel Paschal had commanded the Regiment since its activation in June 1942, and had seen it grow, under his command, into the fighting force it now represented. He regretted leaving his men, and openly expressed this thought when the time came for him to leave. He had done a fine job and he would be missed.

In his place Col Sterling A. Wood had been appointed Regimental commander. Colonel Wood was a man of strong determination and will, staunch of body and character, and an able leader of men. His military career and background were extensive and varied. Colonel Wood graduated from West Point with the wartime class of 1917. During World War I he served at various posts in the United States as first and second lieutenant, winding up as captain and adjutant of the 71st Infantry at Camp Meade, Maryland, in 1919. Following World War I he retained the permanent rank of captain, and served as company commander with several infantry regiments, interspersing this service with tours as instructor of the Organized Reserves, the National Guard, and at The Infantry School at Fort Benning. He was promoted to major in 1933 and took command of a battalion of the 17th Infantry. Then followed service as Civil Works Administrator, commander, and later executive officer of a CCC Camp. From 1935 to 1938 he was Senior Instructor with the Wisconsin National Guard. He graduated from the Command & General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and from the Chemical Warfare School at Edgewood Arsenal in 1939. From 1939 to 1943 he was instructor at The Infantry School and Editor of The Infantry School Mailing List. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1940, and to colonel in December 1941. He is the author of two texts on riot tactics, collaborated in the preparation of Combat Problems for Small Units, and contributed several articles to the Infantry Journal.

Under the command of Colonel Wood the Regiment prepared for future moves, which were soon forthcoming. On June 19 both the Regiment and the 79th Division began a move back to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, where preparations were immediately begun for further training.

Camp Forrest was heaven on earth in comparison to the rugged life during the maneuver period. The training was difficult, and there was no let-up in the intensity with which training was administered, but the mere fact that barracks life was again available was enough to improve morale to an unlimited degree.
Then, too, there were other reasons for the improvement in morale. Furloughs were begun, and all members of the Regiment had the thrill of being free men once again while the furlough period lasted. Meanwhile, on weekends, the men were issued passes to nearby Nashville and surrounding cities. Life at Camp Forrest moved swiftly and morale was high.

Then, as the men returned from furlough the training schedule was intensified. Range firing was undertaken for every man in the Regiment. The men ran the infiltration course and attacks were made on a simulated Nazi village.

As training progressed rumors became prevalent once again. A move was surely in the offing, and it would come soon.

And come it did. In a Division special order of July 24, 1943, the news of a move from Camp Forrest, Tennessee, to Camp Laguna, Yuma, Arizona, was made public. It read in part: “Pursuant to letter, Headquarters Second Army, re: Transfer of 79th Division to Desert Training Center, this Division will move by rail from Camp Forrest, Tennessee, to Desert Training Center with station at Camp Laguna (detraining point, Yuma) for a permanent change of station.”

Yes, the time was at hand. The days in Tennessee were soon to be over. Behind these well trained soldiers lay the experience of their first army maneuvers. Before them (yes, they knew) was the ordeal of another maneuver experience, this time under the heat of desert sun and sand.

There was no figuring this man’s army, unless one were to say that those at the top wanted to put the infantryman through every conceivable experience in every conceivable climate.

Apparently, that was exactly what they wanted, and they were about to see that GI Joe would experience it.

There was nothing left to do but, “Go West, young man, go West.”
Chapter 5: Desert Training

IT WAS A HOT August day when the first train pulled out from the Camp Forrest railhead and headed west. The day was Tuesday, and the date August 8, 1943. Within the Pullman cars enthusiastic troops of the 313th Infantry Regiment talked glibly of the days that had been and the days that were yet to come.

There was something thrilling about troop movements that never seemed to tire the men. There was always in Army life that eternal urge to move on. No matter how pleasant a previous station had been, how uncomfortable or uncertain the next station gave promise of being, the idea of going somewhere else never lost its appeal.

The troops knew that desert training would be a tough ordeal, but for the moment, at least, the thrill off a move west overshadowed all else and morale was extremely high. This was sure to be a great experience, and they were looking forward to it.

And it was a great experience.

The trip lasted four days. En route, stops were made at Nashville, Tennessee; Evansville, Indiana; St. Louis, Missouri; Little Rock, Arkansas; Texarkana, Austin, San Antonio, Del Rio, and El Paso, Texas; Tucson, and finally at the railhead, Yuma, Arizona.

For many of the troops the move westward was a new and unique event. A great number of the men had never been West; many, in fact, had never traveled beyond the borders of their various home states. Now they had known the thrill of seeing the vastness of this great America they had called their own but had never fully seen. Now they were familiar with its mountains and its prairies, its fertile plains and its miles and miles of barren desert land.

Certainly they were to become very familiar with the desert country, for as the first train pulled in at the Yuma railhead on the morning of August 12, the 313th Infantry began a new and more rugged life than it had ever experienced before.

Camp Yuma railhead was situated literally in the middle of the desert. The weather was hot and dry, and the area for miles around was completely devoid of vegetation and covered with dry desert sand. So this was to be called “home!”

At the Yuma railhead the men detrained and immediately boarded trucks for Camp Laguna. The 79th Division Band was on hand for the event, playing tunes of welcome which filtered out on the hot summer air, then vanished in the vastness of desert space.

The trip to Camp Laguna was short but interesting.

The initial part of the trip comprised barren wasteland, which later became fertile, green terrain as the trucks moved through the irrigated Yuma Valley. Then farther out the barren lands reappeared. The hot sun beat down unmercifully; the land grew more and more barren and the spirits of the men grew ever more dim as the miles progressed.

“Sure as hell ain’t,” remarked one GI.

“Sure as hell ain’t,” remarked another.

And then on the horizon the first glimpse of Camp Laguna loomed into visibility. There it was—a tent city stretching for miles under a blistering desert sun, nestled between barren and rock-covered mountains, reflecting brown and amber colors in the sun’s glare.

“Maybe it ain’t true. Maybe it’s a mirage,” someone remarked, and everyone laughed.

Such was the introduction to Camp Laguna, Yuma, Arizona, to the Joes of the 313th. It wasn’t a pleasant picture exactly, but it wasn’t going to be so bad either. After all, these men were used to the rugged life now, and it was better to roast under a hot August sun than to freeze in the Tennessee mountains in the early spring.

Camp Laguna was virtually devoid of facilities. It was not meant to have them. Its reason for existence in the first place was to give all troops who became a part of it the hardest kind of outdoor existence imaginable. Troops who became a part of Camp Laguna were to know the meaning of temperatures reaching 120 degrees and above during the daylight hours; they were to know as well the discomfort of maneuvers conducted in those temperatures. They were to know only the relief of cool nights but beyond this, life would be difficult indeed.

It might be well to give a word picture of the camp itself. There were rows and rows of pyramidal tents, stretching for miles. In these the men slept and lived. Other tents—larger or smaller as the need required—housed the kitchens, administrative quarters, hospital, and officers’ quarters. The only wooden structures available were the shower and wash rooms where the men cleaned up at the close of the day and in the early morning. Water for the showers was pumped from the Colorado River located some ten miles distant, but this water was contaminated and unfit for drinking. The drinking water was selected only at authorized water points, and was purified under medical supervision.

Life at Camp Laguna was indeed rough at first, but after things became more organized conditions im-
proved. PXs were installed, and beer and candy and other supplies were on hand for purchase after duty hours. The beer, whether hot or cold, was a great boon to thirsty and weary GIs. It often sold in case lots, and the troops would gather around under a desert moon or beneath the darkness of the desert night to talk and drink. Movies were shown several times weekly, and at least once a week, whenever possible, a USO show would be staged for the troops. It was during this period that the first noncommissioned officers' club was born for the 313th Infantry. The club for commissioned officers had long since been in existence, but it was not until reaching Camp Laguna that the noncoms banded together and formed a club of their own. They obtained a tent, installed chairs and tables, and began a life of wining and dining in style. It was quite an exclusive affair.

In the early days at Camp Laguna the medics were busy treating large numbers of cases of heat prostration. Many of the men had difficulty adjusting themselves to the extreme temperatures, and the desert life. Only a few cases of serious illness were reported, however, and generally the adjustment to the new life was rapid.

Training began almost immediately after the troops arrived at Camp Laguna, but it was not until late in October that the actual desert maneuvers got under way.

Actual desert maneuvers got under way on October 26, and lasted for a three-week period. By the time they began, the troops were hardened and ready for the ordeal. Long hikes and marches had been conducted in the preceding weeks, and physical training had been stressed to the fullest possible extent. But now the training at Desert Training Center, or the California-Maneuver Area as it was called after October 21, reached its peak when desert maneuvers got under way.

On the night of October 23-24 a move was made from Camp Laguna to the maneuver area. Traveling by truck, the entire Regiment (and the Division) moved in a seemingly never-ending column to Palen Pass, a location especially selected for the occasion. Here the terrain was rugged and the huge mountains formed excellent natural barriers for simulated battle.

Desert maneuvers were to consist of two main problems, the first of which was an attack on fortified positions in Palen Pass. Before the first problem began, however, a rehearsal was staged on October 25 and 26 so that officers and men alike would have an opportunity to practice a simulated attack on fortified positions under desert conditions. This initial rehearsal period was a complete success, and on October 26 the first problem officially began.

The situation was declared tactical in the early morning and the battle was on. In this first problem the 79th Division and the 313th Infantry formed a part of the Blue force operating under the direction of XV Corps. Once again the Blue force was pitted against its arch enemy of Tennessee maneuver days, the 81st Division, operating as the Red or enemy force.

Basically, the nature of the first problem involved the necessity of the Blue force advancing against constant enemy opposition up the treacherous valley between the Palen and the McCoy Mountains. The going was rough at best. The terrain was extremely difficult for motor or foot travel, and enemy opposition was severe at all times.

A feature and highlight of this first problem was the close cooperation between the ground forces of the 79th Division, and another of the Blue units, the 111th Tactical Air Division. As our ground units ran into well fortified enemy positions the air units offered strong support, bombing and strafing enemy installations and offering valuable reconnaissance help.

Throughout the entire problem battle conditions were expertly simulated. According to the umpires the 313th Infantry did an outstanding job of cover and concealment, being careful even in minor details (such as leaving shiny mess gear exposed to the sun, etc.) to prevent detection. This was an especially worthy compliment for the Regiment, because camouflage was difficult to accomplish in open desert country. Nets and a few shrubs were about all that could be relied upon. In places, the rugged terrain with its great bould-
ers and frequent ravines and washes provided cover, but even this proved unsatisfactory in view of the difficulty of getting the vehicles in and out of the washes.

The second and final problem began on November 3, and again the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division remained a part of the Blue force. Essentially, the setup for the second problem was the same as for the first except that in problem two both sides had access to air power from the 111th Tactical Air Division. The plan of the second problem was as follows: The 79th Division formed a part of the "First Army" which was invading the country from Mexico, driving north in the direction of Needles, Arizona. When the 79th Division went tactical and the problem began, patrols at the outset met light opposition from Red (enemy) forces which constantly withdrew to the north. As the problem developed the Blue forces met increasing opposition, and at times the situation was even critical. Air opposition played an important and at times a devastating role. Planes, both enemy and friendly, droned overhead continuously, and many an air "battle" was fought and "casualties" to ground forces inflicted. An outstanding tactical move on the part of the Blue force occurred at one point in the battle, inflicting heavy losses on the Red force. This happened when the 313th and 314th Infantry caught a segment of the Red force unaware and captured thirteen companies.

No one actually won the second problem, but when it ended the Blues were slowly forcing the Reds to surrender and abandon their fortified positions.

The second problem, and with it desert maneuvers, officially ended at 11:00 A.M. November 11, 1943. This date and hour had been selected to commemorate the signing of the armistice terms in World War I, November 11, 1918.

Pages could be devoted to the mere telling of incidents and events that occurred during desert maneuvers, but space will not permit a lengthy record. It can be freely said, however, that desert maneuvers were extremely difficult and that the troops actually suffered severe hardship much of the time. Supply lines were often very long, and it was impossible at times to bring the needed food and water up to the troops in time. On one instance troops of the 313th Infantry marched for a full day with only one canteen of water to see them through the intense heat of the day. This had not been planned as a part of discipline or training. It simply occurred because supply lines were extended to such an extent that it was a physical impossibility to get food and water through to the men in time. It cannot be impressed too strongly that the maneuver periods, both in Tennessee and in Arizona, were difficult and at times actually hazardous for all of the front-line ground troops involved in them. Save for the absence of live ammunition, no combat experience could have been more strenuous, and when the maneuver period finally ended the troops were badly in need of a genuine rest.

Both in the Tennessee and Arizona maneuvers everyone celebrated when word was flashed around that the show was over. The sound of M1 rifles were to be heard everywhere as the men celebrated. Thereafter, everyone began immediately to do the things that had been prohibited while the maneuver period was on. The men built bonfires, sang, and entertained themselves in whatever manner happened to strike their fancy, and the tension that surrounded the atmosphere while maneuvers were in progress immediately disappeared.

In Arizona during the maneuver period there was
little chance for actual relaxation. Passes to nearby towns was out of the question, for there were no towns nearby, and as a consequence the men entertained themselves as best they could during the rest periods between problems. At Tennessee things had been different for transportation was available, and whenever time permitted the men were given permission to visit surrounding communities.

Two days after desert maneuvers concluded the 313th Infantry returned to Camp Laguna, and a short while thereafter rumors began circulating that another move was imminent. In the meantime a limited training schedule was placed in effect, and recreational activities accelerated. The PXs were busy again, movies were being shown, USO shows were staged and a limited number of three- and five-day passes were granted to California cities. Many a lucky GI got a chance to visit Los Angeles and Hollywood during this period.

At Regimental Headquarters, meanwhile, word was awaited day by day as to the destination of the Regiment in its expected move. Finally on November 23 the word came, with the destination specified as Camp Phillips, Kansas. This word spread like wildfire throughout the Regiment and the Division, and shortly thereafter, the 313th Infantry advance party left for the new station. Then on December 8 the first troops embarked at the Yuma railhead for Camp Phillips. The last of the troops left Camp Laguna on December 11. Once more Camp Laguna became a deserted tent city—a “Death Valley” as many of the boys had called it. And once more the 313th Infantry was en route to the mid-west to begin a life which they intuitively and factually knew would at least be considerably better than the rugged life they had left behind.

The thoughts of the average GI were conflicting as the trains pulled out from the Yuma railhead. They didn’t expect to stay at their new station for a very long period, somehow. And for all the hell they had known during the maneuver days it was a lot of fun at that. Take those weekends in Nashville, Tennessee, and Yuma, Arizona, for example. Man, those were the days!

“But what the hell?” they mused. “We’ll have Christmas in Kansas—and that’s nearer home than we’ve been for a long time.”

And that was how another chapter ended and a new one began.
Chapter 6: Camp Phillips

The day was clear and cold. A crisp, crunchy snow lay on the ground, covering the earth with a white, even coat. The air was invigorating and as you stood there beside the train waiting for the order to move forward, the warm breath from your lungs vaporized the surrounding air and formed a mist before your face.

This was in complete contrast to Laguna. Gone now were the days of intense heat—gone the days of perspiration and thirst. A distance of some two thousand miles now lay between the life out there and the life about to begin at Camp Phillips.

From the railhead the men could get an advance glimpse of the camp and it looked promising. There were large barracks and buildings to be seen on all sides. In so far as comfort was concerned, nothing could have been less luxurious than Laguna, and the men anticipated a change for the better. They were getting it.

The advance party had left Laguna on November 18 and had arrived at Camp Phillips four days later. The party comprised Major Phil Lofink, Capt Thomas L. Lyons, Lt Curtis V. Blakely, Lt Virgil D. Basinger, CWO Jinks N. Durden, and 33 enlisted men. They had already been at Camp Phillips some time, in view of the fact that the first troops were only now arriving and the date was December 12. These troops had left Laguna on December 8. Their four-day trip had taken them through five western states—Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado and into Kansas. During the trip they had made stops at Phoenix, Tucson, El Paso, Albuquerque and Pueblo. Within the next two days, by December 14, all troops from the 313th Infantry were due to arrive at Camp Phillips. These troops were still en route, traveling a different course. They were taking the routine through Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma and into Kansas. But regardless of the route taken, the trip east proved as interesting to all personnel as the journey west had been some months before. Despite the fact that troop trains are generally slow in transit, the men never seemed to tire of traveling. They were always ready for a next move. In this regard, the men of the 313th had been singularly fortunate. In less than two years of Army life they had already seen much of the entire United States. Certainly the southern half of the United States had been well covered at one time or another. Unquestionably there was more travel to follow, but as to where or when no one knew as yet.

Several officers of the advance party were on hand to meet the troops and were waiting to guide them to their new Regimental area, only a short distance away. Shortly thereafter the command was given and the troops marched forward.

When the men arrived at their respective company areas they found everything in good condition. There was a certain amount of cleaning to be done, to be sure, but it was soon evident that barracks, dayrooms, latrines, and administrative buildings had been left in a state of proper police.

The barracks were large, one-story affairs built to house fifty men each. They were generally well built, with oak floors and ample housing space. Heating was accomplished by means of three coal-burning stoves, one each situated at each end of the barracks and one in the center. The beds were of wooden construction, sturdily built, with a mattress, two woolen blankets, one comforter, a pillow and pillow case supplied.

The latrines and shower room were housed in a large single building, one to each company area. The dayroom, supply room and company headquarters were situated in one large building, built in sections. The kitchen and dining room were also built together in a large building located nearby.

It need hardly be mentioned that the men were glad to be back in civilization. The months in Camp Laguna had been trying months to say the least, and it was high time for a change of atmosphere. Here in Camp Phillips they would get that change. There were modern service clubs, post exchanges, churches and motion-picture theaters available. There was good bus service to nearby Salina, Kansas, a modern little city with a population of approximately 25,000 people. From Salina, both train and bus service could be gotten for the larger cities of Wichita and Kansas City, which were both within reach whenever two- or three-day passes could be granted.

The men had no idea how long they might remain at Camp Phillips. Instinctively they felt it would not be for a prolonged period. After all, in so far as they could tell, they were now about ready for combat. The combination of training at Tennessee, plus desert training in Arizona, seemed like ample background for whatever Uncle Sam might have in store for them. They were looking upon this period at Camp Phillips as a probable rest period between Camp Laguna and a possible overseas move. They felt that this might well be an interval during which new clothing and equipment would be issued (they were badly in need of both following desert training), and during which the
eagerly awaited furloughs would be granted. The Army makes it a policy to grant, whenever possible, thirty furlough days a year to men in the service. This was usually divided into one fifteen-day period every six months, or two such periods a year. The men knew this, and they also knew that a six-month period had elapsed since furloughs had last been granted. Consequently they were hoping for furloughs during their stay at Camp Phillips.

The men were both right and wrong in their surprise. Less than a week after their arrival the official word had been released as to the nature of things to come. General Wyche, Commanding General of the 79th Division, issued a statement to the effect that the fundamental purpose of the stay at Camp Phillips was to enable the Division as a whole to have an opportunity to engage in a period of intensive winter training. "We are fortunate," he said, "to have this added preparation."

Meantime, a specific outline of the nature of training to follow had been issued. Training while at Camp Phillips was designed chiefly to complete all unfinished phases of training necessary to comply with POM. In Army terminology the letters 'POM' refer to "Preparation for Overseas Movement," and all of the training to come was designed to whip the Division and the Regiment into shape for just such an eventuality.

The very mention of POM served as a stimulus for the Regiment. Contrary to earlier days, the men looked forward to an overseas move with a sense of anticipation rather than of regret. Approximately two years of Army service had changed their perspective regarding many things. They felt now that they were about as well prepared to face the enemy in combat as they would ever be, and they were anxious to go. "Why not?" they thought. "The time is ripe now and the sooner we get in there and do our share the sooner we come back."

Hence the thought of going overseas to face the enemy had a natural and stimulating effect on one and all. There were times during the long training when men were inclined to feel a sense of futility regarding the whole thing. But now the thought of combat erased this perspective entirely. In its place a new emotion came into being. It was an emotion of intermingled alertness, readiness and expectancy. As if by some strange phenomenon, everyone felt this sudden change for the better.

At approximately the same time as word was released regarding the training program, news was officially publicized to the effect that furloughs would be granted. Beginning on December 17, and lasting for an indefinite period, every man in the Division was to receive a furlough. The men were disappointed somewhat, however, when they learned that the hoped for fifteen days had been cut to seven days plus essential travel time. The reduction of time, it was explained, was made necessary because of the intensive training and preparation scheduled for the immediate future. But seven days was a great deal better than none, and the men soon dismissed from mind the fact that they were not getting a full fifteen-day period. As always, there was much talk about home and loved ones, and the usual business of trying to scrape together the badly needed money for the occasion. To enlisted men in the service, a unique code of ethics existed wherein the matter of money was concerned. Contrary to the business and social world, there was no embarrassment felt when a soldier was in need of funds. Those who had money usually lent it freely to those in need, and in the long run the average soldier had his moments when he both had to borrow and to lend. Money, for money's sake alone, meant little to the man in uniform. It was something you either had or didn't have, and the lack of it made little difference—except around furlough time. It was then that the almighty dollar assumed its normal position of importance.

Ten per cent of the Regiment were to be on furlough at all times during the indefinite furlough period, and starting as it did on December 17 ten per cent of the Regiment were fortunate enough to spend the Christmas holidays at home. Another ten per cent were enabled to be away over the New Year. It was a happy group of men that left for furloughs during the holiday period, and when they returned the general attitude was one of, "Man, what a time! I've had my fun now and I'm ready to go wherever they want to send me."

The Christmas spirit was not lacking for those left behind over the holidays. Nothing can replace the joy of Christmas at home, naturally, but those left in camp had everything possible to make the holidays pleasant. Dayrooms throughout the entire Regiment were individually decorated with the traditional holly and tinsel. A Christmas tree, complete with lights and all the trimmings, added to the Christmas picture. In these surroundings many a company beer party was held, and since the Regiment was authorized a three-day
respite from training and Army duties, everyone made the most of the occasion. Money spent for these luxuries was supplied from individual company funds and was indeed well spent.

As for the Christmas dinner, no king of royal birth ever sat down to a greater quantity of food. In many of the kitchens preparation for the Christmas meal was in progress for a full day and a half. The menu included soup, roast turkey, gravy, mashed potatoes, candied sweet potatoes, peas, stewed corn, salad, celery and olives, mince and cherry pie, cake, nuts, ice cream, and coffee.

Speaking of holiday events, certainly the strangest event of the season happened on Christmas Day when the noncommissioned officers of several of the companies voluntarily banded together and decided upon an unusual course of action. It will never be known, fully, whether the assembled group were affected by some temporary mental lapse, or whether, in truth, the Christmas spirit got the better of them. We can only record the facts. The facts are that the highest-ranking noncommissioned officers (bless them one and all!) of Headquarters and Headquarters Company; Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion; Medical Detachment; and Company K decided, since it was Christmas, that the privates should have a rest.

"No matter how much it hurts, we’ll give ’em a break," was the unanimous conclusion.

As a result, on Christmas Day, the noncoms of the companies mentioned were up bright and early. In tender affection they patted sleepy privates on the head, telling them to sleep in peace. "We’ll do KP duty today," they said.

And believe it or not, they did. All day long, from breakfast until the last dish of the evening meal was spotlessly clean, the noncoms labored with unselﬁsh and loving zest. They waited on table. They washed dishes. They scrubbed floors and pots and pans while the privates dined in senatorial splendor.

Need more be said? Truth, unquestionably, is stranger than fiction.

Prior to the Christmas holidays, on December 18, 1943, the entire Division participated in a long-to-be-remembered event. On that day Brig Gen Frank U. Greer, the Assistant Division Commander, was decorated with the Silver Star. General Greer was awarded the medal for gallantry shown in Tunisia when he retained his command post in a position constantly exposed to German fire. Though badly wounded, General Greer remained at his post where he was able to secure maximum observation. After General Wyche, Commanding General of the 79th Division, presented General Greer with the medal, the entire 79th Division marched by in dress parade under the command of General Gurney.

General Wyche made a short address in which he urged all members of the Division to perfect themselves as soldiers. He reiterated that they were fortunate to have winter training. In conclusion, he pointed out that the ceremonies of the morning had been the "Outcome of the realization and acceptance of individual responsibility on the part of the Assistant Division Commander. This should be an inspiration to each of us. . . . If each of us does fully accept his own responsibility, there will be many such citations for wearers of the Lorraine Cross."

During the months of December, January, February, and March, the 313th Infantry underwent as strenuous a period of training as at any time since its activation. In order to comply fully with POM requirements, much last-minute training was necessary. Over and above this, the Regimental commander, Col Sterling A. Wood, was determined that the 313th Infantry would be in the best of fighting condition before a port of embarkation was reached.

The carrying out of this policy, plus the essential compliance with POM requirements, resulted in a steady stream of training memorandums. The Regimental S-3, Major D. A. DeArmond, and the Assistant
S-3, Capt Harrie S. Keck, worked night and day arranging the training schedules for the various battalions and special units. In the course of a few months it would be necessary to complete training covering air-ground operations, range firing, marches, malaria control, grenade throwing, practical foxhole training, identification of aircraft, proficiency problems, infantry-tank training (which was carried out in conjunction with the 702d Tank Battalion), firing of the AT rocket launcher, transition firing, chemical warfare training, AT grenade firing, and assault training.

Many of the above mentioned phases of training had been undertaken before, and some had been repeated many times. Rifle firing, for example, was first undertaken while still at Camp Pickett only a month or so after activation. It was duplicated many times thereafter. Now it was to be done again. Colonel Wood was of the opinion that a soldier could never have too much training—that the more training he had the more efficient he was bound to be in combat. Hence the repetition of many phases of training long since familiar to the men.

The rifle firing while at Camp Phillips was carried out during the latter part of December and the month of January. Needless to say, the weather was much of the time intensely cold and the firing was often carried on under difficulty. Despite this, however, the 313th Infantry as a whole chalked up for itself one of the finest firing records for any Infantry outfit. The figures were almost unbelievable. Colonel Wood had set a goal for the men, stating that he would like to see every man in the Regiment qualify as either Sharpshooter or Expert. This was asking almost more than one could humanly hope to expect, for as a rule a regiment that had the more efficient he was bound to be in combat. Hence the repetition of many phases of training long since familiar to the men.

The climax of the two-day problem consisted of a concentrated dawn attack on the morning of the second day, supported by tanks, infantry, engineers and field artillery. Live ammunition was used in the attack. The tanks contributed mortar firing of their own. The artillery fire was highly concentrated, and the white phosphorus charges made a realistic battle sight as they burst in the early light of the morning hours. The results achieved were highly satisfactory. Emphasis had been placed on effective communications during the problem, and this end was achieved. Company C of the 304th Engineers did a fine job. It was the first time that Company C had operated with the 313th Infantry, and the Regimental commander, Colonel Wood, was especially pleased with their work. In all previous operations it had been Company A of the 304th Engineers that had worked with the 313th Infantry.

During the latter part of February a series of night operations were carried out. The object of these operations constituted an attack on the enemy OPL (Outpost Line) and at dawn an attack on the main enemy positions, closely supported by artillery fire, was effected. In these operations, as was the case in the tank-infantry training, one battalion would attack while another defended. Here again a close simulation of actual battle conditions was apparent. Live ammunition was used, and in one instance one of our men was accidentally killed when artillery fire fell short. Such accidents cannot be avoided from time to time. Every precaution is taken to insure protection, but when live ammunition is in use in operations of this kind, catas-
trophies are bound to occur. You cannot avoid the use of live ammunition during the final phases of training. Actual combat conditions must be simulated as closely as possible. In so doing, countless lives may be saved on the actual field of battle.

Not all phases of POM training had to do with the actual simulation of battle. There were many phases that required study and instruction. To be sure, every phase of instruction had battle significance, and its purpose was designed to save lives. Malaria control, for example, came under this category. In World War II a high percentage of casualties was resulting from malaria infection. The figures were shocking. In some areas as high as seventy per cent casualties were caused by this disease. Consequently, all men were instructed fully as to what to do to prevent infection. The Army was taking every precaution to combat this menace. Every man was given a series of lectures by a medical officer on the cause of the disease, and its prevention.

Identification of aircraft was predominantly a matter of classroom instruction too. Daily classes were held during which the men would be shown lantern slides of the most important aircraft, and at a later date a test was given to the entire Regiment, and every man was required to pass with a score of one hundred per cent. If he failed to do so, he had to take the test again. Naturally the importance of knowing both enemy and friendly aircraft could not be over emphasized. Air power had long since been recognized as a decisive weapon, and knowing whether aircraft were friendly or enemy would be of the greatest importance in time to come.

The help of the motion picture as a training aid was invaluable. Training films, covering every conceivable phase of Army life, were available and were freely used. Particularly during the final phases of POM, training films were frequently relied upon. Films pertaining to secrecy discipline, the staging area, the port of embarkation, the troopship, the proper method of abandoning ship in case of disaster, and other films of a similar nature were shown. Much of lasting value could be gained by all personnel in seeing these training films, and all of the 313th personnel, including officers, had to see them.

The initiation of the Regiment to practical foxhole training will be remembered for a long time to come by the men of the 313th Infantry. Naturally, every man had been given plenty of practical at foxhole digging in the past. Throughout the period of maneuvers and during earlier training days foxholes were considered a normal part of training as a protective measure. But the purpose of the foxhole training at Camp Phillips was designed to give the men a chance to know what it was like to live for an extended period in a foxhole. Hence the term “practical foxhole training.” For a period of twelve hours the men were obliged to stay in a foxhole, while live ammunition and fragmentation hand grenades burst in all directions overhead. The weather was cold and the experience was uncomfortable to say the least, but the training had definite value. Instruction had been given beforehand regarding foxhole sanitation, and the men knew as a result how to live under sanitary conditions when confined to their foxholes for an extended period.

K and C rations were the only food to be had during the twelve-hour ordeal. Patience under difficult conditions was perhaps the greatest lesson learned by the men as a result of this training, and would unquestionably be of value to them when they faced a similar necessity in combat.

While the period of training during January, February and March was going on, the 79th Division began a War Bond campaign in conjunction with the Fourth War Loan drive. All units were to participate in a competitive effort to sell as many War Bonds as possible during a period extending from January 1 to March 1. The enlisted men had been asked many times before to buy bonds and had always given their wholehearted support, but at no time in the past had a competitive bond campaign been instigated.

During the first few weeks in January sales within the Regiment were lagging. Perhaps the need for fur-
lough money was responsible for this, or it may have been due to the fact that no concentrated effort had as yet been made to stimulate War Bond sales. On January 21, however, a board of officers and enlisted men met at 1st Battalion headquarters to discuss plans to increase sales and to put the 313th Infantry over the top in meeting their quota. The President of the Board was Maj John A. McConnell, and the members included WOJG William B. Taylor, 1st Sgt John H. McMahon, S/Sgt Eddie T. Kirkland and Pvt Robert G. Deihl.

At the meeting it was recommended that a Regimental Bond Officer be appointed and Lt John B. Mathews of Headquarters and Headquarters Company was assigned to this post. Similarly, it was recommended that a Company and Detachment Bond Officer and Noncommissioned Officer be appointed, whose duties it would be to familiarize all members of their respective organizations with the value and need of purchasing War Bonds and Stamps.

As a further measure to stimulate sales, it was recommended that War Stamps be made available in each company orderly room, the Officers' Club and the Noncommissioned Officers' Club. Also, that a contest be held between all companies and detachments from January 18 to February 29 inclusive. The winner of the contest, it was decided, would not have to stand reveille or retreat for a period of thirty days. In conclusion, it was suggested that a Bond shoot be held and that punchboards and other lottery devices should be secured to stimulate sales.

Lieutenant Mathews, acting as Regimental Bond Officer, began immediately to put the various plans into effect. The results were more than gratifying. In the final week of the drive the 313th Infantry, with 169 per cent of its quota reached, far outbought other Division units to lead in the War Bond drive. In dollars and cents the 313th War Bond purchases amounted to $90,196.23—a figure well worth being proud of. The 79th Division Artillery was next in line with 153 per cent of its quota.

We cannot tell the story of the Regimental War Bond drive without adding due credit and commendation to a member of the 313th's Medical Detachment. Nicknamed by his buddies "Jake the Fake," Corp Jacob Kaplan proved to be anything but what his nickname implied. Taking all of his life savings, Corporal Kaplan invested every cent in War Bonds—$15,000 worth. Quite calmly and without fanfare "Jake the Fake" informed his commanding officer of his intention and then proceeded to carry it through. When asked later why he had done it, he replied seriously that he felt War Bonds were the best investment in the world, not only in dollars and cents, but equally in freedom and peace. "Besides," said Corporal Kaplan, "it'll help the fellows along on that no-retreat-no-reveille deal."

At the conclusion of the drive, which had been extended to March 7, Lieutenant Mathews sent a memorandum to the Regimental commander, Col Sterling A. Wood. The memorandum stated that all Company Bond Officers had met to act as final judges in the no-retreat-no-reveille contest, and that in view of the fact that the 313th Infantry had led all other units in the Division, they had made the following recommendations:

1. That the first two companies, Medical Detachment and Company H, receive one month's excuse from reveille and retreat.

2. That all companies doubling their quotas receive one week's excuse from reveille and retreat. (This included Company M; Company E; Antitank Company; Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion; and Headquarters and Headquarters Company.)

3. That all companies meeting their quotas receive three days' excuse from reveille and retreat.

Colonel Wood approved the recommendation and extended his appreciation to Lieutenant Mathews for his fine job of promoting War Bond sales, as well as to the Regiment as a whole for cooperating so fully in putting the 313th Infantry over the top.

Aside from the fact that the final weeks at Camp Phillips were crowded with plenty of hard work and training, there was nevertheless ample room for relaxation and social functions of all kinds. Both officers and enlisted men made it a point to schedule all sorts of get-togethers. For the enlisted men, company commanders were seeing to it that the company funds were available for numerous beer parties, dinners and dances. In view of a possible imminent move overseas, it was logical that excess funds should be used in this way. On many a night in company areas throughout the Regiment the sound of a dance band or the none-too-harmonious vocal strains of "Sweet Adeline" filtered through the night air. As usual, nothing stronger than the familiar 3.2 beer was allowed, but the men did their utmost to make up for this by stressing quantity rather than quality. It will eternally remain an
enigma as to how the contents of countless cases of beer managed to disappear in so short a time. The capacity of the average GI for beer-guzzling was limitless.

In many of the companies in conjunction with a scheduled dinner and dance, company talent would put on a show for the rest of the men. Talent was not necessarily ultra-professional, but this fact made little difference. The predominating idea was to have a good time and this end was always achieved.

Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, shot the works during the last days at Camp Phillips by throwing a combined dinner, beer party, and dance. Other companies held similar affairs. In the case of Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, open house was declared for one and all immediately after 5:00 P.M. on Saturday evening, March 25. The dayroom was soon alive with much activity and bartenders, to say the least, were busy. This continued until shortly after 7:30 P.M. when everyone headed for the messhall and enjoyed a roast-chicken dinner complete with all the trimmings. Returning to the day room when the dinner was over, the fun of the evening began. A four-piece dance band supplied the music, and a group of twenty to thirty girls from nearby Salina supplied the necessary feminine charm. Before dancing got under way, however, a show was staged by the enlisted men which climaxed in a one-act appearance of the Beer Barrel Quintet, composed of no less a group of celebrities than Major DeArmond, Captain Hillenbrand, Captain Burns, Lieutenant Lawson, and Lieutenant Meyers. They offered to sing "any tune the boys wanted, old or new" and finally wound up doing a reasonable facsimile of "I've Been Working on the Railroad." Dancing got under way thereafter. So did the drinking of prodigious quantities of beer. Some time the following morning, at an hour not clearly defined, the party came to a happy end.

We have said little to date of the recreational and social activities of the noncommissioned officers, and in this connection we cannot fail to mention the Noncommissioned Officers' Club, established by the first three grades. The "Top Three Club," as it was called, was conceived while the Regiment was stationed at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, shortly before the move to Camp Laguna, Arizona, was made. Actually the club itself did not get under way until the 313th arrived at Camp Laguna, but plans for its establishment had been made beforehand, and a dance had been held while at Camp Forrest to raise funds for this purpose.

A committee was appointed to work out plans for the club, and M/Sgt Horace B. Bishop was appointed the Club's president. "Bish," as he was affectionately called by everyone who knew him, was an oldtimer in the service. He had served in World War I with Company D of the 8th Infantry, and remained in the service, serving in France and Germany from July 1919 until January 1923. When World War II began he had approximately twenty-three years of service to his credit, and was assigned to the 79th Division at the time of its activation in June 1942. He was appointed Regimental Sergeant Major and continued to serve in that capacity. It was rumored that "Bish" was appointed President of the "Top Three Club" because of the wartime beer shortage. It was felt by one and all that he, if anyone, would be the man most capable of procuring beer under any and all circumstances, regardless of the nature of the terrain or the situation, and hence that he was the logical man for the post. This was, or course, only a rumor, for Master Sergeant Bishop never drank beer—much.

With Sergeant Bishop duly elected as the club's president, a committee was appointed including 1st Sgt Donnie E. Fulmer, Vice-President; 1st Sgt John A. McMahon, Treasurer; and S/Sgt Eddie T. Kirkland, Jr., Treasurer. The "Top Three Club" at Camp Laguna was a two-tent affair, located not far from the Special Unit Post Exchange. It was of simple construction, with a few chairs, benches, tables and a hand-made bar. For Camp Laguna, however, this was comfort indeed, and served its purpose well during the hot months while the 313th was stationed there. At Camp Phillips the "Top Three Club" was more luxurious. An entire barracks was turned into a regular club, with furniture, tables, lamps, a juke box and all modern appointments. The club's financial status was good—so good, in fact, that during the last few weeks at Camp Phillips the treasury was in a position to establish open house on many occasions, and was able to splurge to the extent of giving a dinner and dance at the Trianon Ballroom in Salina, which was undoubtedly the outstanding social function of the club's existence. Cocktails were served at 5:00 P.M. Dinner was served from 7:00 to 9:00 P.M. Dancing began thereafter and continued until midnight. There was no charge whatsoever. Membership in the "Top Three Club" was all that was necessary to admittance. Each member was permitted to bring one guest. Corsages were presented to all ladies present, and the entire affair was a huge success.
During the stay at Camp Phillips the commissioned officers of the 313th enjoyed a full measure of social life. Although we have referred to the 313th Officers' Club from time to time in the past, it is worth telling in some detail of the goings on within its halls and walls. Since the earliest days, even before the official activation of the 313th Infantry, plans were put into effect for its establishment. This initial effort was maintained and the Officers' Club, in one form or another, continued. Even during Tennessee maneuvers, and while marooned on the Arizona desert, some form of a club, however meager, was kept in running order.

The Officers' Club of the 313th Infantry was unique in that it was generally far more active and fraternal than were the other regimental officers' clubs within the 79th Division. In the main, the other regiments of the Division relied upon the facilities of the Division Officers' Club as a source of fraternization and entertainment, but the officers of the 313th Infantry maintained a club of their own in which there was always much activity. Hence most regimental affairs within the 313th Infantry were held there, and a fraternal spirit surrounded the institution more and more as time passed. In the earlier days at Camp Pickett, and later at Camp Blanding, a tradition had been established to hold weekly get-togethers every Friday night. Col Paul C. Paschal, the Regimental commander at that time, and Mrs. Paschal, were always present at these functions. Everyone knew everyone else and the formality which might have characterized such affairs gave way to a friendly and homely atmosphere devoid of the usual external flourishes. Everyone felt at home in the 313th Officers' Club and as a relief from the strain of constant military pressure, the officers much preferred to meet under such circumstances, than in a more formal manner. Although there was little time for a continuance of the weekly affairs during Tennessee and Arizona maneuvers, the tradition was remembered nevertheless, and when the 313th Infantry arrived at Camp Phillips much of the old spirit sprang to life again. Colonel Wood, the Regimental commander, and Mrs. Wood attended regular weekly get-togethers which were held on Friday night in much the same manner as the Friday night affairs had been conducted previously. Aside from this, other affairs were scheduled, and the result was always the same. Everyone had a good time.

Social functions for officers of the 313th Infantry reached a new apex during the month of March 1944. On Friday, March 3, a Regimental dinner-dance was held which topped the list of social functions, and was probably the most successful social event the 313th Infantry had as yet experienced. The committee in charge, under the direction of Colonel Wood, included Major Maynard C. Miller, Capt Herbert S. Brown, and Lt. James G. Wilson, Thomas W. Farnsworth and Herbert L. Miller. Extensive plans were made for the affair. Because of the large attendance expected, the event was scheduled to be held at the 79th Division Officers' Club, and on the appointed night the club was filled to capacity with officers, their wives and guests. The evening began when cocktails were served at 7:00 p.m. Dinner was served at 8:00. Dancing began at 9:30 and at 10:00 a floor show was staged featuring a diversified group of entertainers including singers, a dance team, a magician and a chalk-sketch artist. Dancing was resumed thereafter with music supplied by the 79th Division dance orchestra.

An impressive list of celebrities was present for the occasion, including the Commanding General of the 79th Division and Mrs. Ira T. Wyche; the Assistant Division Commander and Mrs. Frank U. Greer; the Commanding Officer of the 313th Infantry and Mrs. Sterling A. Wood; Colonel Wahl, the Division Artillery Commander; Col G. O. A. Daughtry, the Post Commander; Lt. Col. Warren Robinson, the Commanding Officer of the 314th Infantry; the Commanding Officer of the 315th Infantry and Mrs. Porter P. Wiggins; the Commanding Officer of the 310th Field Artillery Battalion and Mrs. Robert H. Safford; Capt. William Allen and Capt. Jensen, Artillery Liaison Officers of the 310th Field Artillery Battalion.

The dinner was complete in every detail and the menu comprised a luscious steak (a luxury indeed in times of rationing) with everything from soup to nuts included. A mammoth ornamental cake, baked by the Division Officers' Club chef, high-lighted the occasion. It was placed on a separate table in front of the main dining table and was, to say the least, a masterpiece of the culinary art. The huge cake was seven layers high and approximately three feet in diameter. A basket made of frosting ornamented the top of the cake, and a frosted reproduction of the 79th Division insignia was placed beneath the handle of the basket. Frosted roses adorned the sides of the masterpiece.

At the completion of the dinner Mrs. Sterling A. Wood cut the first piece from the large cake and later guests plucked the frosted roses from the sides of the cake and kept them as souvenirs.

The entire dining room was beautifully decorated
and arranged for the occasion. The main table was decorated with three bouquets of mixed flowers, and candelabra with lighted candles were situated on each side of the center bouquet. This setting was accentuated by an attractive green spray running the entire length of the table. Every table was similarly decorated with the spray of green and the lighted candles.

The printed programs for the event were a source of much favorable comment because of the originality they expressed. The programs were designed to represent a facsimile of an Army Field Manual, appropriately called FM 79-313. The entire program was worded in typical Field Manual terminology, and the names of all guests were included in the cleverly arranged booklet.

We cannot speak of social functions during the month of March without recalling the auction held at the Officers’ Club at 5:00 P.M. on the afternoon of March 9. Because of the possibility of an imminent move, it was deemed necessary to dispose of the furniture and appointments of the club. Rather than sell these articles second-hand to a dealer, it was felt that officers of the Regiment might well be able to use the furniture and other articles. And it would be an excellent idea to hold an auction with this end in view. Capt Raymond P. Godwin was therefore duly appointed auctioneer, and on the date of the auction everyone turned out to see the show. Many of the officers’ wives were present for the event, which was inaugurated with the serving of cocktails, free, to all comers. Captain Godwin had an eye for business, and the cocktails, he figured, were a good investment toward the ultimate end of successful sales. As a matter of fact, he had planned the entire affair down to the shrewdest detail. For example, he had resorted to the subtle practice of placing several “shills” (men who bid at an auction but who have no intention of buying) in the audience, whose job it was to sing out at the proper time with a bid on a given article, merely for the purpose of stimulating the bidding among the actual buyers. Whether the auction’s success was due to this degraded method of selling, or whether it was due to the free cocktails, we are not prepared to answer. It was evident, however, that the auction went well. Everyone bid on everything. Bachelor officers were buying articles for which they could have had no earthly use unless they had been planning secret elopements in the immediate future. Capt Vincent T. Burns, for example, purchased five chairs for which he had absolutely no use, and to this day wonders why he bought them. He paid a good price for them, too, as did all comers on other articles. But despite the subtleties involved, everyone figured that he got his money’s worth, and came away satisfied. The auctioneer was satisfied too, for when the total sales were counted it was found that the furniture and accessories had sold for a considerably higher price than they had originally cost.

Speaking of recreational events, someone once said that a sense of humor is one of man’s greatest assets. This is unquestionably true, and it is equally true that in times of stress and strain a sense of humor will go a long way toward lightening the load and relieving the pressure. At any rate, we can at least surmise that some such philosophic implication accompanied an incident that took place early in March at Camp Phillips, involving no less a personage than the Regimental commander, Colonel Wood, in the role of chief conspirator, and Lieutenant Colonel Van Bibber, as, shall we say, chief scapegoat.

It’s all a long story, but it has to be told. It is too good to keep, and deserves a place in the regimental archives. It involves a rabbit hunt, a medal of high honor, and numerous other things. This is how it happened.

Rabbits are plentiful in Kansas. Anyone who is any kind of a marksman at all can pick them off by the dozens fully blindfolded. Lacking a rifle a club will do, but sometimes things do go wrong.

It so happens that a party of officers from the Regimental staff were out for a bit of sport one evening, rabbit hunting. Fully armed with carbines, tommy guns, caliber .22 rifles and ample ammunition for same, the party set out for the kill. Among those present were Colonel Wood, Lieutenant Colonel Van Bibber, Majors DeArmond, Lofink, and Monroe, Captains Keck, Lyons and Halliday and Lieutenant Westervelt. They were good marksmen, all, and with such an array of fire power one would naturally think that no rabbit this side of hell itself would stand a ghost of a chance.

But as we have previously stated, things sometimes do go wrong. They did go wrong and the hunting party in question. No sooner had the hunting party arrived at the hunting area than quite by surprise a rabbit leaped from out of nowhere. Ordinarily rabbits run away from danger but this one had other ideas. He ran toward it, right toward Colonel Van Bibber, in fact. Thereafter things happened suddenly. Carbines, tommy guns and caliber .22 rifles barked with a deaf-
enjoying roar. Fire power, from all directions, was brought to bear on B'r Rabbit. But Colonel Van Bibber was in the middle and when somebody yelled, "Get him!" (meaning the rabbit, of course) Colonel Van Bibber yelled for the firing to cease because somebody had already gotten him with a bullet's eye on the posterior region. It wasn't serious, fortunately, merely a ricochet, but the velocity of said bullet was sufficient to be felt by Colonel Van Bibber for some little time thereafter. The rabbit, meanwhile, disappeared unharmed.

It was several days later and the usual Friday night dance was being held in the Officers' Mess. Colonel and Mrs. Wood were there and so was everyone else with the exception of Colonel Van Bibber. He had remained in the solace of his room, possibly nursing the physical and moral wounds received on the rabbit hunt several days before. This would never do, thought Colonel Wood. Something would have to be done to bring Colonel Van Bibber out of his inner sanctum.

A few specific orders were issued by Colonel Wood to Major McConnell and Captain Keck, who immediately disappeared on a secret mission. When they returned orders were issued for Colonel Van Bibber to report to Colonel Wood immediately. Thinking it official business, Colonel Van Bibber reported in the usual military manner. He saluted and awaited further orders.

"Sit down," commanded Colonel Wood.

Colonel Van Bibber sat down. Colonel Wood, meanwhile, proceeded to busy himself with other matters. Shortly an intermission was called and Major McConnell appeared at the microphone.

In solemn voice he recalled the fact that the 313th Infantry had not as yet been honored by the receipt of any meritorious awards. This was indeed lamentable, he continued, but the time was now at hand when such an award could be made. Would Colonel Van Bibber please step forward?

The Colonel obliged.

"You, Colonel," continued Major McConnell, "are the first among us to have seen action on the field of battle in this second World War. You have displayed gallantry under fire and have been wounded in action. Therefore, by order of our Regimental commander, Colonel Wood, I have the honor to present you with this distinguished medal of honor, The Order Of The Purple Rabbit Heart."

Major McConnell produced a large cardboard heart and pinned it ceremoniously on the Colonel's coat. The Colonel sputtered, smiled, and then stammered a few words of appreciation. He was at a loss for words, he said, and overcome with emotion.

Thereafter the dance resumed with a renewed spirit of hilarity and Colonel Van Bibber continued to wear, with no small degree of justifiable pride, his Order Of The Purple Rabbit Heart, for the rest of the evening.

It was only natural and normal that during the final period at Camp Phillips social activities for both officers and enlisted men should have had a paramount position of importance. Everyone contemplated and expected the possibility of an overseas move and it was naturally expedient to crowd as much relaxation and pleasure into the routine of things as convenient. At no time, of course, did social activities interfere with the scheduled training. Social activities served merely as a relief from a highly accelerated training schedule.

Up to the very last moment, training was pushed to the utmost, and the nearer the time came for departure from Camp Phillips, the surer everyone became that POM (Preparation for Overseas Movement) meant, for the 79th Division, exactly what it implied.

There were all sorts of indications to warrant this conclusion and yet no one could be absolutely sure of their point of view. For one and all the possibility of an overseas move was a speculative issue except, of course, for the few individuals in authority who already knew the answers. But this knowledge was carefully guarded and it was increasingly evident to all concerned that the term "secret move" was being enforced within the 79th Division fully and effectively. Previously there had been no occasion to enforce secrecy discipline to the letter of the law. Much had been said of the eventual need for it, but on all moves in the past the destination had been announced openly and officially before the actual move was made. Likewise, there had been no attempt in the past to restrict the personnel of the Regiment from writing or communicating with relatives or friends, telling them of the expected move. Now, however, it was a different story. Strict censorship was in effect. The men knew that a move was imminent, but they had no idea where they were going or when the move would be made. They were allowed to write letters and to tell families or friends that they were expecting to make a move at some indefinite date in the future. They were also advised to state that there would in all probability be a period in the not too far distant future when they would be unable to communicate in any way. In other words, that there would be a restricted period during
which no letters, telegrams, or telephone calls could be allowed. This period, they were informed, would last anywhere from ten to thirty days. Beyond that they were asked to say nothing and as a matter of fact, there was little more they could have said for no one knew anything. This time is was generally agreed something was up. This time it looked as though the real thing was at hand.

It is a remarkable thing to contemplate a move involving many thousands of men and requiring weeks or months of advance preparation as being possible without news of the destination or time of departure becoming generally known. Yet this is exactly what had to be done, and it was done without a hitch. Up until the last few days no one had any idea whatsoever where they were going or when. Some indication of the probable destination was gleaned during the last days when it became necessary to address the many hundreds of crates and boxes for shipment. The address indicated that the move would be eastward, but there was no way to be sure of this, for everyone agreed that the address itself might be a subterfuge. During the last few days there was naturally much talk and speculation among the enlisted men as to the probable destination, but even though the men were confined to the camp area they were careful not to discuss these matters in places where they might be overheard by civilians. Taken as a whole, the enlisted men did a fine job of maintaining secrecy discipline, and the officers who knew in advance where and when the move would be made maintained absolute silence and secrecy.

Restriction and censorship was complete in every detail in those final days at Camp Phillips. All officers and men were restricted to the camp area. No telephone calls, no telegrams or other means of communication were permitted. Letters could be written but were subject to censorship by an officer who deleted any information of a military nature. Even the number of the Regiment and the names of the companies within the Regiment were replaced by a code number, and the Division insignia was removed from all clothing. All personnel were required to either send home or discard papers, letters, cards, pictures, or anything which would in any way divulge their unit, their division, or the names of camps at which they had previously trained. Address books were checked to be certain that no revealing information was contained therein. Every precaution was taken to insure safety.

POM requirements, in every detail, were now complete. The 313th Infantry of the 79th Division was ready for their first secret move. Few indeed knew the answers to the questions where, or when. Finally, in an atmosphere of anticipation and expectancy, the first group scheduled to entrain was alerted at 11:00 A.M. on March 29, 1944. The first group included Company B, Company C, and a segment of the Medical Detachment. Within two hours after the initial alert they had marched to the Camp Phillips railhead, had entrained, and were on their way. Thereafter, at approximately two-hour intervals, other groups were alerted and moved out. This process continued until, on March 31, the last of the 313th had left Camp Phillips.

They had now begun what might well prove to be a series of adventures never to be forgotten . . . the staging area, the port of embarkation, and the embarkation itself. Would these things come to pass? Or was all of this POM business, as some of the troops had jokingly stated, merely "Preparation for Other Maneuvers" rather than "Preparation for Overseas Movement." The time was here when they would soon know. They were on their way. Theirs was a destination unknown, and in the words of Tennyson it was, "Their's not to reason why, Their's but to do and . . ." await future developments.
Chapter 7: Destination Unknown

THE MOVE from Camp Phillips was eastward. The men were now sure of this because the heavily loaded troop train had already crossed the Kansas state line and was heading into Missouri. As a matter of fact, the first major stop had already been announced as St. Louis, Missouri, and the train was not far from the city’s outskirts.

At least one issue of the secret move was now settled, and for most of the men it was a relief to know that this time they were traveling in an easterly direction. The majority of the men in the 313th Infantry were from the eastern half of the United States, and were glad to know that they were returning to home territory. Speculation ran high as to just what the eventual destination was. Now that they knew they were traveling east, many of the men were inclined to put more faith in the shipping address that had been stamped on the TAT (To Accompany Troops) equipment. That address had clearly stated Boston, Massachusetts, as the embarkation point. But by the simple process of deduction the men were still not certain whether this would be their initial destination or not. For if Boston was to be the port of embarkation, would it not be quite likely that some other point be chosen for the staging area? Many felt that New York or New Jersey might be the stopping-off point. Others felt that the destination would be Massachusetts, at a camp located somewhere near Boston. Still others were discussing the possibility of moving southward into Louisiana. There had been rumors among the men that the 79th Division might be heading there for spring maneuvers, and despite all evidence to the contrary, there were those who believed this might be possible. No one really knew. At best, they could only await developments, putting the pieces together as events transpired.

Transportation facilities for moving the troops from Camp Phillips to their new destination were of the same high standard as had previously been experienced. The men travelled via Pullman, and were consequently assured of sufficient rest while en route. Before entraining at Camp Phillips, orders had been given to pack all equipment in newly issued duffel bags. One duffel bag had been issued to each man. They were a new item of issue and replaced the familiar barrack bags which had accompanied the troops in the past. One duffel bag was large enough to hold all of the soldier’s equipment, whereas it had been necessary to carry two of the old-type barrack bags. The new-type bag was much easier to handle than the barrack bags had been, and it looked as though they would be generally more serviceable. A shoulder strap made it possible for the men to carry them on their backs when necessary, and although they were naturally heavy when all equipment was packed in them, they were far less bulky.

The uniform for the trip included the familiar olive drab trousers, shirt, tie and overcoat. Field jackets, rifle belt, leggings and steel helmets were worn, and the men carried arms. When the alert to move out had been given an advance detail took the duffel bags to the railhead by truck, and the men followed later on foot. Each company had been assigned a specific car number, and the entraining process had been carried out with little or no confusion.

During the first twenty-four hours of travel the states of Kansas, Missouri, Illinois and Indiana were covered, and the train was still heading east. By mid-morning of the second day the state of Ohio had been crossed, and it was noted that the route took a more northerly direction out of Cleveland, Ohio. By evening of the second day a tip of the state of Pennsylvania had been covered and New York state had been entered. The route then continued to follow a northeasterly direction and a stop was made at Buffalo, New York. By this time everyone felt sure that Massachusetts would be the eventual destination. Speculation now centered on the possible name and location of the camp, and there was much conversation about various camps in the vicinity of Boston, Massachusetts. The train rumbled on, and after leaving Buffalo stops were made at Rochester, Syracuse, and Schenectady, New York. Thereafter the route veered southeast into Massachusetts, and no major stops were made until the train reached its final destination early the following morning.

The route of travel just described was but one of several routes taken by the various companies and units. Transportation had been routed by the most direct course available, but because of crowded wartime conditions, the routes deviated widely. Some of the troops had travelled from Camp Phillips to Kansas City, Missouri, then north through Rock Island and Joliet, Illinois, into Chicago. From Chicago the route had veered slightly southward into Gary, Indiana, then northeast into Toledo, Ohio. Out of Toledo the course followed the shores of Lake Erie into Cleveland, Ohio, and on to Buffalo, New York. Thereafter it shifted southeast into Birmingham, New York, and
northeast from there into Massachusetts. Still other troops had taken a direct route east through the states of Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and into New York. From New York this group had then travelled north through Connecticut and into Massachusetts.

Upon arrival at the railhead of the new camp the men were naturally anxious to know where they were. There had been no signposts or large towns for a number of miles and consequently it was difficult to get oriented immediately. The trucks at the railhead were the first enlightening factor, for the letters CMS were to be seen on the front of each vehicle. These letters, it was soon learned, stood for Camp Myles Standish.

Camp Myles Standish was a thoroughly modern camp. As the men marched toward their respective areas they noticed modern buildings, barracks and well kept roads. The camp, situated in a wooded area, gave the impression of a summer colony. It was evident that the camp was well equipped, and everyone seemed to feel that they would like it here. No one knew, of course, how long their stay at Camp Myles Standish would be. If this was to be a staging area (and most of the men now felt sure it was), then the length of time spent at this camp would be reasonably short. The usual length of time for remaining in a staging area was only a matter of from one to three weeks, after which a move was usually made to a port of embarkation. The men were ready for whatever was to come, but were hoping nevertheless that their stay at Camp Myles Standish would at least be long enough to enable them to get away for a few hours on pass. They had already learned that Myles Standish was less than thirty-five miles from Boston, Massachusetts, and could be reached by bus in less than an hour's time. Providence, Rhode Island, was also nearby, and regular bus service was available.

A full schedule had been outlined for the men during their stay at Camp Myles Standish. There was much to be done, and, as the men were soon to learn, very little time to do it in. From the moment of their arrival they were informed that henceforth they were to be on call twenty-four hours a day, awaiting orders and instructions. Thereafter, life was a constant series of company formations, during which new orders were given and an outline of duties for the next few hours were made known. No one was allowed to leave the camp or even the company area without special permission. The men stayed together at all times. Even while walking to and from the messhall, they were required to march in company formation and constant checks were made to ascertain whether or not all personnel were present or accounted for. No one was allowed to visit the post exchanges except in groups of ten or more, and these groups were supervised by a noncommissioned officer. Later, they were told, they would be free to go to the nearby theaters or service clubs, and, if time permitted, they might possibly be granted passes.

During the first few days much was accomplished. The men were given frequent physical inspections, took shots for typhus, stood showdown inspections during which all clothing and equipment was checked and rechecked, were issued new, improved-type gas masks and impregnated clothing, had further chemical warfare instruction as well as hand-to-hand combat training. Meantime an athletic schedule was put into effect and softball and touch football games were scheduled. The athletic schedule provided relaxation and kept the men occupied. Later, after the first twenty-four hours in camp, they were given added freedom and were allowed to visit the motion-picture theaters and service clubs.

The first units and companies of the 313th Infantry had arrived at Camp Myles Standish on April 1. The final trainload arrived on the evening of April 2. The personnel section, meanwhile, had been arranging to pay the men for the month of March, and on the morning of April 3 the men were paid. Everyone was exceptionally anxious for a payday at this particular time. The men were not only broke as a result of the frequent social activities at Camp Phillips, but were also anxious to have some ready cash on hand in the event they were scheduled for an overseas move.

From the very first, it was evident to all personnel that Camp Myles Standish was not to be a permanent station. It was unquestionably a staging area, and this being the case, the men did not expect to remain in this location for any great length of time. On the other hand, however, they did not expect the great haste with which the staging area requirements were being carried out. The entire 313th Infantry seemed to be working against time. This seemed particularly true in the case of the 1st Battalion and Cannon Company. For reasons unknown, these troops had apparently been put on a priority list, and within two days had completed all staging area requirements. This fact was not known to the other battalions and special units. Nor was it generally known by them that on the evening of April 3 the entire 1st Battalion and Cannon Com-
pany were suddenly alerted and moved, early on the morning of April 4, to an unknown destination. Since no one expected an alert order so soon after arrival at the staging area, the majority of the troops left behind had no idea that the move had been carried out.

Meanwhile, the troops remaining at Camp Myles Standish were kept busy with their own schedule. On April 3 and 4 a series of lectures were given by officers from Headquarters, Camp Myles Standish. The troops gathered for the event in an outdoor area located not far from the 313th Infantry area. Speakers representing the Intelligence Section, the Postal Section, the American Red Cross, and the various church organizations in Camp Myles Standish, spoke briefly to the men on matters pertaining to censorship, mail, the overseas activities of the Red Cross, and of the opportunities available to the men for worship during their stay in camp. The talks were interesting, and served not only to enlighten the men, but also to doubly assure them that an overseas move was imminent indeed.

The following day, April 5, a lecture was given during which all personnel were advised to join in a voluntary savings plan by investing more of their monthly pay in War Bonds. When troops leave the United States, it was explained, there is far less opportunity for spending money as freely or as easily as at home. Overseas, there were fewer goods and services available. Particularly in England, they were told, rationing of all goods was quite severe and it was therefore unwise to have much money on hand. Many of the men took advantage of this opportunity to save and signed up for stipulated monthly amounts.

By this time it was a foregone conclusion in the minds of everyone that an overseas move was near. The preparation was far too complete for any other possibility. Moreover, the speed with which events were moving indicated clearly that things would begin happening soon. It was a certainty now that the men would not remain at Camp Myles Standish for any considerable length of time. They had been here but a few days and already the final preparations for an overseas move were virtually complete. The men had every reason to believe that there was purpose in this haste, and had already abandoned the hope of being able to get away on pass for even a brief period.

On the evening of April 5 the alert came. Regimental headquarters released the word that all units and companies were to prepare immediately for a move from Camp Myles Standish. Company and unit commanders were given the time of departure. Troops were told to pack all equipment according to a specified plan. A full-field pack with blanket roll and all accessories would be worn. Arms would also be carried. All other equipment was to be packed in the duffel bag.

There was much to be done in a few hours' time once the alert order had been given. Not only did equipment have to be packed, but the barracks, latrines and surrounding grounds had to be thoroughly policed. The men worked late that night and at best were able to get only a few hours' sleep. Very early on the morning of April 6 they were awakened, ate an early breakfast, and awaited the order to move out.

Arrangements had been made to pick up all duffel bags at a central collecting area on the morning of April 6, from which point they would be taken by truck to the Camp Myles Standish railhead. This made it necessary for the men to carry the duffel bags, plus all other equipment, for some distance on foot. Dawn had not yet broken when the men started out, and the march, although short, was difficult. "The man was never born of woman," remarked one officer jokingly, "who could carry that much equipment for any length of time."

After the duffel bags had been collected the men marched in formation to the railhead. It was still not fully daylight when they arrived. Guide torches still burned at the edge of the road. The men lined up in long columns and stood at ease until all companies and units arrived, and waited thereafter until the signal to entrain was given. On command, the entraining process began, and in record time all troops were loaded and ready to move out.

The trains began moving shortly after 7:00 A.M. Because of the crowded conditions within the cars, no one was permitted to remove his pack. Even so, it was a relief for the troops to be able to sit. The packs were exceptionally heavy. In view of the fact that the trip was to be a short one, however, it would have been more confusing and difficult to remove them than it was to leave them on.

The men remained on the train for approximately one hour, and at 8:00 A.M. arrived at their destination. During the brief trip they had passed through Milton, Taunton, and the outskirts of Roxbury, Massachusetts. They were now at the Port of Embarkation, Commonwealth Pier, Boston, Massachusetts.

Morale was high as the men detrained. No sooner had the train pulled up to the pier than the 79th Division Band began playing familiar airs: "Over There,"
from the folks back home would be waiting for them doughnuts among the troops, telling them that a gift reformed in columns by companies. Red Cross worksiastically, and took in as much of the sights as they ers were on hand and began distributing hot coffee and distance from the train to an assembly area where they aboard ship. The men drank their coffee, talked enthusiastiably, and took in as much of the sights as they could in the few brief minutes before embarkation began. They were facing a gangplank which led to one of the decks of a large ship, the name of which was not yet discernible. "She's a beauty," someone re-marked. "Yeah," someone else chimed in, "and that gangplank leads a hell of a long way from the good old U.S.A."

Shortly after 8:30 A.M. the command was given for the first troops to embark. A faultless system had been devised for checking on all personnel as they moved in single file toward the gangplank. Each soldier had been given a number, and all troops were lined up by number, both when entraining at Camp Myles Standish, and at the pier when they had detrained. Now, as the troops moved forward in single file, a transporta- tion officer, with a roster of all personnel, was calling the last name of each soldier in the line. The soldier had been instructed beforehand to answer, when his name was called, by giving his first name and middle initial. After being accounted for the soldier was given a cardboard slip with his cabin and deck number printed thereon. Soon the troops were filing past the checking point with clockwork precision, and were moving up the gangplank toward the troopship.

The sudden departure and disappearance of the 1st Battalion and Cannon Company was fully understood once the men were on board ship. The 1st Battalion and Cannon Company had made the same trip by train two days before, had arrived at Commonwealth Pier, had embarked on the troopship, and had since been assisting in the job of getting the troopship in readiness for the remainder of the troops now arriv-in. The name of the ship was soon known too. She was the Strathmore, a British steamer, manned by a British crew. Little more was known until later about the size or history of the ship, but all agreed that she was a big one and was comparatively new.

Throughout the morning of April 6 the process of embarkation moved forward without difficulty, and considering the large number of troops being taken aboard, nothing but praise and commendation could be said for the excellent way in which matters were handled. Officials of the Transportation Corps aboard the Strathmore later remarked that at no time in their experience had an embarkation been effected with less confusion and less difficulty. They had only the highest praise for the work done by the 1st Battalion, Cannon Company, and the advance party of officers who had been in charge.

The regimental commander, Col Sterling A. Wood, had been appointed commanding officer of all troops aboard the Strathmore. His staff included Lt Benjamin F. Westervelt, Adjutant; Lt Col Edwin M. Van Bibber, Provost Marshal; Capt Rowland H. Jensen (310th Field Artillery), Assistant Provost Marshal; Maj David C. McNeilly (310th Field Artillery), Safety Officer; Capt William W. Allen (310th Field Artillery), Baggage Officer; Capt Chester B. Pasternak (314th Infantry), Police and Sanitation Officer; Capt Harrie S. Keck, Mess Officer; Capt John B. Timmons, Gun­ nery Officer; Capt Herbert E. Halliday, Postal Officer; Lt James J. Baker, Signal Officer; Lt Max R. Kreis (314th Infantry), Finance Officer; and Capt Henry H. Bear, Orientation Officer. The deck field officers included Lt Col Clair B. Mitchell, F Deck; Lt Col Augustus H. Bode, Jr., G Deck; Lt Col Roy V. Porter, H Deck; Lt Col Robert H. Stafford (310th Field Artillery), D Deck; and Lt Col Gilman A. Huff (314th Infantry), E Deck.

On the morning of April 6 Colonel Wood and his staff had boarded the Strathmore. On that same morn­ ing the 1st Battalion and Cannon Company arrived. Colonel Wood assumed command immediately there­after, and in cooperation with the transport com­ mander, Maj S. Parker Foos, complete details for handling the troops on April 6 had been worked out. Similarly, both the personnel of Cannon Company and of the 1st Battalion had been assigned their duties preparatory to the arrival of the remaining troops. Cannon Company had been detailed as gunners, watchers and antiaircraft personnel for the entire voyage. Troops of the 1st Battalion took care of all jobs incident to preparing the Strathmore for the arrival of the remaining troops on April 6.

Despite the fact that the embarkation on the morn­ing of April 6 had proceeded smoothly, the day was a difficult one for most of the troops aboard ship. Par­ticularly on the lower decks, conditions were anything but comfortable that first day. Six thousand troops were being loaded on the Strathmore, which normally, in peacetime, accommodated only 1,500 passengers.

"The Infantry," and other tunes. The troops, carrying all equipment plus the duffel bags, marched a short distance from the train to an assembly area where they reformed in columns by companies. Red Cross workers were on hand and began distributing hot coffee and doughnuts among the troops, telling them that a gift
All available space had been put to use to accommodate troops and equipment, and because the process of embarkation was continuing through the entire day, all personnel were required to remain in their assigned cabins or decks. Personnel on the upper decks were given permission to smoke in specified areas, but on the lower decks no smoking could be allowed until after all troops were aboard ship. It was late in the afternoon before troops on the lower decks could go above to get a breath of fresh air and enjoy a long-awaited cigarette. In the meantime, they had been sitting under crowded circumstances below. By evening, however, the first hot meal was served and the men felt better. Equipment was being put in order, and the troops were beginning to know their way around.

It is difficult to convey an accurate word-picture of conditions and life aboard a troopship. One has to live the experience to fully appreciate it. Certainly, no member of the 313th Infantry will ever forget the voyage. By way of background it will be of interest to know something of the size and history of the Strathmore. The Strathmore, a British steamer, was the thirteenth largest steamship in the world. She was a de luxe liner, owned by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Ship Company, Ltd., which operated a regular passenger service between England and the Indies before the war. She had a water displacement of 23,500 tons, and was first launched in 1936. When World War II began the Strathmore was immediately taken over by the British Government for use as a troopship, and had made many a voyage carrying British troops and supplies to combat areas. This was her first mission however, as a transport carrying American troops. She had made the voyage from Liverpool, England, to Boston Harbor without escort, and had been docked at Commonwealth Pier, Boston, for about ten days before the war. She had a water displacement of 23,500 tons, and was first launched in 1936. When World War II began the Strathmore was immediately taken over by the British Government for use as a troopship, and had made many a voyage carrying British troops and supplies to combat areas. This was her first mission however, as a transport carrying American troops. She had made the voyage from Liverpool, England, to Boston Harbor without escort, and had been docked at Commonwealth Pier, Boston, for about ten days before the first American troops had boarded her. Now she was loaded with troops and equipment, ready to carry them to their unknown destination abroad.

The entire 313th Infantry was aboard the Strathmore. So was the 2d Battalion of the 314th Infantry, the 79th Reconnaissance Troop, the 310th Field Artillery, as well as sixty-three American nurses from the 4th Auxiliary Surgical Group. Every cabin, every room, every available square foot of floor space was utilized. Those on the upper decks were the more fortunate from the standpoint of comfort. The upper decks, naturally, had been built to accommodate the first-class passengers in prewar days, while the lower decks had been used for third-class passage. On the upper decks the majority of the personnel slept in cots. Below, hammocks, mattresses or any other available bedding was put to use. Troops on the lower decks soon got used to the crowded conditions, however, and order replaced the confusion of the first day.

Blackout regulations were put into effect aboard the Strathmore from the very first. On the evening of April 6 all troops were informed that blackout regulations would be in effect beginning at 7:30 P.M., but troops were allowed to smoke on certain decks until 11:30 P.M. the first evening aboard ship. This was permissible because the Strathmore was still docked at Commonwealth Pier and was not due to sail until sometime the following morning. All orders were issued to the troops over a special loudspeaker system which could be heard in all parts of the ship simultaneously. Certain orders pertaining to the activities of the crew were given from time to time by the ship's captain from the bridge. The majority of the ship's orders, however, were given by order of the commanding officer of troops, Colonel Wood. World news from the ship's radio room was also broadcast to all personnel during the entire voyage.

The troops were tired on that first evening, and despite the excitement of embarkation they slept well that first night. Promptly at 6:00 A.M. the following morning, they were awakened and life aboard the Strathmore began. The ship was already moving, and many of the troops crowded the decks even before breakfast to ascertain where they were. The Strathmore was on the high seas, completely out of sight of land. During the night, at 1:30 A.M., she had hoisted anchor and left Commonwealth Pier. Then, while the troops slept, she had sailed down Boston Harbor, past Governors Island and Castle Island Fort, until she had reached the Boston Light, a mammoth lighthouse located some twelve miles from Commonwealth Pier. From there the Strathmore had headed for the high seas, where she had picked up sixteen other ships which were now traveling with her in convoy. Other ships joined the convoy later, making a total of over thirty ships, including the escort vessels.

No words can quite describe the emotion or thoughts of the average soldier when he experiences the first glimpse of the open sea, and finds himself a part of a large convoy en route to points unknown. Possibly no other experience, with the exception of actual combat, lives more vividly in his memory. For it is here that he first fully realizes his severance from home. It
is here that his mind automatically reviews the past and speculates on an uncertain future. It is here that he comes to realize the full import of his years of training and his fundamental purpose in a world at war. Underneath the excitement, underneath the casual comment of the troops on that early morning of April 7, it was evident that these thoughts were at work in the minds of all. All day long, whenever the troops were free, you would find them crowding the railings of the open decks. They watched, hour after hour, the ships, the sea, and the barren horizon. They knew now that they were removed from the safety of their own home shores, and they felt themselves a part of something too big for them to fully understand. It was a bigness in which they at first felt lost, but later came to feel was their greatest security. It was the bigness of the whole show. The immense convoy, the thousands upon thousands of troops; and the vastness of the sea itself.

The first breakfast was served at 7:30 A.M. The task of feeding the 6,000 troops aboard the Strathmore was unquestionably the most difficult problem with which officials had to cope. Both because of the large number of troops, and because of the crowded conditions, only two meals a day were served. The noon meal was eliminated entirely. Rather than attempting to assemble the troops in a central area for feeding in cafeteria style, the troops ate all meals in their own quarters. The food was carried to them in large containers from the main kitchen located on F Deck. There was always a sufficient quantity of food, and the men had enough to eat, despite the fact that only two meals were served daily. The quality, however, was not always the very best. The tea and coffee were constant targets of good-natured criticism and comment. GI coffee, the troops agreed, was bad enough, but never again would they make a disparaging remark about the GI brand. All troops ate from their messkits, and because of inadequate plumbing facilities plus crowded conditions, it was difficult to wash the messkits properly. Inasmuch as the men ate, slept and lived in the same quarters, the problem of cleanliness was a serious factor. But constant vigilance was maintained. Daily inspections of quarters and messkits were made, and as a whole, the troops did a fine job of keeping their quarters in good condition.

It was altogether impossible to plan any training while aboard ship. Even classroom instruction was discontinued for the duration of the voyage. The attention of officers in charge was directed solely toward the end of assuring a safe crossing for all troops, and of keeping them occupied with diversionary interests while the voyage lasted. To insure a minimum loss of life in the event of disaster, daily boat drills were held. At 10:30 A.M. daily an alert was scheduled, and when the alarm sounded, all troops moved immediately to specified locations on the upper decks. All troops, day and night, were required to wear life preservers. From the moment the soldier came aboard ship until he debarked the life preserver became a permanent part of his equipment. He was allowed to remove it only when sleeping, and even then, regulations required him to have it within immediate reach. This same rule applied to all officers and members of the ship's crew. After the troops became familiar with the boat-drill routine, a night drill was carried out. Under blackout conditions all troops were required to move to their stipulated places on the upper decks. In case the ship was torpedoed, it was explained, the lighting system would probably fail, and it was essential that the troops knew how to find their way to safety under conditions of total darkness. The troops learned quickly and willingly to comply with all regulations, and within a few days the drills were executed without any difficulty whatsoever.

The daily boat-drill lasted for a one-hour period. Actually, the drill itself took only a matter of minutes. Once the troops were assembled on the upper decks, however, an orientation lecture was held, during which topics of current interest concerning national and international affairs would be discussed. Actually, the lectures assumed the proportions of a debate, and proved highly interesting. Meantime, on the lower decks, special details were assigned to thoroughly police all quarters.

As commanding officer of troops aboard the Strathmore, Colonel Wood had foreseen far in advance the absolute necessity of keeping the troops entertained and occupied during the voyage. There is always an undercurrent of nervous tension aboard a troopship, and the possibility of submarine or air attack is ever present. Although the men never showed it outwardly, their minds were ever on the alert for the possibility of attack. Under such conditions, to fail to keep the men busy, or to fail to provide entertainment and relief from this mental pressure, would have been disastrous insofar as morale was concerned. With this in mind Colonel Wood had instructed the Special Service Officer, Capt Wilbur N. Earl, to provide entertainment and relaxation for all troops during the voyage. This
order was effectively carried out. Daily movies were shown. Boxing bouts were scheduled, and there were daily periods of physical exercise. Aside from this, a group of enlisted men had volunteered their services and had formed a band which roamed the decks during the day and at night, providing music for the troops.

The men much of the time provided their own entertainment. Dice games and card games were in evidence everywhere. In the cabins below and on the decks above you could always find gambling games in progress. No effort was made to curb this practice, and it was a good thing, for the men found relaxation and pleasure in the games. On the main deck many big games took place. Those who had won a few hundred dollars while playing for smaller stakes, would eventually take a chance in the more professional games that formed on the main deck. In these games it was not unusual to see one soldier "fade" another for hundreds of dollars, and either win or lose on a roll of the dice. Much money was lost, and much won. Yet this was understandable, for money, for the mere sake of its value, meant little to the men themselves. Their attitude was one of "here today and gone tomorrow" and they reflected it in everything they said or did.

Such was the general atmosphere and activity during the long overseas voyage. In the main the troops did a fine job of maintaining order and of keeping morale at a high standard. There were moments, to be sure, when the troops became apprehensive. On various occasions rumors of enemy submarine activity spread throughout the ship, and on more than one occasion the rumors were justified. During the course of the voyage one enemy submarine was known to have been sunk, and another believed sunk; but at no time on route was the Strathmore or any of the neighboring ships in the convoy actually torpedoed.

Perhaps the most damaging factor to morale was the traditional and ever-to-be-expected seasickness which affected many of the troops. During much of the voyage the water was choppy and rough, and whenever this occurred, men by the hundreds would head for the rail in the hope of making it in time. Actually, however, only a small percentage of the troops had difficulty after the first day or so, but for those who couldn't adjust themselves to the rolling and tossing of the ship, the trip was indeed an unhappy one.

The overseas voyage lasted for ten days. Utmost secrecy was maintained throughout the entire trip as to the eventual destination, and it was not until land was first sighted that the actual docking point was made known. To be sure, the troops had been certain for many days that they were headed for the European Theater of Operations, and knowing this, they also felt that their destination would probably be England or somewhere on the British Isles. But throughout the entire voyage they were neither told where they were going or where the ship would actually dock. All opinions had been mere guesswork.

The date of April 15, 1943, was an all-important one in the already eventful history of the 313th Infantry. On that date land was first sighted and the official information was released that the Strathmore was approaching the calm waters of the Firth of Clyde, and would thereafter dock at the port of Grenock, Scotland. Immediately, excitement among the troops reached an all-time high. Soldiers jammed the railings to get their first glimpse of terra firma in ten full days. The tension felt during the long voyage was over now, and the journey into the unknown had come to a near successful conclusion.

Night closed in before the Strathmore dropped anchor at the port of Grenock. When morning came, however, the troops awakened early to find the great ship safely anchored in the Scottish port. The cry of thousands of sea gulls filled the early morning air, and, looking out across the water, the troops saw the green fields and hills of Scotland, with homes and factories dotting the picturesque landscape.

That was Sunday morning, April 16, and until late afternoon of the same day the Strathmore remained docked at Grenock. Then, at 4:30 P.M., she hoisted anchor and sailed up the Firth of Clyde where she again docked at the port of Glasgow, Scotland. The trip, although short, was one of breath-taking beauty. The hillsides were fresh and green from the April rains, and the spring air lent itself to perfect visibility. The least artistic of those aboard were impressed with the sights they saw, and few, if any, will ever forget them.

For two full days the Strathmore remained docked at Glasgow, and meantime, none of the troops on board had as yet set foot on land. During this period final preparations for the debarkation were made and finally, at 11:30 P.M. on Tuesday, April 18, the first troops debarked.

They had at last set foot on the British Isles, and in high spirits, looked forward with confidence and hope to their new life abroad.
Chapter 8: The British Isles

April 19, 1944 was a welcome day for personnel of the 313th Infantry. For three weeks the Regiment had been continually on the move. During that period they had traveled approximately four thousand miles by land and water. They had traveled halfway across the United States by train, had made the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean to the British Isles, and had just completed the trip by train through Scotland and into England. They had regretted neither the trip nor the experience, but it was good to know that they had finally arrived at their destination. Now, they thought, there might at least be a short period during which the severe security restrictions could be lifted. There should be time for passes now; for brief moments of freedom long since denied. There should be mail from home.

It was raining on the day the troops arrived, but morale was high nevertheless. There had long since been a standing joke among the troops that it was sure to rain whenever the 313th Infantry planned a move, and ironically enough, it usually happened that way. True, the majority of the men had no conception of the nature of spring weather in England. They did not know that rain was virtually a daily affair. Nor did they know that on the British Isles it remained chilly and damp, often into late May and June. But neither the weather nor thoughts of an uncertain future could dampen their spirits now. They were safe in England, and were expecting to stay for a while.

The story of the 313th Infantry in England cannot be fully told unless we first relate the experiences of the advance party, authorized by Colonel Wood while at Camp Phillips, to precede the Regiment to the British Isles. It was the job of the advance party to prepare the way for the arrival of the troops. They had left Camp Phillips prior to the departure of the Regiment and the Division, and had reached the British Isles on April 6. The officers of the party comprised Maj Phil Lofink, Maj John A. McConnell, Maj Maynard C. Miller, Capt Thomas L. Lyons and Lt Ernest J. Pesek. The enlisted men included T/Sgt Charles McRussel, S/Sgt Robert E. Thurman, S/Sgt Herman Devitorio, Sgt Sidney E. Smith, T/4 Lewis J. Nemeth, T/4 Frank E. Gensler and T/4 Dwight G. Gamble.

To say the least, the advance party experienced an eventful trip. They had traveled by train from Camp Phillips, Kansas, to Brooklyn, New York, and from there to Fort Hamilton, New York. They had remained at Fort Hamilton for ten days, awaiting orders to embark, and during this period were at liberty much of the time. From all reports the ten days at Fort Hamilton were memorable ones for all concerned. Frequent trips were made by both the officers and enlisted men to New York City during the unexpected but welcome ten-day reprieve from active duty. It was a case of cramming as much life in the USA as possible into the time allotted.

Then, on March 30 the entire party embarked on the world-famed Queen Elizabeth. Prior to this, however, Brig Gen Frank U. Greer, Assistant Division Commander of the 79th Division, had boarded the Queen Elizabeth on March 29. He took with him a staff comprising of Lt Col O’Riordan, appointed Chief of Staff during the voyage, and Capt Thomas L. Lyons, who had been appointed Troop Adjutant.

The trip across the Atlantic was unforgettable. The Queen Elizabeth, sister ship of the famed Queen Mary, and the largest and fastest passenger ship afloat, was loaded to capacity with troops from over three hundred different units representing many nationalities. In all, there were a total of over 14,000 troops and a crew of 900 aboard the Queen Elizabeth. Many celebrities were aboard, including Edward R. Stettinius, Under Secretary of State, and a party of twenty other distinguished civilians. S/Sgt Joe Lewis, the famed Brown Bomber of peacetime days, was also aboard. Among the many different units represented, there was a group of some Wacs, 15 Red Cross girls, and 600 newly commissioned Air Corps lieutenants.

The Queen Elizabeth traveled without convoy. She made the crossing from New York to Grenock, Scotland, in five days, arriving at Grenock on April 5. For reasons of security she had traveled an indirect route, and her course was changed frequently during the voyage.

All personnel on the Queen Elizabeth debarked at Grenock, Scotland. From there the 313th Infantry advance party traveled by train to Northwich, Cheshire, England. In Northwich the advance party reported to officials of 79th Division Headquarters, where they remained for a four-day period. During this time, Division Headquarters was set up in Northwich, and plans were formulated for the location of the regiments within the Division.

Perhaps the greatest single problem confronting American Army officials in England was the acute lack of space for the housing and training of American troops. The entire British Isles was already an armed camp. All available housing space was being utilized. Training areas were few and far between. As a con-
sequence, public parks were turned into camps, and public buildings were converted into barracks. The 313th Infantry was to be allocated a bivouac area in a location which had formerly been a public park, known as Garswood Park, in the town of Ashton in Lancashire, England. When the advance party arrived there, however, it was found that the area was not sufficient to accommodate all of the 313th Infantry, and because of this, the Regiment was split up for the first time. This was only an emergency measure, and although the Regiment was to be located in two separate areas some thirty miles apart, the training and activities of each were to be the same, and the 313th Infantry was to be reunited as soon as possible.

The advance party had a big job in getting things organized for the oncoming troops. In a period of less than six days both camps had to be set up and ready to receive the Regiment. The bulk of the troops were to be located at Garswood Park. The remaining troops were to be located in an area known as Marbury Hall, Cheshire, England. Troops of VIII Corps headquarters were to be located there also. All the rest of the troops of the 313th Infantry, including the 310th Field Artillery Battalion, were to be located at Garswood Park.

On arrival at Garswood Park the advance party got busy immediately. Meantime, Maj Phil Lofink was placed in complete charge of setting up the camp area at Marbury Hall. He was later assigned as Executive Officer, working under Lt Col Mitchell who was assigned as CO of the Marbury Hall Camp.

Both Garswood Park and Marbury Hall were almost completely devoid of facilities when the advance party arrived. Both areas had a few barrel-shaped buildings scattered about, which were used as kitchens and administrative buildings. But aside from these few structures neither location gave any evidence of being a probable camp site. To further complicate matters there were only four vehicles available, and these were divided equally between the two camps. All supplies had to be requisitioned and were slow in arriving. Companies C and D of the 749th Tank Battalion, already stationed in England, were detailed to assist in putting up the pyramidal tents which later served to house the troops.

Despite all difficulties both camps were ready to receive the troops when they arrived six days following the arrival of the advance party. The pyramidal tents gave both areas the appearance of a camp, and all preparations were far enough along that the troops moved in on schedule.

It would be impossible to relate in detail all the events that transpired during the time the 313th Infantry remained in England. It is perhaps best, therefore, that the outstanding incidents be related, and that a word picture of the sort of life experienced by the troops be portrayed. In the early weeks the weather was cold and damp, and at night the dampness seeped through the thin layer of canvas on the Army cots, and many a soldier shivered in his tent "hotel." It was a common practice to sleep with one's clothes on; in fact, it was uncommon in those early days in England to find a soldier who removed more than his GI shoes when he turned in. Then, too, there was little space for training, and as a consequence, the training while in England was confined predominantly to frequent hikes, marches and platoon or company problems. Later, frequent night problems and operations were conducted, and on the whole, much valuable experience was gained during the period that the 313th Infantry remained on British soil.

Morale was generally high throughout the entire period that the 313th Infantry remained in England. Almost from the very beginning passes were granted. Fifty per cent of the Regiment were allowed on pass at any one time to visit nearby towns, and on weekends, members of the Regiment visited the larger cities located within a one-hundred-mile radius of Garswood Park and Marbury Hall. Night after night the pubs of the surrounding towns were filled to overflowing with American troops. They drank freely of English beer, sang American and English songs, and mingled with Tommies and civilians. Often, during the days spent in England, it was difficult to tell that a war was on at all, for the English kept their spirits high, and the American troops stationed there made every day a holiday after day's work was over. Yet on visits to the larger cities, the grim reminder of the war yet to be won was ever present. There, Jerry had visited with his Luftwaffe, and bomb damage was heavy. Block after block in cities of the size of Liverpool were destroyed, and yet, despite this, life seemed somehow to continue with a reasonably small degree of interruption.

Frequent lectures were given to troops of the 313th Infantry during their stay in England. For one thing, it was strongly impressed upon the troops that a severe scarcity of goods and food existed through the British Isles. Soldiers were warned not to buy food or goods anywhere while on pass, and more, were asked not to accept the hospitality of English civilians who offered food to American troops.
Company G, with men from the Royal Navy, participate in ceremonies during “Salute to the Soldier Week” at Haydock, England.

All in all, the English did their best to make the troops feel at home during their stay. Many soldiers formed life-long friends while there, and since both the Americans and the English spoke a common tongue, it was a simple matter to get acquainted.

Only the children were at all forward in approaching the Americans. Wherever an American soldier went, small children would follow them in droves, chanting the familiar “Any gum, chum?” And even though the soldier’s ration for gum was only two packages per week, the kids usually got what they were after.

During the month of May several important events took place which are well worth mentioning. On May 6 a special parade was given in Haydock, England, in which the 313th Infantry played an honor role. The parade had been scheduled as a part of the activities of “Salute the Soldier Week” in the town of Haydock. “Salute the Soldier Week” had been set aside for the purpose of honoring Allied soldiers of World War II, and for raising funds for the continued prosecution of the war. The 313th Infantry had been chosen as the American unit to participate in the parade, and Company G was selected for the occasion. It was a colorful affair, and Company G distinguished itself as an outstanding unit of the day’s ceremonies. The streets were lined with American and British flags, and as the American soldiers moved in column through the main streets of the town, English civilians cheered and waved and shouted the familiar “Hi, Yank!”

Then on May 12, a retreat parade was held at Garswood Park. The affair had been scheduled in order that the townspeople of Ashton in Makersfield might witness American soldiers on dress parade. Much interest had been shown by the local townspeople in the activities of the American soldiers stationed there. The retreat parade, therefore, was scheduled predominantly for their benefit. The public turned out in large numbers to witness the event, which was highly colorful and in no small sense of the word, inspiring. The 3d Battalion was selected as the honor battalion for the occasion, and F Company of the 2d Battalion was chosen as color guard. It was more than evident as the ceremonies progressed that the townspeople of Ashton in Makersfield were deeply impressed by the occasion.

As a climax to the events scheduled in May Lt Gen George S. Patton honored the Regiment by a personal visit during which he spoke to the officers and first-three-graders of the 313th Infantry. In his usual fiery manner, he impressed upon the noncoms the importance of their job, and told them in no uncertain terms that the time was soon to come when they would be called upon to actually lead men in battle against a
Lype Hill, England, on D-day, June 6, 1944

determined and vicious enemy. The General emphasized the fact that when that day came it would be a case of "shoot to kill... and shoot first." At the same time he praised the men for the excellent job they had done to date, and assured them that he was convinced they would more than show their worth when the big moment actually came.

As the month of May drew toward a close all members of the 313th Infantry felt quite at home in their new environment. The weather had become somewhat warmer, and with the privilege of nightly passes life had become interesting and pleasant for the troops. The officers of the staff, meanwhile, had moved into a luxurious home located not far from Garswood Park in the town of Ashton in Makersfield, where they enjoyed the comfort of home life in a manner surpassing even the better Army days in the United States. For these and other reasons no one was particularly anxious to leave England, although one and all knew full well that the time for movement elsewhere was rapidly approaching.

Then, on May 30 the final order came. Early in the morning the entire Regiment was alerted for a sudden move from Garswood Park and Marbury Hall. No one, excepting those in authority, knew the ultimate destination of the Regiment, but rumors spread like wild fire and the majority of the men seemed to believe they were due to be sent south toward London, or along the south coast of England. Tension ran high during those final days on Lype Hill, but the morale of the troops was excellent. They had expected the big moment for so long that they were actually eager for the time to come. Last-minute preparations were made. Final inspections of clothing and equipment were held. Then, on the morning of June 6 the electrifying word was flashed around that D-day had actually come and that the long-expected Channel crossing of Allied might had begun.

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of the word that D-day had arrived, word was received at Regimental Headquarters that the 313th Infantry, as well as the 79th Division, was to be prepared for another move. It was clear to everyone by now that this next move represented a final move-up prior to actually crossing the Channel. Now the troops knew fully that they would be in there fighting before very long, and they were eager to get started.

Events moved rapidly thereafter. On June 10 the expected move was made, and the entire Regiment (less administrative personnel left behind of necessity) moved by motor from Lype Hill to Dunster, England,
where they entrained for Plymouth, England, a distance of approximately one hundred miles. Their destination on this move was Crown Hill Camp, Plymouth, England—a marshalling area for troops scheduled for shipment across the English Channel.

If there were any doubt in anyone's mind as to what was soon to transpire, those doubts were dispelled when the troops arrived at Plymouth. But there were few who doubted their ultimate destination in the first place. They fully knew that this was it, and they were ready for whatever fate had in store.

For a few more days the troops remained at Crown Hill Camp. During the period all English or American money was changed into French invasion currency, and last-minute preparations were completed. Then on June 13, with everything in readiness, men and officers entrucked and moved to the port of embarkation.

The day and the hour had come for the 313th Infantry. Now they were to know the real meaning of their months and years of training. Now they were to become a part of the biggest war in history—an active, vital part of it. They had not been a part of D-day, but the part they were soon to play would be no less important. They were soon to be moving up to take their place side by side with the stupendous army of men who day by day were being sent into the fray. They were off to an early start, and they knew that the part they would play would be a vital one.

Yes, for these well trained soldiers of the 313th Infantry the time had come. In good spirits, with morale high, the men embarked on the waiting ships. Everything moved with precision accuracy, and without incident the Regiment was at last ready to depart.

That was on June 13, 1944, a date never to be forgotten in the history of the 313th Infantry.

June 13, 1944! What now would tomorrow bring?
Chapter 9: The Taking of Cherbourg

On June 14, 1944, the 313th Infantry landed on Utah Beach, beginning at 4:00 P.M. There was no enemy opposition but the sounds of spasmodic enemy shelling and bombing soon dispelled the last, lingering doubt that the Regiment was having another dry run.

The first man ashore was WO Lynn K. Copp of Regimental Headquarters Company, to be followed immediately by Capt Thomas L. Lyons and Lt John B. Mathews. Some of the landing craft closed onto the beach so that the men landed in only a few inches of water, while others grounded on small obstacles or sand bars and the officers and men waded ashore through waist-deep water.

The Regiment had behind it a wealth of pre-combat training. For nearly two years there had been a gradual shifting around of officers and men so that each would fit into his assigned place and those that the Regiment took ashore were the pick of the crop; they were ready for combat and needed only the seasoning influence of a few days of battle to change them into veteran fighters. They were mentally and physically fit for combat and all were eager to get started so that the whole business could be brought to an end and everybody return home.

All the careful plans of having the Regiment met by Division military police on the beach and guided into their initial assembly areas went awry. No one was on the beach to tell the unit where to go. The Regimental commander finally found a beach MP officer and learned the location of Transit Area No. 1. To this all units were started inland. The unit moved by marching along the main road towards Sebeville. Along the road it was met by Division staff officers and MPs and directed into its initial French home. The sides of the roads and the fields along the route of march were still mined and every few hundred yards would appear the sign "Achtung! Minen!"

When the Regiment, and the Division, landed it had become a part of the U. S. VII Corps which was then composed of the 4th, 9th, 90th and 79th Infantry Divisions and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. This corps had all landed on Utah Beach, beginning on D-day with the mission of cutting and then capturing the Cotentin Peninsula. The rapid seizure of the great port of Cherbourg, at the head of the peninsula, was a "must" in the early plans of the Allied high command. Cherbourg would give the Allies their first big port, and its possession would permit them to pour the vast numbers of men and quantities of supplies into France for the great battles that must soon be fought.

On June 14 the Allied front extended inland from Quinville. The 4th Division, on the right, was moving up the coast towards Montebourg; the 90th was on its left and the 9th was pointed towards Barneville across the peninsula. The airborne divisions were holding the lines to the south, stretching towards the U. S. V Corps to the left.

The route of march from the beach to the small village of Sebeville covered about nine miles. Here we had our first contact with the French inhabitants of the Normandy province. They were quiet, reserved, and thoroughly suspicious. They seemed not at all sure that the Americans had landed to stay. There was no hostility, but there certainly was no friendly welcome.

The first night was cold and wet. Many of the officers and men had not completely dried from their bath in the surf. Few of the motors had arrived and there were no blankets or any other items designed for comfort during the first long night. German air raiders came over to strike at the beaches and all officers and men listened to the explosions of the bombs and watched the streams of ack-ack tracers move into the sky towards the hostile planes. The Regiment was not affected by the bombing.

The first bivouac was roughly in the same general area where the 101st Airborne Division had landed. All over the area were evidences of their landing difficulties and early fighting. Scores of smashed gliders and planes dotted the obstacle-covered fields where the gliders had crashed into the trees atop the hedgerows, or the poles which the Germans had placed in all the large fields. A few dead Germans, battered tanks and destroyed equipment was mute evidence of the early fighting.

On June 15 most of the motor equipment, cannon and antitank guns came ashore, were de-waterproofed and joined their units. The Regiment was then complete, with the exception of the five hundred men, all field kitchens, and much equipment that had been left behind in England as the residue.

June 15 passed quietly while everyone looked the area over and began learning how to make living easier in a strange land where all the people spoke a strange tongue.

The remainder of the Division was coming in.

On June 16, the Regiment was alerted for a possible move to meet a German counterattack. With an alternate mission of taking over a large hill mass in the
area of the 82d Division to the south. All units prepared for the move but the orders did not arrive.

June 17 was quiet.

On June 18, the 9th Division broke through to the west and reached the coast of the peninsula at Barneville. This move set the stage for the orders that committed the Regiment to action. The 79th Division would relieve the 90th Division, and together with the 4th and 9th Divisions, would launch a concerted drive on the port of Cherbourg.

North of the Barneville—Valognes—Montebourg line the Cotentin Peninsula is hilly, and gradually increases in height toward Cherbourg. To the south of that line the land is flat and quite marshy with several small streams crossing the area. Much of the marshy terrain had been flooded by the Germans. All the land was covered with hedgerows—those countless, centuries-old mounds of earth, stone, roots and underbrush. These hedgerows bordered all the cultivated fields, orchards and roads and were being utilized with desperate energy by the enemy to hold back the surging waves of American power. Each field was to become a separate battlefield. There was no observation, no place where the artillery or infantry supporting weapon observer could see the area to the front. Observation was essential to secure the best results from our infantry weapons or the deadly artillery time fire. We simply could not see. Leaders must move towards the front lines to see even the troops within the same fields as themselves. Commanders could never see but a small portion of their commands.

Augmenting these formidable natural defenses were scores of enemy strongpoints, emplacements and concrete pillboxes.

The Regiment made a short foot march westward to place it behind elements of the 90th Division. On this march we passed through the small town of Pont l'Abbé, the first French town we had seen which had been completely destroyed.

The 313th Infantry relieved the 359th Infantry of the 90th Division about dusk on June 18.

H-hour for the Regiment was 5:00 A.M. on June 19, 1944. The dawn came up gray and rainy. One hour before the jump-off, one prisoner was captured by Company B, the first prisoner captured by either the Regiment or the Division.

The 313th Infantry relieved the 359th Infantry of the 90th Division about dusk on June 18.

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The 313th Infantry made the main effort of the Division in the left half of the Division's zone of advance. The Regiment jumped off from the vicinity of Colleville—Binneville. The 1st Battalion was on the left and the 3d Battalion was on the right. The 2d Battalion was in reserve. During this first day we were supported by the artillery fires from the 314th, 313th, and 915th Field Artillery Battalions of the 90th Division.

Contact with the enemy took place at 5:40 when Company K reported killing one German sniper. Within a few minutes Company I also killed a sniper. During the rest of the morning the resistance was little more than spasmodic. According to French inhabitants the Germans had largely moved north during the night, although small delaying forces had been left behind to hinder the advance. A few POWs were taken from these units.

By 2:00 P.M. the 1st Battalion had passed through Negreville and was fighting for its objective—the nose of high ground two thousand yards west of the hamlet of La Brique. A small German force was holding firmly to this high ground and a stiff fight developed before the 1st Battalion cleared the area. During this time they fired on and destroyed some German trucks loaded with reinforcements coming up the hill. It was during this fighting that the Regimental executive officer called on Lt Col Clair B. Mitchell for a report of his progress in clearing the hill. The reply came back:

"I am having one hell of a fine fight!"

That statement was typical of the fighting spirit of the Regiment.

The 3d Battalion had encountered considerably more resistance and for a time was held up in front of the high ground near the village of La Brique. The tanks and all available artillery were needed before the 3d Battalion was able to secure its objective, the town

Landing craft taking 313th men from the transport President Jackson to Utah Beach, June 14, 1944
of La Brique and the Bois de la Brique. During the late afternoon the 1st Battalion was digging in on its objective when it was ordered to attack east along the high ground to assist the advance of the 3d Battalion. When this order was received the battalion CP of the 1st Battalion had just been firmly established in one of the few houses that was still standing. They had built a fire and were busy cooking their K rations when they were told to move along east and help the rest of the Regiment.

At 6:00 P.M. the 2d Battalion, which was still in Regimental reserve, was ordered to attack almost straight westward to assist the 315th Infantry on the right. This regiment had run into trouble and was definitely halted. After this attack had been launched this order was changed so that the 2d Battalion swung around towards the north in the direction of Hill 79 at La Brique. During the late afternoon mortar ammunition for both front-line battalions had to be replaced. The 3d Battalion was nearly out of small-arms ammunition, as they had expended much on shooting at the trees and into the corners of the hedgerows in the early stages of the advance. Behind the 1st Battalion there was no place for vehicles to cross the double-track railroad line so the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon of the 1st Battalion blew lanes through the rails so that the ammunition vehicles could be moved forward.

The Regimental command post for the first night was located in a small apple orchard southeast of Negreville. Soon afterwards sniper fire zinged through the trees and the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon had another of its many successful small-time fights. It cleared out the snipers in the only approved fashion.

The night after the initial day's fighting was a busy one for everyone. We had taken some losses. Leaders had to be replaced and everything made ready to continue the advance. Water, ammunition and food was brought forward. Just as dusk was falling another report was received that the 3d Battalion was about out of ammunition. This was serious. All night long the ammunition and supply vehicles moved forward. It was rough going, for a number of by-passed German groups offered resistance. Some German tanks were still operating in the area over which we had advanced and on our right flank where the 315th Infantry had been held up. A few of the ammunition vehicles were cut off by these tanks and captured, only to be recaptured later. During this first day and night a number of vehicles were hit by enemy artillery and tank shells. Altogether it was a busy night.

The next objective was the high ground directly south of Cherbourg. Again the 313th Infantry was to make the main effort of the division as it moved north astride the Valognes—Cherbourg highway. Jumping off from the Bois de la Brique at 6:00 A.M., the assault echelon moved off in a column of battalions in the order: 2d, 1st, 3d. The column moved north to St. Joseph and thence northeast along the highway. Just as the column got started it ran into a torn-out bridge. While the foot troops continued forward the engineers started work on a crossing for our tanks and one for vehicles. Soon a truck appeared. On it was Lt Colonel Mitchell with some large sections of wooden flooring that he had discovered in the town of La Brique. These were quickly thrown across the stream making an improvised bridge over which the combat vehicles and radio vehicles of the battalions could move.

In the vicinity of Hau de Long the advance was so rapid that the Germans were unable to carry out their usual demolitions as four light tanks and one 88 gun were captured intact. Farther up the road, at Hau-aux-Samson, the 2d Battalion came under enemy fire, both artillery and machine-gun or burp-gun fire. It quickly deployed astride the main road and promptly attacked. The resistance proved to be light and the Regiment continued to advance until it reached the little hamlet of Delasse where long-range artillery fire was being delivered right down the main road. Machine guns entered the fight and made any further progress astride the main road impossible. The 2d Battalion was deployed to the right and the 1st Battalion was brought up alongside on the left of the highway. Here the Regiment had its first real experiences from direct fire of the famed German 88s. These high-velocity, direct-fire weapons were sited to prevent movement along the main highway. They did it. Their shells would simply walk up and down the main highway, and made it very uncomfortable for anyone who tried to use the road. They took a slight toll of vehicles and men and convinced even the most skeptical that their reputation was well deserved. We could all hear the gunfire, and while we were waiting to hear the whine of the incoming shell it would explode—often much closer than was at all pleasant.

It was now apparent that the Regiment had run against the outer belt of the enemy's main defenses of Cherbourg. We stopped in place to make a detailed
study of our zone. Throughout the night and day, patrols were sent forward to feel out the enemy's strength and try to find a weak spot in his lines. These patrols brought back much information but each time the enemy made us pay for getting this information. The enemy did no patrolling but reacted promptly to every patrol that we sent out. Spasmodic artillery fire continued to fall in our area throughout the day and night.

During the night of June 21-22 repeated broadcasts were made to the Germans in Cherbourg urging them to surrender. If the Germans were to accept the offered terms a white flag was to be displayed so that it could be seen at a main crossroad on the highway. Here the Regimental commander went at noon on June 22 to watch for any signs of the German surrender. The signs soon came—a few well placed salvos of artillery that landed in the immediate vicinity and put everybody in the ditches.

Plans had already been made and all orders issued for a joint air-ground assault on Cherbourg in case the Germans did not surrender. The army commander had told all divisions that the forthcoming attack on Cherbourg must be successful. Bad weather off the beaches brought the unloading of supplies and additional troops across the beaches to nearly a standstill. The port of Cherbourg must be seized.

At 12:40 P.M. on the 22d the Air Forces began a tremendous attack on the German first-line positions. For eighty minutes our planes were overhead, some going west, some going east and a number of them going in both directions. All the American troops had withdrawn a thousand yards behind our original front lines and artillery smoke shells marked off the targets, but a number of bombs fell throughout the Regimental area and our own planes had a picnic in strafing the whole countryside. It was surprising how few casualties resulted from the air attacks against our own troops. We could not help wondering what damage had been done to the Germans if practically no damage had been caused by the bombs that dropped among us.

The 313th Infantry jumped off at 2:00 P.M. in a column of battalions in the order: 1st, 2d, 3d. The 1st Battalion advanced rapidly for some distance and ran into the cleared area around the anti-tank ditches and the concrete pillboxes on the far side. They were stopped by very effective automatic fire from the German emplacements. Very bitter fighting took place during all the rest of the afternoon. The 3d Battalion was moved up around the left flank of the 1st Battalion, found a weak spot in the German lines, and was able to move forward so that it could attack these pillboxes from the rear. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had brought heavy concentrations of artillery fire down on the enemy pillboxes and were able to resume their advance. They overran some of the pillboxes and established contact with the 3d Battalion that was moving in from the right flank. After a change in direction the two units were again headed north and moving through the gathering darkness on into the night they reached the main Cherbourg highway near CR 177. The 2d Battalion was then directed to move forward to the right of the highway and follow in rear of the 1st Battalion. It was far past midnight when the leading units of the 1st and 3d Battalions reached the main highway. During the darkness the 2d Battalion was still moving and radio contact indicated that it was heading in to reach the main road, but it ran into some enemy resistance during the early morning hours, moved into rough terrain and lost direction and became confused in crossing some German fields of barbed wire.

The movement of the 1st and 3d Battalions after dark met practically no resistance and they continued towards Cherbourg until they reached a point about four hundred yards north of crossroads 177, one of the main road crossings in the area. They reached this point at 2:05 A.M. on June 23. Here they were ordered to stop and organized a perimeter defense of the position they held. They were on the east of a high hill
and there was little sleep for anyone as a constant stream of artillery shells, both enemy and friendly, seemed just to miss the top of the hill. During this night march many concrete pillboxes and miniature forts had been by-passed as they appeared deserted in the darkness.

One of the main defenses that had been crossed was an antitank ditch. This was about twelve feet deep, fifteen feet across and completely stopped the forward movement of all tanks and vehicles. The tanks went with the troops to the south side of the ditch and came under heavy artillery and mortar fire. Some of them caught fire. Soon after dark the 304th Engineers brought up a bulldozer and started filling in the ditch so our vehicles could move forward. In the meantime there could be no resupply of food, ammunition or water.

The pillboxes that were overrun during the attacks on the first line of defenses towards Cherbourg were a combination of steel and concrete, in many cases the walls were from four to five feet thick. Some of the larger ones were really inland forts. The parapets of these forts commanded the ground in all directions, with cleared fields of fire giving the enemy machine gunners perfect targets as our infantrymen moved forward. The strongpoints were all connected and joined the parent fort by a system of deep trenches well camouflaged. Forts, pillboxes, and trenches were all provided with periscopes and all were tied in by telephones. All entrances to the forts were from the rear, at below-ground levels. These entrances were protected by heavy armor-plated steel doors. Underground were the storerooms and living quarters for the garrisons.

The underground works were at different levels, so that if one set of rooms had been destroyed, the enemy could move to another section of tunnels and continue to fight. At times the garrisons would hide below ground while the fort would be captured, with a part of its garrison. The next day the remaining portion of the garrison would appear from a secret passageway to reoccupy the fort and man the guns.

During this first night march, the route of advance was marked by the burning farmhouses that lighted up the dark June night.

The Germans did not know of this deep advance into their lines as enemy traffic continued to use the main Cherbourg road and enemy mortar and artillery fire continued from nearby positions.

At 5:00 A.M. on June 23 it was found that the Germans had cut the line of communication to the rear. The Regimental commander took a platoon of infantry to fight his way back far enough to establish communication with Division Headquarters. As they started back it was found that many Germans had reoccupied the pillboxes that had been by-passed during the night.

About 5:15 the Regimental commander was at CR 177. Out of the semi-darkness from the south came Lt Colonel Bode and some sixty-five men from the 2d Battalion. The rest of the battalion had disappeared in the darkness. Colonel Bode took off towards the south in an effort to locate his battalion. On the mission he met his death from a German sniper.

As the command group continued south there followed a running fight and a number of pillboxes had to be recaptured before the Regimental commander, tapping in on an artillery telephone, established contact with Division Headquarters.

Word was then received of the intended attack set for 9:30, but it was nearly that time now and entirely too late for Colonel Wood and his party to get back to the troops before the attack. The Germans were still occupying some of the pillboxes. Finally there were gathered together a number of men who had been unable to move forward with their units during the night advance. The AT company was brought up and opened fire on the inland fort, the tanks moved into position and opened fire as the party started forward. At about the same time, General Wyche, the Division commander, arrived and joined the party as it started forward. It was necessary to reduce the main inland fort for the third time in twenty-four hours. Tanks moved up right against the steel doors and point-blank fire soon demolished them. TNT was exploded within the fort to put an end to its action. Many Germans were found still within its ruins.

The day's plans had called for a dive-bombing attack on the main enemy defense works about a thousand yards north of the position of the 1st and 3d Battalions. This would take place from 9:00 to 9:45 and would be followed by artillery under cover of which the troops would advance to seize the defensive position. The infantry would advance under the artillery fire and then attack the position at 9:30. The attack jumped off as scheduled and the troops fought their way forward despite very stubborn enemy resistance. As they reached their objective the advance was stopped by very heavy artillery and small-arms fire. A second dive-bombing attack was ordered. Owing to
lack of communications all troops could not be in- 
formed of this second dive-bombing attack and some 
units were caught as they had begun to overrun the 
objective. No further advance was possible.

Throughout that entire afternoon there was con-
tinuous enemy shelling of the entire area held by the 
Regiment. The troops lay close to the hedgerows in 
the field on both sides of the main highway. The enemy 
shells were aimed at the trees growing out of the 
hedgerows that lined all the fields in that area. The 
limbs of the trees would explode the shells and the 
tree-bursts would scatter the shell fragments in all 
directions. The hastily dug holes in the sides of the 
hedgerows offered little protection against the shell 
fragments.

The Regiment resumed its advance on the morning 
of June 24. Its formation was again column of bat-
talions in the order: 2d, 1st, 3d; and the attack was an 
envelopment of the enemy position from the right. 
Heavy artillery fire paved the way for the attack of the 
2d Battalion. This attack was successful and the ad-
vance was pushed rapidly forward against increasing 
enemy resistance from small groups to the vicinity of 
Hau Gringor. The company of medium tanks gave 
excellent support to this attack. The 2d Battalion sent 
patrols into the town, while the 3d Battalion was 
moved up on the left and the 1st Battalion remained 
in reserve. As the troops were moving towards Hau 
Gringor they overran a powerful German defensive 
position that contained two 170mm guns, three 
155mm guns and numerous smaller guns. Most of the 
occupants of this position fled towards the big quarry 
at Hau Gringor. Much other enemy equipment was 
captured during this advance. The Regiment cleaned 
out the town of Hau Gringor and there and at the 
quarry more than three hundred Germans were taken 
prisoner. While our patrols were operating in Hau 
Gringor, many of the Germans started running out 
the town of Hau Gringor and there and at the 
objective. No further advance was possible.

Early on the morning of June 26 the Regiment 
smashed its way into Cherbourg. The 1st Battalion was 
on the right and the 2d Battalion was on the left. The 
order of the day was speed. There was considerable 
house-to-house fighting. Sniper fire was persistent. By 
8:30 A.M. the leading elements had reached the water 
line and the rest of the day was spent in rounding up 
the scattered Germans who had been split into small 
groups by the rapidity of the advance. Hundreds were 
taken prisoner. Some German officers were acting as 
snipers and they had hid on the third floors of build-
ings. It took time to kill them.

The German seacoast guns on the sea face of Fort 
du Roule continued to fire into the rear units of the 
Regiment all during the day. They shot down a num-
ber of buildings that had been occupied by small ele-
ments of the Regiment. This fire was finally silenced 
when all the eighteen 57mm antitank guns of the 
Regiment were turned against these enemy pieces 
from 6:30 P.M. to 6:45. Most of the guns were de-
stroyed or silenced. Four heavy pillboxes were hard to 
reduce. These were right on the waterfront and de-
layed the final mopping up of the town for some hours. 
They were so heavy that close-range direct fire from
our tanks and the 57mm guns simply bounced off
their sides.
Late in the afternoon it was all over. Cherbourg had
fallen. The Regiment rested in the houses for the night
and on June 27 turned around and moved south to
prepare for the next adventure.

The preceding account of the taking of Cherbourg
was written by Col Sterling A. Wood, Regimental
commander of the 313th Infantry. This excellent ac-
count of the historic days that characterized the Regi-
ment's first combat encounter stands as an invaluable
contribution to the 313th Infantry's history. It is accu-
rate and relates in detail the events leading up to and
immediately following the taking of Cherbourg. It
was written from first-hand experience, for Colonel
Wood was always right up there with his men when
the going was rough, and under his command the
313th Infantry was yet to fight many of its most diffi-
cult and historic battles.

Lee McCordell, war correspondent of the Baltimore
Sunpapers, was on the scene at the time Cherbourg
was taken. In this connection he wrote many stories
telling of the experiences of the 313th Infantry, and
his story revealing how the Cherbourg defenses were
cracked is well worth reprinting here. It is an intimate
and interesting account, and members of the Regiment
who were in the Cherbourg campaign will long re-
member the incidents and stories he herewith relates:

So-called pillboxes in the first line of German defenses
which the 79th Division assaulted in the attack on Cher-
bourg were actually inland forts with steel and reinforced
concrete walls four or five feet thick.

Built into the hills of Normandy so their parapets were
level with surrounding ground, the forts were heavily armed
with mortars, machine guns, and 88mm rifles—this last the
Germans' most formidable piece of artillery.

Around the forts lay a pattern of smaller defenses, pill-
boxes proper, redoubts, rifle pits, sunken well-like mortar
emplacements permitting 360-degree traverse, observation
posts and other works enabling the defenders to deliver
deadly crossfire from all directions.

Approaches were further protected by minefields, barbed
wire and antitank ditches, at least 20 feet wide at the top
and 20 feet deep.

Each strongpoint was connected to the other and all
were linked to the mother fort by a system of deep, camouflaged
trenches and underground tunnels. The forts and pillboxes
were fitted with periscopes. Telephones tied in all defenses.

Entrance to these forts was from the rear, below ground
level, through double doors of steel armor plate which de-
fending garrisons clamped shut behind them. The forts were
electrically lighted and automatically ventilated.

Below a casemated gallery in which the guns were located,
firing through narrow slits, were two underground bom-
proof levels packed almost solidly with cases of canned food,
artillery shells and belted ammunition for machine guns.

In several instances after forts had been captured and
apparently cleared of the enemy, more Germans were found
hiding in these deep bomb-proof sub-basements. Sometimes
the sub-basements were not discovered until our engineers
had blown up captured works with dynamite.

Such was the Cherbourg Line which the 79th Division
broke. How they managed to crack it still baffles us.

Had you seen these fortifications before the attack you
would have pronounced them impregnable. Even after our
infantry and tanks had overrun them they looked impreg-
nable to us.

On the morning of Friday, June 23, we left division head-
quar ters where we had spent the night and returned to an
infantry regiment command post.

The command post consisted of a captured German Ford
delivery truck and 30 foxholes, in a wet gully strewn with
hay off a country lane below Hau de Haut. Neither the Old
Man—the colonel—or any of his staff were around.

"Where's the colonel?" we asked Major McConnell who
sat on a folding camp chair drawing fresh red and green
lines with grease pencils on a big position map set up like
a screen before him.

"Still up front with the troops," said the major. "He has
been up there all night."

"And where are the troops?"

"Right there," said the major, putting his finger on two
fresh blue brackets on the map, two fresh blue brackets well
beyond the first line of German defenses, abreast a strong-
point of the second lines less than three miles from
Cherbourg.

We stared bug-eyed. We couldn't believe it.

"What the hell are they doing up there? Did they get
away up there—what time did they break through?"

"Oh, they went through early last night," the major said.

Later the Old Man told us:

"We took the Germans completely by surprise. I honestly
believe that if we had kept going and had had troops to
follow us up and protect our rear we could have marched
right into Cherbourg that night."

When he first told us this we took it with a grain of salt.
We hadn't seen the 79th in action. But we believe it now.

The only trouble was that one unit was going too fast.
It was at least a mile ahead of the supporting elements on
either flank. It stuck out on the front like a sore thumb
waiting for a German counterattack to step on it.

About an hour later, Capt John McCabe, of Toledo, Ohio,
a regimental antitank company commander, came in.

"Well, we just retook a pillbox and did it by the book," he said. "The Old Man was right there with us, helping
with the guns. We had ourselves quite a time."

McCabe pointed out the pillbox location on the map. It
was one that troops had passed the previous night. It seemed
the Germans had infiltrated back through our lines after
dark, reoccupied the position and resumed fighting. Little
by little we pieced together the entire story. Here it is:
The Old Man, his executive, Lt Col Edwin M. Van Bibber, of Bel Air, Maryland, and other key officers of the regimental staff had personally led infantry assault teams across fields, fighting their way from hedgerow to hedgerow after dive bombers had made their low-level attack on the first line of German forts.

The Old Man took his infantry up so fast they by-passed the largest fort before its defenders knew what the score was. The assault teams closed in with bangalore torpedoes and flame throwers, catching the Germans in the rear and cleaning them out of the fort as either corpses or prisoners in short order.

But German artillery never let up. From gun positions farther back toward Cherbourg, Jerry shelled the regimental command post in the gully, sheltered only by rows of trees, hotly during the night.

One lucky hit had landed in McCabe's motor park, blowing up a 2½-ton truck loaded with dynamite intended for demolition of captured German fortifications.

Meanwhile, the Old Man and his Joes, leaving a reduced fort in their rear, reached a road intersection on the main Valognes-Cherbourg highway, a mile or more farther forward. Here they dug in for the night under harassing fire of German snipers and artillery.

The Germans had no idea that the unit had advanced in strength so far. About midnight, Joes at the road intersection heard a German motorcycle putt-putting down the road from Cherbourg.

"Halt!" yelled an American sentry.

The astonished German officer skidded to a stop, tried to turn around in the middle of the road and go back the way he had come.

Out of the shadowy roadside bushes leaped the Old Man, automatic in hand. He called to the German to surrender. Instead, the German yanked out his Luger. But the Old Man fired first.

"I never thought the time would come when I would have to shoot people under circumstances like that," the Old Man said quietly when the dead officer and his cycle had been dragged off the road. "I just didn't have any choice in this case. It was either him or me."

And it was the first of three Germans shot down by the Old Man that day during almost hand-to-hand fighting.

At daylight something went wrong with the field telephone wire laid between the Old Man's forward observation post and his command post at Hau de Haut. He decided that he had better go back and make contact.

Two staff officers, Maj David A. De Armond, of Ridge­wood, New Jersey, and Capt Raymond Godwin, of Indianapolis, a rifle platoon and two light machine guns went with him.

Before starting back the Old Man had traded his automatic with Captain Godwin for Godwin's carbine. The Old Man figured he would have to do some more shooting and he preferred the carbine.

Godwin promptly swapped the automatic with a tanker for the tanker's tommy gun and Major De Armond also traded his automatic with another tanker for another tommy gun.

As it turned out, this exchange was a happy chance because the Old Man's party fought three running fights on the way back with Germans who either had slipped through our front lines or come out of hiding in underground tunnels to reoccupy pillboxes our troops had captured the night before.

"I'm telling you we came through there going like hell when we discovered the Germans had come back, unknown to us, and threatened to cut us off," De Armond told me later. "All along the way we were challenged by German sentries and fired at by snipers.

"As we were passing a fort a German officer jumped out and yelled 'surrender.' I swung old Betsy (his tommy gun) around and pulled the trigger. When we finally got through we had killed four Jerrys and taken one officer and nine enlisted men prisoners."

But the Germans still held the fort. They had remained an 88mm gun there and showed no signs of surrendering.

The Old Man called up a platoon of tanks attached to his regiment. While waiting for them to move up, he ran into McCabe around a bend in the road just below the fort.

"How would you like to do a little shooting this morning, John?" he asked.

"Fine, Colonel," said McCabe, a stocky round-faced fellow whose spectacles gave his cherub face more the expression of a school teacher than a tank destroyer.

"Then get a couple of your guns up here and let's go," said the Old Man.

Tanks rumbled up the dusty road toward the fort. Commanding the first tank in the column was Sgt Charles Jones, of Hagerstown, Maryland. The tanks crossed the antitank ditch at a point where engineers had blown away its sharp crests.

One tank was hit by the Germans and set afire. Its crew got out safely. Another German shell knocked the track off a second tank, immobilizing it, but the other two kept going.

McCabe's antitank company manhandled two 57s up a narrow lane into position behind shell-scarred stumps and blasted brush, from where they could fire directly upon the recaptured fort.

The Old Man was with them, pointing out the target and directing the fire. Gunners laid it in two by two—two rounds of high explosive, then two rounds of armor-piercing shells.

"Hit 'em again!" the Old Man yelled as bursts found their target.

Sgt Jones' tank was creeping upon the fort from the rear. When within a range of about 100 yards it nosed over a rise to bring its 75 to bear directly upon the fort's back double doors of armor plate and sent a dozen rounds of armor-piercing high-explosive shells crashing into it in rapid fire. The doors disintegrated and flew open. Three Germans ran out with their hands up.

The Old Man and his rifle platoon followed the tank into the fort to mop up.

"I swung old Betsy around, spraying the place with a long burst, caught another German running away and that was number five for the day," De Armond told me.

The Old Man's Joes also put the fort's last serviceable 88
Artillery forward observers from the 4th, 9th and 79th Infantry Divisions watch Allied warships shelling Cherbourg, June 25, 1944 (Signal Corps photo)

out of action with an explosive charge that blossomed its slim muzzle into a black lily.

And when McCabe drove me up to the fort in his jeep an hour or two later Lt Robert C. Johnson, of Seattle, Washington, had planted enough dynamite and TNT around it to blow up the Baltimore Trust Building.

"The Jerries will never occupy this one again," McCabe said grimly.

First-aid men were still picking up the wounded. Ambulances were hauling them back to aid stations. German and American dead, including two aid men—all aid men deserve Silver Stars in our opinion—still lay where they had fallen.

At the foot of the fort's forward stoop was the charred and twisted wreckage of a burned jeep, a casualty of the previous day's fighting.

Parking his own jeep farther on, near one of the fort's sodded redoubts where he thought it would be defiladed against enemy fire, McCabe told his driver:

"and you stay right with that jeep and watch it."

He explained to me that he had had two jeeps shot from under him within the last two days. Transportation was growing scarce in his antitank company.

We climbed over the fort. It was my first opportunity for close inspection and I was awed by its massive strength. I still don't know how those Joes reduced it, even with the help of tanks.

Yet they went through another line of similar forts the next day and took a third belt of so-called pillboxes to reach the Cherbourg waterfront two days later.

While we were stepping gingerly over wreckage and scattered German military equipment and I was trying to assemble one good bicycle—I had no transportation of my own—from the remnants of a half-dozen broken German bikes lying in rubbish, more of our infantry moved up through the area toward the front line.

Scores of Joes stopped for a moment to look at the fort and marvel at its concrete walls and armorplate doors. They didn't know their own strength.

We went inside the fort for protection when German artillery began shelling the area. We felt as safe there as the Germans probably had.

You could have driven a two and a half ton, six by six truck through that back door—and the Germans probably had, judging from the amount of food and ammunition stored on the level where we were.

A Joe came in to get out of the shrapnel that was bursting outside.

"To whom does that burned jeep belong?" he asked.

"I don't know," said McCabe, thinking he was talking about the burned vehicle we had passed when driving in, "it has been there since yesterday."

A few minutes later when firing had ceased and we had gone outside again I went back to where McCabe had parked his jeep to return a monkey wrench I had borrowed to assemble my refabricated bike.

The jeep was in flames. The driver was safe, but spare gas cans and hand grenades in the back were exploding right and left. A burst of shrapnel had caught it. I called McCabe.

"Well, I'll be damned," he said when he saw it. "There goes my third one—my radio—my cigarettes and my chewing gum—my musette bag—everything!"

I offered him my bike but he said no, thanks.

The demolition squad blew up the fort and its satellite pillboxes that night. When I saw McCabe next day he said:

"Let me tell you a funny thing about that fort and those pillboxes. When we blew them up last night we discovered
they had a lower level of sub-basement we didn't know anything about. Two groggy Germans crawled out of a hole under one of the smaller pillboxes after we had blown its top.

"There were two other dead Germans, killed by blasts and fumes, in the same hole. They must have been down there yesterday while we were in the fort.

"We don't know how many may have been under the main fort. We couldn't go down into its subterranean tunnels last night because fumes from the demolition charges are poisonous. But we think we understand now why the fort was remanned so quickly after we had taken it the first time and passed on.

"Some of the Germans who showed up there again yesterday morning undoubtedly had infiltrated back through our lines during the night.

"But it is very likely that others about whom we didn't know were hiding down there underneath. After we had passed the fort they simply came up the stairs, closed those armorplate doors and started to fight again. Can you beat it?"

The preceding stories as related by Lee McCardell, war correspondent for the Baltimore Sunpapers, as well as the excellent narrative account as written by Col Sterling A. Wood, Regimental commander of the 313th Infantry at the time Cherbourg was taken, unquestionably present a well rounded account of the events that comprised the taking of Cherbourg.

No one who survived that initial campaign, and who was fortunate enough to come through the campaigns that were yet to follow, will ever forget the experience. Especially will they long remember Cherbourg; for Cherbourg was forever to remain the first combat encounter the Regiment was ever to know in World War II. Being first, it will forever hold a first place in the minds and hearts of all who were a part of it, and rightly so. For no one could deny that the 313th Infantry had performed magnificently in its first face-to-face encounter with the enemy on the field of battle.

They had more than proved their worth in that first engagement, for all time to come.
Chapter 10: The Battles of Normandy

The STUNNED and shattered city of Cherbourg was quiet at last. The dust had settled and the last bullet had flown its deadly flight. The tenuous fingers of American might had at last reached the city’s quivering throat, and the Nazi pulse was stilled at last.

The inhabitants began to creep back, bringing their belongings on every conveyance imaginable. The troops who had taken the city prepared to depart. It was time for them to leave, for the growing anticlimax was becoming more and more apparent. The brass and brassards, the photographers and the Navy began to throng the rubble-littered but far less lethal streets. Everyone who wanted to say they were at Cherbourg began to arrive, so the troops moved out. They marched with a spirit of high accomplishment, with pride in their deeds and those of their fallen comrades.

The first battle was at an end.

For those in the know, the nature of future operations was already clear. For weeks, yes, for many months, higher headquarters had been planning the battles which would inevitably follow. With the port of Cherbourg now in Allied hands, the job ahead was obvious. The entire Cherbourg Peninsula, with its rich Normandy territory, had to be wrested from the enemy. It would not be an easy task, for Allied tacticians had long been aware that the Normandy countryside offered the maximum by way of natural protection for defensive warfare. There were the hedgerows—endless mounds of earth, centuries old, thickly covered with Nature’s vegetation and growth, fencing in field after field for mile after mile. In them the enemy could set up a natural defensive and delaying plan, if he chose to do so, and advance information gleaned from Allied spy activities indicated that the enemy would be ready and waiting, should the Allies attack there. Yet, in weighing the evidence for the best possible point of initial attack on the shores of France, the Cherbourg Peninsula had been chosen as the logical point for the all-out effort, and as a consequence, however difficult the operation, enemy resistance on the Cherbourg Peninsula would have to be overcome. The Cherbourg Peninsula had been designated as the Allied doorway into central France.

The 79th Division, and with it the 313th Infantry, had more than proven its worth in the taking of Cherbourg. Furthermore, being the first to enter and to liberate Cherbourg, the Division and the Regiment were right in line to continue the attack for the Normandy Peninsula. So it was, that with orders from higher headquarters, the Regiment prepared for the battles to follow.

The initial assembly area after leaving Cherbourg was the scene of a former battle. It was termed Concentration 26, known locally as La Glacerie. The town was peaceful now, but was still filled with poignant memories of a bitter struggle. Here the Regiment rested until June 28, on which date a move was made to Le Valdecie. While there the Regiment continued its rest, and bathed and licked its wounds until the 2d of July. On that date the Division passed into Corps reserve at Le-Mesnil-St.-Martin. There our residue, necessarily left in England, rejoined the Regiment, and on July 3 the Division attacked with an objective six kilometers to the south, which constituted the high ground north and east of Lessay. During this attack the Regiment remained in Division reserve, and meantime, plans were made for a motorized task force consisting of the 1st Battalion, Antitank Company, Cannon Company, Company A of the 749th Tank Battalion, the Regimental I&R Platoon and Division Reconnaissance Troop, to dash to the south and seize the objective should enemy resistance prove light. This did not prove to be the case, however, for every inch of ground was contested by the enemy. It was already evident that the Normandy campaign would be hazardous, difficult and slow.

At 7:00 P.M. July 3, the Regiment moved again to a position near Gde Haunville. From that point reconnaissance was made to a possible assembly area at Canville. The Division, meanwhile, continued slowly but steadily through a drizzling downpour of rain, advancing far enough to the south that before nightfall, the Regiment, still in Division reserve, had been able to evacuate a wounded man.
Map 2
Religious services in an orchard in Normandy

move to an assembly position in the vicinity of Baudreville.

Independence Day, July 4, brought more rain, and the situation was slowly leading toward the employment of the Regiment on the southwest flank of the attacking units. Early morning and evening were spent in reconnaissance. Meantime, at exactly noon the Regiment, along with the entire Army of the United States, celebrated the day by listening to the salvo of guns fired at the Jerries by orders issued by the army commander, who had decided that all available artillery pieces fire one round at the Germans at exactly high noon. Then, late in the afternoon the Regiment received the attack order. Meantime, German artillery found the Regiment and until 6:30 A.M., July 5, when the Regiment moved out in the attack, many casualties were suffered.

The plan of attack as revealed by the Division order, involved the envelopment in hopes of trapping the Germans before they reached the fords of Lessay. The route had been carefully planned to skirt the hub of the enemy positions to the west. Therefore, with all preparations completed, the Regiment attacked in a column of battalions, in order: 1st, 2d, 3d, promptly at 6:30 A.M., July 5.

Little resistance was met initially. However, lack of adequate roads, plus marshy terrain, hindered the movement. Despite this, the column moved steadily forward, and upon arrival at an area approximately two miles north of the known enemy position, a task force consisting of K Company, with A Company of the 749th Tank Battalion attached, moved up to follow immediately in the rear of the 1st Battalion. The mission of this task force was to seize the bridge at Concentration 55 and to obtain an adequate supply road for the Regiment.

Upon arrival at Glatigny the task force moved out toward the east in the direction of the bridge at Concentration 55, and were followed, in error, by the leading elements of the 1st Battalion, whose original mission had been a movement to the south to skirt the enemy position. As the leading elements of the task force approached the bridge at Concentration 55 they were met by increasing German resistance. The tanks attached to the task force deployed on the north side of the road, and the task force was then met by a withering barrage of mortar and large-caliber enemy cannon fire. Inasmuch as the 1st Battalion’s leading elements had by their error in movement been partially committed, it was felt necessary that the 1st Battalion then attack to the south, to flank the resistance encountered. Meantime the tempo of enemy artillery and mortar fire increased, and only the sheer courage of the 1st Battalion allowed them to penetrate as far as a water-filled ditch running through the center of a flat, grassy lowland. Here, the forward movement of the attack was stopped cold, and it was evident almost immediately that the situation was critical.

There could be no question now but that the enemy was more than prepared to fight a bitter delaying ac-
tion. It was apparent almost immediately that the enemy positions were so sited as to obtain the best advantage of the terrain for defense. Close-in areas were swept by carefully sited machine guns leaving no determined dead spots. Intermediate areas were covered with mortar concentrations which proved highly effective. These intermediate areas and areas to the north of the hard-top road leading to Concentration 55 from the west, were covered with flanking fire from batteries of 170mm guns and high-velocity weapons. These guns and weapons appeared to have been sited in some instances one thousand meters from the flank of the position defended.

Despite these critical conditions, however, two desperate attacks were launched. The first attack was launched by the 1st Battalion, with A Company on the east and B Company on the west, attacking from a line of departure a hedgerow, which was just to the north of the creek. They attacked to the south, and due to the German defensive scheme the forward elements were allowed to reach a ditch which ran through the open clearing. At that point they were met by a deadly concentration of heavy artillery, and only sheer courage enabled them to hold the ground thus far gained. In a short while the barrage lifted and a German infantry counterattack was launched at the 1st Battalion. Two such attacks were repulsed by the 1st Battalion before nightfall.

Meantime, the Company K task force was given the attack order, which launched the second attack by our forces against the enemy positions. In this attack the same desperate situation continued unabated, and the attack reached its limit when a platoon from that company, showing the greatest possible courage, established itself on the east side of the creek and just north of the bridge at Concentration 55.

After the counterattacks had been repulsed a constant mortar and artillery barrage was placed on both attacking units and the remaining troops on the high ground to the rear, necessitating the evacuation of the many wounded after nightfall. Increasing enemy resistance then made it necessary to withdraw the attacking units from the low ground to a more advantageous position. Our losses had been extremely high.

Starting early on the morning of July 6, the Regiment moved north to the vicinity of St. Remy-des-Landes, then west, then south, in an effort to flank the resistance encountered. The Regiment was to attack at 4:00 P.M., July 6, with a line of departure an unimproved road running east and west about one thousand meters north of Concentration 55. The attack was launched to the south with the 3d Battalion on the right, the 2d Battalion on the left, and the 1st Battalion, in reserve, to the rear of the 2d Battalion.

The attack proceeded about one thousand yards. Strong enemy resistance was encountered indicating that prior reconnaissance was correct and that the Regiment was confronted by strong enemy fortifications, dug in, and protected by barbed wire. It was not deemed advisable to continue the attack at that time, so the Regiment withdrew to its line of departure pending the formation of other plans.

On July 7 the Regiment moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of La Gosselinerie, preparatory to passing through the 315th Infantry and continuing the attack to the south. At this time, the Regiment, depleted by casualties and demoralized by incessant artillery fire, could not be termed the effective combat unit it had been on the march to Cherbourg. The will to go on was inspired only by the highest kind of courage. The men had seen their comrades fall in two abortive attacks on fortified positions. They had little hope of encountering any other kind of resistance, and as they launched into this third attack in a column of battalions, in order: 2d, 3d, 1st, their passage through the 315th Infantry, past the little village of Montgardon, over Hill 84, was again received by heavy enemy artillery fire. They moved over the top of the hill and down the slope beyond, and were counterattacked by enemy tanks and infantry. At Concentration 56 they were stopped, and support from our own tanks and artillery could not get them farther forward than the hard-top road leading from La Surellerie to Biemont. Night fell with our troops still in this position, and the next day the enemy opened up with a murderous artillery fire, rendering the continuance of the attack impossible. However, throughout the entire day the attacking units maintained their positions, and the artillery duel continued.

On the 9th of July the Regiment was relieved by the 315th Infantry and moved to an assembly area approximately one thousand meters to the north of Montgardon in the vicinity of La Gosselinerie. The depletion of both the 313th and 315th Infantry Regiments necessitated the attachment of the 3d Battalion of the 315th to the 315th Infantry, in order to assure that Hill 84, the last remaining commanding terrain north of Lessay, remain in our hands. Meantime, while in the assembly area the 1st and 2d Battalions were given training in methods of hedgerow fighting as
compiled from the experience of all elements of the three infantry regiments. During this period replacements were received and the troops prepared for the continuance of the attack.

The Regiment remained in Division reserve until July 11. At 6:00 A.M. on that date the Regiment continued the attack to the south, again passing through the 315th Infantry. The Regiment had shifted to the east and attacked to the south with the regimental boundary the main road between La-Haye-du-Puits and Lessay. The attack was launched in a column of battalions, in order: 2d, 1st, 3d.

In spite of meeting only slight enemy resistance the initial attack was halting and slow due to the fact that organization and contact were hard to maintain. The units were so small, and the amount of ground that had to be covered so great, that a concerted effort was difficult to make. However, in spite of these factors the Regiment pressed on to the south, crossing the stream and moving to the vicinity of Angoville. Having reached this objective, patrolling to the south and to the flanks was initiated. This patrolling continued until 7:15 A.M., July 13, when the attack was again resumed.

The night before the attack, July 12, a task force was sent from the 1st Battalion to occupy the town of Le Bot, which was taken on the third attempt.

As the attack continued on July 13 the Regiment met only light enemy resistance and moved to the south just short of the objective prescribed by higher headquarters. During the late afternoon and evening, and early morning hours of July 14, vigorous patrolling was initiated in an effort to discern the strength of the enemy. From information obtained from patrols and from captured enemy prisoners it was determined that the enemy had withdrawn at approximately 11:00 P.M., July 13, across the river south of Lessay. On July 14 therefore, the Regiment occupied its objective without a shot being fired. Nevertheless, during the afternoon of July 14, and the early morning hours of July 15, patrolling was effected all the way south to the Ay River to determine if there were any Germans in that vicinity.

On the morning of July 15 the Regiment was relieved by the 315th Infantry and moved west of Montgardon as a mobile reserve.

There can be no question about the fact that the fighting at Montgardon, and, for that matter, during the entire period of the Normandy campaign, represented the most difficult and hazardous combat that the 313th Infantry had yet experienced. The nature of the fighting in the battle for Cherbourg had been vastly different than now. In the first place, the troops were fresh when the battle for Cherbourg began. They were ready, almost eager, for the big adventure ahead. Now they were tired and battle-weary. They were bucking, day in and day out, the nightmarish hell of the hedgerows, where every field was a death trap, and progress was reckoned in terms of yards, not miles. Throughout all of the Normandy countryside the enemy was well dug in, and he lay in waiting, well concealed, prepared for almost perfect defensive warfare. At Montgardon the enemy positions for defense were so sited that every avenue of approach was well covered by all types of enemy fire. All efforts to skirt or to surround enemy resistance met with little success, and the only formula which would or could work was that of weeding the enemy out, hedgerow by hedgerow. To do this, losses were necessarily high, and many times the morale of the men almost reached the breaking point. But always they carried on, undaunted by initial failures, and finally succeeded in driving the enemy back.

There are countless stories which could be told of the heroism and courage displayed by both officers and enlisted men who fought without rest during the critical days at Montgardon. It is impossible, of course, to relate but a very few of these accounts individually. A history cannot attempt to record within its pages the countless individual deeds accomplished in battle, all of which are more than worthy of mention. At best, this history can only scan the outer fringes of the whole picture, and endeavor to relate in so far as possible, the nature of the struggles encountered.

A general idea of the bitterness of the struggle for all companies and groups concerned can perhaps best be derived from the following account, compiled from a report submitted by A Company, 313th Infantry.

On July 4, the account says,

The enemy hit us with a heavy artillery concentration which lasted until the company left its bivouac area on the morning of July 5. The company marched all forenoon and as they approached the little town of Montgardon near Bloody Hill (Hill 55) we waited for an hour while friendly planes bombed and strafed enemy strongpoints and pillboxes in the little settlement at the foot of Hill 55. Immediately thereafter the battle for the hill began, and the enemy, apparently undisturbed by the bombing and strafing, met our onslaught with the most stubborn kind of resistance, including all types of enemy fire. Enemy artillery was extremely heavy, and our advance could only be made with utmost caution.
After Cherbourg the QM set up showers in a field for the Regiment’s use.

The 1st Platoon gradually wound its way up the slope of the hill, creeping and crawling from one tree to another, seeking all possible cover and concealment from the heavy enemy artillery barrage. At no time did the barrage lessen, and the trees all along our avenues of approach were splintered and torn by the bursting shells. The unit forged ahead however, despite increasing casualties, and by the time we reached the summit of the hill, a complete reorganization was necessary. Some of our best officers had been wounded and many of our men had fallen. Among the officers hit, were the battalion commander, Lt Colonel Mitchell and Lts Joseph Emmerich, Dan L. McCaughan and Norbert W. Winkler.

After reorganizing the hedgerow fighting began. Few of the men had experienced this type of fighting since a large majority of them were replacements. The attack progressed, with C Company on our left and B Company on our right. Communications were difficult to maintain, and progress was tedious and slow. Company A advanced, hedgerow by hedgerow losing a few men here and there. Then the word came through that the Germans were dug in beneath the hedges to our rear and were shooting our men in the back. Thereafter, every hedge was searched for Germans left behind.

Hedgerow fighting was jittery business. You never knew where the enemy was, and half the time you didn’t spot him until you were on top of him. While crossing one hedgerow, S/Sgt Hughie Harris lit squarely on a German in a dug-in position. His bayonet was attached, and he used it, just in time. Thereafter he put a few rounds into the Jerry, just to make sure. A few minutes later Sgt James Haun leaped over the same hedge, and spying the German, repeated the same process, thinking he was alive. Later the boys got a big kick out of it, and although there were slight differences of opinion about the technicalities of the case, all were fully agreed that the German was as dead as a man could possibly be.

Due to communications difficulties, Company A and especially the 1st Platoon advanced fully three hedgerows beyond the other units, and severe difficulties followed. Some of the men were taken prisoner because our flanks were open. Part of the 1st Platoon reached a road, controlled and used by the enemy. T/Sgt Blankenship (who was later commissioned second lieutenant) spied a German Tiger tank coming down the road from our left flank. Then another tank appeared on our right flank. It was a tough moment, and to make it worse, our own artillery, falling short, was hitting all around us. Three of our men, S/Sgt K. R. Koch, Pfc Richard A. Flynn and Pfc L. D. Lovelady, were killed. Others were seriously wounded, including Sgt Louis F. Costabile, Jr., and Pvt Robert E. Stecker.

We attempted reorganization and withdrew some three hundred yards, but conditions were no better. Here the Germans were laying down a continuous artillery concentration amidst our disorganized units. Further withdrawal was necessary, and finally, men from all companies reorganized and dug in, and thereafter managed to hold their positions until the following morning.

Such were the initial disappointments at Montgardon. The next day we were relieved by Company A, 315th Infantry, and pulled back about two miles to an area where we had time to rest a little, to draw replacements and replace shortages.

Then on July 11 we went back into the attack, striking in the general direction of Lessay. Things were going better now, but on the afternoon of the second day we hit the main body of the enemy resistance. From well emplaced positions the Jerries hit us with everything they had, and again we lost a number of men due to the heavy mortar and artillery barrages fired by the enemy into our lines. This time, however, we were able to press forward, and soon succeeded in overrunning the German positions, knocking most of them out, with comparatively few casualties to our own men.

The attack continued toward the town of Le Bot, which had virtually been leveled to the ground by the Air Forces a few days before. On the outskirts of the village, we dispersed the men in an orchard where we remained for the night, keeping outposts on all sides. Jerry shelled us heavily throughout the night, and there were a few more casualties. One of the German guns was shooting from our rear. We had by-passed it in error during the day.

At daybreak the outposts withdrew and rejoined the platoon, turning in all information they had gathered. Immediately thereafter Company C sent a task force into the town of Le Bot. This task force was badly hit by an enemy machine-gun nest located in one of the buildings within the town, and another task force, this time from Company A, was sent forward. As they entered the town they were met by a French priest who revealed the information that the remaining enemy resistance had abandoned their positions in Le Bot only a few minutes before, and that all was clear.

This information was rushed to higher headquarters and orders were then received to move in and occupy the town in force. The information given by the priest had been correct, and the town was taken without a shot being fired. However, once we entered the town the enemy opened up with their heavy artillery, and the duel which followed lasted throughout the day and far into the night. Shortly thereafter we were on the move again. This time into Lessay.

Such were the experiences encountered by Company A in the struggles at Montgardon. It was universally the same, for all troops who fought there. From a re-
port received from Company G of the action on July 6, 1944, the following story emerges:

We won’t forget it. To our right lay open fields, across which the unit moved, little realizing that before them lay man-made hell, with the peaceful appearance of just another road, a small pasture, through which flowed a small creek.

Leading the attack were Lt Hubert Murray of the 1st Platoon, and the 2d Platoon under the command of Lt Edward Graf. After crossing the creek and going over the hedgerow wall into the next field, the attacking platoons encountered the first obstacle—a wall of small-arms fire and a barrage of earth-shaking artillery.

The 1st Platoon was pinned down almost immediately, and Lt Murray, while trying to get his men forward, was killed just fifteen yards short of his initial objective, which comprised two enemy machine-gun nests. Technical Sergeant Heard then assumed command, and was also killed in his effort to lead the men forward. Now leaderless and under the heaviest kind of fire, the platoon displayed excellent discipline and heroism, and held their ground in the face of enemy fire.

The light machine-gun section of the Weapons Platoon, led by Sergeant Ponkevitch, saw plenty of action too. When Sergeant Ponkevitch was wounded, Technical Sergeant Spinn moved forward under the heavy fire to rescue him and administer first aid. The enemy fired on him, and he returned to borrow an aid man’s helmet and brassard. Donning them, he succeeded in covering the distance to where Sergeant Ponkevitch lay wounded, where he dressed his wounds, and carried him back to safety.

In the meantime, the 3d Platoon, on the right of the 1st Platoon, was trying to forge ahead, suffering many casualties. The 3d Platoon under the command of Lieutenant Landon, had moved up behind them, but were quickly pinned down by the heavy enemy fire. In one assault Lieutenant Graf, the leader of the 2d Platoon, was captured. Time after time both platoons tried to penetrate the enemy lines but were unsuccessful because of the inability of the other units to bring their lines forward to a solid front.

The mortar section of Company G gave the enemy everything they had, and the enemy retaliated with fire directed at Company G mortar positions. Lt John Senko, directing the firing, was wounded, but remained with his men and continued directing the fire.

Every trick in the bag was tried by the attacking platoons—shifting the one remaining machine gun, rushing, faking—but no penetration of the enemy lines could be made. Finally orders were received from Capt Ben Rhodes, company commander, to withdraw, because the situation had become too critical to insure further penetration or progress. The one and only remaining machine-gun squad, under the direction of Sergeant Pezza, remained to deliver covering fire while the company withdrew. Many men, both wounded and killed, had to be left behind that day because there was no way humanly possible to evacuate them at the time. But the enemy had not seen the end of the courage and skill of Company G, and they withdrew only that they might later return to even the score.

The preceding accounts well serve to illustrate the nature of the fighting during the period July 4 to July 15. For those who were there and who survived, the struggles and experiences will never be forgotten. Neither will those who fell be soon forgotten, and there were many. It was during this period that Major Phil Lofink, the 1st Battalion commander, and one of the finest and best-loved officers of the regiment, was killed in action. The price for the Normandy countryside was indeed high.

Yet for those who, in time of war, are classified as infantry, there can be no looking back. There is no time to reflect, for while the struggle lasts there is forever a new objective to be taken, a new battle to be fought. So it was for the 313th Infantry, and so it was with the struggles of Montgarden at an end, that the Regiment turned grim thoughts to the future, and prepared for the campaigns to follow.
THE CHERBOURG CAMPAIGN and the battles of Normandy had taken a heavy toll of killed and wounded from the rank and file of the 313th Infantry. A period of rest and reorganization was badly needed. Following the struggles at Montgardon it was virtually an impossibility for the Regiment to see action again for at least a number of days. Not only was there an acute shortage of men and equipment, but the men who had already seen action in the preceding campaigns, were physically exhausted and battle-weary.

It was for this reason that the Regiment had been placed in Division reserve, and on July 16, had been moved to the vicinity of Biemont, France, located on the high ground north of the Ay River overlooking Lessay. For an eleven-day period the Regiment maintained a defensive position in this area, resting as best it could, and meantime, drawing new replacements and supplies. Every effort was made to make the new replacements feel at home in their new environment. They were welcomed to the 313th Infantry by a member of the Regimental staff, and were indoctrinated with the immediate and past history of the Division and the Regiment, including the Regiment’s achievements at Cherbourg and Montgardon. Every effort was made to counteract a tendency toward apathy in the new replacements and to inculcate them with a fighting spirit. Upon joining the Regiment they were taught who their commanders were, from the squad leader to their army commander, and no effort was spared in an effort to give them the fighting spirit of the old 313th Infantry.

From July 16 to July 25 the Regiment remained in the vicinity of Biemont, France. The remainder of the Division was also located in the same general area, on the high ground north of the Ay River overlooking Lessay, and the ground to the south. The 315th Infantry was located on the right, the 314th Infantry on the left, or east of the 79th Division on the road to Creances. The 8th Division, which was already in the field on the road to Creances. The 8th Division, which was on the immediate left flank, or east of the 79th Division, also reported resistance increasingly light in their sector. It was becoming apparent all along the line that the Normandy defenses had at last been pierced and a large-scale breakthrough was at hand.

At 7:45 P.M., July 26, therefore, the Regiment received a warning order to be prepared to move across the Ay River, following the 314th Infantry. Then, early on the morning of July 27, the 314th Infantry moved out in the attack. Their advance was slow, however, due to extensive minefields, both antitank and antipersonnel, which the Germans had installed during the previous ten days in an effort to delay the advance to the south. As a result it was not until late on the afternoon of July 27, that the Regiment moved south of the Ay River, and established a defensive posi-
tion in that general vicinity. The movement was made in formation of battalions in column: 3d, 2d, 1st. The only enemy resistance encountered by the Regiment during the move comprised a few rounds of high-velocity artillery, which interdicted known terrain features in that area. Here the Regiment remained during the night, and meantime, orders were received to continue the advance to the south. On July 28, therefore, the Regiment again moved, this time to an area near Nicolle, remaining there only until late that afternoon, when another move was made still farther south.

By this time it appeared certain that a major breakthrough was an accomplished fact, and so, on orders from Division headquarters, the entire Regiment, less the 1st Battalion, was motorized, and given the mission of following Combat Command B, 6th Armored Division, to the south to secure Granville, nearly twenty miles farther south of the Regiment's location at the time.

Meanwhile, the movement of the 6th Armored Division toward Avranches had been held up at Pont-de-la-Roque, where the enemy had blown bridges across the Sienne (not to be confused with the historic Seine) River. This prevented further movement by the 313th Infantry until noon, August 1, when a move was made across the Sienne River to assembly positions in the vicinity of Lingerville. At Lingerville the 1st Battalion reverted to Regimental control and a move was made on August 2, by motor, in formation column of battalions in order: 2d, 1st, 3d, to a new area in the vicinity of St. Pierre-Langers.

Here again there was no time for rest. The armored units, taking advantage of their initial breakthrough, had moved with lightning speed through Avranches and Pontorson, then on to the west. As a consequence the Regiment was again motorized and on August 3, in a formation of battalions: 3d, 2d, 1st, moved out to press the advance farther to the south. The 3d Battalion moved out promptly through Avranches and then on a route which was east of the main road Avranches-Pontaubault. Then the 1st and 2d Battalions moved through Avranches, Pontaubault to Pontorson, where the 1st Battalion was given the mission of protecting the bridges at Pontorson against possible attack from the east or southeast. The 2d Battalion moved to the west of the town to protect against an enemy attack from that sector.

At approximately 5:00 P.M., August 3, word was received through the assistant division commander that the mission of the 79th Division had been suddenly changed in order that the fullest possible exploitation of the breakthrough might be made. Consequently, the Regiment was given immediate orders to move to a position south of Fougeres.

The move began at approximately 6:00 P.M. in formation of battalions: 2d, 1st, 3d. Simultaneously, the Regiment received the attachments: Company A, 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion; 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion; 749th Tank Battalion; 904th Field Artillery Battalion; and the 79th Reconnaissance Troop. In this move the Regiment was preceded by the 79th Reconnaissance Troop and the 313th's I&R Platoon, which maintained an advance lead and reconnoitered for enemy positions. The route of march moved through Pontorson, Pontaubault, St. James, and on to Fougeres. No resistance was encountered until reaching La Blerie, where an enemy force, armed with rifles and automatic weapons, delayed the advance for approximately two hours. Then, on arriving at a point north of Fougeres, resistance was again encountered, but because darkness was already falling it was not deemed advisable to attempt to enter and take the town of Fougeres that night. Orders were therefore issued for all units to button up for the night in defensive positions north of the town, and the following morning, August 4, the attack on Fougeres began.

The attack on Fougeres was completely successful. By mid-morning, August 4, its capture was completed. Thereafter the 1st and 2d Battalions pushed south and east of the town and took up defensive positions, and later in the day, the 3d Battalion also moved to the south and west for the same purpose.

The next move for the Regiment became apparent on August 6, when information was received of the Corps plan of attack. The XV Corps had been ordered to move east across the Mayenne River in the vicinity of Laval, and thereafter to push east to Le Mans. Combat Command A of the 5th Armored Division was ordered to cross the Mayenne River between Chateau and Goutier and Laval and block the two main roads which ran into Laval from the south and southeast, and thereafter prepare to advance farther to the east on Corps order. The 90th Division was ordered to cross the Mayenne River and establish roadblocks at Forêt de Bourgon, Moreilles, Laval, Frambault, De Perriers, and then move south along the Third Army boundary, resuming movement to the east on Corps order. The 79th Division was to attack, with orders to seize the bridgehead across the Mayenne River at Laval, and for this mission, the 313th Infantry was given the task of
spearheading the attack. If resistance was found to be too heavy, a coordinated attack of both the 313th and 314th Infantry Regiments on the town of Laval was contemplated. Otherwise the 313th would take the town alone.

Therefore on the morning of August 6 the Regiment moved out in the attack, with the attachments of the 749th Tank Battalion, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 904th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 79th Division Reconnaissance Troop. F Company of the 313th, D Company of the 749th Tank Battalion, and a platoon of the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, preceded the advance of the combat team to the south. Small detachments of enemy riflemen were encountered at each crossroad en route, and the first serious resistance was met at La Croixille. There, the advance of the Regiment was delayed between two and three hours during which time the forces comprising the advance guard and the 106th Cavalry engaged the enemy in a stiff fight, succeeded in capturing or destroying two 20mm AA guns, one 37mm AA gun and two 88mm AT guns. Approximately fifty German prisoners were taken as a result of this action.

With this resistance overcome the march was continued to the south, and no further resistance was encountered until the advance element reached La Lande, where the Regiment detrucked. The enemy opposition was initially engaged by the task force or advance guard and the 1st Battalion was promptly committed to the left, or east, of the main road leading into Laval. Here, stiff opposition, including tanks, high-velocity artillery fire, and mortar fire, prevented our forces from reaching Laval prior to darkness, and it was almost midnight before the fighting died down sufficiently for the battalions to button up in positions approximately three kilometers northwest of the center of the town. After the battle subsided, patrolling was begun in an effort to discover if the bridges over the Mayenne River at Laval had been destroyed. Several large explosions had occurred during the night which indicated that possibly the bridges had been blown.

Throughout the remainder of the night and early morning considerable enemy information was obtained. Interrogation of prisoners indicated clearly that the main body of the German resistance was retreating south of the river, and information gleaned from our patrols seemed to substantiate this fact. However, it was impossible to definitely ascertain whether the bridges at Laval had been blown or not.

At 7:00 A.M., August 7, the attack was resumed, with the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2d Battalion on the right, and the 3d Battalion echeloned at the right rear of the 2d Battalion. In complete contrast to the heavy resistance encountered the previous day, enemy action was extremely light, and the battalions moved forward with comparatively little difficulty all the way to the edge of the Mayenne River. Upon arrival there, positive information was established that the enemy had retreated across the river and that all bridges had been blown by the enemy in an effort to further slow our advance.

The Mayenne River separates the town of Laval into two sections. The river, running north to south, literally cuts the town in half at its center. By the time our advance had reached the river’s edge the westerly half of the town was therefore cleared. This action had been completed by mid-afternoon, August 7, and plans were immediately formulated for effecting a crossing. It was found that a dam was located about eight hundred yards south of the main bridge, over which foot troops could cross. Immediately, therefore, the 2d Battalion was ordered to send its foot troops across the dam. Meantime a footbridge was erected south of the dam, and thereafter both the dam and the footbridge were used in effecting a crossing by the 3d and 1st Battalions. By 10:00 P.M. the foot troops of all three battalions had taken up defensive positions to the south and east of the town, and prior to midnight the 304th Engineers had completed a heavy ponton bridge, which enabled the battalions to move all their transportation across the river that same night. Before morning the entire town of Laval was cleared of enemy and was completely in our hands.
They were all alike, those French towns we saw after the breakthrough.

In the meantime orders had been received from Division Headquarters for the 313th Infantry plus its attachments to continue the advance to Le Mans. Every effort, naturally, was being exerted to exploit the breakthrough to the fullest possible extent, and as a consequence, no time was lost in moving forward. The movement of the Regiment started at 8:00 A.M., August 8, in a column of battalions in formation: 3d, 2d, 1st, with the lead battalion preceded by the 106th Cavalry and the Division’s Reconnaissance Troop.

The first resistance was encountered at Avesse and delayed the column approximately two hours. Resistance was again encountered on the reaching the outskirts of Loué, when the 106th Cavalry met an enemy roadblock of sufficient strength that infantry was requested to help reduce it. Through an error in instructions only one truckload of riflemen plus one officer was sent forward, when a full company of infantry had been requested. Despite this, however, the officer and eighteen riflemen who had initially moved forward, succeeded in destroying the roadblock and at the same time in seizing the bridge in Loué which the Germans were attempting to mine.

Meantime, the advance-guard commander became aware of the error that had been made, and immediately sent forward the remainder of the company plus a platoon of medium tanks. This group arrived at the bridge none too soon, for resistance was increasing steadily, and in a brief period became so intense that the entire company was forced to move to a defensive position on a ridge approximately two kilometers north of the town.

While this was transpiring an erroneous report of an enemy column of approximately eight hundred Germans moving north toward Avesse was received at Regimental Headquarters. The 1st Battalion was promptly detrucked and placed in defensive positions south of Avesse, to ward off this threat. No enemy appeared, however.

In order to adequately handle the situation at Loué, the 2d Battalion was moved up and detrucked midway between Mariel-en-Champagne and Loué. Within the course of several hours all enemy resistance had been overcome and the advance was again resumed. The 3d Battalion moved forward to Vallon-sur-Gée, with the 2d Battalion following the 3d Battalion by a distance of six to eight hundred yards. Although the 3d Battalion had gotten through to Vallon-sur-Gée without incident, the 2d Battalion met heavy enemy resistance at the western edge of Loué. Apparently a large number of enemy had moved down from the north, and had engaged the 2d Battalion as it attempted to move forward.

The 2d Battalion deployed and with its attached tanks and tank destroyers succeeded in driving the main bulk of the Germans to the southeast, capturing innumerable prisoners. However, one pocket of enemy resistance remained on the hill mass to the north and continued firing 20mm antiaircraft guns and mortars into the town until darkness. Just prior to darkness the 1st Battalion was ordered to move to positions near Mariel-en-Champagne approximately one kilometer north of the 2d Battalion, and the 3d Battalion was ordered to return from Vallon-sur-Gée by way of St. Christophe-en-Champagne to the vicinity of Mariel-en-Champagne.

Throughout the night enemy resistance in the surrounding areas dwindled almost to nothing, and by
morning, August 9, the march was again resumed. This time the movement continued with only scattered resistance, which at no time was serious enough to delay the advance. En route, numerous prisoners were taken. They would come out of fields, waving white flags and with hands over head, anxious to surrender to the advancing column. It was more than evident that the enemy’s ability to continue organized resistance in this sector was at an end.

By evening, August 9, excellent progress had been made. The route of the advancing column had moved through Vallon-sur-Gèc to De Chetif, to Rouillon. There, orders were received from higher headquarters to proceed to an assembly position vicinity of Les Terres, and upon arrival, the Regiment remained in that vicinity until August 10. Meantime, the 315th Infantry had moved into Le Mans, and on its arrival there, the Regiment received orders to follow the 315th Infantry at a distance of three miles across the bridge at Le Mans, to eventual positions in the vicinity of La-Mele-sur-Sarthe. Until the late afternoon of August 11 the Regiment remained en route, passing through Savigne, Beaufay, Courcemont, St. Aignan, Marolles-Braulx and into La-Mele-sur-Sarthe. No enemy had been engaged en route, although scattered groups of badly demoralized enemy still continued to surrender to the advancing Allied column. It was truly a breakthrough in the fullest sense of the word, and the very nature of it sent a thrill of accomplishment and gratitude tingling through the spine of every soldier and officer. It was unquestionably an unforgettable period for one and all concerned.

It is only fitting and proper that some space be devoted to giving a brief word picture of the nature of the initial breakthrough days as the advancing infantryman experienced it. The entire period was one of sharp contrast. It was a period of bitter combat at one moment, and in the next moment the scene would shift to that of a triumphant procession of Allied men and equipment moving through town after town, with newly liberated Frenchmen cheering wildly as the column moved along. It was a period when the impossible and the unexpected were commonplace. At Loué, for example, while the advance units were striving desperately to establish a bridgehead across the La Vegre River, an incident occurred which even fiction would relegate to the realm of the impossible. During the battle there, with artillery, mortar and small-arms fire still in evidence, a civilian band from the town of Loué appeared out of nowhere to serenade the attacking American infantrymen. The small band of patriotic Frenchmen came to the very banks of the river and played stirring music until the bridgehead had been secured. This incident actually happened, and was verified by the Regimental commander who was at the bridge site at the time. All along the route of march the average Frenchman seemed to react similarly. The moment the Americans arrived, a spark was kindled that in a mere matter of moments reached a frenzied fire. Frenchmen appeared from nowhere, oblivious of the danger to life and limb, to cheer the advancing columns on their way. One incident is told of an infantryman who was engaging an enemy sniper in a small-arms fight. The infantryman was crouched behind a wall at a doorway entrance, taking all possible advantage of cover and concealment as he attempted to eliminate the enemy sniper. At that moment a Frenchman appeared in the doorway, with bottle and glass in hand, to offer the American a stout drink of wine. The infantryman refused, and motioned frantically for the Frenchman to take cover. Instead, the Frenchman emerged to the street, in full view of the enemy, and insisted on the infantryman accepting his offer. The infantryman, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, promptly accepted, and after drinking his fill of good French wine, went back to the business of liberating the town.

It is not impossible to understand how such incidents could occur. For four years the French had been under the Nazi heel. They had hoped and dreamed and prayed for liberation. Then suddenly, as if from nowhere, the dreamed-of event would happen, and the populace would literally go wild with enthusiasm and joy. The presence of the Americans was somehow synonymous with a feeling of safety and liberty for which they had waited so long. Once the Americans appeared, the realization of these things overpowered reason, and the results were obvious.

There was hardly a GI in those days who didn’t have a liberal supply of French wine, cider, cognac or schnapps under his belt as the column rolled along. Frenchmen lined the streets of every town, with bottles in hand, anxiously awaiting a chance to give drinks to les Americains. No effort was made to curb this practice; for no amount of restriction could have dampened either the spirits of the French or of the advancing columns. The spirit of re-birth and of liberation was beyond control and beyond checking.

Yet it was not all a rose-covered path that led to victory in those early breakthrough days. Many were
lost as the advance forged ahead. Victory and freedom could be had only at a price, and for every little town, and every little hamlet, some soldier, somewhere, had paid that price. Wherever they fell, Frenchmen would place flowers at their feet, and would stand silently and cross themselves in reverence, while the columns of American men and equipment moved ever forward, toward the very heart of France, and eventual victory.

Optimism ran high in those days. There were many who believed the war might soon be over. Two, three months, they would say, and it is finished. But those in authority knew better. They knew there would be later repercussions. They knew that the march to victory would yet be a long, hard road, and that the enemy, although momentarily demoralized, was far from beaten.

Yet no one could deny one obvious fact. The doorway to central France was now wide open, and we were marching in.
Chapter 12: The Advance Toward Paris

The regiment remained in the vicinity of La-Meile-sur-Sarthe for a four-day period, August 12 to August 15. The 79th Division had assembled in this general vicinity to assist other elements of the XV Corps in blocking the escape of the Germans to the east. The 5th Armored Division, also a part of the XV Corps, was located at this time north and northwest of Sées. In the area between the 5th Armored Division and the 79th Infantry Division small German armored and infantry columns were constantly trying to infiltrate through the lines, and throughout the period the attached reconnaissance units of the Regiment also reported small groups of enemy. All battalions were ordered to patrol vigorously and combat patrols were sent as far as La Lew to destroy any enemy found. Meantime the Air Forces had a field day, constantly dive-bombing and strafing enemy tanks and motor columns which were moving in the area north of the Regiment. Some prisoners were taken during this period and from the information gained, orders of withdrawal had apparently been issued to the German troops.

At 8:00 P.M., August 14, word was received from Division Headquarters that the Regiment was alerted for a move to the east and at 4:20 A.M., August 15, the Regiment received the following movement order:

The XV Corps moves to the east, with the 79th Division on the right, the 5th Armored Division on the left, to advance east on Paris. The XX Corps is to be on the right of the 79th Division until a line is established in the vicinity of Chartres–Orléans. The 313th boundary will be Mortagne–Senonches, then up the river to Nogent-le-Roi. The 106th Cavalry is to precede the Division by three hours. The Division will march in two columns, all units motorized; with the 313th Infantry on the left, the 315th Infantry on the right, and the 314th Infantry following the 313th Infantry. The 90th Division will continue to hold the line northwest of Sées with the 2d Armored Division on their left or west.

The Regiment moved at 10:00 A.M., August 15, 1944, in the following order: 1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions. The route of march included Bocé, Coulimer, Parfondeval, Courgiron, Bizou, Le Mage, Neuilly-sur-Eure, Senonches, Châteauneuf-en-Thymerais, Le-Tremblay-le-Vicomte to Nogent-le-Roi. The attachments of the Regiment at this time consisted of Company A, 749th Tank Battalion; 1st Platoon, Company D, 749th Tank Battalion; and the 813th TD Battalion. The movement of the Regiment was unhampered by any enemy action, and at approximately 5:30 P.M., August 15, the leading element contacted portions of the column of the 7th Armored Division at Nogent-le-Roi. There it was found necessary to double-bank the regiments marching in column in an effort to close into their assigned areas in that vicinity.

The 16th of August found the Regiment still in assembly positions in and near Nogent-le-Roi. There they remained until late afternoon when word was received from Division that the Regiment was to move across the Eure River to assembly positions near Coulombe. This move was made in order to facilitate the movement of the Division the following day across the few bridges over the Eure River. During the Regiment's brief respite in Nogent-le-Roi patrols from B and C Companies discovered two important German installations that had been abandoned by the Jerrys. One, a German warehouse located in the town, contained tons of grain, canned meats, and other condiments. The other was a German airport, which had been abandoned in such haste that the entire workshop, plus six partially intact airplanes, had been left.

The Regiment completed its move across the Eure by 6:00 P.M., August 16, without incident. The 17th of August was spent in patrolling in an effort to clear out a few scattered Germans who had been reported in that area. Officer patrols were dispatched from the battalions to contact elements of the 7th Armored Division and to reconnoiter roads to the north of Coulombe. Enemy air activity, normally limited to night flights and reconnaissance suddenly became active in the regimental sector for the first time since the Regiment arrived in France. Throughout the day waves of Heinie aircraft attempted to strafe our troops. They caused no material damage, however, and before the day ended the Regiment had accounted for three enemy aircraft shot down by caliber .30 and .50 small-arms fire. The Division as a whole accounted for fifteen planes on the same date.

The 1st Platoon, Company A, bagged this ME-109 just before the Seine crossing, August, 1944.
At 9:00 P.M., August 17, word was received that the Regiment might move on the 18th, again toward the east. However, the evening hours passed without a confirming order. Another movement alert order was given to the Regiment at 9:50 A.M., August 18, which stated that the Division was to be prepared to move northeast, east or southeast on six hours' notice. Shortly before noon definite instructions from Division were received for a movement to the north. The 79th Division was to move north to take up defensive positions on the high ground southwest of Mantes-Gassicourt. The Division, the order stated, was to be motorized, and was to move in two columns, with the 313th Infantry on the west route and the 314th Infantry on the east route. The 5th Armored Division was to move in a zone to the west of the 79th Division.

The Regiment moved at 1:30 P.M., with the battalions in column: 1st, 3d, and 2d. The route passed through Colombe, St. Laurent-la-Gatine, Prouvais, Champagne, Houdan, St.-Lubin-de-la-Haye, Meungville and Peudreauville. In the main the move was without incident, although the reconnaissance elements of the Regiment destroyed a portion of the trains of an enemy unit that had been attempting to cross the Seine River, and all units of the Regiment participated in capturing portions of an engineer railway battalion that had been stationed at Peudreauville.

The Regiment closed in the area, vicinity of Peudreauville, at approximately 10:00 P.M., August 18, 1944. That night, reconnaissance was planned to check the ferry crossing at Rosny-sur-Seine and to clear the woods north of Peudreauville and west of Rosny-sur-Seine. At 7:00 A.M., August 19, one Company from each of the 2d and 1st Battalions left the battalion areas to clear out the portion of the woods in their zone. The company from the 1st Battalion had been given the mission of checking the ferry at Rosny-sur-Seine. At 11:50 A.M., word was received from C Company, 1st Battalion, that it had reached the Seine River and that the ferry had been sunk by the Germans. Shortly after that time the company was engaged in a fire fight with entrenched enemy on the north bank, or across the river. The company proceeded on its clearance of the town continuing north to Rolleboise, then to the northwest, then south through the woods. It had no enemy contact during the later part of this movement. The company from the 3d Battalion, I Company, encountered no enemy resistance during its entire movement. Both patrols reported an abundance of enemy matériel, including trucks, tanks, weapons and stores of food that had been abandoned prior to the Germans' crossing of the Seine River.

Meantime, the questioning of civilians in the area revealed that the Germans had been using the ferries at Rosny-sur-Seine and Mantes-Gassicourt to transport both troops and equipment north of the Seine.

The Regimental commander, Col Sterling A. Wood, had accompanied C Company on their movement into Rosny-sur-Seine and Rolleboise, and had established in a hotel on the cliffs at Rolleboise a Regimental OP which overlooked the Seine from Mantes-Gassicourt to La-Roche-Guyon. Late in the afternoon, August 19, Colonel Wood led a platoon over the dam across the Seine River at Rolleboise. It was his intention, upon finding the dam intact, to initiate reconnaissance north of the river. By this action, however, the reward to the Regiment was twofold. First, its commander had the distinction of being one of the first Americans across the historic Seine; and second, the information obtained later enabled the Regiment and the Division to effect a bloodless crossing.

Upon receipt at Division Headquarters of the information that Colonel Wood and the platoon had crossed over the dam without enemy opposition, and that the Germans had been so stupid as to leave the dam intact so that foot troops might easily cross the river, the Division commander, who was at the time at Corps Headquarters, was notified. There the decision was made by the Corps commander that the 313th Infantry would cross its foot troops over the river without delay. This constituted a singular honor for the 313th Infantry, and was the second time in World
War II that the Regiment had been so honored. It was the 313th Infantry at Cherbourg that had spearheaded the drive, and now it was again the 313th Infantry to be the first regiment to reach and to cross the most vital river in all of France, the historic Seine.

The general plan of the movement across the river involved the crossing of foot troops of the battalions in order: 2d, 1st, and 3d. Engineers were to build rafts to ferry the vehicles across and to erect a pontoon bridge at the old ferry site at Rosny-sur-Seine. Prior to 6:30 p.m., August 19, F Company of the 2d Battalion had made the original bridgehead. The remainder of the 2d Battalion started across at 1:20 a.m., August 20. By 8:45 a.m., August 20, all three battalions had their foot troops across and the engineers had completed rafts and were ferrying vehicles toward the opposite bank. At 6:35 p.m., August 20, the entire Regiment, less the heavy transportation of Service Company, had completed the crossing.

Meantime the 314th Infantry, using rafts, boats and a bridge hastily constructed by the engineers, also crossed prior to darkness, August 20. The Regiment had encountered no enemy opposition in its crossing and in its occupation of the high ridge that ran to the east and southeast of Vetheuil. The Division meanwhile continued to extend the bridgehead across the Seine River with three regiments abreast: the 313th Infantry on the north; the 314th in the center; the 315th to the south, in the general vicinity of St. Martin. The 314th and 315th Infantry met slight resistance in the movement to their assigned areas, but in the main the entire operation was highly successful and without serious incident.

After the Seine bridgehead had been secured, the Regiment and the entire Division remained in a defensive position for a nine-day period. During the first few days an ever increasing amount of Corps artillery was moved up, and in the meantime both foot and motor reconnaissance was initiated to determine the location and intention of the enemy. The result of initial reconnaissance indicated that no movement of enemy troops had been made into the general area of Vetheuil–La Roché-Guyon–Vienne-en-Arthies. However, by August 21, it became evident from the information gained from patrols and from civilians infiltrating toward our lines, that the Germans were moving up to attack. In order to better ascertain enemy intentions, the Regimental commander deemed it advisable to conduct a reconnaissance in force, first to La Roché-Guyon, and thereafter to Vienne-en-Arthies, to defi-
mans in the woods north of the village. The task force left a demolition group at a position near La-Roche-Guyon to destroy the large quantity of munitions found in that vicinity. Upon arrival at Vienne-en-Arthies, only a few Germans were found. The Germans had received word that the task force was on its way and had hastily withdrawn farther north into the woods. From the few prisoners taken information was obtained that a company from a defense battalion had been sent to occupy the high ground to the north. At the conclusion of the action at Vienne-en-Arthies, the task force turned to the south arriving within the Regiment's defensive position just prior to darkness. The information received had been of immense value, because for the first time the Regiment had definite indications that the enemy was moving up major forces into the area.

During the remainder of the period that the Regiment and the Division held and enlarged their bridgehead on the north bank of the Seine, the enemy tried desperately to retake the positions already established. It was more than obvious that the establishment of a bridgehead north of the Seine River constituted a serious threat to the enemy, and as a result four desperate attacks were launched against the positions held by the 79th Division. Meanwhile, of course, much equipment and artillery had been moved up, and by the time the enemy was ready to launch even the first major attack the Division was fully ready to handle the situation. Nevertheless, there were critical days and hours for all concerned. The German air force tried desperately to smash the bridge across the Seine, and German infantry did its best to pierce our lines. But all enemy efforts failed and although the positions were held not without cost to our forces the price we paid in dead and wounded was low indeed in comparison to enemy losses. The morale of our troops had never been better and they met each enemy onslaught with a determination and enthusiasm deserving only of the highest praise. Every precaution was taken to insure that no tricks could be played by the enemy, and the plan of defense had been worked out to perfection.

One of the latter enemy attacks was described in a report received from Company A which had been manning front line defensive positions.

Our artillery [the report stated] was zeroed in on the enemy territory and we were waiting for the Heinies to start something. You could never tell when they might attack, and life was a peculiar contrast of peaceful conditions at one moment and one hell of a battle the next.

One of our vehicles being ferried across the Seine River, August 20, 1944.

The 1st Platoon of A Company had gone to get chow and to be paid at the company kitchen. Most of the men had finished eating and several were being paid when suddenly the word came through that we were being attacked. The men ran like hell for their positions, carrying the newly received money in their hands. The enemy was attacking in force, with bayonets attached, but as fast as they came toward our positions they were mowed down like flies. We were ready for them and they didn't have a chance. Those that we failed to get with machine guns and small arms were sure to go down under the artillery we dished out a few minutes later.

The morale of the men was good. Our company had a few losses, of course, among them Joe Scorn and Jim Turner. You always lose a couple of men in any action of that kind. But we felt plenty good knowing that the enemy had been badly beaten, and we continued cracking jokes all the time.

We remained in our positions after that and that night we could hear the rumbling noises of motors and enemy movement. We knew this meant that the Jerries were either planning another attack or else they were getting ready to withdraw. We could hardly wait until morning to get the verdict, and when morning came all was quiet. The Jerries apparently had enough and by the looks of the terrain to our front, we all understood why. Never were so many dead Jerries piled up in so small an area. All the boys were out there trying to count them. The regimental commander came down to investigate the enemy's defense lines, and when he saw the destruction our artillery and machine-gun fire had wrought, he remarked, "I've never seen anything like it in any other battle and I've seen some stiff ones." Later, trucks were brought up to haul the dead bodies away.

The finale of the period in vicinity of St. Martin began
on August 27 when the 30th Infantry Division moved across the Seine River to assist the 79th Division in extending the bridgehead. At 4:00 P.M. on that date the XV Corps, which included the 79th and the 30th Divisions, attacked to extend the bridgehead that had been secured by the 79th Division. The 30th Division relieved the 315th Infantry which had been on the south and took over the extension of the line to the Seine River.

The attack lasted for a two-day period, and by evening of August 28 the XV Corps had taken all objectives, including many prisoners and much enemy matériel. This final attack, supported by tremendous concentrations of allied artillery, sounded the final death knell of enemy resistance in the sector. All elements of the enemy positions were badly depleted and their casualties had been tremendous. Allied coordination, daring and might had won again.

Perhaps the best résumé of the entire period during which the 315th Infantry had advanced toward Paris and had crossed the Seine River can be found in the following newspaper article written by Lee McCardell, war correspondent for the Baltimore Sunpapers. Lee McCardell spent much time with the 315th Infantry and wrote his articles of the 315th in action from first-hand experience. His account follows:

The Regiment, which is commanded by Colonel Sterling Wood, crossed the Seine by night, at Mantes-Gassicourt, about 25 miles northwest of Paris.

The operation was carried out with such speed that the surprised Germans thought Wood's Infantrymen were paratroopers, and the German radio broadcast that an American airborne force had been dropped north of the Seine.

The first newspaper reports cabled to the States credited Patton's tanks with having made an initial crossing. His 7th Armored Division, commanded by Major General Lindsay MacDonald Silvester, of Washington, D. C., made the second Seine bridgehead at Melun, upstream from Paris, near Fontainebleau.

The men of the 315th, which was the first to cross the river, had been the first to smash through the outer defenses of Cherbourg, and the first to enter that city last June.

From Cherbourg it had swung south with the rest of the 79th into the bitter fighting around La-Haye-du-Puits.

The Regiment's first objective after the breakthrough was St. Malo on the Brittany Peninsula. Then it swung sharply east, through Fougeres, Laval and Le Mans, crossing the Sarthe River August 14, and moving north toward Alençon to help close the famous Falaise "pocket."

The Division was now motorized and moving as fast as an armored column. It had captured scores of prisoners and enemy vehicles, but met comparatively little determined opposition, although there had been street fighting in Le Mans.

Its next orders were to attack Paris, but these were countermanded. It was ordered to seize the high ground south of the Seine and west of Paris.

The Division crossed the Eure River between Chartres and Dreux, and occupied the town of Mantes-Gassicourt. There were two dams across the Seine here. One had been blown by the Germans. The other had been damaged but a catwalk across its crest was still passable for foot troops.

Orders came down from higher headquarters to destroy what was left of the damaged dam. But Colonel Wood, who had sent the Infantry platoon across the dam to the northern bank of the Seine, and who lacked enough explosives to carry out the demolition, thought maybe he had a better idea.

The infantry platoon and a Regimental Staff officer had reported the opposite bank of the Seine clear of the enemy.

Late that night a field telephone line was laid from division headquarters to the Colonel's command post. He was about to explain his plan—which was to throw more troops across the river—when an excited division staff officer cut in and shouted:

"Don't blow that dam! Whatever you do, don't blow that dam!"

Wood was then told to begin moving his regiment across the dam's catwalk immediately. It was almost midnight and raining hard. The troops had bivouacked for the night. They were awakened and the crossing began in the midst of the rain and in pitch darkness.

By morning the entire regiment was on the northern side of the Seine, which here describes a wide loop forming a sort of inland peninsula. The engineers built floats on which the regiment's vehicles were ferried across the river that day. Later the engineers also constructed a bridge across the river.
and the entire division, supported by 15 batteries of artillery, occupied the northern bridgehead.

The Germans, already withdrawing from the Paris area, were taken by surprise. Wood established a command post in a house in the town of St. Martin, overlooking the river, and for the next few days the infantry fanned out, without meeting much opposition.

On the fifth day enemy artillery began shelling Wood's command post, and he and his staff had to move.

In the meanwhile his regimental executive officer, Lt Col Edwin Van Bibber, leading a company of tanks and rifle Company L of the regiment, had captured an elaborate headquarters fitted up with underground caves and shelters abandoned by the retreating Germans.

They were told by civilians, who claimed to have talked with Field Marshal Rommel's chauffeur, that Rommel had been injured by an American air force bombing. The infantrymen captured several members of the other German headquarters personnel, including one general's Austrian chauffeur acting as a motorcycle courier.

All this time French and American forces were closing in on Paris from the south. The Germans finally launched a counterattack on the 79th, beginning one afternoon about 4:30. The infantry bore the brunt of this attack.

Three more attacks were made by the Germans during the next two days. The Americans, deeply dug in, and closely supported by artillery, beat them off with terrific losses to the enemy.

It was a sort of Bunker Hill proposition, as the soldiers described it afterward. They had placed machine guns behind the walls in which they had made embrasures. Sitting at their gun positions, calmly smoking while they watched the Germans advance, they held their fire until they "could almost see the whites of their eyes."

"I counted 39 German dead in one small area not more than 50 yards square after one attack," Colonel Wood said. "I've never seen anything like it in any other engagement in this war—and we've had some pretty stiff ones."

German artillery and the German air force did their best to dislodge the 79th, whose position constituted a stubby finger sticking into enemy territory. But the Division held its ground and suffered fairly light casualties compared with those sustained in the Cherbourg campaign, and the fighting around La-Haye-du-Puits.

The preceding account by Lee McCracken adequately describes the nature of those August days in 1944. They were stirring days, thrilling days, and days filled with the strange emotion that comes only to men who know the thrill of victory when a cause is just. The whole Allied world had watched through the eyes of the printed page those days of unprecedented and historic action, and the 313th Infantry had been right there making the history that other men wrote and read about. But the days of the breakthrough phase in World War II were not yet over. There were other historic chapters to be written, and at Regimental Headquarters, 313th Infantry, the information of events to come was already accumulating. The time was at hand to begin the writing of a new chapter and new page in the breakthrough phase of World War II.
Chapter 13: The March to Belgium

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS was busy, and information from sources higher up was coming in at breakneck speed. The breakthrough phase had progressed to such a point that it was now possible to assemble a coherent picture of the enemy situation throughout France. In view of this situation, plans were rapidly formulated, and were often changed just as rapidly because of the lightning speed at which events were developing.

A compilation of G-2 information indicated that approximately fifty thousand men of the German Army had escaped from the Normandy defeat. From this group it was estimated that the enemy was capable of forming five divisions. In addition to these five divisions, the enemy had seven divisions throughout the remainder of France and the Low Countries capable of being employed. At most the strength of any enemy division should approximate eight thousand men, including service troops.

From information gathered there were strong indications that the enemy had intended to pull back to the line of the Somme and Aisne Rivers, and the estimate of German capabilities determined that there were possibly twelve German divisions that would have to defend a line from the English Channel to the Luxembourg border. To cope with this comparatively small enemy force, the Allies at this time had four armies capable of opposing the once powerful German army within France.

Higher headquarters had pooled this information and in a lightning stroke had made sweeping changes to cope with the ever-changing scene. These changes affected the 79th Division and made it a part of the XIX Corps. Then, early on the morning of August 29, the following order for a movement north was received.

The XIX Corps [the order stated] marches on August 30, at 0800 hours [8:00 A.M.] to the northeast. The 2d Armored Division will be on the left, the 79th Division in the center, and the 30th Division on the right. The 79th Division will march in three columns, with the 314th Infantry on the left, the 313th Infantry (less 1st Battalion which will be in Corps reserve) in the center, and the 315th Infantry on the right. The 79th Reconnaissance Group plus the I&R platoons of the regiments will cover the advance.

The attachments of the Regiment at this time consisted of a platoon from Company A, 304th Engineers, as well as Company A and one platoon of Company D, 749th Tank Battalion.

With the receipt of the movement order, events transpired swiftly. In the first place, at 8:45 A.M., August 29, Combat Command B of the 2d Armored Division attacked north through the zone of the 313th Infantry with the mission of capturing the high ground in the vicinity of Vienne-en-Arthies and of making contact with the British 43d Division, which had crossed the Seine River to the west of La-Roche-Guyon. Then, later in the day, the 313th Infantry was ordered into Division reserve, and in compliance with this order the 1st Battalion was moved to the vicinity of St. Pierre. Thereafter, the 2d and 3d Battalions were ordered to assemble in the same general vicinity in preparation for the movement north the following day.

At 7:00 A.M., August 30, the Regiment began the awaited march. Lacking sufficient transportation, the march was made on foot. And since the 1st Battalion had been ordered to remain in reserve, in the vicinity of St. Pierre, only the 2d and 3d Battalions moved out as scheduled. The march continued throughout the entire day, passing through St. Pierre, Fontenay, Bruiel, Avernes, Commy, Moussey, Chars, and Quoniam. No enemy action of any consequence occurred during the movement, although the lead reconnaissance elements were in contact at various points with the retreating enemy. Many prisoners were taken, mainly comprising small groups of Germans who had hidden in the woods as the column approached.

On August 31, the march was continued, and during the course of the day the marching columns passed through the towns of Mériu, Ste. Genevieve, Mouchy, and St. Félix. Only light enemy resistance was again encountered, and like the day before many prisoners were taken. Information obtained from the prisoners indicated that a lack of officer personnel and an absence of orders had completely demoralized them. By the end of the second day's marching the troops were extremely tired, and it was a welcome relief for all concerned when trucks arrived enabling all personnel to ride. The 1st Battalion returned to the Regiment from the vicinity of St. Pierre, and at 5:00 P.M., September 1, the march was continued. The Regiment moved forward in a motorized column, in order: 3d, 2d and 1st Battalions. This time the route moved north through the towns of Hanainville, Courcelle, Rollot, Hainvillers, Boulogne, Fescamps, Laboissiere, Lignieres, Dancourt, Villers, Parvillers, Méharicourt, Liéons, Aboncourt, Pressoir, Demicourt, Fay, Barleux, Flauntrou, all the way to the banks of the Somme River.
The scenes en route to the Somme River were unforgettable. So likewise were the scenes at the banks of the Somme, itself. All along the route of march were to be found unmistakable landmarks of the bitter fighting that had taken place during World War I. The old battlefields were still to be recognized, and some of the towns, with battered buildings and parts of buildings covered through the years with moss and vegetation, told a vivid story of the destruction that had visited France some twenty-nine years before. Then, the Somme River itself showed equal signs of the battles of the previous war, for the Somme River had been a point of bitter struggle in 1916-1918.

It was dusk, September 1, before the leading elements of the Regiment reached the banks of the canal that ran parallel to, and south of, the Somme River. Information had been received during the day that the bridges leading over the Somme River itself had been destroyed. Reconnaissance was initiated at once to determine the status of the bridges, and upon receiving information from the reconnaissance elements that the bridges were impassable, the Regiment was placed in an assembly area south of the canal.

Previous orders from higher headquarters had given the Division until September 3 to close into an area near the Belgium border, and it had been the Corps commander's orders that the Division would move night and day in order to accomplish the mission assigned in the time specified. Consequently no time was lost in an effort to enable the Regiment to cross the Somme River and continue the march.

The attached platoon of Company A, 304th Engineers, were immediately ordered to move to the bridge site and to construct bridges over which the Regiment could effect a crossing. Luckily enough, the Germans had been so kind as to leave adequate building material on the south bank of the river. They had been in the process, apparently, of constructing tremendous anti-tank barriers consisting of logs approximately three feet in diameter, twenty-two feet in length, buried into the ground to a depth of fifteen feet. Much of this kind of lumber and material had been left untouched by the enemy in his hasty retreat, and it served its purpose in enabling the engineers to construct an adequate bridge over which the Regiment could cross.

It was a busy night for the Regiment, and none too pleasant. There was no sign of enemy activity, but the first of September had brought with it signs of oncoming winter, and a bleak, cold downpour of rain drenched the troops and hampered the work of the engineers. Despite these difficulties, however, the bridge was completed that night, and by 9:00 A.M., September 2, all elements of the Regiment were across the Somme River and the motor march was resumed. The majority of the Regiment had crossed the river during the dead of night, under strict blackout conditions, and the task of effecting a safe crossing had been a hazardous one.

Throughout the entire day, September 2, the battalions moved in column, in order: 1st, 3d, and 2d. In many ways the trip was an unforgettable one. The weather, which throughout the night had been cold and rainy, began to clear prior to noon, and throughout most of the remainder of the long motor march the sun shone brightly. There was a tinge of fall in the September air, and as the column moved through town after town, you felt unmistakably that electrifying emotion of peoples newly liberated. You saw them by the thousands lining the streets of every city and hamlet, cheering wildly as the column moved along. In some towns the crowds went completely berserk, storming into the center of the streets, and making it impossible for the lead vehicles to continue the advance. Every jeep and every truck was loaded down with gifts from grateful Frenchmen. There was wine and schnapps and beer; pies, cakes and fruit; and flowers of every possible color and kind strewn on the streets and in the vehicles. No amount of rhetoric could adequately portray either the emotion of the people on that day, or the scene itself. You had to experience it to appreciate it, and from the lowliest private to the highest officer, it was appreciated. It was an unforgettable experience.

The march continued throughout the entire day, and far into the night, with the route passing through Cléry, Bergen, Moislains, Ytres, Neuville, Metz-en-Couture, Trescault, Havrincourt, Cantaing, Fontaine, Cambrai, Blécourt, Denain, St. Amand, and on to Howardries, Belgium. The enemy was conspicuous by his absence throughout most of the march, and from the sights witnessed en route, everyone was more than glad that Jerry was on the run. All along the route of march there were pillboxes and dug-in emplacements. Had the enemy chosen to resist, the march of the 79th Division into Belgium would have been a different affair. But all indications pointed to the fact that the enemy was completely demoralized, and was retreating as rapidly as possible.

It should be mentioned here that the Air Forces had done an amazing job of hampering the enemy's retreat.
Throughout all of France the evidence of the Air Forces’ successful work in breaking up retreating German columns of men and equipment could be seen. There were burned-out trucks and tanks and enemy equipment along every highway, and the Germans, out of a profound respect for the Allied air forces, had forced civilians to dig foxholes and trenches all along the highways. The number of retreating enemy that the Air Forces killed, wounded or rendered ineffective as a fighting force, is impossible to estimate.

Perhaps the greatest ovation given the Regiment by the overjoyed French occurred at Cambrai. Cambrai is one of the larger French cities, predominantly an industrial town. There, the French civilians were completely beyond control, and the march was delayed for a two-hour period only because it was impossible for the lead motor vehicles to force a path through the wall of humanity that jammed the streets. Many sights of near-mob violence were seen there. Collaborators, both men and women, were jeered and teased and tormented. Women, who had collaborated with the Germans, or had been their mistresses, were promptly relieved of all the hair on their heads, and forced to walk the streets with bald heads glistening in the September sun.

When the motor march neared St. Amand, reconnaissance elements began to receive reports that the enemy was near at hand. In a little town some three kilometers south of St. Amand civilians reported that a German force comprising approximately 150 men and five tanks had passed to the north only an hour and a half prior to the arrival of our lead reconnaissance units. In this connection an unusual incident occurred. It was discovered to the amazement of all concerned that the Regiment had at last entered a town where both telephone service and electric lighting facilities had been left intact. Such an experience had never happened before. Throughout all of France into which the 313th Infantry had ventured, all communications had been destroyed, and a luxury such as electric lighting had been an impossible dream.

On learning that telephone service was available, Lieutenant Couillard, a French officer who had been attached to the Regimental I&R Platoon, placed a call to St. Amand to determine if the route through St. Amand was clear. The call revealed that the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) had eliminated all but a minority of this force, and as a consequence only a few short bursts of machine-gun fire met the reconnaissance elements as they came into St. Amand.

The remainder of the march to Belgium was without incident. A bright moon aided the movement during the hours of darkness, all the way to the border between Belgium and France, just south and west of Howardries. At this point the moon was obscured by heavy clouds, and the remainder of the movement through France’s “Little Maginot Line,” into the assembly area just north of the Belgian border, was made in pitch-black darkness. The Regiment had arrived at its destination at approximately 2:00 A.M., September 3, 1944.

Yes, the march to Belgium had been a historic one. And it had been accomplished not without due credit and honor both to the 79th Division and the 313th Infantry. For the Division, the Commanding General of the XIX Corps, Major General Charles H. Corlett, wrote the following, in a letter to Major General Wyche, 79th Division Commander.

On August 28, 1944, the 79th Infantry Division joined this Corps. At that time it had already established a bridgehead and was astride the Seine River. The Corps was ordered to advance and in seventy-two hours the Division covered a total of 180 miles, crossing the Somme River and numerous smaller streams and closing in perfect order on its objectives in Belgium.

This is believed to be one of the fastest opposed advances of comparable distance by an infantry division in warfare. It is desired to commend you, your officers and men on this splendid achievement. The Commanding General, United States First Army, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, concurs in the commendation.

And that was not the only honor received. For the 313th Infantry, there was the added distinction of being the only one of the three regiments in the Division to cross into, and occupy, a portion of Belgium.

The 313th Infantry had scored another “first.”
Chapter 14: The Return to France

It was a foregone conclusion when the Regiment arrived at its destination in the vicinity of Howardries, Belgium, on September 3, 1944, that no further move would be made for at least several days. Previous information from Division Headquarters had indicated as much. The supply situation was becoming critical. Although the spectacular advance of the American armies through the heart of France had indeed been an achievement without precedent, the problem of supply had now become of primary concern. Already there was an acute shortage of gasoline. The advancing columns of motorized infantry had moved so swiftly that it was virtually impossible for the supplies to keep abreast of the advance. Therefore, it would be a matter of at least several days before additional supplies could be brought up.

With this information at hand the Regimental commander took immediate steps to cope with the situation. Gasoline was rationed throughout the Regiment to the absolute minimum essential for military purposes. Other essential supplies were carefully watched so as to insure against scarcity until additional supplies were available.

Meantime, as a precautionary measure, the Regimental commander ordered the battalions to thoroughly patrol the area surrounding the general vicinity of Howardries. The whereabouts of the enemy in this region was not fully known, and although civilian and armée blanche reports had indicated that the enemy had taken flight, it was believed possible that groups of enemy might still be found. The result of the initial patrolling was negative. No enemy was contacted, although during succeeding days a number of prisoners was taken. A day-and-night vigil was maintained to insure against infiltration of enemy groups through our lines.

The forced delay in movement caused by the shortage of supplies afforded the Regiment an opportunity to enjoy a much-needed rest. The troops were tired and badly in need of a little time to rest and clean up. Colonel Wood, substantiating the conviction that "a clean soldier makes a better-fighting soldier," ordered all company commanders to see to it that their men were given haircuts during the rest period. Similarly, preparations were made to enable the men to take showers and to wash personal equipment and clothing. Within a 24-hour period after the clean-up order had been issued the troops were clean-shaven and of neat appearance. This, plus the long-awaited opportunity for a brief rest, had a stimulating effect upon morale generally. As a further stimulus to morale a USO show was staged for the troops on September 5, and as always when entertainment was to be had, a large and appreciative crowd of GI's attended.

For two days following the arrival of the Regiment at Howardries, no further word was received from Division Headquarters in regard to a next move. On the afternoon of September 5, however, Brig Gen Frank U. Greer paid a visit to the Regimental CP and at that time informed Colonel Wood that a move would be made in the near future. That same evening, at 9:30 P.M., a telephone call from Division revealed the following information:

The Division will probably move September 6, or shortly thereafter, depending upon arrival of sufficient gasoline. Move will be made by foot and motor, with the following general plan. Movement by motor: Division Headquarters; Division Artillery; 79th Reconnaissance; 315th Infantry; 314th Infantry (less 1 1/2 battalions who are to be attached to 313th); 312th Field Artillery; 304th Engineers; 749th Tank Battalion; 813th Tank Destroyers; 313th Infantry, with 1 1/2 battalions from the 314th; will march on foot and receive trucks the following day. Objective, destination, route, time: Unknown. However, all elements move as a combat team, and the Division will be attached until further notice to the U.S. Third Army.

This original information was destined to be changed somewhat before the actual move was made. The final order of the march for the Division included the 315th Infantry, motorized units of (engineers, TDs, tanks), plus the 314th and 313th Infantry Regiments. The 79th Division Reconnaissance Troop was to be attached to the Provost Marshal and to mark the route for the motor column. The Division, the order stipulated, was to move on one road.
The date of departure was of necessity delayed, due to the continued uncertainty of the supply situation. On the morning of September 6, word was received that the march had been postponed, but that all units were to remain on the alert for a possible move at any time.

The entire day of September 7 was spent in preparation and waiting for the actual move, and it was not until 2:00 P.M., September 8, that the movement got under way. When the move actually began all units were motorized, and advance information precluded the movement for a twenty-hour period. The route of march continued all the way from Howardries, Belgium, to Reims, France. No enemy had been encountered en route, and for a twenty-hour period the march continued without let-up. The route of march had included Valenciennes, Cambrai, Péronne, Ham, Guiscard, Coucy, Soissons, Fismes and Reims. Since the march used up most of the night hours, little was seen by the troops of scenic interest en route, but when the convoy arrived at Reims, the troops had a good look-see at one of France's largest cities, paying particular attention to the beauty and grandeur of the world-famed Reims Cathedral, which was clearly visible in the distance.

Southeast of Reims the march halted at approximately noon, September 9. There, in a prearranged assembly area a three-hour rest and refueling stop was made. The men were tired, having had virtually no rest the night before, and the brief respite was welcome. Promptly at 3:00 P.M., however, the motor march was resumed. Few indeed knew the ultimate destination or the length of time they would yet have to travel, but they were soon to know, for the march continued throughout the entire night and until 8:00 A.M., September 10, when the Regiment closed into an area vicinity of Thonnance. The route of march had included Verzy, Louvois, Marue, Vertus, Fere-en-Champenois, Sommesous, Arcis, Brienne, Wassy, Nomécourt, and Thonnance.

Later on the morning of September 10, Maj Gen Ira T. Wyche, Commanding General of the 79th Division, visited the Regimental CP. In a talk with Colonel Wood he expressed the opinion that the Division would probably remain in its present location for at least several days. He explained, however, that the situation was subject to change at any moment. This latter thought was verified that same afternoon when definite information was relayed from Division Headquarters to the Regimental CP that the Division was alerted for a move the following morning, September 11. The tentative plan of movement was outlined as follows:

The Division moves by motor and on foot. One motorized regiment, two marching regiments, 314th motorized, 313th and 315th to move on foot, marching approximately twelve miles to the vicinity of Neufchâteau. 313th will leave present area approximately 0800 hours, September 11, 1944. Motors will be kept off roads until the 314th Infantry clears its foot column.

Division will march in two columns. Objective: Charmes, France, on the Moselle River. Resistance anticipated. Progress of advance dependent upon situation. Upon arrival by foot vicinity of Neufchâteau the 313th Infantry will move to the north, by motor, if the situation permits.

The following morning, September 11, the first elements of the 313th Infantry had crossed their IP at 7:15 A.M., and the march began. By 9:00 o'clock the entire Regiment was on the move. By noon, the Regiment had travelled approximately twelve miles in the general direction of Neufchâteau without encountering any resistance. At this point, the entire Regiment was motorized. The foot troops piled on every vehicle available, including the Corps Artillery, and the march thereafter continued in a more northerly direction through Soulaincourt, Lézéville, Grand, Midevaux, Coussey, Attigneville, and Repelet. While en route, advance elements met some resistance, which was quickly overcome. Otherwise the march had been made without incident.

At 8:30 P.M., September 11, the Regiment closed into an area east of Oelleville, where a Regimental CP was established. Little was known for a brief period, either as to the exact status or location of the remainder of the Division, or, for that matter, of the possible enemy situation in the immediate 313th Infantry area. By morning on September 12, however, the situation was more fully understood. Word had been received from Division Headquarters throughout the night that the advance Division elements had closed in on their objective at 6:30 P.M., September 11, with the 314th Infantry located at a point on the Moselle River north of Charmes, France, reportedly in contact with the enemy on the outskirts of the town. The exact location of the regiments and attached units was also made known. Meantime, information had been received re-
PWs being marched to the rear from Ambacourt, France, September 14, 1944.

garding the possibility of enemy in the sector surrounding the 313th area. Civilian reports indicated that there were Germans at Ju vaincourt, Mirecourt and the woods northwest of Mirecourt. Reconnaissance by the Regimental I&R Platoon however, plus information gotten from patrols sent out by the battalions, indicated that there was no enemy in the immediate vicinity surrounding the 313th Infantry. However, the town of Ambacourt was definitely known to be occupied by enemy forces, and so, on the late afternoon of September 12, 1944, the 3d Battalion was ordered to capture Ambacourt and hold it.

The battalion approached the town from the west and went into a position in the thick woods west of the town. Due to the difficulty of movement in the woods itself and the lateness of the hour the battalion did not get into proper position until approximately 10:30 P.M., so the attack was necessarily postponed until the following morning. Two prisoners were captured in the woods just prior to darkness and from them much information was obtained as to the disposition of the enemy forces within Ambacourt. Later, patrols were sent out which verified this information and enabled the battalion to successfully attack early on the morning of September 13.

Meantime, however, other important events had been taking place. Reports had been continuing to arrive at Regimental Headquarters concerning the whereabouts of the Germans, and at 9:30 P.M., September 12, the 106th Cavalry had observed approximately five hundred Germans moving northwest on the road to Juvaincourt. German artillery opened fire on a cavalry OP which was located in the vicinity of Juvaincourt, forcing the OP to abandon its position. Other reports of a similar nature made it increasingly clear that the entire sector was a hotbed of enemy activity and that the enemy had no intention of withdrawing without a fight.

The original mission of the Regiment had been to establish a defensive position in conjunction with the 314th Infantry in the vicinity of Charmes. However, once it was fully determined that the enemy held the main road vicinity of Poussay, Ambacourt and Bettoncourt, it was deemed necessary for the 313th Infantry to clean out this resistance and establish roadblocks to protect this section of the supply route.

On September 13, events moved swiftly. Promptly at 9:00 A.M., the 3d Battalion attacked Ambacourt, and by 10:35 A.M. the town was completely occupied by our forces. This engagement had been particularly successful for as a result of the attack the battalion was known to have killed 13 enemy, capturing 46 prisoners, and much enemy equipment and material. The enemy had been taken completely by surprise, and because of the advance information as to the nature of enemy positions, the entire attack had been executed with almost perfect precision. Our casualties had been extremely light, inasmuch as the attack had been so well planned and so well carried out that the enemy was virtually powerless to resist. From a military stand-
point, the Regimental commander later described the attack as a near-perfect military operation, and highly commended the 3d Battalion for their success of this mission.

Upon the clearance of Ambacourt of enemy the Regimental I&R Platoon was given the mission of moving northeast from Ambacourt to determine if the remainder of the route to Charmes was free of enemy. The platoon discovered an enemy roadblock just north of Bettoncourt which they attacked, capturing 15 prisoners, a supply wagon, a sedan and an antitank gun. After the elimination of the roadblock the I&R Platoon was ordered to return and a reinforced rifle platoon from Company I was subsequently ordered to establish a roadblock in the same general vicinity, to protect the remainder of the Regiment from any enemy who might infiltrate from the north.

At 2:00 P.M., September 13, the 2d Battalion, which had been in position in the woods just south and west of the 3d Battalion, attacked due east to clean out the remainder of the woods and to destroy the enemy who were known to be in position near the Poussay–Ambacourt road on the high ground immediately west of the road and south of Ambacourt. The battalion attacked following a well planned artillery and mortar barrage and quickly moved to their objective, being successful in capturing and killing all enemy located there.

Upon the clearance of Ambacourt and the woods to the south the 1st Battalion was ordered to cross the river at Ambacourt and to proceed south in the general direction of Chaffecourt, Maziriot and the high ground immediately east and overlooking Poussay. The initial movement of the battalion was unhindered by enemy action and consequently the battalion was ordered to continue the advance, and to launch an attack upon the town of Poussay. However, upon reaching the edge of the high ground overlooking the town the battalion was subjected to heavy artillery fire which caused some disorganization and prevented any movement of the battalion into the town prior to darkness. Meantime, the 2d Battalion was ordered to assist the 1st Battalion, and both units were ordered to continue their movement and to capture the town that same night. This was not possible, however, because much difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable crossing over the Madon River into the town. As a result, only the 2d Battalion managed to reach the outskirts of Poussay that night. Upon arrival they established a defensive position and formulated plans for a house-to-house cleanup at daylight the following morning. These plans were carried out, and by approximately 11:00 A.M., September 14, the 2d Battalion had cleared the town of Poussay, capturing 74 prisoners and much enemy material, including vehicles, ammunition and weapons.

Upon the capture of Poussay the 1st Battalion, which had been assisting the 2d Battalion by fire from its position on the high ground east of Poussay, were ordered to proceed south from Poussay to Mirecourt and to establish contact with the French 2d Armored Division which was reported in that vicinity. The Regimental I&R Platoon was ordered to precede the battalion in its movement to Mirecourt and to establish and maintain liaison between the French 2d Armored Division and our Regiment. The I&R Platoon, preceding the battalion, moved out at approximately 12:45 P.M., from Poussay. On entering the north edge of Mirecourt civilians gave the platoon the information that no friendly units were in the town and that the town was occupied by the Germans. Similarly, they reported that there was an enemy roadblock and a German headquarters located at the southern end of the town, and estimated that about one hundred Germans occupied the enemy headquarters.

Without hesitation the I&R Platoon moved into the town of Mirecourt, engaged the roadblock with fire from caliber .50 machine guns, succeeding in killing or driving away the Germans at that position. The 1st Battalion by this time were moving in on the town astride the main street and upon arrival of the leading elements at the roadblock the I&R Platoon continued into the southern section of the town setting up a roadblock which successfully cut off the escape of the Germans in that area. Their action culminated in the capture of approximately one hundred German prisoners. The 1st Battalion cleaned out the remainder of the German garrison and consolidated its defensive position around the town. The entire action was a profitable one, for it had netted approximately 150 prisoners, 17 motor vehicles of all types, one AT gun and two 20mm AA guns, plus much abandoned equipment, food and clothing.

At 2:00 P.M., the same day, upon the completion of the 1st Battalion attack on Mirecourt the 2d Battalion was ordered to move across country from Poussay to attack and seize Ramecourt, a small town approximately two kilometers west of Mirecourt on the main road between Mirecourt and Neufchâteau. This movement was a complete surprise to the small enemy gar-
rison stationed in and near the town. The supporting weapons of the battalion were used most effectively and the battalion swiftly closed in on the town itself, capturing 80 prisoners, 15 vehicles (including prime-movers, ammunition trucks and civilian cars which had been used by the Germans for transportation) two 20mm AT guns, plus a partially destroyed artillery battery which comprised four 75mm guns.

Every effort was expended to quickly consolidate the position for defense against any enemy that might attempt to use the main road as an escape route, for by this time the 315th Infantry had broken the enemy resistance in their sector and were moving east on the same road several kilometers west of Ramecourt. By the capture of Mirecourt and Ramecourt the Regiment had succeeded in closing the escape route of an estimated battalion of enemy infantry, for the advance of the French 2d Armored from the south, and the contact that had been established late in the afternoon between the French 2d Armored and our Regiment, left only an area of a few miles of the main road between Ramecourt and Chatenois that was still free to enemy movement.

The combat that had characterized the period during which the 315th Infantry had liberated the towns of Ambacourt, Bettoncourt, Mirecourt, Ramecourt and Poussay will not soon be forgotten by those who participated in the battles. It was impossible to predict just how the enemy would react. There were times when an entire town could be taken with comparatively little opposition, and at other times the enemy would resist fiercely. On the hill overlooking Poussay, for example, the enemy went all out to hold the position and only the sheer guts of the infantrymen finally succeeded in dislodging the Germans from that position.

Lt Bryan Bell, Jr., of Company G, 2d Battalion, was seriously injured in the action that resulted in the capture of the hill overlooking Poussay. In civilian life Lieutenant Bell had been a journalist, and while convalescing, in a hospital somewhere in France, he wrote an account of that action as he and his men had personally experienced it. Probably no other account to be recorded in the 313th history tells a more graphic story of fighting men in action, and it well serves as a vivid word picture, not only of the specific action involved in the story itself, but equally of the kind of day-to-day fighting that characterized the long and difficult road to eventual victory. Lieutenant Bell's story, in its entirety, is here related.

"There's where the enemy is supposed to be. We are to take those woods and the hill."

The Captain, a tall man with a great red beard, was issuing orders to a group of officers and noncoms. They were concealed in a clump of trees and looked out across a field to their front. The field was criss-crossed with barbed-wire cattle fences and ended in a hill, at the top of which was a wide stretch of woods. The scene was peaceful, and the woods looked just like hundreds of others the Americans had passed in crossing France. But these men had learned what innocent-looking countryside could conceal.

Company G was approaching Poussay. It was many small baddies such as took place on the outskirts of this village which won the major part of France for the Allies, but by itself this attack could hardly be considered an important affair. The Germans were not numerous, and in the face of aggressive attacks by the Americans their defenses crumbled in two days. If the folks back home knew about it at all, it was from a possible tag line in the news, such as, "Poussay was also liberated." But for the members of the 79th Division, and particularly for the attacking companies, like G Company of the 315th Infantry, it was a great battle. And for many a young Doughboy, it was the most important event in his life—and his last.

Company G had just escaped an artillery barrage. In moving forward, they had been forced to cross a series of open fields, and it was then that the "incoming mail" started. The first round splashed on a road to the rear, right beside a tank, and not far from a man who was either blown or dove into the ditch. But the next rounds were closer. They followed, or rather chased, the G Company men across the fields. The only hope for safety was in reaching a clump of woods where they could conceal themselves from observers; and no orders were required to make the men "double time." They stopped often on the way, flopped on the ground, and hugged the dirt for protection. Each time an approaching shell gave its warning screech, they dove, and listened with fearful anxiety to the resounding "Cr-r-rump." Then after a slight pause to allow the flying shrapnel and dirt to settle, they sprang up and ran forward again. The men carrying the machine guns, the mortars and the heavy bags of ammunition lagged behind a little. Their faces were strained with exertion and the sweat ran off unnoticed.

Several casualties and the medics were left behind, but most of the men reached the safety of the woods. They made their way to the forward edge of them, and were preparing to meet the German infantry defending the high ground in front of the town. Their next objective was the wooded hill.

"I wonder how many Jerrys there are up there?" asked one of the lieutenants.

"I don't know, but we'll damn soon find out," replied the Captain. "Let's get going."

Orders were issued in subdued but authoritative tones. It was old stuff to these men; they had done the same thing over and over in training, and in combat too. But direction was still necessary, and the officers and noncoms moved up and down issuing instructions.

The company was preparing to advance, but first, scouts had to be sent forward ahead of anyone else to reconnoiter the woods. It is tough on the scouts, going out alone like that
into unknown terrain. But it is better to lose a few men that way than to have the company caught in surprise fire. The best that can be done is to have the rest of the company "cover the scouts," that is, to be in a position to take the enemy under fire and allow the scouts to reach safety.

"Spread your men out here, Sergeant. Have them crawl up to the positions from the rear. And put an automatic rifle over there," the lieutenant of the 1st Platoon ordered.

Another lieutenant was placing a machine gun. The gunner and his assistant crawled forward dragging the machine gun after them. They pushed the muzzle through a bush and made sight adjustments. Ammunition bearers lay close by, ready to bring forward new boxes of ammunition should they be needed. A sergeant from the mortar section wriggled out to a slight rise where he could establish an observation post, unrolling telephone wire as he went. Concealed behind a bush, he attached his telephone, established contact with his gun set up to the rear and prepared to direct mortar fire.

The scouts started forward. Two of them moved out together, and when they had gone 100 yards, two more followed. With rifles at the ready position, they walked boldly, their alert eyes searching the ground to their front. When one man had to climb a fence the man behind him paused. Two men together provide a tempting target. One of the scouts ran a short distance to the side to investigate a small gully, where a machine gun might easily have been concealed, but the area was clear and he returned.

To the rear, the rest of the men in the company tensely watched the movements of the scouts. Their trained eyes sought any indication of enemy, and several men were already aiming at suspicious points and gently fingerling their triggers.

The forwardmost scout halted, and his hand shot up as a warning signal to the others. Warily he moved forward, apparently approaching a possible enemy position. His suspicions were confirmed, as the unmistakable sound of German machine guns filled the air. From several places along the edge of the woods tracers streamed out across the field and again and again came the savage rattle of the Jerry guns.

The first German tracers gave the awaited signal to the Americans, and all the Doughboys simultaneously blasted away at the woods opposite. The machine-gun sergeant yelled, "Open fire!" but his gunners anticipated the command, and his voice was lost in the sound of his own guns. The light machine guns, and the heavies, the slower, pounding automatic rifles, and the M1 (Garand) rifles, all in the hands of experts, poured forth showers of lead. And through it all, to the rear could be heard the hollow "pong" of the mortars as they raked the forward edge of the enemy woods.

"More ammo," called a machine gunner. And a man darted forward with a new box.

The Germans shifted their fire from the scouts to the main position, and a spent round, its force lost in ricochet, dropped in the Captain's lap.

The last scout to leave the position took advantage of the distraction caused by the covering fires of his company to make a break for safety. At a dead run he returned to his platoon. The men near him, seeing his approach, held their fire until he reached the edge of the woods. There he threw himself on the ground behind a tree and lay panting. His squad leader came over to him.

"Damn! I never thought I'd make it," said the scout. "Those bullets were buzzing round my head like a swarm of bees."

"Did you see what happened to the other scouts?" asked the squad leader.

"Naw, but it's rough as hell out there."

A second scout was seen. First only his helmet and part of his combat pack were visible as he wriggled along on his stomach, then his whole body as he made a running dash for a small fold in the ground. After a pause he ran again, this time to the concealment of a bush. Two more jumps and a final long dash, and he was back in the woods. A machine-gun bullet had slashed across his forehead and eyebrow, and another one had completely smashed the driver's goggles which were attached to his helmet. The blood ran down into his eye.

The German fire diminished and finally ceased, and from then on there was sporadic fire from the American side. When the noise subsided, it became clear what had happened to another of the scouts. He could be heard calling from the middle of the field, "Dick, I'm hit. Come get me. I'm hit bad. Help me."

The sergeant named Dick pounded the ground with his fist and swore. The scout had a machine-gun bullet in his back, another bullet had broken his leg and he could be seen writhing about in the middle of the field. A medic started out to help him but the Germans, who perhaps could not see the red cross on his arm from that distance, opened up again with their burp guns. The mortar sergeant tried to make a dash from his observation post to the wounded man, but the ping of a sniper's bullet and a slight thud in the ground beside him drove him back.

"Dick, why don't you come? I'm hit bad. Dick! My leg and back. Send a medic," the man continued to call.

Gradually, however, his calls became less an intelligible appeal for help, and more the incoherent cries of a man in pain. Slowly he pulled himself with his arms, dragging his wounded leg, in the direction of the company and he finally reached a position where litter bearers could pick him up.

With glasses the last of the scouts could be seen, lying motionless by one of the cattle fences.

The Captain crawled over to where the communications sergeant lay behind a tree, the -300 radio strapped to his back. He used the code names in calling the battalion commander.

"Hello, Dusty to Sam. Over."

"Hello, Sam to Dusty. Over," the answer came back.

"Hello, Dusty to Sam. We hit several Jerry machine guns in that position and we haven't been able to get anywhere. It's a tough one to take across that open ground. What shall we do? Over."

"Hello, Sam to Dusty. I know it's tough, but we've got to do it. The whole attack is held up and yours seems the most likely place to punch through. Try it again and see if you can't get that hill before nightfall. Over."

"Hello, Dusty to Sam. Roger. Out."

"Well, let's try it again." The Captain's voice was matter-of-fact.
"That's easy to say from back there at Battalion," the communications sergeant mumbled to himself. "The battalion commander ought to see this damned ground."

The mortar sergeant came up to the captain and said, "Sir, I'd like to show you something. Will you come up here for a moment?" The two went forward to the edge of the woods. The sergeant had been studying carefully the enemy positions with binoculars and had discovered a whole series of emplacements, many more than the previous firing had indicated. The Germans had made skillfull use of camouflage, but the branches and brush placed around their positions had withered, and a slight change in color allowed the sergeant to find the locations of seven machine guns. There was also a log pillbox set back in the woods. He pointed them out to the Captain.

"It would be slaughter to try to assault that position, without further help," he said. The Captain agreed.

Another conversation with the battalion commander took place over the 300 radio, and afterwards the Captain issued his final instructions. "We'll stay here until tomorrow, and then we'll really give it to them."

The company posted security, and the men dug in for the night. Wrapped only in raincoats, they lay down in their wet foxholes and tried to forget the cold in sleep. Those who had the appetre ate cold beans in the dark.

One of the guards saw a figure approaching from the direction of the enemy lines. Concealed behind a bush and with his rifle at his shoulder ready to fire, he called out softly, "Hal!"

"Don't shoot," a voice said. "It's me. Nick." It was the fourth scout.

"Good gosh, man, we thought you were dead," the guard said.

Nick came up and answered, "Naw, I was just playing possum. They hit all around me but never touched me once. When it got dark, I hauled out."

The guard laughed. "Those Germans can sure spray hell out of a large area, but they aren't worth a damn when it comes to a point target," he added.

"Yeah, I guess so," said Nick, "Well, maybe some other day."

A sergeant came up and overheard the conversation. Such escapes were old stuff to him and he took it matter-of-factly. "Glad to see you back, Nick. Dig in over there. We're going to give 'em hell tomorrow."

H-hour the following day was at 1000. E Company had been moved up to join the battle, and a full-scale attack was arranged. At H minus 20, the shelling started, as several battalions of artillery turned the full power of their fury on the German positions. Round after round came screaming over the men and burst at the edge of the enemy woods. Fountains of dirt, leaves, branches, smoke and shrapnel were thrown up and subsided as quickly as they had arisen. A single round would hit, then another, and after a pause, several would come over together.

The awaiting riflemen enjoyed seeing Jerry catch hell like that. They knew what it was to be on the receiving end of such a barrage. One rifleman, ready with fixed bayonet to move forward, grinned at the man next to him and said,

"Keep 'em coming, brother." The man replied with the artillery chant, "Hitler, count yo' chillun."

Shortly, the 81mm. mortars joined the artillery, and their rounds increased the noise and destruction. A lieutenant, observing for the mortars, shouted orders into a telephone. At first the rounds were short, but he made adjustments. Then he yelled into his phone, "OK, we're zeroed in. Start dropping them in, and don't spare the ammo."

"Just before jump-off time, the small arms started. The full assembly of weapons of the two attacking companies joined the battle—light machine guns, automatic rifles, and the less rhythmic, but active Mls. Two extra platoons of heavy machine guns had been put into position on the right flank and were pumping lead at their most rapid rate. Streams of tracers arched through the air and buried themselves in the ground around the German positions or ricocheted through the trees.

Above the rattle of the small arms, and the reverberating explosions of the artillery, could be heard the antitank guns. Their crews had worked half the night to pull these heavy pieces into position through the woods where no vehicles could go. They were brought up to fire at the log pillbox, and the hills echoed with the roar of their shots and the tenor sound of the striking projectiles as they shattered the trees of the enemy woods.

It seemed as though nothing could live through that concentration of lead and explosion. But the infantrymen knew what protection a well made emplacement can give, and they still expected to hear the angry snort of Jerry guns when the assault began.

With H-hour came the artillery smoke. A shell burst at one end of the woods. Hundreds of little burning projectiles spiraled through the air followed by streams of smoke. Then a great bellow arose and drifted with the wind. Methodically, other smoke shells were laid down all along the edge of the woods, until the whole area was obscured in a great cloud.

The smoke was a signal. Jump-off time had arrived. A lieutenant from G Company stood up and waved his hand above his head in the direction of the enemy, and yelled, "Come on, men, let's go." Riflemen climbed out of their holes all along the line and started forward. To the left, the men from E Company could be seen moving out in the same fashion. Scouts ran forward and cut the wire of the fences.

But the Germans also knew that the smoke meant the advance of the infantry and the Americans recognized instantly the sharp snap of the air vacuum caused by passing bullets. Two men instinctively threw themselves on the ground, but the sergeant signaled them forward, and they got up and started walking again. They could not stop there; they had to reach the woods and actually rout the Germans out of their holes. Fortunately, enemy machine gunners were blinded by the smoke.

"They aren't all dead yet," a man carrying an automatic rifle yelled to the soldier next to him, but his voice was lost in the noise of battle.

A machine-gun bullet ripped the side of a lieutenant's leg, but he continued to limp forward. One man was knocked
Part of an enemy convoy hit by our artillery at Mira-
court, France, September 15, 1944

down by the force of a bullet hitting him in the chest. His face wore a surprised expression; he did not realize he had been hit.

As the riflemen approached the woods, the artillery shifted its fire farther back in the hopes of chewing up enemy reserves or of catching men driven back by the first barrage. The machine guns to the rear were forced to cease their supporting fires as friendly troops masked the target. But the advancing riflemen themselves continued to fire, “like coked-up gangsters of a grade-B film.” They paused in their advance and shot from the shoulder with hasty aim or else they fired from the hip as they continued to walk.

An artillery “short,” one of their own rounds, burst in front of a platoon and several men went down. The surrounding noises had drowned out the warning screech and they had all been caught standing up. Better to lose a few men, though, from your own artillery than to allow the Germans to mow you down, unhindered, with their machine guns.

The riflemen were approaching their objective. Several yards in front of the edge of the woods was a giant German, without helmet or rifle, lying dead, his bald head glistening with sweat. His arms were still raised above his head in a gesture of supplication, but perhaps the man who shot him did not know he was trying to surrender.

“There’s still someone in that hole!” a sergeant yelled. A man with an automatic rifle stepped up and the German felt the full force of 10 rounds fired rapidly into his chest.

Already the medics were on the field, giving first aid to the wounded and indicating to the litter bearers which men were to be taken back to the aid station which had been set up to the rear. Other troops were moving up the hill now. The machine guns were shifting to the new position. The Captain moved forward, followed by the communications sergeant and his messengers. As he reached the edge of the woods he called for the -300 radio and put the headpiece to his ear. The smoke had cleared and the sun shone on his great red beard.

“Hello, Dusty to Sam. Mission accomplished. Over.”

“Hello, Sam to Dusty. Good work. Be prepared for another attack order later this morning. Over.”

“Hello, Dusty to Sam. Roger. Out.”

The hill was taken.

The preceding story as written by Lieutenant Bell represents a superlative account of the sort of fighting that characterized the infantryman’s role throughout all of France. It serves as an invaluable contribution to the 313th’s history, not only because it was written by a front-line officer who had personally experienced the action related, but also because it so aptly portrays the hazardous day-by-day life to which those men assigned to infantry are continuously subjected. It should be remembered when reading the history recorded in these pages, that every action, even though receiving only several lines of mention in the combat pages of this book, was accomplished only through a similar display of courage and fortitude and daring on the part of the officers and men of the 313th Infantry. However seemingly small or unimportant an assigned combat action may seem in the scheme of things, it nonetheless represents the struggles, the fears and the very lives of the men taking part in it.

Following the action which culminated in the fall of Ambacourt, Bettoncourt, Mirecourt, Ramecourt and Poussay, the enemy situation seemed well under control. However, reports continued to come in to the effect that groups of enemy were still in the vicinity. At approximately 6:00 P.M., September 14, C Troop of the 106th Cavalry, located at the time west of Ramecourt, reported observing an enemy column moving along the road. Every effort was made to get observation on this enemy movement but by nightfall no one had been able to locate the reported column. The battalions were alerted concerning the possibility of enemy movement in the vicinity of Ramecourt, but as the night progressed no enemy contact was reported by the battalions.

About midnight, however, all hell broke loose, and finally culminated in one of the weirdest and unique stories in the annals of the history of the 313th Infantry. The men of the Regiment have since labeled it the "Rumpus in Ramecourt," and the story itself was told in a front-page newspaper article by Lee McCardell, war correspondent for the Baltimore Sun-papers, who was with the Regiment on the night that the strange event transpired. He was billeted at Regimental Headquarters, then located in Poussay, and the following article as written by him more than adequately relates the nature of events on the night of September 14-15. The story follows:

At Poussay, the billet where we tried to sleep last night wasn’t as roomy as we had first thought.
It seems that the two old French women and man who own the house and live there had locked up most of the second-floor bedrooms. We were late in staking out a claim on floor space. The only spot we could find for our bedroll was a patch of cold, tiled floor, in the downstairs center hall, under the stair case by the door, at the head of the cellar steps. We shared this piece of floor with Lt Jeff Collins, who, like us, was hotel-less when the time came to go to bed.

We were awakened around midnight by a loud and alarming babble of French, to find ourselves lost in a dimly lighted forest of hairy shanks and wooden shoes, which we presently identified as those of the two old ladies and the gent. They were standing over us in their nightgowns. They were obviously in trouble, but neither Jeff nor I could make it out at first.

Finally, we caught on. Stretched out on the floor as we were at the head of the cellar stairs, we were blocking the path to their abri, their cellar shelter. From off in the direction of Ramecourt, about a mile away, we could hear machine-gun fire. The three old people were frightened. They asked if we thought the Germans were coming back. We did not. Did we think there was any danger? We did not.

In our best French, which is lousy, we advised them to retirez content, go back to bed and forget it. They shuffled off in their wooden shoes, unlocked their bedroom door farther down the hall and disappeared inside, locking the door behind them. We went back to sleep on the floor. But not for long.

"Pardon, M'sieur. Pardon, M'sieur."

Again the air was full of hairy shanks and wooden shoes. Stampeding for the abri, the old folks were walking right over Jeff. We helped them open the cellar door. They plunged through.

"Lock it," said Jeff, "so they can't change their mind again."

The sound of firing near Ramecourt was louder. Through the wall beside us we could hear our own "Old Man" on the radio in the dining room. He was calling Major Sam Gooding, commanding officer of the force which took Ramecourt yesterday, and was posted there last night. The artillery was coming down strong around Ramecourt now. We could hear one concentration after another. Wooden shoes clumped up the cellar steps behind us. The door was pushed open.

"Pardon, M'sieur. Pardon, M'sieur."

Again Jeff was run over. The old folks were taking off for keeps this time, pet dog and all. Evidently they had lost faith in their abri. They left the house by the back door, and we didn't see them again until this morning.

Our Old Man sleeps in an upstairs bedroom. He had been awakened by the call of "Urgent! Urgent!" over the radio in the downstairs dining room. He had come down and got on the horn himself, to find out what was going on. He was told that an enemy column had tried to barge through Ramecourt.

Three trucks had made it as far as Mirecourt, where they were stopped. The rest of the column had been caught at Ramecourt. Then Gooding called for artillery. The guns had been surveyed in yesterday afternoon, on the road beyond Ramecourt.

Neither the Old Man nor his staff, gathered in the dining room, could understand exactly what had happened, but Gooding seemed to have the situation in hand. The bottle of champagne which the artillery last night had presented the Old Man was still sitting on the side table. The Old Man suddenly remember he had forgotten to open it, so he and the staff killed it then and there.

When he got out to Ramecourt at daylight this morning, the Old Man understood why the situation had seemed confused last night. The wreckage of enemy columns, burned vehicles, many of them towing artillery, stopped up the road to the next village of Domwahler.

Two hundred and fifty-three Germans had been captured. Lying along the road were uncounted German dead. Wounded Germans were still being carried into the aid station. No Americans had been killed. Ten had been wounded in the weird battle-royal fought in the darkness between midnight and dawn.

Here's the story:

About midnight, a jeep came speeding down the road from the direction of Domwahler. An American antitank gun crew, posted beside the road just outside Ramecourt, let the jeep pass. They thought it American. They must have been mistaken. The next thing they knew, a convoy of German trucks and German soldiers pedaling bicycles were highballing past them.

"When the shooting woke me up, there were Jerrys all over the place—one hell of a mess," said Corp Walter Hubbs, an antitank gunner off duty when the fighting began.

A few minutes earlier a Frenchman had walked into the medical aid station in a house at the other end of the village and asked Capt Maurice Lazarus, a former Johns Hopkins student, to come over to his house on the other side of the road and take charge of a GI who had too much to drink.

Lazarus went over and was bringing the GI back across the road to the aid station when they were almost run down by a motor truck. The captain angrily flashed his light to see who was driving and was told, in German, to put it out.

He didn't have to be told a second time, because he saw another truck, loaded with German soldiers, behind the first. He beat it for the aid station, got the force commander's CP on the telephone, and told the officer who answered that a German convoy was passing the aid station.

"Nuts!" snorted the officer, and hung up—just as a burst of machine-gun fire skipped past the front window of the aid station.

Lieut Louis Greinke, an antitank unit commander, bedded down for the night at Capt Emmitt Creighton's house farther up the road, had seen the Germans. He had backed his jeep, armed with a caliber .50 machine gun, out of the covered alleyway where he had parked it earlier and opened fire.

He hit a truck loaded with gasoline and ammunition. The truck stopped and burst into flames, blocking the road. Other vehicles of the convoy piled into the burning truck. The blaze lighted up the road. The troops in the jammed column scattered, trying to get out of sight and away from Greinke's caliber .50. They headed for the nearest houses on either side of the road.
The didn't know that the men of Gooding's force were quartered in almost every one of those houses.

"I never saw such a mixup," said Pvt Norman Jenkins, who was also in Captain Creighton's combination farmhouse-barn.

"There were Jerries inside and out. One crawled in under Lieutenant Greinke's jeep and got up in the haymow. I made him holler 'Kamerad! Others sneaked in the back way. There must have been a dozen in here at one time."

"We couldn't tell who was who in the dark. They were lost and didn't know who we were. One German shook hands with a man in our antitank unit."

Another walked up to Pvt Ira Baker, a radio operator, and "kept jabbering at me in German until I knocked him cold," Baker said.

"I grabbed hold of somebody in the dark and asked, "who are you?" said 1st Sgt Ralph Elrod.

"Kamerad!" he says.

"Kamerad, hell," I said. "We got no Kamerads in this outfit, and I knocked him down. He got up, and I knocked him down again. Then Baker finished him off with a bayonet."

"Dullest damn bayonet I ever saw," remarked Baker.

"We had to feel the ends of each other's rifles to make sure of our own men in the dark," Elrod said. "If we felt a cleaning staff—our rifles don't have any—we knew he was a Jerry."

Captain Creighton, a Maryland Eastern Shore man, had been talking over the field telephone when the shooting began. He ran outside and joined the open-air fight of rifles, machine guns and hand grenades. Some of the machine guns talking now were those which Sgt George Maerz, who had posted farther up along the road.

One group of Germans blundered into the front yard of Gooding's CP. Two boxes of German hand grenades captured yesterday afternoon were sitting in the yard and the staff expected them to come through the windows any minute. The switchboard operator didn't dare talk above a whisper. When the Old Man came on the radio, demanding to know what was going on, it wasn't safe for anyone to talk loud enough to tell him.

Captain Lazarus and his medics also had Germans in the front yard of their aid station. The medics disconnected their field telephone for fear it would ring and give them away.

The crocked GI who the captain had navigated across the road through the German column, revived every now and then to break the strictly observed silence with a loud bellow: "Gimme a carbine. I'll clean up the lousy Jerries!"

Then another aid man would sit on him.

The French civilians living upstairs, and always helpful, came down with a light to inform the blacked-out medics that les Boches were out front.

"It sounds funny now, but it wasn't funny last night," Lazarus said this morning.

One soldier was using a rifle to pry open the front door of Lt Ralph Scott's house farther down the road when Sgt. Stanley Whitten, opened up from the inside with a submachine gun.

"I was coming down from the loft, where I had been sleeping," Scott said, "and he almost took me off that ladder."

Other Germans managed to break into other buildings along the road, including the village cafe, which Corp Henry Zorn, and Pvt William Viewag, had almost settled on as a good place to sleep last night. Their final choice had been Gooding's CP.

By this time, Major Bedell's artillery was dropping the first of its concentrations.

"We had the joint cased," said Capt Clifford Couvillon, an artillery officer with Gooding's headquarters.

He was referring to the fact that the guns, surveyed in yesterday afternoon, had registered fire on either side of the road.

While the infantry was mopping up the head of the column within the village proper, our artillery wiped out—and I mean wiped out—its tail, a string of cars, trucks, towed mortars and horse-drawn artillery which was detouring the roadblock between Ramecourt and Domvahler. We've never seen a more completely destroyed column. It looked like an Air Corps job.

When the artillery shells first began coming in last night, the Joes weren't sure whose they were. In the field outside Ramecourt, where he had bivouacked, one Joe started to dig himself a foxhole. Just across the fence another soldier was digging like mad. Not until the soldier in the neighboring foxhole surrendered this morning did the Joe know he was a Jerry.

At daylight, fifteen or twenty Jerries climbed out of the stack of American bedding rolls in which they had been hiding beside Creighton's billet since the midnight blowoff. One came forward to surrender the lot. From a ditch across the road where he was hiding, some fanatical Nazi threw a hand grenade at this Kamerad, killing him.

The other Germans still alive were willing enough to be taken prisoner. They crawled out of cellars, bushes and even the Americans' motor pool, two hundred strong.

A wounded German first lieutenant lying in front of Scott's billet haughtily asked Sergeant Whitten to get him a clean pair of pants and a pipe from his pack in one of the cars of the blasted column.

The Joes, followed by the inevitable French scavengers, had pretty well picked over everything in that column. Its burned wreckage had been shoved to one side of the gory, ash-covered highway. The live artillery horses had been cut loose from their traces and turned loose in the fields. Caissons had been hauled away, and captured bicycles stacked up.

French farm carts filled with bloody Germans still were coming down the road from Domvahler when we got into Ramecourt this morning. Captain Lazarus, his own medics, a captured German major—a medical officer—and German aid men had been working with the wounded for the last five hours.

"What burns us up is that we medics never have a chance to gather souvenirs," said Lazarus, who was taking time out for a canteen cup of coffee.

Then another ambulance and another wagonload of wounded, mostly litter cases, pulled up. Lazarus handed a canteen cup to another medic.

"Keep it hot for me," he said. "Get me a water can to put under the foot of that litter over there. Get me a bottle of plasma."

The destruction of the column last night marked the end
of the German 16th Division, on which this force has been whittling.

The foregoing story as told by the Sunpapers war correspondent, Lee McCardell, is no figment of the imagination. The event as related actually happened, and it was not until noon, September 15, that the situation was fully under control.

Meantime, during the morning hours of September 15, word had been received from Division Headquarters that the 313th Infantry had been placed in Division reserve, and was to move that same day to an area in the vicinity of Avrainville. The receipt of this information was good news to all concerned, for in the main, the troops were extremely tired and in need of rest. Preparations for movement progressed throughout the day, and by 3:00 P.M., the march to Avrainville was begun. By 6:00 P.M., a Regimental CP had been established at Avrainville, and the Regiment had completed its march by motor, following a route through Poussay, Bettoncourt, and thence to the rest area.

So closed another chapter in the history of the 313th Infantry. No one knew how long the rest period at Avrainville might last, but everyone accepted willingly the opportunity to leave behind for at least a few days, the strain, excitement and unpredictable chain of events that characterizes the life of the infantryman, and an infantry regiment.
Chapter 15: The Lunéville Drive

IT WAS a great feeling to be in Division reserve. After the hard fighting and the long motor marches of the preceding days the chance to rest was gratifying indeed. The Regimental commander, aware of the prolonged period of strain upon the men, expressed the hope that the period would last at least long enough for the men to get some much-needed rest and relaxation, as well as to take badly needed baths. Preparations were begun immediately to arrange for the latter, and at the same time the Special Service officer began to arrange a schedule of movies and other entertainment for the troops.

The enemy had been cleared from the area surrounding Avrainville and as a consequence there was little, if any, actual enemy activity while the Regiment remained there. On one occasion the 773d Tank Battalion reported capturing 24 prisoners in the woods north of Germaniel, and stated that there were reportedly at least as many more still at large within the woods. With the receipt of this information the 1st Battalion sent two platoons to the woods to find the reported enemy, but returned with word that the Germans had fled. Later, small groups of enemy aviation appeared over the area and were fired on by AA batteries. In this connection a tragic incident occurred. At 1:30 A.M., September 17, a lone plane, believed to be enemy, flew over the area and was brought down by AA fire. The plane proved to be a friendly aircraft, a B-24, which was returning from a bomber mission. The pilot was saved and was brought to Regimental headquarters the following morning, dazed, but not seriously injured.

The Regiment remained at Avrainville for a threeday period, and the highlight of the entire stay occurred when the Regimental Special Service Officer, Capt Harrie S. Keck, succeeded in completing arrangements for a "personal appearance on the afternoon of September 18, of Bing Crosby, noted radio and motion-picture celebrity. In an area selected for the occasion Bing chatted and sang for the officers and men, who were there en masse for the big event. It need hardly be mentioned that Bing and his troupe put on a fine show, and that morale within the Regiment, already good, soared to new heights. Along with many other hit tunes, Bing brought down the house when he sang the popular "Singing On A Star," and topped it off with the sentimental ballad "Sweet Leilani." The whole show was an unforgettable entertainment highlight.

Meantime, while the entertainment on the afternoon of September 18 was still in progress, word was received from Division Headquarters that the 313th Infantry was to be prepared to move to the vicinity of Rugney, or slightly south; the Division to notify the Regiment as to when to move; the 3d Battalion to remain in its present location. The Regiment would be required to furnish one rifle company as CP guard for Headquarters XV Corps. However, by 2:15 P.M., these orders were set aside and notification was given that the Regiment was alerted for an immediate move to the northeast.

By 3:30 P.M., word had been received regarding the route and ultimate destination of the Regiment. At 5:00 P.M., the I&R Platoon was ordered to proceed from Avrainville to Charmes to the 4th Armored Division bridge at Bayon to mark the route for the motor columns to that point. At 6:30 P.M., an oral order was issued to the battalions, the Regiment motorized to move in a column of battalions in order: 3d, 1st, 2d. Route: Avrainville, Charmes, north to the 4th Armored bridge west of Bayon, Froville, Einvaux, and Landécourt.

By approximately 4:00 A.M., the Regiment had closed into its area in the vicinity of Landécourt, extreme darkness causing the only difficulty en route.

At 7:00 A.M., September 19, the 1st and 3d Battalions were ordered to attack due east to the high ground just west of the Meurthe River; the 1st Battalion on the north, 3d Battalion on the south. By approximately 10:00 A.M., both battalions had reached their initial objective and only the 1st Battalion had encountered any enemy resistance. Thereafter, both battalions were ordered to patrol vigorously in an attempt to find a suitable crossing of the Meurthe River. The original objective had been to capture the high ground in the vicinity of Lamath, but progress had been so rapid that the Regiment had been ordered to cross the Meurthe River and secure the town of Xermaménil. Only the 3d Battalion was able to find a suitable crossing point and at 2:30 P.M., the leading elements crossed the Meurthe River and proceeded north to engage the enemy at Xermaménil. One company had been left at the river's edge to secure the right or south flank during the movement of the remainder of the battalion. This company, while in the process of being relieved by a company from the 2d Battalion, suffered severe casualties from a barrage of our own artillery fire that had been mistakenly called down by an artillery forward observer.

Upon the capture of Lamath by the 1st Battalion the tanks and tank destroyers which had moved up on
the ridge overlooking the river and the town of Xermaménil, opened fire on enemy tanks in the vicinity of Xermaménil. This action continued throughout the time preceding and during the attack of the 3d Battalion. Meantime, by 4:30 P.M., the 3d Battalion had reached the south edge of Xermaménil and after an artillery preparation moved in to clean out the town itself.

At 5:35 P.M., OPs reported an enemy column of ten tanks and approximately one hundred infantry moving east out of the town of Xermaménil. By 7:50 P.M., the 3d Battalion had completed its mission and in conjunction with the 2d Battalion plus one company of the 1st Battalion, a defensive position was set up around the town of Xermaménil to protect the bridge which was to be constructed over the river at Lamath.

By midnight of September 19, a treadway bridge had been erected across the river at Lamath. No enemy activity was encountered during the rest of the night, and except for occasional enemy artillery fire everything was quiet. By daylight, September 20, it was determined that the Regiment had been quite successful and had wreaked much havoc. Two Mark V and two Mark IV tanks had been destroyed, 29 vehicles of all types had been captured, one 88mm. AT gun and many prisoners were taken.

The quoting of facts and figures of whatever nature usually impresses the reader as being exceptionally dry and uninteresting. Yet to the men on the line, responsible for the deeds of heroism which alone made the facts and figures possible, it was no simple task. In this regard, it is well to relate a story in connection with the action at Xermaménil.

At the time of the action a German Mark V tank was threatening the stability of the Regiment's lines when a bazooka team composed of Pfcs W. Mundheim and C. Deloach sighted the formidable tracked fortress at a distance out of range of their weapon. Disregarding personal fear or danger they crept up to within one hundred yards of the tank and fired three well aimed bazooka rounds, all of which hit the target. The tank was knocked out on the spot, and later, when General Wyche appeared on the scene, he promoted the two men responsible for the deed to the grade of staff sergeant.

Deeds such as the incident just related were com-
Moving up for the Forêt de Parroy fighting

monplace throughout the Regiment. Day after day incidents would be reported to Headquarters, showing with unmistakable certainty the valor and courage of the men on the lines. Despite the fact that progress was often slow and hazardous and despite the fact that there was little time for rest, the men continued to prove their worth, and as a consequence, enemy resistance was overcome and the way was opened for the march on Lunéville.

The city of Lunéville, it was understood, had already been entered by friendly armored units, but there was little or no factual information available as to the exact situation within the city itself. It was anticipated that there would at least be some mopping up to do, and because of the size and importance of the town, it was expected that the enemy might attempt to retake it.

At 1:30 P.M., September 20, the Regiment moved out of Germaniel, moving in a column of battalions, in order: 1st 3d, 2d. The battalion motors, tanks and tank destroyers moved by bounds behind the marching column. No enemy contact was met by the marching column in reaching Lunéville. However, some difficulty was experienced in finding a route over the Meurthe River into the city itself. The marching columns continued into the city where contact was made with a tank destroyer battalion of the 4th Armored Division. The 1st Battalion was then ordered to proceed southeast through the city and to set up a defensive position east of the town and south of the east-west road through the city of Lunéville. At the time of contact information was gained that the city was not entirely free of enemy, and that the enemy held the eastern and southeastern sections of the city, through which our advancing columns had been ordered to move.

On receipt of this information it was deemed necessary to move the 3d Battalion south and east through the town astride the road to Moncel. The 1st Battalion made contact with the enemy at the eastern edge of Lunéville where they were fired on by machine guns and small arms. Tanks were brought forward in an effort to assist the advance but were unable to move more than a few hundred yards past the eastern edge of town due to heavy AT-gun fire from several well sited German AT guns which succeeded in knocking out one tank and preventing any further movement forward. The entire area of the city through which the 1st Battalion was deployed was subjected to considerable artillery and mortar fire.

The movement of the 3d Battalion into a position south of the 1st Battalion had been quite slow. Although initially no enemy contact had been made the lateness of the hour made it advisable for the two battalions to button up in a defensive position running from the main street at the eastern section of the city, straight south across the railroad tracks to the Meurthe River.

The 2d Battalion had not yet entered the city itself and were left in an area south of the Meurthe River to protect the right or south flank.

Vigorous patrolling was initiated after dark on September 20-21, in an effort to locate the enemy positions, as well as a possible river crossing for the 2d Battalion to the village of Moncel, which was south and east of Lunéville.

On the morning of September 21 the 1st and 3d Battalions were ordered to attack, in an effort to beat back enemy resistance. Progress was difficult however, and the fighting intense. At approximately noon, General Greer arrived at the Regimental CP to discuss the situation with Colonel Wood. The facts were becoming clearer now, and it was known that progress would at best be slow. Colonel Wood was informed that the defense of Lunéville was now definitely in the hands of the 79th Division and that the problem of defending the city might indeed be serious. Plans were made to move a battalion of the 315th Infantry into Lunéville to assist in defense of the town; the battalion taking over the northeastern section of Lunéville and the remainder of the 315th to be prepared to cover the defense of the city proper. That very morning the
enemy had attempted to infiltrate into the city proper by approaching through the part at the northern edge of town, and a part of the 106th Cavalry had been committed to reconnoiter the park area. It was necessary, therefore, to be constantly on the alert. There were no other forces immediately available to assist the 79th Division in holding the town, and it was believed possible that the enemy had considerable forces of infantry and material available for use in the area surrounding Lunéville. The Forêt de Parroy (Parroy Forest), located to the north and west of Lunéville, was believed to be heavily fortified. In World War I this same forest had been a bloody battle ground, and neither side had succeeded during the course of the war in penetrating it. It was known that the original fortifications built during World War I were still standing, and, in fact, that they had been improved by the Germans after they had occupied France in World War II. Since the Forêt de Parroy was within the 79th Division sector, it would be necessary for the 79th to advance through it. First, however, the city of Lunéville had to be cleared of all resistance, and the area leading to the forest itself would have to be taken. The immediate problem, however, concerned the defense of Lunéville and the task of pushing the enemy back in the general direction of the Forêt de Parroy.

In the sector to which the 79th Division had been assigned and committed, the city of Lunéville was the last of the larger French cities to be entered before reaching the German border. The World War I German border ran on a line not more than a few kilometers from the city’s eastern outskirts. The enemy had every reason, therefore, to attempt to defend it, and to continue a delaying action as strongly and as long as possible. This fact, plus the fact that it had been learned that the city of Lunéville itself was pro-German, and that throughout the town there were known to be spies, snipers and Germans in civilian clothes, made the problem of defense doubly difficult. In this connection much praise can be given to the FFI, for it was predominantly through their effort that this phase of resistance was cleared up. The leader of the FFI called on Colonel Wood on September 22, offering his services and the services of some 250 FFI men. Being familiar with the situation in Lunéville, he was able to disclose valuable information, and under his leadership the town was later cleared by a house-to-house canvass, during which all subversive and suspicious characters were rounded up.

In the days following the arrival of the Regiment in Lunéville, both General Wych and General Greer spent many hours at the Regimental CP, discussing and planning the course of events with Colonel Wood. There was no question about the fact that in the first days, at least, much of the responsibility for the city’s defense, and the responsibility for pushing the enemy back beyond the city, lay at the doorstep of the 313th Infantry. It was the 313th Infantry that had first entered the town after the initial liberation by the armored units, and as a consequence, they were now in a front-line position to defend it. This responsibility was a heavy one, and the situation, more than once, was critical.

The events which transpired, following the arrival of the 313th Infantry in Lunéville, covering the dates September 21 to September 28, inclusive, are recorded henceforth in the form of a daily log. The essential facts of the part played by the 313th Infantry in defending Lunéville, and in the difficult advance to the edge of the Forêt de Parroy, are herewith related.

**September 21**

Patrols from all battalions were active during the entire night feeling out enemy positions and investigating possible river crossings. Patrols reached to within five hundred yards of Moncel and were fired on by the enemy. Vehicular sounds were heard coming from the woods northwest of Moncel, and enemy artillery fire was believed to be coming from the same direction. Other patrols reached the railroad tracks approximately 1,200 yards to the front of the 3d Battalion lines but could not proceed farther. We heard the enemy talking and the sounds of equipment being brought up to the vicinity of the railroad tracks. No suitable river crossing was found.

During the morning hours the 1st Battalion was ordered to attack in the vicinity of the railroad overpass, and to clean out resistance in houses beyond the overpass. The 3d and 2d Battalions were ordered to advance toward the railroad and river’s edge. Resistance was intense in all sectors, and progress slow. Meanwhile, information had been obtained that there was a dam located below the 3d Battalion area, which if blown, would reduce the water level in the vicinity of Moncel to one or two feet in depth, making it possible for infantry to cross the river. Investigation of the river bottom proved favorable, the surface being of hard gravel. The dam was ordered blown by the Regimental commander.
During the afternoon General Greer was at the Regimental CP. The situation was discussed by General Greer and Colonel Wood. General Greer remained at the CP for the entire afternoon, reporting on the progress of the Regiment to Division by telephone. Artillery fire was intense on both sides throughout the entire day. Lunéville, in the city proper, was shelled intermittently by heavy artillery.

By evening, despite heavy resistance, substantial progress had been made. The dam below the 3d Battalion area had been blown, the sluice gates opened and the river made fordable. Resistance at the overpass and up to the river’s edge had been overcome and the battalions had crossed the river. By 5:30 P.M., the town of Moncel had been entered by elements of the 1st Battalion. The 3d and 2d Battalions fought until dark, pushing the enemy back to the edge of the woods northwest of Moncel. All units buttoned up for the night by 9:00 P.M., with the 1st Battalion in an area around Moncel and the 3d and 2d Battalions on a line at the edge of the woods northwest of Moncel.

At Regimental Headquarters, meanwhile, word had been received that the 314th Infantry would cross the river and assist in the attack of the following morning.

**September 22**

There was heavy fighting during the entire day. The 2d Battalion received an enemy attack at 6:00 A.M., supported by tanks and infantry. The 3d and 2d Battalions were bitterly engaged also. The 3d Battalion lost four mortars to the enemy when its mortar posi-
By afternoon the situation indicated that resistance was breaking. Some enemy troops surrendered. PWs stated that thirty enlisted men had been told to dig foxholes for another unit which was to replace them but our artillery fire prevented them from digging. Morale was reported low among German troops. PWs stated that German officers slapped enlisted men and forced them to fight at point of gun.

During the afternoon both General Wyche and General Greer were at the Regimental CP, discussing the situation with Colonel Wood. Today the situation was looking much brighter. Our troops now are practically through the woods and indications are that the enemy is withdrawing.

By evening the boundary line of both the 313th and the 314th Infantry had been reached. Patrolling was planned after nightfall. Instructions were given to patrols to proceed to the opposite edge of the woods, and, if clear, to continue to patrol to the town of Croismare, and report results.

The 315th Infantry, meanwhile, was now in position and ready to assist the 313th and 314th.

September 24

There was little fighting for the 313th Infantry during the entire day. The Regiment was ordered to hold its present positions in the woods northwest of Moncel and to comb the entire zone. Patrols from the previous night indicated that the enemy had withdrawn. This was verified during the day for the entire northern sector in the 313th zone was combed by troops with no enemy contacted.

The French 2d Armored and the 315th Infantry made substantial progress during the day. The French 2d Armored entered our zone and captured the town of Marianviller, located to the south and west of Croismare, and reported that the enemy had blown the bridge at the edge of town. The 313th's I&R Platoon, meanwhile, had been sent to Croismare to get a full report of the situation there. Patrols sent to Croismare the night before had reported the enemy as occupying the town, and were unable to get more information. By 4:00 P.M., the I&R Platoon reported that the enemy had left Croismare just one hour previously—that they had blown the bridge at the north edge of town but that the bridge on the road to the south was intact and would hold our tanks. Both bridges crossed the Vexouze River, and were a necessary link for an advance to the Forêt de Parroy. On the strength of this information additional patrols were sent to Croismare immediately to maintain contact with the situation there. Patrols reported seeing the enemy moving north in the vicinity of the Forêt de Parroy, and at 6:35 P.M., reported three Germans moving toward the south bridge at Croismare. They retreated however, before reaching their objective.

With the towns of Marainviller, Chantheux and Croismare in our hands, and with the woods northwest of Moncel clear of enemy, it would now be possible to begin an advance toward the Forêt de Parroy where the enemy was believed to be deeply entrenched. All was in readiness for the advance by evening, September 24, and final word was awaited from Division regarding the plan of advance.

At 11:00 P.M., word was received from Division that the Air Forces had been requested to bomb the Forêt de Parroy the following day, to soften up enemy fortifications prior to an infantry attack. Instructions were issued to withdraw all units south of the Vexouze River prior to 8:00 A.M., the Vexouze serving as the Air Forces boundary line during bombing. Bombing scheduled for 8:30 A.M., September 25. All units were ordered to display panels during the bombing.

By midnight all units had been alerted regarding the expected bombing. The 1st Battalion was ordered to withdraw the platoon located at Croismare prior to 8:00 A.M. All units were instructed to display panels, and were informed of the Air Forces boundary line.

September 25

The bombing scheduled for 8:30 was postponed, at first until 11:30, and then definitely called off for a 24-hour period. The weather was extremely bad and the future outlook not good for bombing. Higher headquarters believed that bombing was absolutely essential prior to the infantry attack and so postponed all plans until the weather cleared.

Patrolling was initiated, and towns en route to the Forêt de Parroy were again occupied by our forces. Aside from patrolling activity the 313th Infantry was not committed during the day. Intermittent artillery fire came over during the day. Some heavy artillery fell in Lunéville proper.

Other items: F Company was ordered to guard Corps Headquarters, and was relieved of its front-line position during the afternoon. Our artillery was very active during the day, firing missions at enemy targets. The day was otherwise quiet and uneventful.
September 26

The bombing was again called off for an additional 24-hour period, since the weather was absolutely unfavorable for bombing mission. The attack was again postponed. The Regimental commander ordered battalion officers to the Regimental CP for a conference. He outlined for battalion commanders the Division, Corps and Third Army objective. He warned against over-optimism and related that the fighting in the Forêt de Parroy would be tough. He made suggestions for bolstering the morale of troops. The Regimental commander admitted the fighting had been difficult for all concerned but stated that any possibility of relief for the Regiment or for the Division in the near future was out of the question. We must fight on.

The day was otherwise relatively quiet. Patrols were ordered out again and some were fired on by the enemy. Engineers meanwhile completed bridges at Croismare and cleared roads of mines. There was considerable enemy artillery fire throughout the day. The heavy artillery firing on Lunéville slackening somewhat.

September 27

The bombing was postponed for the third consecutive day. The weather was very unfavorable. However, weather reports indicated that atmospheric conditions would clear during the morning or afternoon of September 28. Patrols were again sent out, and our artillery was active during the day. Enemy artillery also was active, and especially heavy on the road leading from Lunéville to Moncel. The shelling of Lunéville proper by the enemy artillery again resumed.

During the late afternoon reports from Division indicated that the bombing mission would most likely take place on September 28. The weather was now clearing somewhat, and weather predictions looked good for the following day. Division Headquarters stated the bombing would last one hour and ten minutes. The attack was to begin two hours and five minutes after completion of the bombing.

Battalions were alerted to expect the bombing the following day, but a definite time for the bombing was not given as of midnight.

During the night of September 27-28 final word was received from Division Headquarters to the effect that the bombing, which for three days had been delayed due to weather conditions, would definitely take place on the morning of September 28. The weather had cleared during the night and all forecasts for September 28 were favorable. The time of the bombing had been set for 10:45 A.M., and was to continue until noon. The infantry attack was to follow the bombing two hours after the bombing mission had been completed.

Yes, everything was now set for the attack on the Forêt de Parroy. Higher officials had every reason to know that the fight would be a tough one. The troops anticipated a tough fight too, for intuitively they sensed that the enemy waited in great numbers behind the wall of trees that stretched out endlessly before their very eyes. Deep down they dreaded the experience that must inevitably come. They were tired—tired of seemingly endless days of combat. Yet though they longed for rest they knew it could not come. They were infantry soldiers, and upon them rested a great responsibility. Tired though they were, they could not turn back. Nor did they turn back. Instead, they fought doggedly and persistently and without rest, driving the enemy back inch by inch, taking it day in and day out, and dishing it out with an ever-increasing vengeance.

These men of the 313th knew how to fight.
Chapter 16: The Forêt de Parroy

The fighting in the drive to Lunéville had been difficult. There had been long days and nights, seemingly without end, during which the troops of the 313th Infantry had known little or no relief from the strain of battle. The brief rest at Avrainville, while the Regiment had remained in Division reserve, had been all too short. The men were in need of a genuine and well deserved rest, and although higher officials were fully aware of this, nothing could be done to alleviate the situation for the moment.

The war had reached a critical phase. Jerry had been pushed back desperately close to his own home soil and was fighting fiercely. Higher headquarters had stated flatly that relief for the moment was out of the question, and that the offensive must continue.

For the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division the continuance of operations involved a supreme test of courage and tenacity. They were now face to face with a situation which might well prove to be the most difficult and hazardous yet encountered. Before them stretched the Forêt de Parroy, a vast network of Nature’s own defense in which the enemy was believed to be deeply entrenched. Higher headquarters had stipulated that this area would have to be cleared of the enemy, and the only way to do it was for the infantry to get in there and weed them out.

So it was that on the morning of September 28, 1944, the men of the 313th Infantry awaited the word to attack. Everything was in readiness. All troops had been pulled back behind the line of the Vexouze River, which had been stipulated as the boundary line for the expected bombing. As the time for the bombing neared, the men waited tensely for the approach of the planes. They hoped it would be a massive air attack, for they knew that the more damage the Air Forces could inflict, the easier their job would be when the time came.

The planes appeared on schedule and the bombing began. It was not as big an attack as the men had hoped, but as the big bombs dropped on their suspected and known targets, the men breathed a sigh of relief and felt a renewed confidence.

Then, by noon, the bombing mission had been completed. Now the time had come for the infantry to move in. How long it would take to clear the forest no one knew, nor did they know how effective the bombing had been. Nerves were tense as the battalions waited for the attack order, and at 2:00 P.M. it came.

With the receipt of the order to attack, the 313th Infantry, attacking in a column of battalions, crossed a line of departure in the vicinity of Champel and began moving forward toward the entrance to the Forêt de Parroy. Some harassing artillery fire was encountered on the movement up to and beyond the line of departure and the leading battalion was under constant harassment by two enemy gun batteries until they reached the forest itself.

No other enemy resistance was encountered until the leading battalion reached the edge of the woods north of the Hte. Rappe Farms. There, the leading elements came in contact with what appeared to be an enemy outpost line. Many casualties were suffered from well placed enemy mortar barrages and defensive machine-gun fire. The battalions succeeded in driving these elements into the edge of the forest and by darkness had penetrated the forest to a depth of approximately one kilometer. At 6:45 P.M. the enemy launched a counterattack consisting of tanks and a company of infantry. This attack was successfully repulsed. The German tanks did not attempt to move in but were used as means of supporting fire. Information from captured prisoners indicated that the attacking enemy unit was the 13th Company, 104th Panzergrenadier Regiment, 15th Panzergrenadier Division. One prisoner revealed that his company had no infantry howitzers and that it was employed as an infantry unit. He also stated that his company had suffered no casualties from our bombing, which proved to be but the first of many indications that the bombing, as a whole, had been ineffective.

No further enemy action except harassing artillery...
fire occurred throughout the night of September 28-29, and by 9:00 A.M., September 29, the 1st Battalion had completed its reorganization and continued the attack. It initially came in contact with a small group of enemy riflemen who had dug in directly to the front of the leading elements. The movement of the battalion continued slowly due to the difficult terrain, and the advance was further impeded by the hazardous search for enemy in the dense woods. As a consequence slow progress was made during the morning of September 29.

Enemy resistance stiffened about noon and at 1:50 the 1st Battalion received a counterattack by infantry with at least one tank, the tank again being used as a means of supporting fire. At 4:00 P.M., the 3d Battalion, 313th Infantry, was committed to relieve the pressure.

The remainder of the day showed a marked increase in enemy activity. Enemy artillery fire was greatly accelerated, and at 10:30 P.M., the 3d Battalion reported a counterattack consisting of tanks and infantry coming from the north into a position about midway between the 1st and 3d Battalion. The enemy tanks moving up and down the road firing into the lines; the infantry attempting to infiltrate at this juncture between the battalions. Some small groups did penetrate and because darkness had set in the situation was not entirely clear until the following morning at which time it was determined that the battalions had succeeded in destroying two Mark IV tanks that had participated in the attack.

A degree of confusion regarding the exact status of the situation continued throughout the morning of September 30. As late as 1:00 P.M., September 30, the reorganization of the 3d Battalion was still not complete enough to facilitate an advance. Heavy enemy artillery fire kept the troops pinned down and delayed the reorganization. By 1:45 P.M., however, the leading battalion had advanced to a point south of the main road through the forest. This placed the unit considerably in front of the 315th Infantry, leaving our left (north) flank exposed. The 2d Battalion was promptly moved up to the rear of the 3d Battalion to assist in furnishing adequate protection. This was necessary due to the constant infiltration attempted by the Germans. At approximately 3:30 P.M., September 30, this open flank was subjected to a counterattack by the enemy. The attack was successfully repulsed, but fighting continued until after dark. Enemy artillery fire was particularly heavy during this period. For example, between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M., September 30, the 3d Battalion alone suffered thirty casualties. Prisoner reports, meanwhile, indicated that the enemy was suffering a terrific toll in killed and wounded as a result of our artillery fire. PWS indicated that replacements were continually being thrown into action, as rapidly as they could be moved into position.

At approximately 11:00 P.M., September 30, contact was established with the 315th Infantry which had pushed ahead, closing to some extent the existing gap between the regiments.

Enemy action quieted down somewhat throughout the night, dwindling to occasional mortar and artillery fire until about 6:00 A.M., October 1, when the enemy employed either tanks or assault guns as direct fire into the position of our 2d Battalion. In the meantime patrols throughout the night had verified the belief that the enemy had withdrawn a few hundred yards to a new delaying position, and as a consequence both regiments again moved off to the attack. Considerable difficulty was encountered in an effort to maintain contact between the regiments, but the advance continued satisfactorily and only scattered enemy resistance was encountered until about noon, when the 2d Battalion, 313th Infantry, was held up by approximately four heavy machine guns plus infantry to their front. By 2:30 it was determined that the opposing force consisted of approximately eighty men, and after an artillery preparation the 2d Battalion successfully overcame this resistance and continued to move.

The night October 1-2 was quiet except for occasional heavy concentrations of enemy artillery fire and a few rounds of Nebelwerfer fire.

October 2 was spent in closing the gap between the regiments, reorganizing, and patrolling. The engineers were employed the morning of October 2 in clearing the roads of the many antitank mines (R-43), which the enemy had placed as a protection against the movement of our tanks or vehicles on the main east-west road through the forest. By 9:30 A.M., the leading battalion had patrolled approximately six hundred yards toward the front and had made no enemy contact. Enemy artillery fire continued to be active, however, with what appeared to be interdictory fire on definite terrain features such as crossroads, trails, and road junctions.

On October 3 the 314th Infantry, which was moving north in an attempt to pinch out our leading unit, moved abreast, and it was not until October 4 that the unit actually moved ahead, or east, of our leading ele-
ments. During this period the 314th Infantry was subjected to counterattacks involving both tanks and infantry, but the only action of the 313th Infantry at this time comprised patrol missions to clear the rear areas of the 314th Infantry of enemy that had infiltrated through the woods.

No further enemy action was encountered by the 313th Infantry while in this position. Then, on October 5, the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, was placed in Corps reserve. Patrols were sent out and a number of prisoners were taken who claimed that the enemy was on a line in that vicinity. Meantime, the 1st Battalion received considerable enemy mortar and artillery fire while in the area around Marainviller. The mortars which were firing on the town were 120mm. in size and were believed to be located in the general vicinity of Forêt de Marainviller. Additional patrols from the 1st Battalion determined that the woods to the north and east of Marainviller and the high ground east of Marainviller and north of the railroad tracks were definitely occupied by enemy forces.

Patrols were again sent out on October 6 in an effort to penetrate the woods north and east of Marainviller, but enemy small-arms, machine-gun and mortar fire prevented any movement of our patrols into that position. On the night of October 6-7, 1944, a combat patrol of the 1st Battalion was sent northeast of Marainviller in an attempt to waylay an enemy food and ammunition truck, but returned without making contact, reporting that the vehicle had failed to put in an appearance. Prisoners captured during the period verified the fact that the enemy did not bring forward either food or ammunition the night of October 6-7.

On October 7 the only element of the Regiment in contact was again the 1st Battalion who had continued to send out patrols in an effort to develop the positions north and east of Marainviller. Otherwise the day was quiet, save for the usual concentrations of enemy mortar and artillery fire in the area surrounding Marainviller.

Final preparations and plans had been completed on October 8, for a coordinated Division attack in the Forêt de Parroy sector on October 9. In Field Order No. 20, received October 7, the plan of attack, in part, had been outlined as follows: "The 79th Division (reinforced) attacks 090630 [9th of this month, at 6:30 A.M.] 315th Infantry north, 313th Infantry south, 2d Battalion 314th Infantry to take limited objective between 313th and 315th."

Much time and effort had been expended in planning the Division attack. Although the objective was a limited one, it was nonetheless of vital importance. The hard days of fighting that had gone before had seen the German pushed slowly back until he was now fighting with his back to the very edge of the woods. It was deemed entirely possible that a coordinated attack at this time would, if successful, discourage the Germans from further attempts to defend the last remaining terrain within the forest itself, and to retire to a new defensive position. The attack was to be launched toward the high ground at the eastern edge of the forest, with the high ground itself the objective. Once attained, it was believed the Germans would consider the remainder of the forest untenable for defensive purposes, and would, as a consequence, retreat.

On the morning of October 9 an advance Regimental CP was opened at 6:00 A.M., deep within the woods. Here, last-minute preparations were made, and promptly at 6:30 A.M., October 9, the attack began. At that hour the 1st Battalion, with attached tanks and tank destroyers, opened fire with a diversionary attack from positions vicinity of Marainviller. Their mission: to fire at known and suspected targets, to create movement, but to make no attempt to advance. Twenty minutes later, at 6:50, the actual attack began. The 313th Infantry, with Company A of the 304th Medical Battalion, Company A of the 749th Tank Battalion, plus two platoons of the 773d Tank Battalion, attacked on order to seize the required objectives.

For the most part the attack proceeded throughout the morning of October 9 according to schedule and plan. In spite of the fact that the 314th and 315th Infantry Regiments were held up for some consider-
The cooks get ready for a horse-and-buggy ride into the muddy Forêt de Parroy

able time by stiff resistance, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 313th Infantry, were able to attain their objectives with little difficulty. Only scattered resistance and some artillery fire caused slight delays. The 3d Battalion, in following the 2d Battalion, lengthened the distance between the battalions and as a consequence some casualties were suffered from enemy artillery. Roadblocks were established, however, according to plan.

By 2:00 P.M., the Regimental objective had been taken, and the supporting tanks had taken defensive positions at specified locations. One platoon of Antitank Company was then attached to the 3d Battalion to support the roadblocks already established, due to a report of enemy vehicular movement to the south of those positions. Patrolling was begun immediately to the east and south of the objective. The result of this patrolling gave indications, which were later verified, that the enemy had withdrawn from the woods to the east.

This first indication of enemy withdrawal proved to be the beginning of a general withdrawal by the enemy from the Forêt de Parroy. As had been hoped, once the high ground on the eastern edge of the forest itself had been taken, the Germans considered the battle of the forest lost and began to retreat. The Division objective had been taken before nightfall, October 9, and patrol activity thereafter substantiated the belief that the enemy was in general retreat from the woods.

Bad roads and a few by-passed snipers, meanwhile, necessitated the use of light tanks in getting rations, bedrolls and water to the battalions. Artillery fire in

the Regimental sector varied from sporadic to intense throughout the remainder of the day and night.

Throughout the night enemy stragglers caused some concern to the rear of the battalion positions, but by daylight, October 10, this difficulty had been overcome with all enemy strays either killed or taken prisoner.

The date of October 9, 1944, will long be considered an important one for members of the Regiment and the Division who participated in the taking of the Forêt de Parroy. On that date enemy resistance within the forest was finally broken. For eleven consecutive days the battle for the forest had been bitter and intense. The weather had been miserable, and casualties high. In forceful language, the fight within the forest had been hell. In consideration of the difficult job to be done, however, progress had indeed been rapid and the final result achieved in record time. The taking of the Forêt de Parroy in World War II, at least in so far as the 79th Division was concerned, had been accomplished in eleven days, while in World War I, after many months of hard fighting, neither the enemy nor the Allies had successfully penetrated it. The Germans had unquestionably considered the Forêt de Parroy a vital point, and were determined to hold it at all costs. This was repeatedly confirmed by information gleaned from prisoners, who stated time after time that new replacements were constantly being thrown into action on the enemy front lines, as rapidly as they could be committed. German propaganda broadcasts, beamed to all of Europe, also indicated beyond question that the Germans considered the Forêt de Parroy a vital sector. In one broadcast it was stated that the 79th Division had been completely wiped out in its desperate attempt to take the forest. Another broadcast stated that the Americans had lost one paratroop division and three crack infantry divisions during the brief period of eleven days in which the fighting for the forest continued. The actual facts, of course, were quite different. The 79th Division, in its assigned sector, had taken the forest alone, and the losses, in consideration of the job to be done, had been comparatively light. The enemy, on the other hand, had suffered very heavy losses, predominantly as a result of the terrific day-and-night artillery pounding placed on all known or suspected enemy positions.

It would be impossible to describe in mere words the sort of conditions that constituted the eleven days of fighting within the Forêt de Parroy. There was no escape, day or night, from the anguish that prevailed...
there. From the moment the first troops entered the dense woods, until the moment the last troops emerged into the open again, every moment spent therein was a living death. It would be impossible to exaggerate the privation and suffering the men endured while the battle for the forest lasted. It rained constantly, the weather was cold, and day and night the enemy resisted with a fierceness that the veteran fighters of the 313th Infantry had never experienced before. No sooner would we attack than the enemy would counterattack with a desperation that only a loser with his back against the wall could master. It was, in so far as the Germans were concerned, a last-ditch fight, and with all due respect for the enemy's fighting ability, he fought on despite all odds. In the meantime, as our troops edged their way forward, every tree was a potential death trap, and every man was haunted with the feeling that his next step might well be his last. It was one thing to fight out in the open like men. It was another to fight deep within a forest where you never knew where the enemy was or when or how he would strike. And the enemy had the advantage all the while. He was on the defensive, while we remained throughout on the offensive. It was tough to go in and weed him out; to endure the tree bursts, the cold, and the uncertain fear of the unknown. It was, as one private later said, "The goddamnedest place on earth."

But be that as it may, the fight for the forest was won. The coordinated efforts of the three infantry regiments had succeeded in their sector in pushing the enemy back until the forest itself was clear.

With the Forêt de Parroy in our hands, the nature of the fighting changed. It was not anticipated that the fighting would be lessened to any great extent, for the enemy had given no indication of relaxing his vigilance. Yet to the soldier on the line it was a great relief to be out in the open again.

For several days following the final coordinated attack within the forest, Regimental activity was confined mainly to reorganizing and patrolling. Our artillery, meanwhile, began firing concentrated missions on all known or suspected enemy positions beyond the forest. At the same time every inch of remaining ground within the forest was combed for enemy stragglers, and from prisoners captured more and more was learned of the enemy's positions and movements.

On the morning of October 11 the Regimental I&R Platoon made a reconnaissance mission to the little town of LaNeuveville and reported it clear of enemy. Acting upon this information, the Regimental commander made a personal reconnaissance to and beyond the village, and thereafter, ordered all battalions to move east and south of LaNeuveville to take up defensive positions and institute further patrolling to the east.

By dusk all battalions had taken up defensive positions as ordered, and at 6:00 P.M., a Regimental CP was opened at LaNeuveville. Thereafter, the 1st Battalion was ordered from Marainviller and tied in with the 314th Infantry, located on the right boundary of the 313th Infantry.

The Forêt de Parroy was now completely cleared and defensive positions beyond the forest were now established.

After the Regiment arrived at its new positions in the vicinity of LaNeuveville, a full day was spent in active patrolling to determine the enemy's positions and intentions. Much information of value was obtained, and by mid-morning, October 13, it became certain that the bulk of the enemy's defenses and forces were established in the town of Emberménil, located farther to the east of LaNeuveville.

Upon receipt of this information the Regimental commander ordered an attack on the town. The attack jumped off as scheduled at 1:30 P.M., October 13, but upon reaching the outskirts of Emberménil our units were immediately met with extremely heavy small-arms, mortar, artillery and machine-gun fire. The 3d Battalion attacked from a position on the high ground overlooking the town, while the 1st Battalion attacked generally from an area in the vicinity of the railroad station to the south.

During the afternoon the advance was steady although progress was slowed from time to time because of heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Despite these obstacles, however, Emberménil was taken at 3:00 P.M., by the 1st Battalion, which continued to advance to a line approximately three hundred yards east of the town proper. Shortly thereafter the 3d Battalion reached a line adjacent to the 1st Battalion. At that point it was decided to button up for the night in the positions then held. Even then, however, parts of the 1st Battalion were still engaged in a fire fight with the enemy in the vicinity of the railroad station.

Throughout the night plans were made for continuing the attack, and despite the fact that the weather was extremely bad, the attack was pressed forward. Heavy rains made tank activity literally impossible, and progress in so far as the battalions themselves were concerned was none the less difficult. Because of these
conditions, and equally because our troops were tired to the point of sheer exhaustion, very little progress was made. The enemy was well entrenched on the high ground farther to the east of Emberménil, and despite all efforts, our troops were unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy from their well fortified positions. By nightfall, ten of our tanks were completely bogged down in the mud, and the day had shown no substantial gains.

The preceding events had taken place on October 14, 1944. That night, word was received from 79th Division Headquarters, ordering the troops to dig in on their present positions and to await more favorable conditions before continuing the attack. Division Headquarters was well aware that the troops of all three regiments were so extremely tired that effective fighting could not continue, at least until conditions improved.

For a five-day period, from October 14 to 19, 1944, the Regiment remained in the positions then held. During that time Regimental activity was limited to the establishment of outposts, roadblocks, the sending out of patrols, and the constant manning of defensive positions. In the meantime, the enemy made several abortive attacks, all of which were thwarted with heavy enemy losses. On one occasion, which occurred on October 17, the enemy planned an attack which backfired with terrific repercussions. The event transpired during the night, when two German prisoners were brought in to Regimental IPW Team No. 50 for interrogation. The prisoners revealed that the enemy was planning a major attack against our lines and against Emberménil between 3:00 and 3:30 A.M. From them full information regarding the plan of attack was obtained. It was learned that the attack was to be spearheaded by tanks and followed by infantry. The location of both the tanks and infantry was wrested from the two frightened prisoners, plus information as to the likely route of approach to be used by the enemy tanks in the attack. This information was relayed at once to Regimental Headquarters, thence to Division and to Corps, and preparations were made to surprise the attackers. The enemy attack came off promptly at 3:30, but the element of surprise was the reverse of what the enemy had hoped it would be. All available artillery opened fire on all possible avenues of approach, as well as blasting the points of concentration where the enemy tanks and infantry were reported as located. As a result the attack was stopped almost as soon as it had begun, with heavy enemy losses in both men and matériel.

On October 19 the Regimental commander called a meeting of the Regimental staff and battalion S-2s, to formulate plans to straighten our defense lines, which involved the taking of a dominating ridge of high ground to the front of our positions. This plan was inspired by Division Headquarters in an effort to straighten the lines of the three infantry regiments. In line with carrying out this plan, the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, was relieved by a battalion of the 315th Infantry in its zone on the night of October 19-20, and by 3:00 A.M., the relief was completed.

In the course of the two days to follow, October 20 and 21, the front lines of the three infantry regiments were straightened according to plan. This was accomplished with considerable difficulty, however, as the enemy continued to counterattack wherever and whenever possible. Especially at night, the enemy became doubly active, and our outposts were constantly calling for artillery barrages on stipulated locations to discourage enemy attacks or attempts at infiltration. Artillery fire on both sides was extremely heavy.

For weeks—yes, ever since the troops of the 313th Infantry had first entered the city of Lunéville—rumors had been rife that the Regiment and the Division would soon be relieved for a much-needed rest. In part, these rumors were based on fact, for Division Headquarters was well aware that a rest was desperately needed. On the other hand it was also known that no relief could possibly be granted immediately.

Now, however, it appeared that the possibility of relief for the Division was beyond the rumor stage. Division Headquarters was promising as much, and by October 22, definite plans for the relief of the Division had spread like wildfire throughout the ranks of the 313th Infantry, and once the reality of the promise of relief became known, every hour spent on the front lines seemed like an endless eternity.

Then, at noon, October 24, 1944, the sector held by the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division was placed under the control of the commanding general, 44th Division. Meantime, the 324th Infantry of the 44th Division had been in the process of taking over the positions held by the 313th Infantry. Throughout the day the process of relief continued, and by 10:50 P.M., October 24, the Regimental commander reported to the 79th Division commander that the relief of the Regiment was complete.

Trucks were spotted and troops were then mounted for a movement to a rest area in the vicinity of Rosieres-
aux-Salines, located some fifty kilometers from the city of Lunéville. This was the first official relief the Division or the Regiment had known since the attack on Cherbourg began, June 18, 1944. For 128 days the troops had engaged in continuous combat, save for brief rest periods while a single unit had been placed in Division reserve. This 128-day period established a marked and well-earned record for both the Regiment and the Division. Beyond question the example set by all the men of the 79th Division served to prove that human endurance knows virtually no limitations, and that the valor of men in arms is beyond computation.

Though very tired, they were a happy group of men that pulled away from the front lines and headed for their long-awaited rest at Rosieres. As the trucks rolled along, and the sound of the artillery became ever less discernible, these men breathed deeply of clean, fresh air, and looked about them at the quiet and peaceful French countryside. Undoubtedly they thought that the very land over which they were now passing had not so long ago been under fire, and they fully realized that peace could only be had at a dear price.

These men, moving back from the lines of battle, had earned their measure of rest. They hoped they might have it, and that it might last long enough for jangled and war-torn nerves to be replaced by peace of body and of mind.

Yes, they had earned all the rest they could ever get. They had earned more than they could ever get, for the war was not yet over. This they knew, and they knew that once the rest was over they would be called upon again to return to the front.
THERE ARE no words in Webster's dictionary, or in Roget's thesaurus, or even in GI language, to express the relief and sheer gratitude the troops of the 313th Infantry felt when they found themselves removed from the front lines and safely transported to the rest area at Rosieres. For too long a time they had known only the hell of continuous combat. Nerves were taut, and bodies were dead tired. If ever men needed to get away for a time from the whine of artillery and the sound of cannon these men were in need of just such a change. To a man they had all inwardly hoped their luck would hold out long enough that they could once again experience the thrill of ordinary comfort and safety, even though it be for only a short period of time.

The morning of October 25 brought just such an opportunity for the men. Now, for an unspecified length of time, they were to know their first official rest period in many months. There had been brief periods of rest in the past, but these had come only while the Regiment had remained in Division reserve for short periods, and when such periods did come, at no time were the troops fully out of range of enemy artillery or activity.

Now, however, they were far behind the enemy lines. They were living in an area which for many weeks had been cleared of enemy, and which, in the main, had returned to normal living again.

During the first few days virtually no restrictions were imposed. Army routine, of course, being what it is, was maintained. Clothing and equipment were cleaned, and a rigid inspection of equipment and arms was held. Baths were taken, and the men soon emerged clean and newly shaven. It was like beginning life all over again.

In the meantime plans were put into effect to provide motion pictures and other Special Service entertainment. Passes were freely given to the nearby communities of Lunéville, St. Nicolas, Dombasle, Hud­donviller, as well as to the town of Rosieres around and in which the Regiment was bivouacked. The larger city of Lunéville, and the smaller surrounding towns, immediately sprang to life. Everywhere you went the beer halls and taverns were always full, and in the areas where the troops were bivouacked, you could find groups of men staging shindigs of their own, using company funds for the purchase of beer or other spirits. From the very first day it was evident that plenty of beer could be obtained, but as usual the "hard" stuff was difficult to get. Despite all difficulties, however, there was usually a way of getting a few drinks in limited quantity, but it was a foregone conclusion that the quality was also limited. The Mirabelle, Cognac and "fire water" available was vicious stuff indeed.

Although none of the GIs could fully understand why, within two days after the Regiment arrived at the rest area a training schedule was placed in full effect. The reason, as revealed by higher headquarters, was to adequately train the replacements who would soon find themselves facing the real thing when the Regiment was called upon to return to combat. But to the seasoned veteran who had endured so much for so long a time, the very thought of further training was, to him at least, both unnecessary and unwanted. Yet an order is an order, and so the training began. All units engaged in night training, small unit training, with special emphasis placed on assault-detachment training. This, combined with range firing of both small-caliber and .50-caliber weapons, plus patrol training (both reconnaissance and combat) kept the troops busy almost continuously.
During the entire period, meanwhile, winter clothing was being issued. As rapidly as the winter supply of clothing arrived, distribution was made to all units. Ample warm clothing, blankets and equipment was to be had for all.

The training, of course, did not entirely prevent the men from enjoying themselves. Within the various units and companies the training was so arranged that there was ample time for granting passes and enjoying other entertainment. Throughout the entire rest period the men made the most of every free moment allowed.

On October 23 and again on November 3 two impressive ceremonies were held during which awards were given to personnel of the Regiment who had distinguished themselves in combat during the preceding months. The ceremony of October 28 was held at Regimental headquarters, where the Commanding Officer, Col Sterling A. Wood, presented the Bronze Star to 27 members of the Regiment, varying in rank from that of private to lieutenant colonel. Later, on November 3, a special Regimental ceremony was held in an area north of Rosiers, during which the Commanding General of the 79th Division, Maj Gen Ira T. Wyche, presented awards to members of the Regiment who had distinguished themselves in various actions. This ceremony was a particularly impressive affair. One company from each battalion—Companies B, F and L—was present, and both the National and Regimental colors waved impressively as the awards were presented. Many of the local townspeople turned out to witness this event.

On November 5 word was received at Regimental headquarters that the Regiment was alerted for a possible movement order at any time. Instructions were issued from Division Headquarters that a six-hour alert order would be issued prior to departure. No one knew the actual movement date, therefore, for a number of days, for it was not until November 12 that the Regiment actually moved.

Meantime, on November 11, Company G, 313th Infantry, was awarded the honor of taking part in the Armistice Day ceremonies in the city of Lunéville, where French and American soldiers paraded in commemoration of the victory in World War I, twenty-six years previously. This too, was an impressive occasion, and the streets of Lunéville, not many weeks before a scene of combat between our forces and those of the enemy, were lined with French civilians who waved both French and America flags and shouted "Vive l'Amerique," "Vive La France."

A few days before the departure of the Regiment on November 12, the Regimental commander, Col Sterling A. Wood, was taken ill. He had been suffering for some time with an internal condition which medical specialists had warned must be corrected by an operation, but he had repeatedly refused to leave his men for prolonged treatment. Now, however, the condition had grown progressively worse, and under orders he had been forced to take time out for hospital care. In the meantime, Lt Col Clarence Sagmoen, at the time the Regimental S-5, was placed in temporary command of the Regiment. Lt Colonel Sagmoen had held a Reserve commission since June 1924, and had been called to active duty in 1941. In June 1944 he was flown overseas with a group of high-ranking officers and immediately thereafter joined the 313th Infantry as Regimental S-5.

Colonel Sagmoen remained as acting commander
Men of the 313th marching to decoration ceremonies at Rosieres, France, November 1944
of the 313th Infantry from November 5 to November 12. On that date, Lt Col Edwin M. Van Bibber, who had been injured some months previously in line of duty, returned to the Regiment and assumed command. Colonel Van Bibber had been with the 313th Infantry since its activation in 1942, and had an extensive military background to his credit.

Colonel Van Bibber is a native of Maryland. He graduated from the Military Academy with the class of 1929. During the next ten years he served as platoon and company commander with the 12th, 18th, 19th, 27th, and 29th Infantry Regiments. He also served in MP companies in Hawaii and the United States. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1935, to captain in 1939, to major in 1941, and lieutenant colonel in November 1942. He is a graduate of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, and completed the 15th General Staff Class at the Command & General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1943.

Lt Col Van Bibber arrived at Regimental Headquarters and assumed command on the very date that the Regiment was due to return to combat, November 12, 1944. He was again in good health and fully recovered from his injuries. His return had come at a crucial moment.

For indeed, the days at Rosieres had drawn to a close. All units had already been alerted and were ready for movement by motor. No information had been revealed as to the destination, for as always in time of war, such moves are secret. But it was no secret to the men that they were again returning to combat, for they had known when they came to Rosieres that the rest period was to be but a breathing spell from intensive and prolonged weeks of combat. The military picture was still far too critical.

And so, with renewed courage, these men of the 313th Infantry steeled themselves for whatever was yet to come. Their rest had been brief—all too brief—but they were thankful to have had those few days of normalcy in a world torn by war.

They well knew that in such a world there was nothing to do but to fight on.
Chapter 18: The Race to Alsace

As THE REGIMENT moved the division unfolded the plans of its operation. The attack was to jump off to the east toward the Saverne Gap. The line of departure was the Lunéville road with the axis of advance being the road Montigny–Ancerville and to the east. The 314th was to attack on the left, the 315th on the right, with the 313th Infantry in reserve. The CP of the 313th was initially to be at Brouville five to six kilometers northwest of Montigny.

Early in the morning of the 13th the attack jumped off, and in spite of moderate resistance made steady progress. The Regiment was directed to protect the flanks of the attack as it advanced, and this was done by moving the 3d Battalion into the vicinity of St. Pol on the right flank and the 2d to the east of Magnéville. The 1st Battalion was kept in reserve.

The road junction at Montigny received continuous and heavy artillery fire, because the Germans realized how vital a link it was in our communications. In addition, St. Pol received heavy artillery fire, as well as counterattacks from the southeast which jumped off from the town of St. Maurice.

Company L, reinforced with machine guns and mortars, was assigned the task of defending St. Pol. The Germans attacked it continually by day and by night with infantry and self-propelled guns, their object obviously being to reach Montigny and cut off our rapidly growing salient, which by now resembled a long finger pointing toward our objective, the Saverne Gap.

As the finger lengthened, the thinner were stretched the 2d and 3d Battalions, guarding the left and right flanks of the Division, respectively. The Germans seemed to realize this, and their attacks on the right flank became more determined. After one of these, Company L counted forty-nine dead Germans in front of their position, which was the eastern edge of St. Pol.

At this point the French 2d Armored Division, which had been bivouacked in rear of the 79th, seemed to stir into action. It was a member of our Corps (the XV), but little was known of its capabilities or intentions. Small French task forces began to operate in the Division area, the bulk of which seemed to concentrate to the southeast on the Division's right flank. One of these went to Badonviller and took it from a German battalion. Another blundered into St. Pol which they thought was still held by the Germans. One of their halftracks got into one of Company L's minefields and had a track blown off, which further convinced them that they were confronted by the enemy. So they came into St. Pol shooting, whereupon the Americans took to the cellars. When the French discovered their mistake they apologized profusely. No one had been hurt by the misadventure, and so it was regarded in the light of an amusing incident by all concerned.

The French forthwith picked another objective and off they went after it, this time being assured that it was actually held by Germans.

The Regimental CP had meanwhile moved to Montigny—a hot spot, as has been said. The 2d Battalion was ordered to patrol the left flank which seemed ominously quiet. The 1st Battalion which had been in reserve was ordered to Halo ville on November 16, to extend the flank of the 3d Battalion and to keep contact with the advancing right flank of the 315th Infantry. Thus, all battalions of the Regiment were committed, unless you count the 2d Battalion as being free.
It was not in contact with the enemy in spite of its extensive patrolling.

On the 16th also, the Regimental CP moved to Ancervillier which was about halfway to the tip of the salient from Montigny. The French agreed to take over St. Pol, allowing the 3d Battalion to assemble south of Ancerville in Regimental reserve.

Meanwhile the 314th Infantry had advanced as far as Barbas and on the 16th was attacking that town with its 1st Battalion. The remainder of the 314th had passed on to the east, so was not in a position to aid in the capture of Barbas with which the 1st Battalion was having some trouble. The Division therefore ordered the CO of the 313th to move his 2d Battalion forward to relieve the 1st Battalion, 314th, and to take Barbas. The 2d Battalion was to be relieved from its present position by the Division Reconnaissance Troop.

Now on this same eventful day at 8:45 P.M., action flared up again at St. Pol. The French had not yet arrived, and the 3d Battalion had moved all its units except Company L into its new assembly area near Ancervillier.

The Germans attacked with infantry and artillery, and it was thought that Company L would need additional fire support. As all the Division artillery had displaced or was in the act of doing so, the Regimental Cannon Company then in position in the vicinity of Ancervillier turned its guns to the rear and fired in the defense of St. Pol.

The attack was driven off eventually and that flank quieted down. The French arrived soon thereafter, enabling Company L to close into the battalion area by 10:15 A.M. on the 17th.

When the 2d Battalion reached Barbas on the morning of the 17th they found the 1st Battalion of the 314th Infantry in possession of the town and preparing to patrol the ridge to the north that night. The plan was that if they could take the ridge they would that night, but our 2d Battalion was to relieve them wherever they were before daylight.

That night when the 314th patrols explored the ridge they found no enemy so Lt Col "Tiger" Teague, the battalion commander, promptly ordered his battalion to occupy it. This they did but, before the dawn broke and the 2d Battalion, 313th Infantry, was en route to relieve them, the enemy infiltrated around the flanks of the 1st Battalion, 314th, so that not only was relief impossible but the battalion could not extricate itself. Therefore an attack by our 2d Battalion was imperative. The plans were hastily changed and at daylight the attack swept around the left flank of the 314th's battalion.

It was a beautiful job in spite of the short time for preparation. Companies F and G moved out quickly initially abreast but changing into column order to avoid heavy mortar and self-propelled-gun fire. Our own artillery fire and the steady small-arms fire which was poured into the German positions kept Jerry's head pretty well down until he was overrun. As the enemy's hold was loosened on the ridge the 1st Battalion, 314th Infantry, moved out to rejoin the rest of the Regiment. As the ridge was a long one it was 8:15 A.M. on the 18th before the objective on the other end, the Bois du Trion, was reached. There were found some artillery pieces abandoned by the enemy.

The Regimental CP now moved to Barbas and plans to take Blamont just the other side of the ridge began to take shape. The presence of the artillery pieces in the Bois du Trion coupled with the report of a heavy explosion at 3:00 A.M. the night before indicated that the bridge across the stream at the southern entrance to the city was blown. Company E was ordered to patrol this area to ascertain this fact, and to contact the enemy in the town wherever he might be found.

The patrols moved out at 12:30 A.M. and at 12:45 were seen entering the edge of town apparently without opposition. At 12:47 radio reports came from the patrols that the bridge was in truth blown and that no Germans had as yet been encountered. Later came reports that twenty-one prisoners were taken without firing a shot and the town was ours.

The bridge was not repaired until midnight when the Regiment began to cross immediately. The 2d Battalion went first as it was scheduled to continue the attack at 7:00 A.M. It was followed by the 1st, and then the 3d Battalion, which did not close into Blamont until 9:30 A.M. the next day.

The attack of the 2d Battalion was unopposed and evidently Corps decided that it was time for the armor, because at 2:00 P.M. a message came from the Division to clear all roads and streets, priority on which had been given the French 2d Armored Division. This called for a special effort on the part of the Regiment to get all its elements across the new bridge, because it had been found out by experience that if the armor broke through, trucks would be along to take us along in their wake, and it was necessary to be ready for this eventuality.
Blamont fell, and the road to the Alsace Plain was clear. France, November 20, 1944

The armor roared through Blamont all day while the infantry laid low and waited. There were the usual diverting sights such as hair-cutting by the French of women who had been "collaborating," but the minds of most of the men were on the future. Was this a real breakthrough and if it were, how far would it go? Would it be like those halycon days of last summer? Where would the Germans make a stand—or could they? How about the Saverne Gap, the Maginot Line, the Siegfried? Many rumors and speculations such as these were voiced eagerly and the morale of the men rose high.

The Regimental CP had moved into Blamont and at 8:00 o'clock that night Division called and said the next objective was Saarburg. There was only vague information on the progress of the French, but it must have been good because they had cleared Blamont.

At 2:15 P.M. the next day (the 20th) the Regiment was ordered to move immediately by truck via the route Richeval–St. Georges, to the area formed by the triangle: Hattigny–Fragualfind–Niederhof. At 3:10 P.M. the Regiment moved, led by the 3d Battalion, to which a company of tanks had been attached. This move was made without incident and the CP was set up at Niederhof.

On the 21st, at about noon, the Regiment was called upon to furnish a battalion to be attached to the French 2d Armored Division now reported to be fighting in the passes through the Vosges. The 1st Battalion was designated partly because its S-2, Lieutenant Hutter, spoke fluent French, and it started off on one of the most colorful and interesting missions ever performed by any part of the Regiment. It moved initially to St. Quirin, and its story will be told when the narrative reaches the point where it rejoined the Regiment.

At 2:30 P.M. the Regiment less the 1st Battalion was ordered to the vicinity of Schneckenbusch via the route Nitting–Hesse.

Something should be said of the weather at this point. Ever since the attack started on November 12 the rain had been intermittent. The increased traffic occasioned by the entry of the armor into the operation had ground the roads into seas of mud, making progress as difficult as can be imagined. German aircraft activity had increased as it usually did during murky weather, and strafing by planes in groups of three could be expected at any time although the effect was generally merely harassing.

Two hours later the Regiment had closed into its new area. Upon learning that the Thanksgiving turkey was now on our supply trains, efforts were made to find out from higher headquarters when we would have time to eat it. The results of the inquiry were encouraging. The Regiment was scheduled to move.
on the 23d in the afternoon; the turkey could be eaten at noon. So plans were made for the feast and the turkey for the men of the 1st Battalion was sent to them forthwith.

Word came on the 23d at 2:00 P.M., that the armor was on the outskirts of Strassburg, and that the 79th Division CP was moving to Phalsburg in the Saverne Gap. The Regiment was to move at 7:30 P.M. on the 24th on Weyersheim, a little village near the Rhine River.

The route given was Pfalsburg-Saverne-Dettweiler-Brumath. The plan was to follow the 314th Infantry who were to go into position to the south of us, but our route did not join theirs until we reached Brumath.

The Regimental log at this point leaves much to memory. The reason for this will be evident as the narrative proceeds. There was not much time for punching the typewriter.

The move started by truck as scheduled and at first no obstacles were met other than mud and traffic. As the Regiment passed from Pfalsburg to Saverne there was much evidence of the fighting done by the French where they took this stretch of the road—the narrowest part of the Saverne Gap. There were burned-out tanks, both French and German, along the road. Also there were German fortifications armed with self-propelled 75s, and 88s literally by the dozens. How it was possible for the French to break through these belts of defenses so quickly and without infantry it is difficult to conjecture.

The 3d Battalion was leading the march and had tanks attached as before. The traffic was getting worse, as elements of the armor were still on the roads. When the head of the 3d Battalion reached the main road at Brumath, the column halted and the Regimental CP group moved forward to proceed to Weyersheim, as the quartering parties had reported the area clear. During this delay, however, it was learned that the 314th had not passed, and we were the leading elements now. Then came word that the 314th quartering parties had been driven out of their area by German patrols! Furthermore, higher headquarters issued the warning that German armor was attacking from the north, west of the mountains, and was threatening the Corps headquarters at Saarburg! The dispatch added that the possibility of a similar attack east of the mountains was very strong.

If either attack were successful the Division—if not the Corps—would be cut off, and badly so. There was nothing for it to do, however, but to continue the mission.

The 3d Battalion was sent immediately to Weitbrück north of Brumath to clear the enemy from the area. While this was being accomplished enemy fire was heard near Kurtzenhausen in the 314th area just to the left of the head of the 2d Battalion column. Lt Colonel Gooding, CO of the 2d Battalion, was ordered to attack immediately which he did almost on the instant. His troops vaulted out of their trucks, formed skirmish lines and moved out quickly. Machine guns and mortars were set up in the ditches along the road and soon were delivering supporting fire.

German mortar fire began falling along the road. In fact one shell fell into a French halftrack which was rounding the bend and destroyed it. The Division commander, General Wyche, who was at the intersection personally directed fire on the enemy by a French tank. He gave his orders in French and got good results, from all accounts.

It was nightfall before the 2d Battalion had its objective—a little village on the hill. The 3d Battalion seized the high ground just south of Weitbrück and established contact with the 2d by patrols. The Regimental CP was set up in Weyersheim entirely unprotected except by the I&R Platoon. Such was the situation in which the Regiment found itself on the night of November 24.

The 3d Battalion of the 314th Infantry relieved our 2d Battalion that night. They were moved over to Kurtzenhausen, two kilometers north of Weyersheim. Considerable relief was felt at the Regimental CP at this added protection.

The Division line extended now in an east-west direction facing north and about five or six kilometers north of Brumath. The next morning the 3d Battalion took Weitbrück while the 2d Battalion took Greis just north of Kurtzenhausen. Just beyond stood Hagenau and Bischwiller and the edge of the great Hagenau Forest.

Then followed a period of watchful waiting. Reports from PWs and French civilians indicated that Hagenau and Bischwiller were held in force, and that the German defenses were in some depth and strength in the woods which lay between Greis and Bischwiller. These defenses apparently extended along the Division front.

Our patrolling confirmed these reports in the main and every night the sound of chopping could be heard in the German lines, indicating that they were
strengthening their defenses. Also German artillery fire increased daily as more of it was placed in position. The bulk of it seemed to come from the Hagenau Forest although some came from the east of the Rhine.

There were many reports of tanks in Hagenau and Bischwiller. One report stated that fifty Tiger tanks had arrived one night on the train.

On November 25 the I&R Platoon went east out of Weyersheim to reconnoiter Gambsheim, a village three kilometers due east and on the Rhine. They had been there the day before to find the place unoccupied. The road was generally under water so they reached the place only with difficulty, and they asked some civilians if there were any Germans in the town. The civilians replied that there were, and while the conversation was in progress around a corner came a car full of Germans firing burp guns! Luckily one of the I&R men was alert behind his .50 caliber, so he let them have it and killed all of them. No American was hurt but the I&R Platoon lost no time in leaving Gambsheim.

It might be noted here that Gambsheim continued to be a thorn in the side of the Seventh Army for many months afterwards.
THE PERIOD that followed found the Division on the defensive, awaiting a possible counter-attack. But it began to be realized that the Saverne breakthrough had done the Germans more damage than was thought at first. If the enemy had troops in the area in sufficient numbers to strike a decisive blow, the time for such action to occur was as soon after our arrival on the Alsatian plain as possible. We were off-balance ourselves from our unexpected success, and our first days in this area were spent in a mad scramble to reorganize.

On November 25 the Regiment established contact again with the 1st Battalion in Strasbourg. It was not released as yet, but was detached from the French 2d Armored Division and attached to "T Force," a specialized detachment from Army Group whose mission was the seizure and examination of certain pre-designated enemy "targets" or installations in which the high command had interested itself. But as interesting and colorful as this assignment was it could by no means compare with their former one—their part in what might be called the "Battle of Strasbourg."

Many and fantastic are the tales of that action. How the battalion rode into Strasbourg in trucks under fire, and joined battle with the enemy after entering the town; the dash for the Rhine bridge with the armor in an unsuccessful attempt to seize it intact; the demand on a German force to surrender when Captain Timothy, S-3 of the battalion, sat in the enemy CP for five hours while the German commander and his staff argued back and forth whether or not to surrender. They finally decided to give up and those prisoners and many others taken in the action swelled the numbers already credited to the Division quite considerably. The story briefly was as follows:

Early in the morning of November 21, 1944, the Regimental executive officer notified the 1st Battalion of a special mission then assigned it, to render assistance to the French 2d Armored in their exploitation of the breakthrough of the German lines before Blamont. The French 2d had requested the assistance of two reinforced companies who were to establish roadblocks to protect their speedily advancing right flank. When liaison was established that night it was discovered that the force requested was too small for the assigned mission. Division directed the detachment of the entire battalion.

At 7:45 A.M. the battalion left Niederhof to join the French column at Bertrambois. The leading elements of the French armored division were pushing so rapidly ahead in their advance through the foothills of the Vosges that plans for the establishment of roadblocks changed. As a result the battalion originally ordered to establish roadblocks in the vicinity of Cirey-sur-Vexouze and St. Quirin and Walscheid proceeded to an assembly area at St. Quirin. Company A took over three roadblocks in that town. There the battalion received orders definitely attaching it to the French. There was some enemy activity in the vicinity of the roadblocks and the town received four rounds of long-range enemy artillery. Explicit orders for the employment of the battalion were received at 5:40 P.M. Company A was to remain in position and the rest of the battalion was to join Combat Command V of the French 2d at Birkenwald. The battalion joined the French column at 9:00 A.M. November 22 and moved through the Vosges Mountains via Rethel, Dabe, Oberseigen to Birkenwald. During the route of march a courier was dispatched to inform Company A to rejoin the battalion and to clear St. Quirin at 2:30 P.M. At Birkenwald orders were issued employing the battalion in the defense of Reutenberg.

At 9:30 P.M. November 22, 1944, the Combat Command order was received at battalion headquarters. The French 2d were to occupy Strasbourg and push on to Kehl. CCV was to make the main effort while two combat teams from the other two combat commands were to assist. CCV was divided into three combat teams each with a separate route of march. One combat team had the mission of establishing the bridgehead at Kehl and the 1st Battalion was to rein-

The enemy fought a last-ditch stand in the Schleusen Kaserne in Strasbourg. The tank is American made, and operated by the French 2d Armored Division.
force them. In the event the bridge at Kehl should be blown, then the expected disposition of the force would be three combat teams echeloned to the north between the Paris Gate and the Rhine with the 1st Battalion in Neudorf. The instructions were explicit—the whole force was to push on with as much speed as possible, pockets of resistance were to be by-passed, prisoners were to be disarmed and sent to the rear without guard, civilians were to be treated with suspicion. The French anticipated the fall of Strasbourg with high hopes and much enthusiasm.

Information of the enemy indicated that there would be little opposition outside the main forts guarding the city. At the time the AT ditch was bridged by a belt of roads which were still intact.

The attack went off much according to plan and before noon the leading elements of all five columns could see the Strasbourg spires in the distance. The battalion followed Combat Team Cantrell. As the leading elements of Combat Team Cantrell crossed the antitank ditch the Germans blew up the road, thus blocking the main approach to the city. One other combat team entering to the left flank of Cantrell reduced the fort from which the road had been dynamited. The combat team then swung to the south and entered the city from Obershafolsheim. On the road between Obershafolsheim and Wolfisheim the antitank ditch was covered by some fire from Fort Kleber. Company B was given the mission of clearing the enemy from this fort and the battalion proceeded into the city. Company B remained in position besieging Fort Kleber until relieved by units from the French 2d Armored at 6:00 P.M.

The battalion entered the city through the Porte Nationale and received orders to clear the section of the city called Neudorf. Proceeding along the Boulevard de Lyons across the Rhine-Rhône Canal the battalion entered a section of the city supposedly clear of the enemy. As the head of the motorized column approached the Caserne Marquet it was engaged by small-arms fire from the fort. The battalion rapidly dismounted and returned the fire. French tanks were ordered to force an entry into the fort from which the Germans were lobbing mortar shells into the streets. At 3:30 P.M., November 23, an entry was forced into the fort and a platoon from Company A broke into the courtyard of the garrison and took a number of prisoners. At 4:30 a German officer came out of the garrison under a flag of truce and indicated the willingness of the garrison's commander to surrender to the American forces. The surrender of the garrison was negotiated by Capt James S. Timothy, Capt Charles E. Freeman, and S/Sgt James P. Haun. Sixteen officers and 377 men were marched from the garrison to the PW enclosure. The battalion command post was established at Quartier Senarmont.

At 8:00 A.M., November 24, 1944, the battalion received orders to continue with its mission of cleaning out of the Neudorf section and to tie in with two combat teams of CCV. Proceeding on foot through the city, the battalion by-passed a large military hospital which upon investigation was found to contain approximately six hundred German soldiers besides a large medical staff. Company C conducted a search of the hospital area and found a large cache of small arms and ammunition. At the same time along the route of the battalion advance the battalion repatriated a group of American officers and men who had been prisoners of war. The 2 officers and 57 men were from the 79th, 100th, 44th, 36th, 80th, 26th, 3d, and 45th Infantry Divisions and had been captured in the XII and XV Corps areas in October and November.

As the leading elements of the battalion crossed over into Neudorf orders were received detaching the battalion from the French 2d Armored and attaching it to T Force, Strasbourg. The battalion reassumed at the Quartier Senarmont and fulfilled the varied assignments of the T Force commander.

At 7:00 A.M., November 30, 1944, the battalion was relieved of its assignment with T Force and rejoined the Regiment at Brumath. On November 26 the Regiment was ordered into reserve, being relieved by the 514th Infantry. This had no sooner been accomplished when tentative plans were received from Division for an attack in conjunction with the 100th and 45th Divisions.

On November 28 Colonel Wood reported for duty and took command of the Regiment, relieving Lt Col Van Bibber. He had been in the hospital in Paris and during his recuperation had been appalled by the number of casualties coming in which were caused by trench foot. Immediate plans were made to apply counter-measures, to include changing of socks and drying and massaging of feet. Habits instilled at this time stood the Regiment in good stead later in its mountain fighting when even under the most adverse of conditions our casualty rate from this cause was remarkably low.

The attack jumped off on November 29 with the Regiment still in reserve. Progress was slow and
November 30 found the front lines generally along the south edge of the woods south of Hagenau and Bischwiller. On the 30th the 1st Battalion was released to the Regiment and returned the same day.

As the 314th Infantry moved north and west of Gries the Division right flank was becoming dangerously exposed. Accordingly, the 2d Battalion was ordered to return to its old haunts in that vicinity, and upon reaching there found the Germans still in their positions and still industriously strengthening them. They seemed irritated at our return, and Gries was shelled much more than it had ever been before. This shelling caused few casualties, however, except among the civilians who failed to remain under cover.

Patrolling by the 2d Battalion was very active at this time, because it was felt that the Regiment would be ordered to attack very soon. Some of these patrols penetrated deep into the enemy positions and many a small fight resulted from these excursions. But information was received which had a very important bearing on events which were to follow.

On December 3 a German news broadcast was heard to announce that a large-scale American attack on Bischwiller had been repulsed with terrific losses to the Americans. This caused a good deal of mirth in the Regiment because the action referred to was one of Lt Colonel Gooding's (CO, 2d Battalion) methods of "needling" the Germans. It was just a sudden outpouring of artillery, mortar and small-arms fire at certain targets in the enemy positions in order to see what reaction would result. On this particular occasion the 3d Battalion which had moved in on the left of the 2d Battalion joined in. Losses to us were zero.

The next operation had as its objective the capture of the towns of Hagenau and Bischwiller. This was an ambitious undertaking because they were large towns and all reports indicated that they were well defended. The Regimental objective was Bischwiller and the plan for taking it was as follows:

The 2d Battalion was to jump off from its present positions and take the woods to its front, pass through them and assault Bischwiller from the southwest. The 3d Battalion was to leave its present positions near Weitbrück prior to the attack and go into an assembly area south of the 2d Battalion. At H minus 20 minutes it was to move our silently, sneak as near the town...
from the southeast side as possible without detection and then make the assault.

The timing of this operation was very interesting. There was a bridge in the route of the 3d Battalion which was out but patrols reported that it could be easily fixed. The plan was for the 3d Battalion to overrun this bridge at such time as the engineers could fix it well enough for the tanks to pass over, and get the job done in time for the tanks to start from their assembly area at the same time the 2d Battalion started its attack. The reason for this was secrecy. The Germans could hear the tanks start and as soon as they did that, the fat was in the fire, so to speak. So what was desired was to have all the following events occur at the same time: (1) The 3d Battalion assault Bischwiller under supporting artillery fire; (2) The tanks start from their assembly area and race to the support of the 3d Battalion over the repaired bridge; (3) The 2d Battalion assault the woods southwest of Bischwiller, also under artillery support.

Now in order to do this the 3d Battalion had to actually sneak through the German outpost line, which was necessarily very thin because of the wide open ground. Therefore, the move had to be made under cover of darkness, but it was necessary to begin the assault on the town in enough light to observe artillery fire. So the hour of attack was set at first light with the 3d Battalion moving out on its sneak at H minus 20 minutes.

The 3d Battalion executed this move in a masterly fashion. There was absolutely no light as is often the case just before dawn and the shadowy figures of the men made no sound. When the head of the column had almost reached the bridge a trigger-happy German must have suspected something because a high-velocity weapon rang out, and after that there was silence.

The engineers with the head of the column were heavily laden with material to fix the bridge which their patrol had previously reconnoitered. When they reached it they hurriedly laid it in position as the column passed by, so as to be ready to drive the first spike when the artillery opened up.

Precisely at H-hour the two battalions jumped off, and under cover of the crashing of the artillery the tanks started up and with cold motors moved as best they could for the bridge. The engineers worked frantically so as to be ready when the tanks came. The battle for the town was on.

Actually, the tanks had about a five-minute wait at the bridge but joined the 3d Battalion in time to throw their weight into the assault. The defenses on the edge of town crumpled under the combined shock of the tanks, infantry, and artillery, and the street fighting commenced. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion had secured a foothold in the woods and was moving steadily forward. The woods were too thick for tanks, so the infantry had the problem all to themselves.

To return to the 3d Battalion, in the town now and fighting toward the northern edge of it. There was a bridge there across a small river which had not been blown, according to civilian sources. In order to get the bridge intact Lt Colonel Porter, CO of the 3d Battalion, ordered the tanks carrying a platoon of infantrymen to rush forward and seize it. The bridge was already under our artillery fire to keep the Germans from blowing it up.

The tanks got there just in time. There was a huge aerial bomb lying on the bridge, all wired to explode, but apparently our artillery fire had cut the wire. A German soldier was trying to fix the wire when the Americans arrived and he fell, hit fifty times. The Americans rushed out on the bridge, dismantling the wiring and dragging the bomb off the bridge. Others rushed across and, in the face of heavy machine-gun and self-propelled-gun fire, started their assault on the town of Oberhoffen just across the river. The tanks rumbled over the bridge to join this new attack.

Meanwhile the town of Bischwiller was being heavily shelled by the Germans. Troops moving down the streets would hear the shells whistle and disappear into doorways, only to come out and continue the march after the explosions had died down. Here and there lay a man who failed to make it in time but the others passed on, unheeding. Such sights had long since become commonplace to them.

By this time the 2d Battalion had cleared the western part of town and were attacking in the river bend to the northwest, in order to eliminate the source of the self-propelled high-velocity fire which was being directed into the left flank of the attacking 3d Battalion and also on the newly won bridge. The 1st Battalion which had been held in reserve throughout the action was moved into the southern part of Bischwiller.

By 1:00 P.M. 134 prisoners, including two officers, had been taken and many enemy wounded and killed. Our casualties had been very light, a tribute to the planning and the execution of the operation.

The fighting in Oberhoffen resulted in the clearing of the enemy from that town by 2:00 P.M. on December 9. The 3d Battalion buttoned up in the town and
sent out patrols which located the enemy on the
heights just north of it. Oberhofen had been receiving
quite heavy concentration of artillery fire since its cap-
ture, to which was now added high-velocity fire from the
wooded area north of the town.

The route which now lay before the Regiment was a
single road along the eastern edge of the Hagenau
Forest. Part of this road was in the forest itself and
part ran out into the open and was exposed to observa-
tion from the east. There were two towns which lay
along this road before it emerged finally from the
northeast corner of the forest. The first of these was
Schirrheim, a village more than a mile in length, but
having only one main street. Two kilometers farther
along was Soufflenheim, more compact in nature but
having a stream through its center, over which there
was a bridge on the main road.

The facts above could be easily seen from the map,
but there were other questions the answers to which
were more obscure. The first and most obvious was,
"Where will the enemy make his next stand?" That
all depended upon the effect of the beating he had just
received and the presence of other enemy troops in the
area which were near enough to influence the situation.

By noon the 314th was battering its way into
Hagenau, the twin city to Bischwiller. Marienthal had
fallen to the 315th and it looked as if the enemy was
going to have no choice about retiring into the forest
of Hagenau all along the Division front.

Due to the fact that other divisions were making
progress to the west of the forest, it did not appear
probable that the 79th Division would have to face
another struggle such as it had experienced previously
in the Forêt de Parroy, but the important thing it
seemed would be to break the back of such German
defenses as did exist, so as to destroy the enemy troops
before they could retire into the Siegfried Line which
lay to the north.

Accordingly, a plan was drawn for a quick advance,
the initial objective of which was Seltz, a town just
outside the forest of Hagenau in the route of the 313th
Infantry. The Regiment was given this mission and
plans were drawn up for a task force to exploit the
breakthrough if it were achieved. The task force was
to play the role of an armored force and consisted of
the 2d Battalion, a company of tanks, a company of
TDS and a battalion of armored artillery borrowed for
that purpose.

The next move was to try for the breakthrough. At
2:00 P.M. on December 10 the 3d Battalion moved
up the heights north of Oberhofen. There was no re-
tion to this move at first, and at 4:40 P.M. they had
reached the southern edge of Schirrheim. Here they
received some high-velocity fire but were ordered to
take the town before dark. At 5:00 P.M. they jumped
off in the assault, attacking across the open ground
under cover of smoke. By 5:40 the first row of houses
had been reached in spite of increasing resistance. But
as night approached the Americans were not to be
denied the shelter of the village. At 6:30 the assault
elements were well established in Schirrheim with the
rear echelons closing in.

The next step was Soufflenheim. The 1st Battalion
was ordered to pass through the 3d and attack the
town, jumping off at 7:30 A.M. the next day.

The attack started as scheduled but met sufficient
resistance to stop its progress on the hill just south of
the town. German artillery then started coming in in
such quantities as to indicate that it was here the Ger-
mans had decided to defend.

Certainly it looked like the place for it. We had no
contact with friendly troops on our left, and the vast
stretches of woods on that flank suggested ominous
possibilities. There was also an open flank on the right
from which came high-velocity fire from time to time.
If a counterblow came from the left we were certainly
set up for it, like a boxer stopped by a left jab from
his opponent and wide open to the Sunday punch to
follow.

The only thing was to get forward, out of this forest
and into Seltz. "Seltz or else!" became the watchword,
and the 1st Battalion attacked with renewed energy.
At this juncture Colonel Wood experienced a relapse
into his old illness to such an extent that it became
necessary to evacuate him. Lt Colonel Van Bibber re-
assumed command on December 11.

The Regimental CP which had been in Bischwiller
moved into Schirrheim, thus cleaning the last of the
Regimental elements out of that area except for the
Service Company which remained in Kurtzenhausen.
The 3d Battalion which was still in Schirrheim was
ordered to block all approaches from the left flank and
to prepare to envelop the enemy's right flank in Souf-
flenheim with a force of not less than one rifle
company.

The fighting in Soufflenheim became more and
more confused. On one occasion Major McConnell, the
Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, went forward to
find his CO. He missed him as he moved up and before
he knew it his jeep was in the town inside enemy lines.
There was a German machine gun and crew moving around a building near the road, which Major McConnell and his driver promptly took prisoner and brought them in, five of them, piled on the hood of his jeep.

It was nearly 5:00 P.M. before the 1st Battalion had the town. Then it was found that the enemy had blown the bridge, but this had been foreseen and the engineers were on hand.

The 3d Battalion was ordered to move through the 1st Battalion and seize the heights north of Soufflenheim. They moved out at 5:30 P.M. and by 9:00 had a company across the river. They completed their crossing the next morning, December 12, and were ready for their move on Seltz.

The bridge, however, would not be in until afternoon. That meant that only the foot elements, carrying by hand all arms and ammunition, would be able to move but time was considered to be precious and the advance began. When the 3d Battalion cleared the crossing the 1st Battalion was ordered to follow immediately.

The Regimental CP moved to Soufflenheim and the 2d Battalion remained in that town, although it passed to Division control as part of the task force. Lt Colonel Gooding was designated as the task force commander and was given orders to be ready to move out on short notice.

At noon on December 12 the bridge at Soufflenheim was complete, and the vehicles of the Regiment were moving across with those of the 3d Battalion leading in order to catch up with its foot elements.

By 1:40 P.M. patrols of the fast-moving 3d Battalion were in the outskirts of Seltz. Then followed an episode which is difficult to explain in the light of the military skill which had always been displayed by the enemy heretofore. As the Americans cautiously approached the city they could see freshly dug entrenchments guarding its approaches. But directly behind the fortifications they could see German soldiers playing ball! Where were the Germans we had driven out of Soufflenheim? Why hadn’t they at least warned the garrison at Seltz? And why hadn’t the commander in Seltz posted his own security?

The 3d Battalion patrols did not stop to ponder these enigmas. They went to work immediately and in a very short time had machine guns trained upon the enemy. Then with all available weapons ready the lieutenant in command gave the order to fire and literally “broke up the ball game!”

There followed such a mad scramble in Seltz as to adequately indicate how great the surprise had been. But before the enemy could man his defenses the 3d Battalion was entering town, leaving the Germans no alternative but to abandon it.

That is, they abandoned that part of town south of the river—a good three-quarters of it. But they blew up the bridge and settled down to the business of defending the river line. It appeared that they had what might be considered an adequate force to accomplish this mission under the circumstances, because first of all the river was wide enough and deep enough to prevent all vehicular crossing and any personnel to cross would have to use boats.

The terrain lent itself to the defense. Except at the bridge site there were adequate fields of fire all along the low flat banks. Buildings on the north shore made admirable observation posts, and there was ample cover in the areas north of the city for artillery and self-propelled guns which made existence in the south part of town a very tenuous business.

Nevertheless the 3d Battalion moved into town and arrayed itself along the river bank, using buildings for shelter. The 1st Battalion moved into the south end of town and, after cleaning out remnants of the enemy which still remained, put out security to the east and buttoned up to await orders.

The Regimental CP moved into Forstfeld, a tiny village four or five kilometers southwest of Seltz.

In spite of the very considerable artillery fire in Seltz, reconnaissance was initiated in order to find a way across the river. The bridge site was hell itself due to point-blank artillery and machine-gun fire, but all agencies concerned went on with their reconnaissance nevertheless. At one time Lt Colonel Van Allen, Division Engineer, was pinned down by machine-gun fire at the river’s edge for thirty minutes. As a result of these excursions it was discovered that the Germans had done a very inexpert job of blowing the bridge. There were several large holes in it and it was further damaged somewhat, but it would most certainly bear foot troops and light vehicles and might possibly support tanks too.

It was estimated that the north part of the town was defended by three companies of enemy with attached self-propelled guns and tanks.

The remainder of daylight was spent in keeping the area beyond the bridge site under heavy TD, AT and machine-gun fire, while the rear areas were thoroughly pounded by the artillery. With the approach of dark patrols were organized and as soon as the night fell
they started to cross the river at different points. All met resistance of varying strength, and it was deemed advisable to cross at the bridge as the enemy seemed no stronger there than anywhere else.

Accordingly Company K made ready and suddenly, behind a wall of artillery fire, rushed the bridge. It was a magnificent effort performed with tremendous courage and aggressiveness, resulting in the successful start of a bridgehead. As soon as Company K had fought its way into the houses on the far shore Company L followed, but so great was the resistance, it was not until 3:00 P.M. the next day that the entire 3d Battalion was fighting its way toward the northern edge of the town. Frequently the Germans counterattacked with tanks, on one occasion getting almost as far as the bridge. The engineers had to stop work on the bridge on two occasions due to direct fire from the enemy tanks.

It was apparent that the Germans had no notion of giving up the town without a fanatical fight. The struggle reduced itself to the most grueling kind, that of taking one house at a time.

By 8:00 P.M. the bridge was complete and tanks started to cross to join in the fight. The battle had died down somewhat but the 3d Battalion sent out patrols to keep contact with the enemy. These patrols had an extremely difficult task in performing this mission at night, but the effectiveness of their efforts is shown by the report they sent in about midnight stating that there was definite evidence the enemy was pulling out.

The 3d Battalion was ordered to move forward and the 1st Battalion was ordered to follow them closely if they made any appreciable advance. By 7:00 A.M. the 3d Battalion was advancing again, out of close contact, and found the village of Neuweiller five kilometers to the north clear of the enemy. They were ordered to move on to Schaffhausen four kilometers beyond.

The 1st Battalion was ordered to move to Neuweiller which they reached at 5:30 P.M. The 3d Battalion buttoned up in Schaffhausen which they had found clear of enemy except for a couple of tanks which fired a few shots and departed.

The village of Schaffhausen sits behind a ridge, the other side of which slopes down to the Lauter River and the town of Lauterberg. The river is the German border, and beyond it lay the vaunted Siegfried Line. It might be well to pause here in our narrative and remark on the feelings the men of the Regiment had on this subject.

In the first place from the Normandy beaches on, particularly after a hard battle was won, the remark, "Wait until we hit the Siegfried Line," was often heard. There was no fear apparent in the tone—just respect and the consciousness of a trying task ahead. There was never any doubt expressed about our chances of success in this venture, for we had carried out all assigned tasks with success even greater than expected. But the wall was there and there was no doubt but what it would try our every resource.

However, in the past month as we drew nearer the obstacle rumors began to go the rounds. One was that the pillboxes were full of water and, therefore, could not be manned. Another was that the troops confronting us now were the only forces available to the enemy with which to defend the line, and these were becoming so badly depleted by battle attrition that their effectiveness was questionable. One often heard the remark, "The more we kill here the fewer will try to stop us at the Siegfried Line."

Well, here we were at the Line itself and the time for the test was at hand. There was plenty of confidence among the men that was not based on rumors, but rather on the faith and confidence in the fighting ability which each man felt and on that of the man next to them.

The next Regimental objective was Lauterberg,
with special accent on the bridge over the river. The town, a very ancient one, lies almost entirely on the south, or French, side of the river with the village of Neu Lauterberg situated about a kilometer beyond the north bank. To the east of Neu Lauterberg is the village of Berg, about a kilometer away. Just beyond these two villages is the southern edge of the forest which hid the Siegfried Line in this area. The main highway running from Hagena to Bischwiller had been the axis of the Regimental advance, and now crossed the river at Lauterberg, passing between Neu Lauterberg and Berg, on into the forest beyond and finally to Karlsruhe some thirty kilometers to the north. A look at the map will show our objective in the extreme northwest corner of Alsace where the German border breaks westward away from the Rhine. To the soldier another thought immediately arises: That capture of this objective would expose the victor to enemy artillery fire from three sides.

The plan for the attack followed the principle which had formed the basis for the taking of Bischwiller. The 1st Battalion was to pass through the 3d Battalion at Neiweiller, move down the road toward the objective, and attack it from the west side in two columns. The right column was to enter town while the other was to go for the bridge which we hoped to save. The 2d Battalion was to move across country and attack the town from the southeast, making junction with the 3d Battalion at the church in the center of the town. Utmost secrecy was to be preserved, the tanks and artillery not starting until the assault commenced just at first light. This time all the tanks were to support the 1st Battalion.

The 2d Battalion, having the longest route, moved out at 2:45 A.M. December 16. It was nearly 1:00 P.M. before the 1st Battalion got near enough to the bridge to discover it had been blown, dashing our hopes for a quick crossing.

We had the town, however, by 3:30. Immediate reconnaissance showed that the enemy was digging in around Neu Lauterberg and Berg, and their tanks were in evidence. Accordingly, plans were made to cross the river to the west of town, at a point where the open ground between the stream and the woods was narrowest. The crossing was to be made on engineer foot bridges, two of which were to be installed. The order of march was: 1st Battalion in the lead, 2d next, while the 3d Battalion was to move into Lauterberg. The crossing battalions were ordered to move eastward as soon as they entered the woods. The 1st Battalion was given the mission of capturing Berg, securing it, and seizing the culvert over an antitank ditch two kilometers to the north. Patrols were ordered sent beyond the culvert to contact the enemy. The 2d Battalion was directed to take Neu Lauterberg and clear the enemy from the area between that village and Lauterberg itself.

The enemy by this time were shelling Lauterberg industriously with both artillery and tank fire. The bridge site seemed to have a high priority in their fire plan, because that area became so hot as to make reconnaissance by the engineers very difficult. The bridging operation which followed was also seriously hampered by this fire.

Colonel Wood suffered another relapse at this time and was again evacuated, this time never to return to the Regiment. Lt Colonel Van Bibber assumed command.

The crossing operation commenced at 9:00 A.M. December 16. It was completed without incident or resistance and Neu Lauterberg and Berg were taken with only a minor skirmish. Obviously the enemy had retired into his concrete fortifications.

On the 17th the Regimental CP moved into Lauterberg. Plans were made to push the 3d Battalion through the 1st Battalion and advance to the north, an operation which was intended to be a reconnaissance in force because the enemy situation was so vague. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion was to patrol actively to its front so as to protect the 3d Battalion's left flank.

The operation started at 8:30 in the morning, the 3d Battalion running into hot resistance almost immediately after passing through the lines of the 1st Battalion. They reported five enemy tanks to their front, as well as pillboxes. The TDs were moved up to support the attack which was slowing down. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion was ordered to attack on the left of the 3d Battalion.
By this time the 3rd Battalion had reached the antitank ditch which was well covered with artillery and machine-gun fire. It was approximately twenty feet wide and ten to fifteen feet deep in places, adequately stopping any tracked vehicle. Beyond it, between it and the pillboxes, was a band of barbed wire twenty to thirty feet deep, completing an obstacle the like of which the Regiment had not encountered since Cherbourg.

The 2nd Battalion also reached the antitank ditch at about 4:30 that afternoon. Here they met the same fanatical defense, and when the 314th Infantry pulled up on the left of them and was also stopped it was realized that this was it! We had encountered the Siegfried Line!

The Germans did not have any antitank guns, apparently trusting in their ditch to provide all the protection against our tanks that was needed. Accordingly, a tankdozer was sent up and went leisurely to work, filling crossings in the ditch while the enemy looked on helplessly. It made two crossings in the 2nd Battalion sector and then the 2nd Battalion attacked again. Here followed the most severe fighting in the history of the Regiment.

As Company G crossed the ditch into the wire the Germans sent down a terrific artillery and mortar barrage. Their losses were extremely heavy, but the losses of Company F on their flank were almost as many. The wire held the attack in the beaten zone, and although it was blown with bangalore torpedoes and mashed down by TDs and tanks, only a few men reached the pillboxes beyond. There were Lieutenant Landon and the heroic remnant of his Company G which by now consisted of only twenty-three men. But they entered the hand-to-hand combat with the enemy with typical enthusiasm. "Grenades fell around like rain," said Lieutenant Landon, in telling about it afterward.

Enemy artillery barrages continued to roll in, two to three hundred rounds at a time. No one had ever heard enemy artillery come in like that—and it came in from the north, northeast and east. Some even came from the southeast, from the east bank of the Rhine.

The attack had definitely bogged down in spite of the heroism of Task Force Landon. Company F was moved up to cover Company G's withdrawal and the 2nd Battalion moved back to its starting point south of the ditch.

The next plan to be put into action was to have the 1st Battalion attack northeast through the gap between the 2nd Battalion and the 3d, to cut off the enemy in
front of the 3d Battalion and allow the 3d Battalion to advance. A Churchill tank especially fitted to carry a bridge was to move up in the 3d Battalion sector, bridge the ditch, and allow the 3d Battalion tanks and TDs across. This move was intended as a surprise, and it was hoped that we would catch the enemy weak on that flank.

The 1st Battalion jumped off at 2:40 P.M. December 19 but by the time they reached the ditch it was dark, so they were ordered to button up for the night. On the morning of the 20th the attack was resumed, and was met with the same terrific artillery fire that had stopped the 2d Battalion. Company C was temporarily disorganized and the attack bogged down. Meanwhile all efforts of the 314th Infantry to get forward failed as well as those of the 315th.

It thus became evident that the enemy defenses were not going to be breached by ordinary means. A special operation was required, and it was up to higher headquarters to decide whether the over-all strategic plan justified this effort at this time and place. While these matters were being decided the 79th Division contented itself with merely defending the ground it had already won.

While in the middle of December the Regiment was fighting its way northward to the German border in Alsace, the enemy opened his counteroffensive in the Ardennes. This fact coupled with the fact that the Siegfried was obviously being held in force brought of the enemy. The rear installations moved first and which had said, "You are entering Germany by courtesy of the 79th Infantry Division." Regrettably we blew up the new bridge at Lauterberg and started the general retrograde movement which was to last until February, and was to yield back to the enemy so much of Alsace which we had taken at the cost of so much blood and effort.

The new position was almost devoid of cover, but afforded beautiful fields of fire. The defense was devised on a framework of interlocking bands of caliber .50 and caliber .30 machine-gun fire. Foxholes were dug and later enlarged into trenches and dugouts complete with communication trenches. Barbed wire was strung in front of the position and mines were laid in great plenty, because the terrain afforded excellent going for tanks. TDs were dug in with the aid of bulldozers at strategic points covering tank approaches. It was the nearest thing to World War I tactics which we had as yet encountered.

The Regimental CP moved to Oberseebach, an extremely picturesque village about three kilometers behind the front lines. It had snowed during the move, completing an ideal setting for Christmas, the anticipation of which was heightened by the belief that the sector would be inactive enough to enjoy the season. Initially the front lines were given to the 1st and 3d Battalions with the 3d Battalion on the right and the 2d Battalion in Oberseebach in reserve. But plans were made to rotate the troops within the battalions so as to afford each man a chance to get in under cover and to enjoy his Christmas dinner. Christmas was spent quietly enough. The Germans apparently wanted to enjoy the season also, because we did not hear from them in any way that entire day.

Some cognac was issued to the men and they had their turkey and some rest, but that did not mean that our vigilance was relaxed in any way. Patrolling was continued across the river from our outpost line which ran generally along the south bank. An occasional report of contact with enemy patrols was received, but there was no general move by the enemy to re-occupy the lost ground at this time.

Booby traps were strung along the front lines by both sides; and each side booby-trapped the other's booby traps until the situation became so complicated that neither had any desire to cross into the other's territory. The Germans seemed content to hold Germany and the Americans showed every inclination to let them do it.

Thus the remainder of the year was spent in watchful waiting. There were plans to be made for counter-
attack and for withdrawal so much reconnaissance was necessary. Also the defenses were being continually improved, so everyone was kept moderately busy. In addition the Maginot Line in rear of the Regimental sector was prepared for occupancy by one battalion. The work was done mainly by the engineers but TDs had to be dug in and plans for minefields made, as well as coordination effected with units on right and left. Aside from an occasional artillery shell the enemy did not interfere with these operations.

However, the respite which was so conveniently timed with the Yule season was not to continue beyond it. The Germans were not satisfied with their initial successes in the Ardennes, but delivered a blow in the Bitche salient in the Vosges Mountains some thirty kilometers to the west of Oberseebach. This blow was well timed, falling on an armored task force on New Year's Eve. This task force was spread thinly in a large sector and the German attack caught it by surprise. Then, breaking through, the enemy captured tanks, jeeps and halftracks, throwing the defenders into confusion.

Troops were needed and needed badly to prevent the enemy from exploiting his success. On New Year's Day therefore the Regiment was ordered relieved by elements of the 314th Infantry. It was to send the 1st Battalion to Riepertswiller to report to the 45th Infantry Division with the vague directive to attack to the north. Almost immediately after the 1st Battalion took its departure the remainder of the Regiment less the 3d Battalion was ordered to follow, which it did, catching up with the 1st Battalion as it entered Rischhoffer. The Regimental CP was set up in that town.

At 2000 the night of January 1 the patrols of the 1st Battalion started north and by midnight the rest of the battalion followed. They closed into Riepertswiller before daylight after having met only an enemy patrol or two. The 2d Battalion was moved into a flat area south and east of Riepertswiller in Regimental reserve. The Regimental CP moved into Rottbach.

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It is appropriate here to describe the countryside of this new area of operations so that the reader can properly appreciate the obstacles and difficulties encountered by the Regiment. The situation was entirely different from that down in the Alsatian plain in every possible respect.

The Vosges Mountains run generally northeast and southwest and cut Alsace off from the rest of France. They generally consist of five or six heavily wooded ridges with very steep sides and generously strewn with rocky cliffs and gorges. Some of these gorges are wide enough to furnish passage through which roads have been built, and they are two to five kilometers apart, and run in a northwest-southeast direction.

Riepertswiller is a village in a narrow valley between two ridges. A stream runs through this valley and the road from Rottbach crosses the stream two kilometers east of the village, proceeding to the village and then north through the mountains into German territory.

A kilometer southeast of Riepertswiller finds the ground rising sharply to a ridge surmounted by the village of Picardie, which in turn is dominated by the hill and ancient castle of Lichtenberg. This castle furnishes observation over the entire area for miles around, being a walled and turreted affair and having a high tower or keep within its confines. From a military standpoint this castle was in excellent repair and admirably suited for the purpose for which it was built, i.e., protection and observation, as will be seen later. As a matter of fact the military knowledge and foresight displayed by the forgotten architect proved to be a most fortunate circumstance.

The ground in these mountains was frozen solid and covered with snow. This made the digging of foxholes and other fortifications a very difficult business and the snow almost nullified the cover afforded by the wood from observation from above, providing as it did a white background against which dark objects could be easily seen.

Except in the villages and in the castle there were no buildings to be used as protection either from the elements or from shell fire. This circumstance contributed more to the hardships of the campaign than any other.
The Regiment less the 3d Battalion having been formally attached to the 45th Division was ordered to attack to the north and seize the mountain passes within the Regimental sector at their northern exits. The line of departure given was about five kilometers north of Riepertswiller. The Regimental sector was about twelve kilometers wide at Riepertswiller, narrowing to about five kilometers at the objective. There were no friendly troops on either flank but the 180th Infantry (45th Division) was echeloned to the left rear about two thousand yards.

The situation opens on the morning of January 3 with the 1st Battalion in possession of the rising ground just north of Riepertswiller and across the stream and might be termed a "bridgehead." They had been in contact with enemy patrols since their arrival. The 2d Battalion which had a combat strength of 127 men was just to the rear and out of contact. Company G, or Task Force Landon, had eighteen men.

The 2d Battalion was ordered to pass through the 1st Battalion and proceed up the road to the north of Riepertswiller, seizing the first heights. After it had moved about a kilometer it was attacked in strength and only by the greatest exercise of skill and coolness was it able to extricate itself before it was cut off and destroyed. It fell back to positions just north of those occupied by the 1st Battalion.

This show of strength on the part of the enemy gave rise to concern about the safety of our flanks. About a kilometer to the west of Riepertswiller was the village of Wildenguth, which from a small height dominated the crossroads on the road running into Riepertswiller. Although this village was technically just inside the sector of the 180th Infantry it was considered expedient to seize it for our own protection.

Accordingly, the 180th was notified and Company C was sent to take the village. When it got there it found that the place was full of Germans and was being enthusiastically defended. Company C attacked but Company A was sent in on the left end to flank out the position to make sure of the capture. This maneuver was successful and the town fell into our hands. However, about noon the enemy counter-attacked and cut the road between Riepertswiller and Wildenguth at a small group of houses called Saegbuhl. This move and their subsequent occupation of the high ground south of Saegbuhl and south of the stream successfully cut Companies A and C off from the rest of the Regiment. When the Germans dug in the next morning, January 4, the 1st Battalion, 314th, attacked to take the hill north of Saegbuhl. This attack was successful in that it secured the town and netted nearly a hundred prisoners including a battalion commander.

On January 5 the enemy began to infiltrate around our right flank, crossing the Rottbach road and moving to the wooded area south of Picardie. The fact was known only because an occasional one was seen by the supply and wire personnel who used the road. Now this road was the main supply road of the Regiment, and if it were cut the troops would not be supplied.

Meanwhile reinforcements arrived in the form of the 1st Battalion of the 314th Infantry. They were received with gratitude and sent immediately into the fray in order to remove this new enemy incursion. They moved under cover to a position south of the ridge overlooking Saegbuhl and then by attacking north struck the German rear, driving them down across the road and stream and into the town of Saegbuhl. By 5:00 p.m. on January 3 they were fighting in the edge of Saegbuhl. The enemy counter-attacked, striking to the east of the 314th and running into Company B of the 1st Battalion, 313th, which held successfully, taking some prisoners.

Meanwhile the Germans to the front were keeping
up continuous piecemeal attacks. The Regimental OP in Picardie could see many of these against the snow background. They were directed at various points along the line, and were repelled in one or two instances by our troops calling down artillery fire on their own positions. Some enemy managed to reach the rear areas of the battalions, so as to force the mortar crews to defend themselves against small-arms fire. Finally the Germans were dominating the main supply road between Riepertswiller and Rottbach by fire, shutting off communications.

On January 6 Captain Timmons, CO of the Cannon Company, reported seeing Germans in Picardie. His positions were just west of the town and he immediately took steps to defend them, using his cannoners as riflemen. At the same time the 180th Infantry had come up to Wildenguth and relieved the beleaguered Companies A and C there. As they moved toward Riepertswiller they were ordered to Picardie to clear the village of Germans. Captain Hylton, CO, 1st Battalion, directed the hastily ordered attack. The Regimental OP which had moved into the Lichtenberg Castle had a 50-yard-line seat for the battle.

These Germans had crossed the main supply road, cutting it and driving the I&R Platoon to the rear. The entire Regiment was now cut off from the CP and from the rear. This was a battle behind our lines and it was imperative to win it if we were to continue to eat and shoot.

The battle was joined quickly. One company went straight in supported by two tanks. The other cut between the town and the castle and took the enemy in flank. The fighting raged until dark, at which time the enemy found himself surrounded and overwhelmed. When he surrendered we found we had taken 4 officers and 129 men—all that remained of an entire German battalion!

Now it seemed necessary to take the high ground to the Regimental front, principally to remove enemy observation and fire from our forward areas. The 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 314th, were ordered to seize the heights to their front. This attack jumped off at 10:00 A.M. January 7, and as the day wore on progress was reported as slow but steady. By nightfall they had not gained their objectives, however, and were ordered to continue the following morning. Meanwhile enemy groups continued to infiltrate around the right flank and into our rear. The main supply route was still cut and the enemy had mined part of it, making it necessary to use the other road, now cleared of obstacles, to supply the Regiment.

During the night of January 7 the Regimental OP group again moved into the castle. During this move one of the I&R jeeps missed the roadway which went through the postern gate and as a result fell into the 30-foot moat. Due perhaps to the great amount of snow no one was hurt, but in addition to that the builder of the castle had evidently foreseen such a mishap, and had obligingly constructed a ramp just wide enough for a jeep to climb straight out of the moat.

On the morning of the 8th the two 1st Battalions continued their attack, the 314th's Battalion moving into their objective. The 1st Battalion, 313th, however, was moving up an almost vertical cliff and the enemy was well dug in at the summit. They had a natural fort of rocky ledges which they had strengthened with log fortifications. The battle for this height continued all day.

On the morning of January 9 the 1st Battalion of the 313th continued its assault on the German positions. By 8:00 A.M. they were within grenade range of their objective and by 2:00 P.M. they had taken the hill. This achievement was the result of the most tenacious kind of fighting over a long period of time, and under the most severe of weather conditions. The men who fought this battle, as obscure as it was in the Big Picture, have every right to be proud of their heroism.

At this juncture the 2d Battalion, which was considered the Regimental reserve although it was actually in the line, was ordered to move forward to occupy the heights to its front.

This move was considered to be an aid to friendly troops reported to be moving up on the right flank of the Regiment. Resistance was light and the 2d Battalion reached its objective on schedule.

The friendly troops on the right, the 276th Infantry (70th Division) attacked on the morning of the 10th as did the 180th Infantry on our left. Both regiments were still far to the rear, and not even close enough to prevent the continual infiltration of small enemy groups around both flanks.

On January 11 the enemy counterattacked, striking the right flank of the 180th Infantry, which at this point was nearly on a line with the 1st Battalion of the 314th. The 180th fell back leaving our left flank wide open and the enemy seized his advantage. He infiltrated around to our rear, forcing us to give up the hard-won heights. Back to the river line and Saegbuhl was the first withdrawal and then the enemy, working in the gap between ourselves and the 180th Infantry,
struck the Cannon Company of the 313th. Fortunately, as has been said, the cannoneers were ready and had dug in as infantrymen. So when the enemy reached this position he was stopped, and stopped cold. The saga of this battle will long ring in the ears of the 313th's cannoneers. They carried the day on that occasion and may well be proud of it.

On the night of the 11th the 2d Battalion of the 157th Infantry (45th Division) arrived with the mission of restoring the position of the 1st Battalion, 314th. They were ordered to attack without delay, a most difficult assignment since it was night and they were complete strangers to the country. There had not even been given an opportunity for reconnaissance, and any preparations that they made could only be hasty and makeshift. However, they jumped off without hesitation and achieved what must be regarded as a near-miracle. They gained their objective by 1:00 o'clock the next morning.

At noon January 12 the enemy counterattacked, striking the front of the 2d Battalion, 157th, right in the middle. This was a strong attempt and it was repelled only after a desperate struggle. It was dark that night before all was quiet again, and during the night the 1st Battalion of the 314th was sent up to reoccupy its old positions and to relieve the 2d Battalion of the 157th Infantry. This was completed by dawn, and the 1st Battalion of the 314th was detached from the 313th Infantry and attached to the 180th Infantry who had regained their positions on the left flank.

On the 13th of January the Regiment was relieved by the 276th Infantry and detached from the 45th Division. By midnight it was assembled behind the ridge south of Picardie and on the morning of the 14th entrucked and moved back to the Alsatian Plain to rejoin the 79th Division.

Let us review the achievements of the Regiment in this last and one of its most difficult campaigns. In the first place, the Regiment was badly depleted as a result of its assault in the Siegfried Line in December. It was minus its numerically strongest battalion, and entered the Riepertswiller area with the 2d Battalion having a fighting strength of 127 men, and the 1st Battalion only 405. The weather conditions were most severe, taxing the personal tenacity of every man.

Furthermore, the Regiment was called upon to meet and stop a victorious enemy, who had pushed everything before him in an effort to clean the mountain passes for the panzer divisions to enter the Alsatian Plain. Had the Regiment failed in its mission, the enemy's armored columns would have gone to Haguenau and to Strasbourg, effectively cutting off the bulk of the Seventh Army.

The initial move of the Regiment was blind. No one who had been in the area could say just where the enemy might be encountered and in what strength, as witness the fact that we were given a line of departure in the initial attack which we have never seen—not even yet!

Furthermore, because the enemy was encountered sooner than expected, the sector assigned to its depleted ranks was nearly twelve kilometers. But the high-hearted courage of the 313th could not be dimmed by even these handicaps. As one of its battalion commanders said, "It doesn't matter so much how many we are as who we are!"
Chapter 20: Retreat Toward Victory

WHEN THE REGIMENT returned to the 79th Division it found the 3d Battalion occupying that part of the Maginot Line which had been prepared for it previous to the departure of the Regiment for the Riepertswiller area. In fact the Maginot Line in the Division sector was being defended by Task Force Wahl which included elements of the 79th and 42d Infantry and 14th Armored Divisions, and had its CP at Surburg.

The 21st Panzer Division had made repeated attempts to penetrate the position of our 3d Battalion, each attack ending in disaster for the enemy. This masterly defense of the sector is a tribute to the skillful planning and farsightedness of the battalion commander, Lt Colonel Porter, and to the untiring vigilance and aggressiveness of his men. The battalion received the Distinguished Unit Citation for this action.

Perceiving, apparently, that no penetration of the 3d Battalion sector was possible, the enemy shifted his efforts farther south. After a terrific struggle he succeeded in capturing the towns of Hatten and Rittershoffen, making a salient in the American line about a kilometer wide and two kilometers deep. To say that the enemy captured these towns is not exactly accurate, because at the time of the Regiment’s return from the Vosges there were a few Americans in both towns who in the face of overwhelming odds were putting up as fanatical a defense as is credited to any unit in the annals of this war.

This salient, however, exposed the right flank of the 3d Battalion, causing the battalion reserve to be placed along the north side of the salient. While the reserve cannot be said to have been committed, being out of contact with the enemy due to the open terrain, it was definitely being used to man the line. Therefore the newly arrived 2d Battalion was placed in a position at Niederbetschdorf where it could be used to bolster the defense. The 1st Battalion and other units of the Regiment were assembled in and near Hermerswiller, which village also sheltered the Regimental CP.

The period that immediately followed can best be described by the term “watchful waiting.”

Everyone was anxiously awaiting the outcome of the struggle in the arena that was the area around Hatten and Rittershoffen. These towns were in the middle of an open plain, so no reinforcements or supplies could be sent in by either side except at night. Therefore, of course, both sides made the roads in the area a perfect hell with artillery during hours of darkness, forcing the traffic to use the open fields. The ground was frozen and had a light covering of snow, so each morning it was easy to perceive what routes had been taken by supply vehicles and tanks during the night before.

Now and then the German vehicles would wander into the range of the 3d Battalion’s guns and would be destroyed. In fact the hulks of these vehicles became so numerous as to form what the men of the 3d Battalion called their “Kraut motor pool.”

The battles in Hatten and Rittershoffen continued with unabated fury. The situation was peculiar in that neither side could send any appreciable number of reinforcements to influence the outcome because there simply wasn’t enough room in the villages for them; and to move into the open country near them would have been sheer suicide. Reports came in that indicate the nature of the fighting. One of them read, “We now control the entire side of [a certain] street,” or, “We lost two houses yesterday.”

Meanwhile the enemy, jumping off from Gambsheim (see end of Chapter 18) attacked Soufflenheim. Elements of the 14th Armored Division contained this attack, but were unable to drive the enemy out of the salient they had made. This second breach of the Maginot Line rendered our position, thinly held as it was, more precarious than ever. At one time, the 1st Battalion was sent to this vicinity to aid in defending the area against this new threat. The need to commit them did not arise, however.

Finally, on January 20, the decision was made by higher headquarters to withdraw farther so as to shorten the lines, and make more economical use of the troops available. The plan was, to abandon the whole Hagenauf Forest to the enemy, and to fall back on the Hagenauf–Bischwiller line, taking advantage of the barrier offered by the river.

The route of withdrawal for the Regiment was the main road through the center of the forest, through Surburg. There were three bridges on this road, which were to be blown after all elements had crossed them. This task was given reconnaissance elements of the 14th Armored Division, who were to screen the withdrawal. The 1st Battalion, still in position near Soufflenheim, were to move independently on foot, and were designated as the Regimental reserve in the new area.

As soon as orders were received on the 20th the Regiment began its move. The first elements to start were such special units as could be infiltrated into the already growing mass of traffic to the rear. The last
units, of course, were the infantry troops in contact. Although the roads were slippery with snow, and jammed with traffic of all kinds, the move continued without incident. The tanks and TDS were moved in daylight for safety purposes, as were the heavier trucks. Actually, when the front-line troops began to move early in the morning, there were no vehicles left except the trucks which were to carry them, and some anti-tank guns and control jeeps.

The 3d Battalion with C Company attached moved into Hagenau and began immediately to construct their already reconnoitered positions. The 2d Battalion occupied the left half of the Regimental sector, or the open ground just west of the town. The 1st Battalion went into buildings in the southern part of Hagenau. The Cannon Company had its gun positions just south of the town, and the Regimental CP occupied a tiny village named Harthausen, about three kilometers south of Hagenau.

The 314th Infantry was on the right of our Regiment, and occupied Kaltenhaus and Bischwiller, while elements of the 42d Division tied into the left flank of the 2d Battalion at a town named Schwieghausen.

The enemy was slow in following. Perhaps our move was a surprise to him, although it is difficult to understand how we could have evacuated Hatten and Rittershoffen without being detected. That they were slow is obvious, because American stragglers were still coming to our lines and asking entrance as late as January 22. They reported having seen no enemy, although they had stayed on the roads.

However, on the afternoon of the 22d, the enemy finally arrived. By this time, the 3d Battalion in their characteristic fashion, had strewn all approaches to their front with plenty of mines and booby traps, so the enemy contented himself with merely coming to the river bank, and occupying the houses there. The houses were in some cases only fifty yards away from those occupied by the 3d Battalion!

From then on there was conducted with Hagenau what might be called a snipers’ war. All troops on both sides sniped with all weapons. Every effort was made to lure the other side into an exposed position and then let him have it. On one occasion an enemy tank suddenly lumbered out from behind a building and knocked out two TDS. Visiting officers borrowed rifles and lurked at windows waiting for a chance to kill a German. Some of the more ingenious of the men invented devices designed to hurl phosphorus and fragmentation grenades into the buildings occupied by the enemy.

They named these weapons “V-16” and “V-17,” and they were made out of such things as old tire tubes, door springs and springs out of an old automobile.

The 2d Battalion, being generally along the north edge of a wood, and facing flat open country, were forced to dig in. But the ground was frozen and dry, so after they had put in enough time and effort on their shelters, their lot was not so bad, particularly in view of the announced plan to rotate all battalions at appropriate intervals.

There were still plenty of civilians in Hagenau, who remained in spite of the increasing German artillery that was coming into town.

When they were told that no further withdrawal was contemplated they lost much of their fear and became very friendly; so friendly in fact that some members of the Regiment continued to visit Hagenau long after we had left the area—in fact long after the war was over! When we did leave, we moved into a long deserved rest area in France, but still there were individuals who returned to Hagenau to visit friends, although it was still on the front lines!

Many have been the amusing tales told about our defense of the “Hagenau Line.” There was one story of a patrol from the 2d Battalion which moved through their own outposts, through those of the enemy, then back through the enemy’s and through those of the 3d Battalion—just to steal some of the 3d Battalion’s cognac! The return trip, according to certain authority, was made over the same route without incident, although the patrol was loaded down with eighty bottles of liquor!

There were only two serious actions while we were in this area. The first one consisted of an attack by the Germans on the town of Schwieghausen. This town was in the zone of the 222d Infantry (42d Division) and was just west of our left boundary. It was a night attack, starting about 9:30 P.M., January 24, and was made by German paratroopers, at least initially. When the attack started the I&R Platoon was moved to our left flank, and the 1st Battalion (then in reserve) was alerted to move in case it became necessary.

The Germans broke through just west of the town, and cut off F Company, 222d Infantry. Our 2d Battalion immediately took this unit under its wing and organized it to protect our left flank. The enemy pushed on south into the woods, and before daylight had disorganized the American units in the sector. Division dispatched a battalion of the 314th to the critical sector, which, with the help of a battalion of
armored infantry of the 14th Armored Division, plus one of its tank battalions, began methodically to restore the position.

It was a long-drawn-out, difficult affair, due to the fact that different units were sent in under different orders to attack in thick woods. But it was handled admirably. Lieutenant Swope, from his ring-side seat with the I&R Platoon, kept sending in reports of the battle and at 6:40 P.M., January 25, was able to state that the position had been restored.

The other incident was a build-up, one might say, being the result of a desire for prisoners. Higher headquarters had expressed some curiosity as to the identity of the enemy troops to our front and directed that we get some prisoners. The 2d Battalion was designated for this task, and sent out a platoon that night, supported by a box barrage of artillery fire. Although they got into a lively scrap with the enemy, no prisoners were forthcoming, so it was decided to try again.

The next night Lt Colonel Gooding sent an entire company on this mission. The only difference in the results attained was the increased size of the fight that ensued. Meanwhile Division was needling more and more for prisoners, so it was decided to do the thing on a grand scale.

The 2d Battalion was relieved by the 1st, and moved back into the reserve area. Company C was released to the 1st from attachment to the 3d Battalion, so there would be sufficient troops to defend the area. The plan was to have the 2d Battalion attack through the 1st Battalion in two columns. The right column, one company in strength, was to proceed along the route taken by the other two raids, and act as a diversion.

Meanwhile, the other two companies were to hook around from the left and try to get into the rear of the enemy. It was felt that the Germans would shift to meet the first attack and leave themselves weak on the left.

The preparations for this raid were extensive. Footbridges were built by the engineers and were to be carried to the river by them and put in place immediately before the attack. The artillery plan was designed to heighten the illusion of a small raid by initially boxing in the attack of the right column as had been done before and then shifting to the support of the left column as directed.

The artillery started at 8:55 P.M., February 1. At 9:00 the troops of the right column (G Company) moved out and at 9:15, after the right column had drawn fire, the remainder of the attack commenced.

Colonel Van Bibber decorates S/Sgt Arthur Dill with the Silver Star at Cadier-en-Keer, Holland

The left column was on its objective with only light resistance by 10:00 P.M. but due to the darkness and to the strangeness of the territory much confusion ensued. On one occasion, two elements were firing on a house from opposite sides. The house was on fire, and the Germans in it wanted to surrender, but the Americans thought that the bullets coming their way were German bullets, so the surrender was not accepted. The result was that many valuable prisoners burned up with the house.

At 11:30 the 2d Battalion started back with only four prisoners. One of these died before he could be gotten to medical aid, but one of the others was an officer. So in the end, valuable information was received, and the 2d Battalion moved back into reserve for a well earned rest.

On January 25, the first indications came that we were about to be relieved. The first of these was a request from Division on how many trucks would be needed by the Regiment for a long move by truck. Needless to say, nothing could have suited us better. We had been steadily in combat since June, except for
the short rest in Rosieres, and were tired. Our strength was way down, because we had received very few replacements, and we had done some very hard and difficult fighting under the worst of winter conditions.

However, it was not until February 5 that actual orders for the relief came out. We were to be relieved by the 506th Parachute Infantry and were to move to Pont-à-Mousson, in France, for a rest. Just what this means to an infantryman, only an infantryman can realize. We were to move far away from the sound of guns, and were to spend days and nights in perfect assurance that no artillery would fall on us—there would be no patrols into enemy territory and—for a short period at least—no foxholes!

We could take baths and get clean clothes on. There would be a chance to clean up our vehicles and get them into shape. And last but surely not least, we might get some replacements to help us fight the next campaign, whenever it might be.

The move took place on February 6, and we moved into and around Pagny, a little village, north of Pont-à-Mousson, closing in at 6:20 P.M. This movement ended the Regiment's eighty-fifth day of continuous combat during the second combat period which had begun on November 12. The Regiment now had a total of 213 combat days to its credit.

For two days we rested. Every man did exactly as he chose, the idea being that personal adjustment is the best foundation in the preparation for further tasks. Then, as replacements began to arrive, training started. But it was not the arduous type like that prescribed for Rosieres, but merely to re-form the team with the new men. There was some close-order drill, squad problems, and firing of crew-served weapons—all with the team work idea in mind. There were ceremonies to present awards, too. But there were also beer parties, movies, and other entertainments. No stone was left unturned to make these new men realize that they were in truth members of the fighting 313th Infantry and had an obligation to be just as jealous of its honors and reputation as any veteran who bragged to them of its past accomplishments.
ON FEBRUARY 17 we were ready to go again—and go we did. The move was most secret, no intimation being given of our mission, or for that matter, of our assignment. There was a rumor abroad that we were to be in the Ninth Army, but that conveyed very little to the men of the 313th Infantry. Mainly, the reaction was: "Well now—that makes all of them." It seemed that whenever an army had a job to do it wangled the services of the 79th Division—knowing that the surest way of being certain that the job would be done properly was to get hold of General Wyche's lads and give them the ball. So, shrugging our shoulders with conscious pride, off we went, and wound up for the nonce, in Wimmertingen, a little village in Belgium, closing in at 12:42 A.M., February 18.

Here, we started drawing ammunition and supplies for the coming campaign. Rockets, grenades, and ammunition we had expended training in France came in and was distributed. This lasted for two days, and then the move continued, this time to a village called Cadier-en-Keer just east of Maastricht, in Holland, closing in at 8:00 P.M., February 22. The German border was just close by, but American troops were on the Roer River, and preparing to cross. So we knew that there would be a task for us in the not too distant future.

Training was stepped up in tempo. A tank battalion arrived, and problems were arranged with it, both to train our own new men, and to acquaint the tankers with our methods of fighting. Also, ranges were set up, and training in the use of individual weapons was continued. There were more ceremonies for the presentation of awards, during which the troops marched splendidly, indicating that during their long months of combat they had lost nothing of one of the basic qualities of a soldier—the instinct for precision on parade.

Here might be recorded the incidental intelligence that during this period, on February 26, orders were received that Lt Colonel Van Bibber was promoted to Colonel as of February 21.

On February 28 the Regiment was placed on a three-hour alert to move. The 102d Division had crossed the Roer, and was to be relieved by the 79th. Reconnaissance parties were started for this relief. However, the 102d found a hole in the German lines and moved forward before the relief could be accomplished. On March 3, the Regiment moved to the vicinity of Hildenrath, Germany, with the mission of cleaning up behind the 102d. This certainly was a novel mission for the 79th Division—cleaning up another division's rear areas—but the job was undertaken with a will. Task forces were formed and reinforced with light tanks and the area was divided up among them. Very little of interest came of this activity.

On March 5 the Regiment moved again, this time to Suchteln, Germany, with a mission of continuing the clean-up. However on March 8 they moved again, to Jabbeek, back in Holland. The reason for this move was the fact that all efforts to relieve the 102d Division were futile, as it was moving forward all the time, and having reached the Rhine River, had been pinched off by other divisions converging on the same area. So it was out of the fight, and in the same position that we were. To cross the Rhine was a separate and special operation, and plans had to be made.

On March 9 the Regiment was notified of the Division's mission to cross the Rhine on the south flank of the Ninth Army. Training was initiated on the Maas River, and the training period as well as the actual crossing itself has been described by Colonel Van Bibber in his paper on the subject, which follows:

OBJECTIVE: PERFECTION
THE RHINE RIVER CROSSING

On March 9, 1945, the Regiment received orders to prepare for the Rhine crossing north of Orsoy. The warning order was substantially as follows: To prepare plans to train the Regiment in river crossings at a site on the Maas River south of Maeseyck. The plan included preparations for the crossing in column of battalions, and therefore required the leading assault battalion to be designated immediately so that it could receive priority in all training.

On February 22, 1945, units of the 313th cross the Albert Canal on their way to Holland.
American correspondents get a lift after watching the Rhine crossing in the 313th sector

It is convenient to divide the operation into phases. These phases must overlap by their very nature, both from the standpoint of time and scope. At times, several of all phases were receiving attention simultaneously, and the various officers who were doing the planning found it necessary at times to interest themselves in each other's specialty to a degree not encountered in normal operations. It was a test of the versatility and ingenuity of the commanders and their staffs.

The phases were as follows:

1. Training.
2. Reconnaissance.
3. Intelligence.
4. Planning.
5. Execution (the crossing itself).
6. Follow-up.

The objective set for this training phase was quite obvious and clear-cut. It was to take a thoroughly non-amphibious division and train it to cross a swiftly running river quickly by the use of various specialized craft, and to deploy and attack promptly once it had landed. It must be able to do this in darkness and under any weather condition.

In general, the troops went through three stages in this training, as follows: Familiarization with craft; day and night crossings; and a dress rehearsal. A site on the Maas River was selected that resembled the actual crossing area on the Rhine to a remarkable degree. Regimental reconnaissance and map study of the Rhine area indicated that the crossing should be made in a column of battalions, so the leading assault battalion was designated at once and so notified. It was sent immediately to the training area and given priority on all training.

The supporting engineer battalion also moved to the training site and close liaison was established. It was planned that there would be enough boats (assault, M-2) to carry the foot elements of the battalion in two waves, and accordingly boat groups were made up to suit the tactical plan. These boat groups were organized on a permanent basis, which were to team up with their respective engineer boat crews and remain in close contact throughout the entire operation, until the final landing on the far shore of the Rhine. This was considered important because it was felt that such intimacy bred mutual confidence and promoted teamwork.

The leading assault battalion had drawn the most difficult task. It was necessary that it carry the boats over the dyke (existing on the training site and on the actual site as well) and launch them. Subsequent troops could embark at the water's edge. The normal crew, fourteen men, could barely carry the boats up the steep incline at first, but after practice the difficulty was overcome and the work went more easily. The engineers handled their boats and kept their engines running after a little practice, and so, in spite of difficulties, the training progressed satisfactorily.

There were difficulties, of course; supply of specialized equipment seemed to develop hitches. The motors for the boats had to have special oil which was unobtainable at first. The brackets for the motors failed to arrive. There were, at first, only four hundred life preservers for the entire set-up. Storm boats, promised in satisfactory numbers failed to show up, and, in fact, never did. The LVT-2s and LVT-4s to be used for our initial supply and for the movement of light vehicles had maintenance troubles and couldn't go in the water. Consequently, experimentation had to be made on land.

These and many other difficulties arose, but by substitution and improvisation progress was made. The infantry and the engineers worked smoothly together with their respect for each other increasing daily.

When performance was unsatisfactory, it was insisted that the drill be repeated until a satisfactory result had been achieved, no matter how tired the participants were, or how little time off they had had. This policy was established early so as to set a definite pace for the training and to stress the seriousness of the project and the necessity for the utmost precision on the part of all concerned. When the Regiment had arrived at the point where the leading battalion could complete the crossing at night in twenty-five minutes and the other battalions in twenty minutes, it was considered satisfactory.

More difficulty was encountered in getting the troops to the boats in the dark than was anticipated. The leading battalion, of course, had a comparatively simple problem in this respect. Their boats were behind the dyke, on the ground in a long line. It was never so dark that they couldn't sort out the correct boats, even if their engineer crews who acted as guides missed finding them initially.

However, the follow-up battalions had to wait for a short period behind the dyke until their engineer guides could come back and get them when their boats were ready. It was found that the guides either couldn't find the right boat groups, or when they did they couldn't get back to the right boats in the confusion and milling around. It was necessary, therefore, to run engineer tape from each boat-landing site back over the dyke to a snake, where the boat group was in-
structed to wait. Hence the engineer guide moored his boat at one end of the tape, followed it to the other end, picked up his infantrymen and returned along the same route. This system worked very well.

For the dress rehearsal it had been planned to run the whole show exactly as it was planned to cross on D-day, but there were more difficulties arose. The Navy, who were to carry our tanks and TDs failed to show up. The LVTs were still non-operational, and so, just to be safe, infantry assault rafts were built and used. Communications were set up just as was planned to do on D-day, with lines from the various assembly areas to the engineer control post at the crossing site, with a phone and switchboard at the Regimental OP, on the flank of the site. It worked extremely well, but liaison would have done just as well and would have been less trouble.

After the dress rehearsal, it was felt that the troops had reached the point where they could do their job in getting across the Rhine.

Reconnaissance

The greatest difficulty concerning adequate reconnaissance was the fact that there were seven-fifteen miles between the training site and the crossing site. The roads were loaded with preparatory traffic, making the trip a three-hour run each way. It was not considered to the best interest of secrecy to have large parties moving on reconnaissance, or even of staying in the area any length of time. The division holding the river bank quite properly put a definite limit on parties wandering indiscriminately about, and required all parties to check in and out through its headquarters. The Corps artillery made its liaison planes available in a limited quantity to commanders of assault units. This helped immeasurably, but it became increasingly evident that no adequate reconnaissance could be made until we moved nearer the Rhine.

It was before the training phase actually started, however, that the exact crossing site and ferry site had to be picked and agreed upon by the infantry and engineers. Hence Regimental reconnaissance was made both on land and by air just as soon as it could be done. The other reconnaissance could be postponed, but this was absolutely essential, because the fullest exploitation of the opportunity for training depended on it. Also an intelligent approach to the tactical planning phase, which was practically continuous throughout all other phases, was contingent upon an early decision as to the exact pin-pointing of our routes of attack.

Our reconnaissance was aided materially—as was our planning and intelligence—by adequate maps and aerial photographs. These last, both vertical and oblique, were most helpful but they were not recent enough. Too much time elapsed between the taking of the aerial photograph and the delivery to the assault troops. The ideal set-up would be to have the pictures delivered the day after being taken to the commander of the assault echelon. However, the photographs and maps as furnished were a great help, and were invaluable in the construction of a sandtable, used in the planning phase to be described below.

The Division moved into an assembly area near the Rhine on D minus 3. There was opportunity for the battalion commanders, their S-2s and S-3s, and the company commanders, to make both a ground and air reconnaissance. There was also complete opportunity for the Regimental executive officer and the S-4 to reconnoiter traffic routes and assembly areas, and to plan traffic control in accordance with the Division traffic control plan. The assault battalions reconnoitered their routes to their jump-off areas, and timed their movements so that there would be no unnecessary waiting in assembly areas. Communications were arranged with a radio net superimposed on the wire net, in case of emergencies. From his initial assembly area until his final objective, his route was marked in his mind as clearly as the combined facilities.

Intelligence

The situation remained about static throughout the preparatory stages of this operation. As developed in the initial phase, it naturally formed the basis for all tactical decisions, and it only remained to keep up to date on any changes in order to continue the planning which is at best a progressive phase. Keeping up to date, however, was not as easy as it sounds. The means at hand were adequate enough, at first glance, but a study of how they worked out will be revealing.

The means were as follows:

1. Patrols by units on the river bank.
2. Their observers.
3. Our observers and reconnaissance.
4. Air OPs (artillery).
5. Air photography.
6. PWs.
7. Reports from higher headquarters.

Of the list, No. 1 was easily the most useful. From this it was learned that there were probably no mines, and that the river's edge was manned by listening posts only. Nos. 2 and 3 revealed that the dyke—some four hundred yards inland—was occupied. From No. 4 it was found out that there was little or no traffic in the daytime. No. 5 told nothing current. No. 6 indicated that there was only a company defending the Regimental objective (later found out to be erroneous to a considerable degree). No. 7 was usually too general to be more than corroborative to indications derived from the others. An officer was placed in the headquarters of the Regiment occupying the river bank in our sector to gather all information obtained locally from the various sources at the disposal of that organization. This proved very helpful, and gave a definite "feel" of the situation.

Planning

As decisions are based on intelligence, so is planning based on decisions. Thus, major decisions must be made as early as possible in spite of the fact that the changing situation may render the decisions less feasible, and so adversely affect the planning. Flexibility of plans, then, must be the keynote, in order to make allowances for alterations in the enemy situation.

It was decided at the outset that the Regiment would cross in column of battalions. However, it was considered perfectly possible for this decision to be changed at the last minute to a scheme calling for battalions abreast. As a result, provisions were made for this change, as well as for others.

A study of the map indicated that plans should include pro-
visions for rapid crossing of the open ground between the far shore, and the towns of Vier Linden and Walsum. The ground was as open and flat as the map indicated, except for a large dyke, or mole, running across the entire sector. The right flank of the Regiment rested on the canal to the south, but the whole sector was under observation and fire from the area south of the canal—which area it was not planned to attack—at least initially.

Therefore, it was obvious that daylight should not catch the assault battalions on this open plain. It was also obvious that in order to supply the assault battalions and move other troops across this area during daylight, something must be done to screen the sector and to counteract enemy fire.

It was recommended that H-hour for the assault battalions be 3:00 A.M. Since daylight was at 6:30 it was felt that they would have ample time to fight their way into the towns which afforded more adequate cover. For the elements that must cross in daylight other arrangements were made.

The following organizations were attached for the operation:

- Company A, 304th Engineer (C) Battalion.
- Company A, 304th Medical Battalion.
- Company C, 83rd Tank Destroyer Battalion.
- Company A, 717th Tank Battalion.
- Company A, 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion.
  (Attached 1 platoon, Company B, initially)
- Company B, 809th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
- Supported by 187th Engineer (C) Battalion.

The following fires were available from units not crossing:
(a) one company TDs; (b) caliber .30 and .50 machine guns from the Regiment in our sector, as well as its mortars and Cannon Company; (c) Division artillery of the divisions through which we were passing; (d) 79th Division Artillery and numerous Corps and Army units—some fifty battalions in all to fire in our Division sector; (e) 313th Infantry caliber .50 machine guns—not crossing initially, plus the mortars and the machine guns of the reserve battalions.

The next step was to plan the routes and objectives of the assault battalions. This had to be accomplished at this point, in order to plan the fires. The decisions were based on what we knew about the enemy and how he had organized the ground.

All indications pointed to the following: The enemy held the dyke in strength, but only outposted the river bank, with his listening posts near the water’s edge at night. The next organized ground east of the dyke was the railroad embankment. Probably located in the towns near the railroad were his local reserves. He depended on covering the open ground along the river and in front of the dyke by high-velocity fire from south of the canal.

The Regiment crossed on a narrow front out of necessity. It seemed appropriate to capitalize on the extra control and speed that was afforded us, and speed was made the watchword of the entire attack. By placing the bulk of the close-in fires on the positions in the path of the narrow frontal assault, it was felt it was possible to slip through the initial enemy lines which were, probably, necessarily thin, and then race for the towns. This by-passing seemed justified because of the confusion which must inevitably be the enemy’s lot when he finds his rear defenses and reserves attacked. The reserve battalion could clean up the river bank and dyke area on the way to its position.

The point had now been reached where the routes could be planned. The lead battalion was to have friendly troops on its left as it landed, since the crossing site of the regiment on the left was adjacent to ours. Their route was generally along the boundary between regiments as far as the dyke, thence to the northeast. It seemed wise therefore to route the assault battalion along the boundary also, until it had crossed the dyke, and then attack the town of Vier Linden as its first objective. This had the added advantage of giving the next battalion the near objective, the town of Walsum, so that if its crossing was held up until daylight for any reason, it would have a shorter distance to go over open ground.

The route for the 2d Battalion in line was to go straight for Walsum. The route for the 3d, or reserve battalion, was to follow the leading battalion as far as the dyke and then take position in defilade. It was given the added mission of mopping up in its route of advance.

To return to the fires, it seemed advantageous to put the extra machine guns and TDs south of the crossing site: that is, east and south of the village of Oesoy. This would not only provide flanking fires but would not draw fire on the site. In addition it would facilitate firing on enemy weapons south of the canal.

If at H-hour these weapons opened up along the enemy’s shoreline and the entire dyke it was felt it would keep down enemy fire on the boats. Then as the boats were nearing the far shore, all fires could shift to the dyke, and as the leading elements approached the dyke these fires could again shift to the south half of the dyke, to keep enemy fires from striking the flank. It was deemed best to control this on a time schedule.

The same general principle was applied to the artillery. Preparation until H plus 5 and then shift to the dyke. At H plus 15 shift to the south half of the dyke and the western edge of Walsum, as well as on the battalion objective. Fires were to be lifted on call. For convenience of control, the 4.2 mortar fire came into the artillery fire plan, and was coordinated by the FDC. All caliber .30 machine-gun fire and other mortar fire were controlled locally on a time basis. The caliber .50 fire was organized and controlled by a staff officer from Regimental headquarters. The TD fire was also controlled...
The priorities were planned to move as follows: (1) Weasels with re-supply of ammunition; (2) antitank guns; (3) TDs; (4) tanks; (5) communication vehicles; (6) ammunition jeeps; (7) 1½-ton prime movers. The S-4 planned to have a dump near Walsum just as soon after daylight as possible so he could place ammunition, gasoline and food at the disposal of the battalion S-4s. Much of this supply was to move by DUKWs as soon as the engineers could bulldoze a launching site.

Evacuation was planned as follows: One extra surgical team to go with the leading assault battalion to take care of the clearing of the casualties of both battalions to a central point, and to care for them until clearing could be established. The clearing company was to send a forward echelon across behind the reserve battalion and set up a clearing station on the far shore, and to be prepared to move inland as the advance progressed beyond the initial objective, or as soon as ordered. Evacuation across the river to be done by DUKWs. Communication was to be by wire as soon as the cable was put across the river by Division at H plus 3. The regimental switchboard was to cross behind the AT guns and to set up in a pre-designated spot west of the dyke.

The regimental OP group was to cross right behind the reserve battalion. It consisted of the following personnel and equipment:

Regimental commander.
S-3.
Assistant S-3 (operations).
Assistant S-3 (OP group commander).
S-1.
SCR-284 radio (portable) and operator.
Two SCR-300 radios with operators (one on channel of each leading battalion).
Four members I&R Platoon as guards.

All members of these groups were especially armed to combat enemy stragglers whose presence was foreseen due to the narrow fronts of attack.

The orders given the assault battalions were quite simple. They were to proceed with all speed to objectives shown over routes shown; and to button up, prepared to move east or south on order. The reserve was made to move to area shown, cleaning up in zone, and await orders. The CP would be in the objective town of the right battalion.

Execution

On D minus 1, just at dark, the Regiment started to move into its attack positions. The foot troops moved about halfway by truck, walking the remaining six miles, their heavy weapons moving up on one 1½-ton truck per battalion. They moved into their rear assembly areas and settled down to wait for H-hour. The motor elements moved over other routes with all possible caution to avoid noise. The regimental OP group went to a large factory building just on the water's edge and on the right flank of the crossing site. Thereafter there was nothing else to do, for all plans had been made. All that remained was to put into execution the operation.

At H minus 1 the artillery started. It was so heavy that
Before noon on the day of the Rhine crossing, the supply carriers were taking ever-increasing numbers of PWs on the return trips.

The individual reports of the guns were indistinguishable, giving the effect of a solid roar. The gun flashes kept the western sky in a continual blaze of light and the whistle of thousands of shells overhead sounded like so many freight trains. The bursting of the shells seemed to literally cover the far shore.

The hour of preparation seemed very long—far longer than sixty minutes. It was difficult to imagine how anything could stay alive on the other side of the river. Finally, however, as the time drew near the boats moved off the huge dyke in perfect alignment, and slid into the water as one at exactly 3:00 A.M.

The .50s and .30s opened up with a wild suddenness with ricochets bouncing high into the air. As was hoped, the noise of the machine guns did much to drown the noise of the motors of the assault boats, preventing the enemy from pin-pointing our crossing site.

To show how closely the actual crossing corresponded with calculations, the following time schedule, as it was actually accomplished, is presented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embarked</th>
<th>Cleared far shore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.M.</td>
<td>A.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Wave (1st Assault Battalion)</td>
<td>3:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Wave (1st Assault Battalion)</td>
<td>3:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Wave (2d Assault Battalion)</td>
<td>3:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Wave (2d Assault Battalion)</td>
<td>4:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Battalion</td>
<td>6:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimenal OP Group</td>
<td>6:35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attention is invited to the fact that the fourth wave took twenty minutes to get across. This was the result of one boat getting swamped, and of others becoming confused in their direction and landing on the near shore. It was one of those unexplainable things that happen once in a while and it was corrected promptly.

Resistance in front of the leading battalion was initially very light, due to the shock effect of the preparation and the speed of the attack. When the next battalion landed it went over the same landing site, but as it moved south out of the track of the landing battalion it encountered enemy who partially recovered from the preparation and who contested its progress with resistance which was classified as light to moderate.

Nevertheless, both battalions moved to their objective towns without serious delay. The enemy encountered at the dyke was overrun with as much speed as possible, as planned, and the battalions were in the outskirts of the towns well before daylight.

The reserve battalion moved into its assembly position on the west bank as the second assault battalion moved to the dyke and the boats. When it became apparent that the opportunity to move the reserve across would soon be at hand it was ordered to the dyke. About the time it got there, both assault battalions were fighting on their initial objectives, so it was ordered to proceed across without delay. At 7:35 A.M. it was in its assembly area and had taken some prisoners.

The Regimental commander and his OP group crossed with the reserve, but passed through it as it was reorganizing on the far shore. The OP group proceeded in the path of the second assault battalion, and set up a forward CP in Walsum. A Regimental wire team followed the OP group from the switchboard on the far shore, as planned, so there was no delay in getting wire communications with the battalions and Division.

Early in the planning, it was realized that the Regiment, being the flank unit, and attacking across ground devoid of cover, was going to experience difficulty maintaining communications unless the flank was thoroughly screened. Therefore a comprehensive plan was made to start a smoke screen at daylight, using the 4.2 mortars that would obscure the flank, and to maintain the screen until the bridgehead had expanded sufficiently for communications to move farther north and into comparative safety.

At daylight on D-day the wind was blowing from the south—an ideal situation. Not only was it easy to obscure the flank, but the whole area became covered with what might be classified as an "operational haze"—making enemy air observation difficult, if not impossible.

While the wind remained in the south, enemy artillery harassed the area and the crossing site, but it was unobserved and therefore did little damage. However, at about 2:00 P.M. the wind veered to the southeast, and although the mortars readjusted their data, the impact area which would have performed the mission satisfactorily was either out of range or in an area occupied by friendly troops. Immediately, enemy artillery became more effective. Efforts were made to correct the deficiency by the use of smoke pots, but little change resulted. Finally a smoke-generating unit was moved up by Division and put into operation. This solved the difficulty almost at once, but it is believed that this unit should have been attached initially, to facilitate the making of more inclusive plans.

The WP barrage by the mortars achieved a twofold benefit. Not only did it obscure our operations from enemy observation, but its initial impact area, south of the canal, was so devastated as a result of the fire that it was made uninhabitable to the enemy. Later in the operation, when it became necessary to cross the canal south of Walsum, it was found that there was no serious enemy resistance as a result.

The assault battalions were fighting for their initial objectives in the towns of Vier Linden and Walsum, and the
reserve, in its assembly area northwest of Vier Linden, was carrying out its mission of cleaning up in zone and establishing contact with the regiment on the left.

The resistance on the objectives was spotty and disorganized although there were numerous enemy present. Approximately four hundred prisoners were taken, and between five and six truckloads of enemy dead were evacuated. All this is a tribute to the artillery plan, which not only provided for a paralyzing amount of fire, but also provided for a schedule of fires which permitted the assault troops to follow them closely and catch the enemy while he was still taking cover. Although most of the enemy dead were killed by small-arms fire, it was mainly because they were rendered powerless to defend themselves by the artillery.

As D-day wore on, the fighting became merely a clean-up. At 3:00 P.M. it could be said that most of the resistance on the initial objectives had ceased. Communications were moving at that time with a fair assurance that they would not be sniped at.

Meanwhile, there were difficulties at the crossing site. As has already been stated, the wind changed at about 2:00 exposing the area to enemy observation. Heavy craft which were detailed to move the armor across were prevented from moving to the ferry landing by enemy artillery fire. Finally the smoke screen was adjusted and the TDs and tanks started across, but they did not complete the movement until almost 4:00, or just in time to take part in the continuation of the attack to the east. Once they got across, however, they were able to get into action promptly. This was due to the fact that they had sent reconnaissance parties over with the battalion OP groups. These parties sent guides to meet them and bring them directly from the ferry to the place where they were needed.

Earlier in the day information had been received from
Division that the reserve regiment was going to cross the river, and orders were received to continue the attack, seizing Waterbeck and the slag pile to the south of it.

**Follow-up**

The battalion that had taken Vier Linden was ordered to take the slag pile. The reserve battalion was directed to attack to the north and take Waterbeck. The hour for the attack was 4:30 P.M.

Meanwhile the reserve regiment had received orders to attack also, the zone of advance being to the north. The regimental commanders met and arranged boundaries, and the attack jumped off. Objectives were taken with only moderate resistance.

**Discussion**

Judged by any standards, this operation was completely successful. The objective was attained in remarkably short time. The enemy units opposing the landing were virtually destroyed, and the casualties sustained were negligible.

In view of the above, the following seems significant, that there was nothing unorthodox or unusual about the planning, the troops involved, or the equipment. Methods were those long recognized as sound and taught in the service schools. If there was considerable attention to detail in the planning and training, it was no more than has long been insisted upon by military doctrine for operations of this kind—and indeed all operations where the time and opportunity are available.

The operation was also characterized by the fact that it was directed by the use of fragmentary orders in the purest sense of the term. From time of the first warning order, all echelons of command made known to subordinate units all information and projected plans, even tentative, as fast as they became available. Thus the framework of the planning was blocked out early, and the details were filled in progressively as time went on. This resulted in all echelons being fully conversant with what was expected of them well in advance of D-day, and when the actual written orders were prepared, although they were in considerable detail, they merely served as confirmation to instructions issued previously.

The preceding account deals solely with the establishment of the bridgehead and the minor adjustments made thereafter. The next phase finds the 79th Division ordered south of the Ruhr River with the 313th Infantry on the right—its objective the city of Hamborn.

Accordingly, the 1st and 2d Battalions jumped off, with the 1st Battalion on the right starting from Walsum and the 2d from its last objective, the slag pile. They crossed the first canal with very little resistance, moving into the former impact area of the chemical mortars. This area, as has been said, was so devastated by the smoke shells that the Germans could not stay in it, and so the advance continued south with only sporadic resistance until it reached the second canal.

Here, the bridges were found blown, but the 1st Battalion promptly forced a crossing. The 2d Battalion, however, found itself confronted with not only the canal, but a formidable railroad embankment as well which was being defended. So it was held up on the north side of the canal and the attack so halted on the evening of March 27.

The next day, the 2d Battalion was ordered to continue its efforts to cross the canal and meanwhile the 3d Battalion was to use the 1st Battalion crossing sites and attack the city of Hamborn. This attack was considered to be an operation of some magnitude and accordingly was carefully planned; but it fell far short of these expectations. It started with great caution, but no enemy was encountered, so it quickly changed into what might be called a triumphal entry. Hamborn fell with hardly a shot being fired.

This easy victory was a preview of things to come. With only one or two exceptions the Regiment was to experience no more of the bitter struggles it had previously known only too well. The reason for this change might be indicated by sketch of the Big Picture and short description of how the over-all strategic plan was unfolding.

The Ruhr Valley, which was the heart of German industry and for that matter one of the greatest industrial centers in the world, was being cut off in a great encircling movement. Three hundred thousand enemy troops were being cut off in it, at the same time, but their effectiveness was being severely reduced by their lack of supplies and replacements.

So while the troops detailed for the encircling went about their work, the rest of the war passed on to the east, for eventual juncture with the Russians.

Hamborn was the first large industrial city to fall to the Division. From this time until the end of the war we were to take others of importance. Dortmund and Essen were two of the larger ones—some of which were devastated to an unbelievable degree, while in others the factories and mines were still running! Incidentally, during the capture of Hamborn the 1st Battalion overran three submarines tied up at the docks. This might be called the Regiment's first and only naval engagement.

Another item of interest took place while the Regiment was in Hamborn. In the city of Duisburg, just south of the Ruhr River from Hamborn, a number of white flags were seen flying. It was a matter of some conjecture whether the German troops wanted to surrender, or whether the civilians had put up the flags.
German civilians drafted for work clean up the mess in Hamborn under GI supervision

Or for that matter, whether there were German troops still in the city.

So on April 1, Lieutenant Gooch of the 1st Battalion volunteered to take a boat, and accompanied by the Mayor of Hamborn and a soldier interpreter, go to the Germans under a white flag and demand their surrender. His first trial ended in failure, due to sunken barges in the river, but he tried again on April 2. This time he made contact with the Germans, who blindfolded him and conducted him to their battalion CP. Here a conference of considerable length took place with officers from Regiment or higher, but the German decision was not to surrender. So Lieutenant Gooch was blindfolded again and taken back to his boat.

The mission did accomplish something, however. We found out (1) that there were German Wehrmacht units defending the area; (2) that they were willing to fight; and (3) in spite of his blindfold, Lieutenant Gooch was able to determine something of the nature of the German defenses.

On April 6, just one year from the date of our departure from the United States, we moved to Horst. This city is about twelve kilometers east of Hamborn, and on the Rhine–Herne Canal. We had been relieved by the 513th Parachute Infantry (17th Airborne Division) who were given the mission merely to hold Hamborn initially. The mission given the 79th Division was to cross the Rhine–Herne Canal the next day at 3:00 in the morning.

Here was a mission! The Rhine–Herne Canal crossing, viewed in retrospect appears to be a tougher assignment than even the Rhine crossing and we had fourteen days to plan the latter, while we had just twelve hours notice on the former.

The Rhine–Herne Canal is a double canal at the spot chosen for our crossing. Its bridges had all been blown on the south branch, but remained serviceable over the north branch leading to the “island” in between. The Regiment’s crossing site was in the midst of the factory area, but was given over, on the south side of the canal, to open fields, mainly, and few small factory buildings.

The canal itself was thirty-five yards wide with perpendicular walled sides, about twenty feet high. There were spots along its length in our sector where a foothold might be obtained by an infantryman. In addition, one of the bridges was not sufficiently blown to prevent a foot soldier from crossing with difficulty. Accordingly, the remaining daylight hours were spent in frantic preparations and reconnaissance, and after dark the 1st and 2d Battalions were moved to the

Sniper hunting in Duisburg, Germany, March, 1945. (Signal Corps photo)
island. Engineers brought infantry assault rafts which were to be put into position before H-hour—at 3:00 A.M.

It was known that the enemy had the south bank well defended, but probably in no great depth. It was therefore determined that the same tactics used on the Rhine crossing would be employed; i.e., crossing on a narrow front and attacking objectives well behind enemy lines, and relying on the reserve battalion to clean up behind the assault echelons. There was one difference, however. There was to be no artillery preparation, as it was thought that great benefits could be reaped from a surprise.

As the unit which had been occupying the area before us (35th Division) had been sending out patrols every night, we had to follow suit, in the interests of lulling the enemy into a false sense of security. The other unit had been using the ruined bridge, so we did the same thing—but when the 1st Battalion started its patrols across it was found that it was easier than had been thought. So the patrols were followed by other troops, until by H-hour the 1st Battalion had nearly a company across! The surprise was complete, it appears. Before the enemy realized what was happening, American troops were pouring across the canal. The Germans responded with heavy artillery fire and every other resource at their command, but the Regiment, once having got its toe-hold, moved in relentlessly.

The 2d Battalion had some trouble with its footbridge, due to the heavy shelling. This caused a delay, but the impetus of their attack once they had landed made up for it.

By 9:30 A.M. the two assault battalions were across and fighting for their first objectives. Company B, the 1st Battalion reserve, was having some trouble with a factory in their sector, and it was necessary to send I Company across to give them a hand. Company E, which was cleaning up for the 2d Battalion, was having an easier time of it and needed no help. German artillery was making things very uncomfortable for everybody, however, and it was not until midnight April 7 that all three battalions were across.

When we say "all three battalions" in this case we mean only the foot troops, of course. It remained to get the lighter vehicles over including AT guns, ammunition vehicles, and control jeeps. We could not wait for a bridge, naturally, so assault rafts were built and the work was well under way by dawn April 8. It must have been disconcerting for the enemy to see jeeps and other vehicles running around on the south side of the canal when they knew we had no bridge.

But they made the site, where it was obvious it would be the best place to put a bridge, a perfect hell with artillery. We therefore chose a site a couple of hundred yards to the east, and after putting down a heavy smoke screen, started a bridge. This maneuver was a complete success, and it is interesting to note that the bridge in the 313th area was the first, and for quite a while, the only one in the Division area to be in service.

Meanwhile the assault battalions pushed steadily on, the resistance growing lighter all the time. The break-up of German resistance was becoming more and more apparent, as odd things began to happen.

For instance, Major McKean, Executive Officer of the 3d Battalion, drove into Gelsenkirchen, which is a large industrial center, and found no enemy. As the attack swung east toward Bochum, we began to overrun concentration camps, full of Russian and Polish slave laborers—with the German guards still on duty. We learned very quickly not to release these people wholesale, because the subsequent depredations they made on the countryside caused a condition that made the mere fighting of the Germans a parlor game by contrast!

On April 10 the Regiment took Bochum and the high ground to the east. There we were ordered to stop and await orders. On April 11, the 1st Battalion was detached and ordered to Essen, on the same T Force mission it had had in Strasbourg in December.

In connection with the mission in Essen, Germany, Time magazine, in its issue for April 23, 1945, published the following account which is well worthy of inclusion here. The account follows:

The great Krupp works at Essen, arsenal of Kaiser and Führer, lay dead. For five years this steel heart of the German
war machine had been a prime target of Allied bombers. Last week U. S. Ninth Army men rolled past the debris, and a few miles farther south overran the highwalled Villa Hugel, secluded estate of powerful, mysterious Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Herr President of Krupp, silent partner of Nazism, now wanted by the Allies as a war criminal.

A brace of Villa Hugel retainers blocked the door. Strapping (6 ft. 5) Lieut Colonel Clarence Sagmoen (513th Regimental S-5) merely drew his Colt .45, and a passage opened.

Colonel Sagmoen soon had his captive in tow—a thin, nervous man, balding at 37 and trimly dressed in a pin-striped business suit. The American growled: "You bastards started this war and we'll show you who's finishing it." He ordered the prisoner into the back of his jeep.

As the jeep drove off a servant hurried from the mansion with a week-end bag for the master. He was too late.

In the kitchen of an Essen apartment, where a regimental command post had been set up, the prisoner was interviewed.

His plant had been shut down, he said, since the heavy Allied air raid of March 11. At that time upward of 50,000 workers, including 10,000 foreign slaves, were on the Krupp production line.

The Americans asked, "Why didn't you leave the Ruhr?"
Herr Krupp shrugged his bony shoulders: "I wanted to stay with my factory where I belong, with my fellow workers."

"Are you a Nazi?"
"I am a German."

"Are you a member of the Nazi Party?"
"Well, yes, but most Germans are."

"What is your present salary?"
Herr Krupp was annoyed. "Must I answer?" he snapped. "Yes," Colonel Sagmoen snapped back. Herr Krupp lit a cigarette from a silver case in his pocket, puffed anxiously, said: "four hundred thousands marks a year" [$160,000 at official prewar exchange rate]. All profits, he said, had been split between the Nazi Government and his family.

"Do you still think Germany will win the war?"
"I do not know. Politics is not business. My business is making steel."

The Americans thought of Krupp steel—the steel that went into U-boats, tanks, guns. They thought especially of the "Krupp Cannon"—the famed, deadly 88, destroyer of Allied men and machines all the way from El Alamein to the Rhine. They asked a final question.

"What are your plans after the war?"
Herr Krupp pondered. For five generations his family had forged arms—for Napoleon, for the Habsburgs, for the Hohenzollerns, for the Nazis, for any customers with cash. They had made $200,000,000 in World War I. They had profited even more fabulously—for a while—in World War II. And now? Herr Krupp, merchant of death, answered: "I hope to rebuild the factories and produce again."

The foregoing is an exact reprint from Time. It is but one of many newspaper and magazine accounts that were written during the war, reflecting credit to members of the 313th Infantry, and to the Regiment itself.

Following the events in the vicinity of Essen, there began what afterward became known as "Operation Zig-Zag." We moved west again ... winding up in the peninsula of land between the Ruhr River and the Rhine-Herne Canal in the vicinity of Witten. This area we were ordered to clean up, which we did in a series of sporadic fights. We were told that friendly troops were coming up toward the Ruhr from the south, and to try to save the bridges for them if we could. This was undertaken against considerable resistance in some cases, the most notable of which was the bridge that A Company took, storming across to the other side in an attack which rivaled some of the bridge-taking assaults which the Regiment became famous for in Alsace the winter before.

Orders were changed, however, and it was only under protest that A Company could be persuaded to come back to the north side and to give up their bridge. But it was becoming more and more apparent that the war was drawing to a close, and the opportunities for high deeds and heroic accomplishments were becoming fewer and farther apart.
The title of this chapter is, appropriately, "Anti-Climax." The war was folding up all about us now—collapsing like a house of cards. The actual fighting was now—as far as the Regiment was concerned—definitely over. There was plenty to be done, it is true, but in the hearts of many of the members of the 313th it was like harnessing a race-horse to a plow. Not that the new assignments were undertaken with disinterest or apathy. Not at all. In fact the new tasks represented a challenge which was met by most with a zeal that was most gratifying, but it was not fighting. And the Regiment had had drummed into it that fighting was the sole purpose for its existence for three years.

The Regiment moved eastward again, to an area in and around Schwerte, closing in about April 30. Its mission was twofold. First, there were about eighteen DP (Displaced Persons) camps, or camps housing slave labor which had been operating the factories for the Germans. These camps ranged in population from those holding a couple of hundred to several thousand. The type of dwellings ran the entire gamut of human habitation, from mine shafts to modern military barracks, from schoolhouses to airports. The nationalities, to name a few were as follows: Russian, Polish, Latvian, Estonian, Ukrainian, Italian, American, and many others. They had to be fed, clothed, deloused, cleaned up and entertained. They also had to be kept within bounds and not allowed to forage over the countryside. This in itself was no mean task.

Some of the camps were in such a bad state of sanitation as to defy powers of description. Most of these had to be abandoned in the interests of humanity, and the personnel moved to other locations. This required a high order of planning and logistics, for it is one thing to move trained and disciplined soldiers, and quite another to transport half-starved, wild-eyed men, women and children who speak any one of a dozen languages, but who were united in one thing—their hatred of the Germans and their desire to do them all possible damage by way of revenge.

The other phase of the Regiment's new job was the policing of the Germans. This was by far the easiest part of the task, for the Germans were not only thoroughly beaten but they recognized in the Americans their only protection from the righteous wrath of their erstwhile slaves. So, it remained only for us to impress them with the fact that we did actually represent a disciplined and orderly force—their propagandists to the contrary notwithstanding.

This was accomplished by cleaning up and converting to a garrison-soldier basis. The spontaneity and good will with which it was done belies the tradition that Americans are basically civilians and have a natural horror for spit-and-polish. The indication is not that Americans, conversely, are born soldiers, but that they can be anything they want to be, and it happens that when the need arises they can be soldiers as well as whatever else is required.

As the fighting army metamorphosed into an occupation army, it was allotted areas in the occupation zone. The Regiment moved farther eastward, setting up its CP in Unna, with its 3d Battalion in Hamm, and the remainder extending around those two towns. There were more DP camps, of course, and therefore more work, but this was a welcome circumstance. As the realization invaded the consciousness of the infantry soldier more and more that he was through fighting, a reaction seemed to set in that in many cases represented a problem.

No longer did the old bugbear ride the shoulders of the infantryman, that the only way out was to be wounded or killed. He could now see his way out—clear. It is necessary to have been an infantryman in combat to even begin to understand the breath-taking sense of relief and subsequent exhilaration that he experienced at this time. This exhilaration brought about a heady source of energy that needed an outlet, and the best outlet at hand—that is, the best for the individual as well as for the mission—was work, and plenty of it.

Now, the story definitely starts downhill. At 2:00 P.M., May 5, the Regiment received the "cease fire" order. The log records it as follows:

Msg rec'd from Div signed by Gen Eisenhower "Cease Firing"! German High Command has surrendered unconditionally all land, sea and air forces in Europe. Active operations will cease at 0001B hours 9 May 1945.

So this was it! Almost thirteen months to the day since the Division sailed from Boston, we had won. No one even dared dream it would be so soon when we sailed. It was almost impossible to believe even now.

The occasion literally drove one to retrospect, and in our case it was not too unpleasant a task. We had been a hard-fighting Division and had been where it
was rough. We didn’t have to sit back and listen to anyone with envy. Our accomplishments were known to all. We had been in all the armies and most of the corps. We had been wherever the fighting was the hottest, and in every important operation. Everything we had ever attempted we had done damned well, better than anyone ever hoped we would.

Didn’t we go piling into Cherbourg first? And how about the breakthrough? And who were the first American troops across the Seine? What outfit got to Belgium first? For that matter, what outfit got to the Rhine first, down in Alsace? Here is stuff to talk about that is solid, and no one can take it away from us.

Of course, at that time Japan remained to be beaten, and there isn’t any doubt but what the members of the Regiment viewed that prospect with mixed feelings. But on the whole, a soldier is a soldier, and therefore a fatalist. The lads who were already fighting the Jap weren’t doing too badly, and the more of us the better. There is reason to believe that the majority of the troops, now flushed with victory, looked upon the future with a light heart.

On June 6 the Division was ordered to Czechoslovakia, to the area along the western border which is known as the Sudetenland. The mission was much the same as the one we had in the Ruhr, but the Ruhr was to be part of the British zone, so we were relieved by a British infantry brigade.

The trip to Czechoslovakia was accomplished in two days without incident. The Regiment relieved parts of the 1st Infantry Division and set up its CP in Graslitz. The 3d Battalion also occupied this town, while the 1st Battalion moved in and around Schonbach. The 2d Battalion went in to a hilly area just
north of the 3d Battalion, with its CP in the little village of Bleistadt.

Roadblocks were placed along the river line by the 3d and 2d Battalions with the mission of stopping refugees from moving into the already crowded area. The Russians moved up and placed their roadblocks opposite ours, apparently with the same mission. While there was very little fraternizing between the Russians and ourselves, relations were as cordial as the differences in language would permit.

Meanwhile, the Division was placed in Category II which meant that we were designated as part of the attack force on Japan. With this in mind, training was started, which consisted mainly of firing and small-unit problems. It might be noted here that the men took considerable interest in this training because they were veterans, and knew its value.

There were also parades and ceremonies all done with professional style, and very impressive to the civilians. One ceremony which consisted of the renaming of Adolf Hitler Platz took place on July 4. The new name was Franklin D. Roosevelt Platz, and the Regimental commander was invited by the Czechs to unveil the tablet announcing this fact.

On the athletic side of our endeavors, we had a Regimental track meet, and what the men lacked in skill they made up in enthusiasm. One contestant, Hubert Kerns, however, went all the way to the Army meet. Our boxing team looked like championship material from the first. We didn’t lose a meet in the Division and when the men got to Corps the story was the same. There were very few fights lost, but when they were, the winner knew he had been in the ring!

The Regimental newspaper, The Dim View, published twice weekly, made its debut in the Ruhr, and flourished during the stay in Czechoslovakia. In addition to news, it carried sports results, and programs for the future. Its staff deserves a lot of credit for their skillful and willing contribution to the general morale.

Speaking of morale, it would not do to leave this period without mentioning some of the articles obtained in this area. To begin with, the Sudetenland is the heart of the musical instruments industry in Europe. The men, therefore, were able to buy accordions, trumpets, harmonicas, and other articles of this
nature at prices which were but a fraction of those in the States. Also, the embroidery industry contributed Combat Infantrymen Badges and Division insignia as well as silk guidons for ceremonies. Much hand-made lace was bought and sent home by the men to provide souvenirs of a very pleasant stay in an attractive corner of Europe.

Such were the activities in Czechoslovakia, which began early in June and continued until early in August. Then, on August 5, 1945, in a surprise move that smacked alternately of the rat race across France and Tennessee maneuvers, the 313th Infantry and the entire 79th Division pulled its occupational stakes in Czechoslovakia and moved more than 150 miles into a newly opened U.S. Third Army training area near Hammelburg, Germany. There, in a tent city in the middle of nowhere the Regiment awaited further orders, while throughout the world at large momentous events were taking place. World War II was drawing to a close.

The war ended, if anything, more dramatically than it started. It ended, really, on Monday, August 6, when an American plane dropped a single atomic bomb that annihilated sixty per cent of Hiroshima, a Japanese city of 375,000. Yet, though this fantastic new weapon sealed Japan's fate, the war staggered on for nine more days. Another atomic bomb cut down Nagasaki, and the exchange of peace messages began.

Negotiations over the fate of Emperor Hirohito lasted for four days, but throughout the world premature celebrations greeted Japan's first request for peace terms and each development thereafter. For soldiers who had seen the very worst that the war had to offer, the waiting from day to day seemed almost unbearable.

Finally on Tuesday morning, August 13, (ETO time), the Tokyo Radio broadcast that the terms had been accepted. Then, at 1:00 A.M., Wednesday, in Paris, and midnight in London, the great announcement came at last; the Japanese were ready to lay down their arms. General Douglas MacArthur was named Supreme Allied Commander to accept the surrender and occupy Japan, and all Allied armed forces were ordered to cease offensive action. So at last it had come. At long, long last. And while the world celebrated, the 313th Infantry, in its tent city in the middle of nowhere, greeted the news half stunned, half bewildered, yet overjoyed.

Now they knew they would not be sent to Japan. No, they were high-point veterans now, who would be among the very first to leave for the place their hearts had long since dreamed of going... Home!
Men of 313th Find Hope In the Mud of Camp Boden

The capitation of the Japa­nese was announced at mid­night Wednesday, central Eu­ropean time, by the announce­ment from the White House. The terms, relayed via the receivers in the Battle­field, Switzerland, were sent in a long list of declarations by Emperor Hiro­hito himself. Japanese soldiers were given the opportunity to return to their homes under a safe con­ditions treaty, and those in the Allied forces were given the choice to stay or return to their homelands.

The emperor declared to the people to "cultivate ways of restraint" in face of the threats that were present. He also expressed his gratitude for the actions taken by the Allied forces, and for the safe return of Japanese soldiers.

Shades of Paraguay! Is there any area that is muddier than this one? You don’t dare to walk, just slide your way around and keep your balance, while your are doing it or you’ll find yourself looking like a sewer cleaner.

What a place for polished shoes and painted pants, too. When you get up in the morning your body has more aches than butter has pills.

Yesterdays, while the rain fell gently on my shoulders, and I shivered and crawled my way to and back from the ship, I found my head had soaked too much water than a three­dollar sponge.

I can’t help wonder how those fellows who complained about Bleistadl, Grasslitz and Schle­bach are making it now.

There are just a few of the expressions that thickened the air at Camp Boden as the men of the 313th once more reluctantly settled down to the life of the field in a forested area near the town of Bleistadt.

New Jersey, the garden state, has extensive water navigation facilities, being mostly low and flat, having its only hill development in the southern end.

An old proverb once said, "A child shall lead them" and in a place this is true in the Stotus family of Chicago. Gene Stotus, the son, started his army career at Camp Grant, Ill., on May 14, 1943 at the ripe old age of 18 in answer to the President’s greetings and went on to Camp Ford, Texas for his basic training in Tank Destroyers. Raymond "Pop" Stotus, the father entered the army via the same Reception Center at the tender age of 37 and he too moved on to Camp Ford for his basic training in Tank Destroyer.

Some evidence of this re­mains in the tank retriever that was damaged by a short distance from where it now stands by the battered buildings to the north of Bode.

Camp Boden itself strictly F, L. S. Army creation, built first for the occupancy of the 31st infantry to whom the 313th must send its thanks for many of the conveniences available.

Area Takes Names of 313th Heroes

The 313th Infantry’s new area in Europe is to be known as Camp Boden in honor of Lt. Col. Augustus H. Swoboda, one of the original members of the 313th infantry in Europe, who was killed in action near Cherbourg, in one of the initial actions of his battalion.

Father and Son Duo See Nine Countries in ETO Travels

Bode First

USO Team
Here Tonight

The 313th will visit its first USO show tonight in Loud­sian, Saturday, at Lt. Donald Parkin announced yesterday. The show, known as “Fun Fiestas”, will be a make up appearance and is scheduled to start promptly at 8 p.m.

Dressed as an excellent unit, the father and son of three men and three women.
Chapter 23: Inactivation

THERE NEVER WAS, and there perhaps may never again be, a period of frustration and confusion as great as that which confronted Allied army commanders everywhere immediately following the final defeat of Japan and the end of World War II. Every human instinct buried deep in the hearts and minds of one and all who participated in the war urged them on toward one common goal—home. That was all that mattered now, and the pressure of millions of voices both abroad and in the United States clamored for action and for a speedy return of Americans overseas.

The job was a momentous one, and Allied commanders found themselves overnight torn between the necessity of maintaining an occupation army, and at the same time of transporting millions of veterans to home shores under a point system geared essentially to deal fairly with a continuing war, which was no more.

When VJ-day came, the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division were awaiting final word for shipment to the United States for a brief furlough and training period, after which they had been slated for shipment into the Pacific area for further combat. However, the war’s end changed all previous plans, and the 79th was again placed in an occupational capacity within Germany. The 313th Infantry was assigned an area in the vicinity of Miltenberg, Germany, with a mission of occupying Kreis: Lohr, Alzenau, Aschaffenburg, Obernburg and part of Miltenberg and Gemünden Kreis. This mission included the task of supervising about 9,000 DPs as well as over 2,000 PWs. The Regimental CP was located in Miltenberg in the Hotel Linde, and Cannon Company was also in that town. The 2d Battalion was stationed at Obernburg with their companies strung out in little towns along the Main River. The 3d Battalion was located in Alzenau, not far from Frankfurt. The largest town in the whole Regimental area was Aschaffenburg, occupied by M and L Companies, although L Company’s chief mission was that of caring for the fluctuating 4,000 to 7,000 DPs (mostly Polish) at the large caserne there. Regimental AT Company was located just outside of Aschaffenburg, while the 1st Battalion CP was located in a hotel at Lohr with the various companies stationed in little towns in Lohr Kreis, with the exception of D Company, which was guarding 900 PWs in Gemünden.

The Regiment had arrived in this general vicinity approximately September 15, 1945. They remained there until November 18, 1945. In the period between virtually all of the old personnel who had fought with the Regiment were transferred to other units and shipped home. They were high-point men, naturally, and were first in line to return, and since the Regiment and Division had been placed in an occupational capacity temporarily, it was impossible for these men to return home with their parent unit. Only a few of the original officers and enlisted men remained, and as the old personnel left, new men arrived to replace them until the Regiment was composed almost entirely of new blood. Hence the 313th Infantry essentially remained the 313th in name only, while those who had been an intimate part of it had been transferred or sent home.

Nevertheless, the Regiment and the Division did return. On November 16th the entire Regiment assembled at a large tent city (which had been built by the 2d Battalion during occupation duty) located between Aschaffenburg and Frankfurt. On November 18 special units began moving out in convoy, motorized, and arrived at Metz that same day. The trip thereafter covered Dijon, Lyons, to the Marseille–Calas staging area. The battalions followed by rail on the proverbial 40-and-8s. The trip was a cold one, and none too pleasant, but spirits were high because everyone believed they would remain at the staging area for only forty-eight hours and thereafter be on their way home. This was not the case, however, and all units waited at the staging area from seven to fourteen days before actually sailing for home.

The story of the return of the 313th Infantry and the 79th Division can perhaps best be told by an article which appeared in the Baltimore Sun, December 6, 1945. Lee McCardell, veteran correspondent of the Sun papers, who had witnessed many of the campaigns of the 313th in action, had the following to say:

The 79th Infantry Division, the Cross of Lorraine—including the 313th Infantry Regiment, is homeward bound.

All units are now on the high seas. The first scheduled to arrive in this country is expected to disembark tomorrow in New York.

Disbanded at the close of the last war, reactivated at Camp Pickett, Va., in 1942, the division went overseas in April, 1944. Its shoulder patch, the Cross of Lorraine, had been won in the last war by the first 79th which stormed Montfaucon.

The division now homeward bound landed on Omaha Beach in Normandy on D plus 8. Its troops were the first into Cherbourg, the first to reach the Seine, the first across the Belgian border, the first to establish a bridgehead on the Moselle. One battalion of the 313th which entered Strasbourg
3d Battalion memorial services in Graslitz, Czechoslovakia. Colonel Van Bibber, Regimental CO, salutes our fallen comrades.

with a French armored division, was the first American outfit to reach the Rhine.

Last January, immediately after the Battle of the Bulge, the 79th stopped a diversionary German offensive in Alsace—the strongest counterattack launched by the Germans on the Western front with the exception of that through the Ardennes. In March they spearheaded the Allied Rhine-crossing into the Ruhr.

The division was one of the few to fight as part of all four American armies on the Western front, and probably comes home the most widely traveled American division of that theater, with the possible exception of outfits which also fought in the Mediterranean.

In its journey of 2,300 fighting miles back and forth across France and Germany, it lost 20,000 men—2,000 of them killed. German Army intelligence reports rated the 79th "one of the best attack divisions in the United States Army."

At the end of the war the 79th was in the vicinity of Dortmund, Germany. Later the division moved into Czechoslovakia, north of Pilsen. Since then many of its high-point officers and men have returned home.

The division went overseas and through combat under command of Maj Gen I. T. Wyche, now commanding the VIII Corps, with headquarters at Camp Gruber, Okla. It comes home under the command of Brig Gen Allen F. Kingman.

The 313th Infantry Regiment was commanded during the latter part of the war by Col Edwin M. Van Bibber. Colonel Van Bibber is now the commanding officer of the Loire Disciplinary Training Center at LeMans, France, and is not expected home for several months.

The first of the 79th to arrive in New York are expected to be the headquarters companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions and E Company of the 313th, and the 1st Battalion and the cannon company of the 314th Infantry. They are aboard the Rushville Victory, scheduled to dock in New York tomorrow.

Other units are scheduled to arrive as follows:

December 8 — Aboard C.C.N.Y. Victory: Regimental headquarters, Service Company, Anti-Tank Company and 1st Battalion of the 313th and part of the 79th Military Police Platoon.

December 9 — Aboard John Ericsson: 312th Field Artillery Battalion; 304th Engineer Battalion; 79th Quartermaster Company, 779th Ordnance Company, part of the Division Headquarters Company, the Division Reconnaissance Troop, and the 315th Infantry Regiment.

December 10 — Aboard Gray Liberty: 904th Field Artillery Battalion.

December 11 — (Unnamed ship): Companies F and K and the medical detachment of the 313th Infantry; aboard Bor-
INACTIVATION

Companies G, H, L and M of the 313th Infantry; part of the 79th Signal Company and Headquarters Battery of the Division Artillery.


December 14—Aboard William Richardson: Companies E and F of the 314th, 2d Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Regimental Headquarters Company of the 314th Infantry.

December 16—Aboard Cornelius Hartnett: Part of Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company, part of Division Military Police Platoon, headquarters of the 3d Battalion of the 314th Infantry and I Company of the 313th Infantry.

December 18—Aboard Marion Crawford: H Company of the 313th Infantry and H Company of the 314th Infantry.

It is probable that the troops will move from the piers where they disembark to Camp Shanks, where most of them will be discharged any time within 48 hours after their arrival. The division will be deactivated at Camp Shanks and its records sent to a section of the Adjutant General's office at Savannah, Ga.
Appendices

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 75

I. MEDAL OF HONOR. By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 9 July 1918 (WD Bul. 43, 1918), a Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty was awarded by the War Department in the name of Congress to the following-named enlisted man:

Technical Sergeant Robert E. Gerstung (Army serial No. 36713544), Company H, 313th Infantry Regiment, Army of the United States, on 19 December 1944 was ordered with his heavy machine-gun squad to the support of an infantry company attacking the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line near Berg, Germany. For 8 hours he maintained a position made almost untenable by the density of artillery and mortar fire concentrated upon it and the proximity of enemy troops who threw hand grenades into the emplacement. While all other members of his squad became casualties, he remained at his gun. When he ran out of ammunition, he fearlessly dashed across bullet-swept, open terrain to secure a new supply from a disabled, friendly tank. A fierce barrage pierced the water jacket of his gun, but he continued to fire until the weapon overheated and jammed. Instead of withdrawing, he crawled 50 yards across coverless ground to another of his company’s machine guns which had been silenced when its entire crew was killed. He continued to man this gun, giving support vitally needed by the infantry. At one time he came under direct fire from a hostile tank which shot the glove from his hand with an armor-piercing shell but could not drive him from his position or stop his shooting. When the American forces were ordered to retire to their original positions, he remained at his gun, giving the only covering fire. Finally withdrawing, he cradled the heavy weapon in his left arm, slung a belt of ammunition over his shoulder, and walked to the rear, loosing small bursts at the enemy as he went. One hundred yards from safety, he was struck in the leg by a mortar shell but with supreme effort he crawled the remaining distance, dragging along the gun which had served him and his comrades so well. By his remarkable perseverance, indomitable courage, and heroic devotion to his task in the face of devastating fire, Sergeant Gerstung gave his fellow soldiers powerful support in their encounter with formidable enemy forces.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General
OFFICERS OF THE 313TH INFANTRY

Following is a list of the officers, by unit, who served with the 313th Infantry during the period of activation for World War II. Unfortunately, during the arduous months of combat, and later, during the various re-deployment stages, many of the vital records were destroyed or lost. As a result, there will be noted some instances of error, possibly to the extent of showing an officer affiliated with the wrong unit. Likewise, there may be some few names that have been inadvertently omitted.

Many of the officers served in more than one unit, and in these cases they are shown usually with that last served with. No attempt has been made to show their length of service with a unit and the order in which the names appear is not to be construed as representing any particular value.

At the end of the list are the names of officers for which no record could be found of the unit with which they served. It was thought much better to show them in this way than to omit them.

Names of officers killed in action or died of wounds or from other causes are printed in italic.

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS
Paschal, Paul C., Brig Gen
Wood, Samuel, Maj
Van Bibber, Edwin M., Col
Bagnno, Lawrence C., Col
Schwarz, Andrew J., Col
Gannon, Charles W., Maj
Dickerson, David A., Maj
Keck, Harrie S., Maj
Goodwin, Raymond O., Maj
Timmons, John B., Maj
Lyon, Thomas L., Capt
Collins, Jeffrey, Capt
Reed, Sheryl A., Capt
Sullivan, William E., Maj
Grant, Frederick L., Capt
Newby, Robert N., 1st Lt
Couch, Edward O., 1st Lt
Barrett, Donald H., 1st Lt
Basinger, Virgil D., 1st Lt
Carothers, Henry J., 1st Lt
Vonne, Leo E., 1st Lt
Glazer, Anthony P., 1st Lt
Wilhide, Harold L., 1st Lt
Budens, Henry J., Capt

CHAPLAINS
Nordgren, Armand R., Maj
Furack, A. L., Capt
Paradis, Robert M., 1stLt
Fugno, Lawrence L., Capt
Dineen, Edward D., 1st Lt
Clarke, Edward J., 1st Lt
Bear, Henry H., Capt
Hanes, Elbert L., Capt
Pratt, J.}, Capt
Lam, Alfred P., 1st Lt
Kidd, Leon W., 1st Lt

CANNON COMPANY
Cree, Frank A., Capt
Porter, Vernon L., 1st Lt
Casey, Patrick J., 1st Lieut
Bruno, Robert O., 1st Lt
Esser, Bernard L., 1st Lt
Hess, Carl M., 1st Lt
Teter, Dudley C., 1st Lt
Rodd, Gerald L., 1st Lt
Bull, Lyle E., 1st Lt
Ashbaker, Joseph, 1st Lt

SERVICE COMPANY
Monroe, George E., Maj
Potts, Edward J., Capt
Grundman, Frank H., Capt
Seaford, Charles W., Capt
Jackson, Harry L., Capt
Smith, Vernal L., Capt
Arnold, Frank, Capt
Blade, Charles A., Capt
Kellow, David D., 1st Lt
Kent, David D., 1st Lt
Verhey, DeLloyd, 1st Lt
Lippin, John S., 1st Lt
Shain, John B., 1st Lt
Broady, Milton, Maj
Lundy, John C., 1st Lt
Parker, Donald R., 1st Lt
Tod, Robert G., 1st Lt
Wilson, Charles L., 1st Lt

ANTITANK COMPANY
Sheahey, Stewart S., 1st Lt
Sinclair, Robert E., 2nd Lt
Taylor, William B., Capt
Allen, Vernon E., CWO
Coyle, Eugene M., WOJG
Lawrence, Squall S., Maj
Huddleston, Edward P., Maj
Halliday, Herbert E., Capt
Minnich, G. Arthur, Capt
Kelly, Maurice F., Capt
Halsey, Theodore, Capt
Hale, Thurman A., Capt
Wolf, Adam M., 1st Lt
Curtis, Lymus L., 1st Lt
James, Daniel C., 1st Lt
Allington, David J., 1st Lt
Sebeck, Charles W., 1st Lt
Kernan, Harlan L., 1st Lt
Miller, Francis L., 1st Lt
Goodholf, Thomas C., 1st Lt
Smith, Frederick G., 1st Lt
Mathews, John S., 1st Lt
Quigley, John N., Capt
Malkin, Murray O., 2nd Lt
Dougherty, J. W., Capt
Dunson, Jonas C., CWO
Phillips, Charles H., CWO
Cohen, Herbert, WOJG

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
Eber, Green H., Capt
Carson, George, Capt
Baker, James J., 1st Lt
Henderson, James F., 2nd Lt
Mathews, John B., Capt
Wright, Borden T., CWO
Copp, Lyman K., 1st Lt
Edwards, Richard D., WOJG

MEDICAL DETACHMENT
McLaughlin, Thomas J., Capt
Rodman, Robert M., Maj
Brown, Herbert S., Capt
Moilant, Bernard H., Capt
Goren, Malvin M., Capt
Pinto, Sherman S., Capt
Budner, Louis J., Capt
Sharp, Albert, Capt
Black, Clarence E., Jr., Capt
Feustle, Robert H., Capt
Goldin, Samuel, Capt
Battaglia, Samuel A., Capt
Martin, Phillip A., 1st Lt
Bohrer, Earl L., Capt
Richard, Dalbert J., Maj
Moore, Gregory P., 1st Lt
Brecker, Arnold, Capt
Lauritsen, Maurice S., Capt
Scheff, Harrill C., Capt
Jones, Silas, Capt
Lyon, Joseph S., Capt
Hattas, Nicholas P., Capt
Oliver, Abraham J., Capt
Dawson, Robert H., Capt
Holloway, W. R., Capt
Cahan, Robert, Capt
Hekton, Paul A., Capt
Royster, Raymond, Capt
Muselman, Paul A., 1st Lt
Yealy, James E., 1st Lt

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY B
McCauley, John M., Capt
Grunke, Louis E., Capt
Morgan, Frank F., 1st Lt
Proper, Floyd J., 1st Lt
McCarthy, Robert L., Capt
Schirm, Michael H., 2nd Lt
McGally, Raymond C., Capt
Budick, George M., 1st Lt
Hayden, Vernon L., 1st Lt
.Davenport, Archie J., 1st Lt
Hausler, George F., 1st Lt
Schiff, Richard W., 2nd Lt
Roger, William E., 2nd Lt
Grayson, Alvin R., 2nd Lt

1ST BATTALION
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
Mitchell, Blair B., Lt Col
Lawrence, Frank J., Lt Col
McConnell, John A., Maj
Hurst, ——, Maj
Freeman, Charles E., Maj
McGreegor, Hugh A., Capt
Wilson, James G., Capt
Swope, Charles L., 2nd Lt
Good, Christopher M., Jr., 1st Lt
Wormser, Teenor M., 1st Lt
Blach, Anthony L., 1st Lt
Zirkle, Henry L., 1st Lt
Elliott, Carl H., 1st Lt
Lynch, John M., 2nd Lt
Hylton, William A., Lt Col
Lohn, Philip, Maj
Novello, Joseph J., Maj
Williams, Joseph M., 2nd Lt
Burts, Vincent T., Capt
Duke, William T., Capt
Timothy, James S., Capt
Fever, Woodrow W., 1st Lt
Mathis, James E., 1st Lt
Harris, George T., 1st Lt
Lockwood, Orville K., 1st Lt
Celenum, Philip E., 1st Lt
Bruner, George, 1st Lt
Wesnynski, Charles, 2nd Lt
Whiter, Charles H., 2nd Lt

COMPANY A
Fowler, Harry S., Capt
Perry, Carl S., Capt
Blanchard, Herman W., 1st Lt
McBreen, Benjamin, 1st Lt
Watkins, Joseph A., 1st Lt
Vink, Donald R., 1st Lt
Smith, Ross L., 2nd Lt
McKeown, Donald, 2nd Lt
Winkler, Norbert W., 1st Lt
Parker, Orville B., Capt
Johnson, Carl S., 1st Lt
Emmerich, Joseph F., 1st Lt
Shute, James R., 1st Lt
Kilgore, John S., 1st Lt
Harden, Paul E., 1st Lt

COMPANY B
Hellembein, Robert W., Capt
Sheahan, Richard E., Capt
Morse, Albert B., Capt
Byler, Joseph E., 1st Lt
Mastoris, Theodore, 1st Lt
Scheff, Robert C., 1st Lt
Sears, Robert C., 1st Lt
Scoll, Chauncey B., Capt
Nantkermer, John U., 2nd Lt
Day, Donald M., 2nd Lt
Diening, James J., 2nd Lt
Landon, Shirley R., Capt
Hunt, Joseph, Capt
Dent, James F., Capt
Ellis, James D., 1st Lt
Conners, John J., 1st Lt
Keating, Robert G., 1st Lt
Altman, Lindeman E., 1st Lt
Shively, Ralph L., 2nd Lt
Stevens, Arthur O., 2ndLt
Trot, William B., 2nd Lt
Kent, Roy L., 2nd Lt

COMPANY C
Hill, A. Lewis, Capt
Curtis, August, Capt
Bryant, Otis G., Capt
Buckley, John W., Capt
Major, James H., 1st Lt
Goold, Frank E., 1st Lt
Santacrove, Nuno G., 2nd Lt
Mosk, Harry G., 2ndLt
Kline, Arthur T., Capt
Hale, Robert E., Capt
Simms, William W., 1st Lt
Larsen, George, 1st Lt
Coste, Charles L., 1st Lt
Diederich, Clarence M., 2nd Lt

COMPANY D
Williams, Albert S., Jr., Capt
Littell, Charles J., Capt
Yanez, Cornelius H., Capt
Lewis, Carl B., 1st Lt
Buchner, Orville K., 1st Lt
Kidchety, Emil O., 1st Lt
Plummer, Warren C., 1st Lt
Bowman, William P., 1st Lt
Doherty, Albert L., 2nd Lt
McClung, Lee C., 2nd Lt
Paul, Philip R., 2nd Lt
Kreidler, Charles R., 2nd Lt
Kreidler, Charles R., 2nd Lt
Sheard, John B., 1st Lt
Miller, Norman A., Capt
Mazur, Edward W., 1st Lt
Herbst, Don L., 1st Lt
Bec, Billie, 1st Lt
Hummel, Wayne H., 1st Lt
Ewing, Ernest J., 1st Lt
Brook, Billie, 1st Lt
Legan, Frank C., 1st Lt
Carnes, Walter H., 2nd Lt
Briant, Arthur W., 2nd Lt
Lewis, Joseph R., 1st Lt
DelSiever, Neilus D., 2nd Lt
Fosdike, Wayne A., 2nd Lt
HISTORY OF THE 313TH INFANTRY IN WORLD WAR II
ENLISTED MEN, 313TH INFANTRY

Rodio, Salvatore, J., Pfc.
Rodriguez, Amos J., T/3.
Rodriguez, Anthony, Pfc.
Rodriguez, Gregorio F., Pfc.
Rodriguez, Mike M., PFC.
Rodriguez, Raymundo, Cpl.
Rodriguez, Virgil, J., PFC.
Rodriguez, W., Pvt.
Roe, John W., Sgt.
Roecker, Ernest, J., PFC.
Roeber, Russell, A., Pvt.
Roe, Frank C., Pvt.
Rogers, Earl J., Pfc.
Roderick, Michael M., Pfc.
Rogers, Gregorio F., Pfc.
Roman, Frederick J., Pvt.
Rohrer, Eugene, Pvt.
Rogers, John, Pvt.
Rogers, Jacob, Pvt.
Roederer, Irvin, Pvt.
Rodriguez, Raymond, Pvt.
Roseberry, Delbert, Pvt.
Rosamilia, Gaetano A., T/l5.
Romoser, John D., Pfc.
Romansky, Cpl.
Rolling, Marvin, L., Pvt.
Roman, Francis, C., Pvt.
Roman, Frederick J., Pfc.
Romano, Anthony M., Pfc.
Romansky, Stanley E., Pvt.
Romero, Margarito, Pvt.
Rominski, Leonard, Sgt.
Romoser, John D., Pvt.
Rone, Samuel, J., Pvt.
Root, Walter P., Pvt.
Rosales, Francisco, Pvt.
Rosales, Guadalupe, Pvt.
Rosamilla, Guadalupe A., T/5.
Roscher, Alfonso, Pvt.
Roseberry, Delbert C., Pvt.
Rosendin, Jack, Pvt.
Rosenblatt, Sam, Pvt.
Rosenthal, Alfred, T/5.
Rothschild, Fred, T/5.
Ross, Raymond, Pvt.
Ross, Leo E., Pvt.
Rosenthal, Alfred, T/5.
Rone, Tony, T/5.
Rothschild, Fred, T/5.
Ross, Leo E., Pvt.
Ross, Leo E., Pvt.
Rosenthal, Alfred, Pvt.
Rooke, Roy, Cpl.
Romaniou, Manus, Pvt.
Rosenlund, Walter, T/5.
Rone, Tony, Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
Rothschild, Fred, Pvt.
Ross, Leo E., Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
Rothschild, Fred, Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
Rothschild, Fred, Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
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Rothschild, Fred, Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
Rothschild, Fred, Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
Rothschild, Fred, Pvt.
Russo, John A., Pvt.
ENLISTED MEN, 313TH INFANTRY

Widener, John T., Pvt
Widmaier, Robert W., Pvt
Wielerting, Samuel A., T/5
Wielkopolski, Eugene R., Pvt
Wiene, Herbert R., Pvt
Wier, Goode S., Jr., S/Sgt
Wiegersmann, John L., Pfc
Wiersm, Harry G., T/5
Wigent, Leser T., Pvt
Wiggio, Joseph C., Pfc
Wiggin, Pat A., Pvt
Wigtort, Frank, Pfc
Wigley, John E., Pvt
Wigler, Lewis C., Jr., S/Sgt
Wilcox, Allen H., Sgt
Wilcox, Robert E., Pfc
Wilczek, Stanley E., Pvt
Wilczewski, Steve, Pfc
Widman, Floyd A., Pvt
Wil, Erwin R., Cpl
Wills, Stanley A., S/Sgt
Wills, Melvin L., Pvt
Wilke, Andrew, Pfc
Wilke, Albert H., Pvt
Wilke, Edwin, Pvt
Wilkinson, John O., Pvt
Wilkie, Allen T., Pfc
Wilkie, Paul H., S/Sgt
Wilkins, Charles W., Pfc
Wilkins, Edward J., S/Sgt
Wilkins, James R., Pfc
Wilkinson, Andrew J., Pvt
Wilkinson, Robert D., T/Sgt
Wilkinson, Turley H., Pvt
Wilkinson, John R., Pvt
Wilkinson, Alphonse, Cpl
Will, George J., Pvt
Will, William J., Pvt
Will, William F., Pvt
Will, Herman V., Pvt
Williams, Burr E., Jr., Pvt
Williams, Charles A., Pfc
Williams, Clarence W., T/4
Williams, Clifford E., Sgt
Williams, Clyde, S/Sgt
Williams, Emmett L., T/5
Williams, George G., S/Sgt
Williams, Gerald J., Pvt
Williams, Guy, Pvt
Williams, Homer C., Pfc
Williams, James, Pvt
Williams, James N., T/5
Williams, Kenneth R., Pfc
Williams, Kermit, Pvt
Williams, Lewis E., Pvt
Williams, Robert S., Sgt
Williams, Roger E., Pvt
Williams, Talmage V., Pvt
Williams, Thomas A., Pvt
Williams, Virgil H., Pvt
Williams, William A., Pvt
Williams, William D., Sgt
Williams, William G., Pvt
Williams, William H., Pvt
Williamson, Albert L., Sgt
Williamson, Jarret, Pvt
Williamson, John M., Pvt
Williamson, Louis, S/Sgt
Walls, Ernest E., Pvt
Walls, Crace, Sgt
Walls, James P., Pvt
Walls, James W., Pfc
Walls, John R., T/Sgt
Walls, Marion W., Pvt
Walls, William, S/Sgt
Wells, Marion H., Pfc
Wells, Marshall, T/4
Wells, Alex G., Jr., Pvt
Wells, Boyd, Pvt
Wells, Darrell C., S/Sgt
Wells, David P., Pfc
Wells, Donald E., T/4
Wells, Edward L., Pvt
Wells, Harvey B., Pvt
Wells, Joseph, Pvt
Wells, Larre, T/5
Wells, Lawrence L., S/Sgt
Wells, Lester, Pvt
Wells, Mark A., Pvt
Wells, Millard R., Pfc
Wells, Raymond F., Pfc
Wells, Thomas T., S/Sgt
Wells, Weaver O., S/Sgt
Wells, Wilbert F., Pvt
Wells, Lionel, Pvt
Winn, Albert R., Pvt
Winne, Kenneth L., Sgt
Wine, Walter C., Pfc
Winebarger, Paul, Pvt
Winfred, Felix H., T/5
Winfred, Owen C., Pvt
Wing, Joseph, Pfc
Winger, Reber C., Pvt
Winner, Daniel R., Pvt
Winnicki, Joseph L., Pfc
Winston, Hugh T., Pfc
Winters, Charlie, Pvt
Witherow, John, S/Sgt
Whit, Carl G., Pfc
Withra, Ralph J., Pvt
White, Charles B., Sgt
White, Delmer A., Pfc
Wienekski, Alvin R., Pvt
Witham, Herbert H., Pvt
Withrow, Francis L., S/Sgt
Widgester, Norman G., T/5
Witt, John E., Pvt
Wittendorf, Arthur J., T/5
Witzke, Raymond, Pfc
Wise, Andrew F., Pvt
Withers, Wilfred F., Pfc
Witko, Stanley C., Pvt
Wojcik, Walter A., T/Sgt
Wojnash, Frank, Pfc
Wolberg, Rudolph S., Cpl
Wolcott, Harold C., Pvt
Wolinski, Alphonse, Pvt
Wolf, Charles J., T/5
Wolf, Clarence H., T/Sgt
Wolf, Jack, Pvt
Wolf, John, Pvt
Wolf, Emery P., Pvt
Wolf, Wallace H., S/Sgt
Wolf, Robert W., Pfc
Wolinski, Leo, Pfc
Wake, Albert, T/5
Walkers, Perrow, Pvt
Walkert, Robert J., Pvt
Womac, R. L., S/Sgt
Womack, Thompson C., Pvt
Womble, Loyel D., Pvt
Wood, Donald A., Sgt
Wood, Elliott, Pvt
Wood, Frederick C., Pfc
Wood, Herman C., Pfc
Wood, John R., Pvt
Wood, Joseph R., T/5
Wood, Thomas V., Jr., Pvt
Woodard, Henry C., Pvt
Woodard, Richard A., Pvt
Woodell, John H., Pvt
Woodrum, William, Pvt
Woods, Burt, Pvt
Woods, David P., Sgt
Woods, French, Pvt
Woods, Glenn E., Pvt
Woods, Gordon H., Pvt
Wood, Lock, Pvt
Woods, Landon C., Pfc
Woods, Oren M., Pvt
Woods, Ray E., Pvt
Woods, Robert A., Pfc
Woods, Lynne D., Cpl
Woodstock, Donald E., Pvt
Woodward, Lonnie E., Pvt
Wood, James A., Pvt
Woodard, Charlie J., Pvt
Wooley, Astris A., Pvt
Wooley, James N., Pfc
Wooster, William F., Cpl
 Worthen, Gordon W., Cpl
Wurster, Blain H., Pvt
Workman, Hollee D., T/5
Worell, Vance N., Pvt
Wright, Adam C., Pvt
Wright, Cyril A., Pvt
Wright, James, Pvt
Wright, Lester J., Pvt
Wright, Samuel A., Pvt
Wright, Shirley, Pvt
Wright, Wilburn R., Pvt
Wright, William R., Sgt
Wrona, Charles, Pvt
Wrona, Chester T., Pvt
Wulf, Harold, Sgt
Wunderlich, Louis M., Pvt
Wunderly, James W., T/5
Wunsch, Frank C., Pvt
Wyatt, Ernest O., S/Sgt
Wyse, Paul E., Pvt
Wynn, William C., Pvt
Wyszynski, James, Pvt
Wyszynski, Stanley J., Pfc
Yacko, Andrew, Pvt
Yanchuk, Don, Ssg
Yanchuk, Francis E., Pvt
Yarnoborski, William M., Cpl
Yarlett, Delbert T., T/Sgt
Yarnell, Raymond L., Pvt
Yeates, Chester R., T/4
Yeates, Herman, Sgt
Yeates, Orlando C., Pvt
Yeger, Frederick M., Cpl
Yee, Wai M., Pvt
Yelverton, Frank, Pvt
Yoeman, Roosevelt V., Pvt
Yessini, Abiel R., Pvt
Ylikko, Joseph, Pfc
Yogling, Earl R., Pvt
Yip, Wallace S., Pvt
Yockey, Lewis W., Pvt
York, Watson L., Pvt
Yost, Charles R., Jr., Pvt
Young, Albert, Pvt
Young, Charles A., Pvt
Young, Charles S., Pvt
Young, Charles L., Pvt
Young, Chester C., S/Sgt
Young, Donald B., Pfc
Young, Frank W., Pvt
Young, Laugh, Pvt
Young, Paul W., T/Sgt
Young, Richard F., Pfc
Young, Robert, Pvt
Young, Russell J., Sgt
Young, Waldo O., T/5
Young, William D., Pvt
Young, William N., Pvt
Young, William T., Pvt
Youngberg, Philip H., Jr., Pfc
Younger, Edward P., Pvt
Younger, Boyd C., Pvt
Yuen, Jon, Pvt
Yuhes, Joseph W., Pfc
Yachocki, Joseph J., T/5
Yull, Floyd W., Pvt
Yukoth, Joseph E., S/Sgt
Yuchne, Peter P., Pvt
Yunginger, Walter E., Pvt

Z
Zabrockie, Albert J., Pvt
Zablotowicz, Stanley R., Pvt
Zabrowski, Joseph C., Pfc
Zaffiro, Joseph E., Pvt
Zager, Stephen, T/5
Zagarlo, Frank L., Pvt
Zahner, James, Pfc
Zaino, Nuccio F., Pvt
Zaino, Sabino J., Pvt
Zak, John, Pvt
Zalecki, Henry, Pvt
Zamboni, Frank J., T/Sgt
Zambor, Silvio, S/Sgt
Zane, Irving, Pvt
Zapponi, George J., T/5
Zaron, Sidney, Pvt
Zarnach, Michael, Pvt
Zasowski, Albert J., S/Sgt
Zawiski, Bernard, Pvt
Zawodzki, Emil J., Pvt
Zeinefield, Seymour W., Pvt
Zeis, Joseph J., T/5
Zezulka, Harold R., S/Sgt
Zelazka, Thomas L., Pvt
Zemlo, John, Pvt
Zeller, Henry T., T/5
Zemaitis, George M., Pvt
Zergera, Victor F., Pvt
Zerneger, Leonard A., S/Sgt
Zeranski, Alphonse, Cpl
Zewack, Stephen A., Pvt
Ziegeler, Franz M., Pvt
Ziel, Albert H., Pvt
Ziemnicki, Edward S., Pvt
Zimelmo, Thomas J., Pvt
Zieto, Frank, Pvt
Zima, Stanley V., T/5
Zimmerman, Glenn J., Cpl
Zimmerman, Thomas L., Pvt
Zink, Paul A., Pvt
Zink, Frank, Pvt
Zojer, Henri P., Sgt
Zollihan, Arnold P., Pvt
Zolton, Albert, Pvt
Zorn, Henry J., Cpl
Zrotlak, Mike J., Pvt
Zschacht, Paul, Cpl
Zsaev, George T., Cpl
Zuckerman, Saul, Pvt
Zuckerick, Burrow, Pvt
Zueller, Howard M., Pvt
Zwegel, George H., Pvt
Zwolinski, Raymond J., Pvt
III. BATTLE HONORS. 5. As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul. 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bul. 11, 1942), citations of the following units in General Orders 67, Headquarters 79th Infantry Division, 3 May 1945, as approved by the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, is confirmed under the provisions of section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citations read as follows:

* * *

The 3d Battalion, 313th Infantry Regiment, is cited for the extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty exhibited during the period 31 December 1944 to 21 January 1945 in the vicinity of Obberroedern, Alsace, France. This unusual fighting battalion, which had for days held a sector of regimental frontage, was faced again and again by determined enemy troops and armored vehicles but utterly refused to yield ground, holding against almost overwhelming odds with a tendency possessed only by the most courageous. Although depleted heavily in effective strength, the intrepid infantrymen of the 3d Battalion met the onslaught of the enemy and repelled each assault with heavy losses to the attackers. When the main effort of the German attack was launched against the sector defended by the 3d Battalion, the battalion not only held the onslaught but by sheer determination and dominant fighting spirit virtually destroyed the infantry element of the 21st Panzer Division. Headquarters personnel, cooks, and other men normally found in the rear areas worked feverishly and without rest to improve the defensive positions, laying additional concertina wire entanglements and hasty minefields. Finally, the enemy, discouraged by the losses sustained in the 3d Battalion area, shifted his main effort and succeeded in penetrating the positions of an adjacent unit. Despite an increased frontage, repeated enemy attempts to widen the shoulder of the salient were smashed by the 3d Battalion without allowing the slightest penetration. By holding its positions, the battalion limited the enemy's penetration in the adjacent sector to a narrow corridor and denied the enemy the terrain necessary for maneuver in order successfully to exploit the penetration, thereby preventing a major break-through. Had the enemy succeeded in effecting the break-through, repeatedly attempted despite prohibitive losses, it is almost a certainty that a major withdrawal would have been necessitated. The courage and fighting determination of the officers and men of the 3d Battalion, 313th Infantry Regiment reflect the finest traditions of the Army of the United States.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General
AWARD OF CROIX DE GUERRE WITH PALM
79TH INFANTRY DIVISION

DECISION No. 273

The President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic Cites to the Order of the Army:

79th Infantry Division

Headquarters & Headquarters Company
79th Reconnaissance Troop
313th Infantry Regiment
314th Infantry Regiment
315th Infantry Regiment
304th Engineer Combat Battalion
304th Medical Battalion
79th Division Artillery
- Headquarters & Headquarters Battery
- 310th Field Artillery Battalion
311th Field Artillery Battalion
904th Field Artillery Battalion
312th Field Artillery Battalion
79th Infantry Division Special Troops
779th Ordnance LM Company
79th Quartermaster Company
79th Signal Company
79th Division MP Platoon
79th Division Band
463d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
813th Tank Destroyer Battalion

CITATION

A remarkable unit which displayed splendid endurance and exceptional fighting zeal. It distinguished itself brilliantly from 21 to 24 November 1944 in hard combat. It mopped up in the forest of Parroy and materially aided the French 2d Armored Division to break through to the Col de Saverne. In spite of heavy losses it fought stubbornly against a dashing and fanatical enemy, preventing it from reappearing in the Vosges. It thus contributed greatly to the liberation of Baccarat, Phalsbourg, and Saverne.

This citation includes the award of the Croix de Guerre with Palm.

PARIS, 22 July 1946

Signed: BIDAULT

General of the Army JUIN

Chief of Staff of National Defense